The question presented is whether an underage, unlicensed driver injured while driving his mother’s automobile without her knowledge or consent may recover medical benefits from the no-fault insurer of her automobile. We agree with the Court of Appeals that he is entitled to recover no-fault medical benefits, and affirm.

*62I

Renee Priesman owned an automobile insured by Meridian Mutual Insurance Company. Her son, Corey Warfield, who was fourteen years old, took the automobile without her permission during the nighttime while she was sleeping. Corey picked up friends, was involved in an automobile accident, and one of his friends was killed.1

Corey sustained serious and severe bodily injuries, necessitating medical treatment at a hospital. Meridian paid billings by the hospital until six months after the accident, when it informed Pries-man that it would not continue to pay because Corey had taken her vehicle without permission.

The circuit judge granted Meridian’s motion for summary disposition with regard to Priesman on the ground that she lacked standing, granted a motion to amend the complaint to name Corey as a plaintiff, and granted Meridian’s motion to dismiss with respect to Corey because the vehicle had been unlawfully taken. The Court of Appeals reversed.2

Meridian contended in the circuit court and the Court of Appeals that Corey was not entitled to no-fault medical benefits because an exception in *63the no-fault act provides that a person is not entitled to no-fault benefits if, at the time of the accident, he is using a vehicle that he had "taken unlawfully.”3 Meridian contended that Corey’s taking of his mother’s vehicle was "unlawful” because the Penal Code provides that it is a misdemeanor to take or use a vehicle "without authority.”4

The Court of Appeals, observing that Corey had not been charged or convicted, stated that the question was whether the "mere fact of taking without permission by an underage driver who is the son of the owner and who lives in the owner’s household is 'unlawful’ under the no-fault act.”5 The Court observed that the term "unlawful” is not defined in the no-fault act, and said that, under § 31146 of the Insurance Code, Corey was *64entitled to no-fault benefits because he was a relative of his mother domiciled in her household. The Court concluded that Corey did not lose that "entitlement by virtue of using his mother’s car without her permission,” and that his use was not "unlawful under the no-fault act”: "We cannot say that the Legislature intended that § 3113(a) of the act would apply under the circumstances of this case.”7

ii

The no-fault automobile liability act8 provides that a no-fault insurer is required to pay medical benefits, without limitation in amount or duration,9 and other no-fault benefits10 to any person who suffers accidental bodily injury arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle, without regard to fault.11

All persons,

—those who own vehicles and those who do not;

—those who insure a vehicle they own, and those who do not insure a vehicle that they own, unless a person who does not insure is injured while driving that uninsured vehicle;

—the spouse and a relative domiciled in the same household of an owner of a vehicle without regard to whether the owner has insured the vehicle; _

*65—passengers, pedestrians, sidewalk gawkers, persons walking, sitting, or lying down in a parking lot or a field, and also those who become involved in a vehicular accident while in a structure

are entitled to recover full medical benefits without regard to fault and without regard to whether they or a family member has paid for no-fault coverage, under Michigan’s most comprehensive no-fault act.12

It is in that context — full medical benefits, unlimited in amount for every person, including even a person who does not insure a vehicle he owns (except when driving that vehicle) and the spouse and relatives domiciled in the household of the owner of an uninsured vehicle even when driving or riding as a passenger in that uninsured vehicle *66—that we assess the correctness of Meridian’s contention that the Legislature did not intend that Corey recover medical benefits because, when he was fourteen years old, he took his mother’s insured vehicle in the middle of the night, while she was sleeping, without her permission.

iii

The Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, a model act considered by the Legislature when the no-fault act was adopted, excepts from coverage a "converter” — a person who steals —unless covered under a no-fault policy issued to the converter or a spouse or other relative in the same household.13_

*67Meridian contends that the Legislature, in substituting "unlawfully” for the umvara language excepting uninsured converters from no-fault coverage, intended to except from no-fault coverage not only those who convert, but also joyriders like Corey, who was not a "converter” because he did not intend to steal and, thus, would not have been excepted under the umvara even if his mother was not insured.

While this is, indeed, arguable, the argument does not consider that there may be other explanations for the failure to adopt the umvara language.

The umvara exception permits, as Meridian acknowledges, a thief to recover no-fault benefits while driving the stolen vehicle if he is covered by insurance he purchased or by insurance purchased by his spouse or relative in the same household. The Legislature, in rejecting the language of the umvara exception, apparently decided to except from no-fault coverage a thief driving a stolen vehicle even if he or a spouse or relative had contributed to the no-fault pool of money.

The legislative purpose, in rejecting the umvara language, was thus to except from no-fault coverage thieves while driving stolen vehicles even if they or a spouse or relative had purchased no-fault insurance, and not necessarily to except joyriders from coverage. At the same time, the Legislature simplified the complex verbiage of the no-fault exception,14 and thereby avoided litigation concerning what constitutes "conversion,” a term of art in criminal and personal property law. That, in substituting "taken unlawfully” for "converts,” the Legislature did not intend any substantial difference in scope or meaning from the prototypical *68umvara concept excepting thieves from no-fault coverage, appears to be the view of Judge Keeton and Professor Widiss, who read the Michigan provision as excepting a person injured in an automobile that he has "stolen.”15

Legislators generally are also parents and sometimes grandparents. Some may have had experience with children, grandchildren, nephews, nieces, and children of friends who have used a family vehicle without permission. Some may have themselves driven a family vehicle without permission.

We are not persuaded that legislators, sitting at a drafting session, concluded that the evil against which the umvara exception was aimed was not adequate because it did not cover teenagers who "joyride” in their parents’ automobiles, especially automobiles covered by no-fault insurance, in the context that countless persons would be entitled, under the legislation they were drafting, to no-fault benefits without regard to whether they are obliged to purchase no-fault insurance or, if obliged to insure, do in fact do so.16

It appears that in the twenty years since no-fault automobile insurance legislation was first enacted, no appellate court has decided that a person like Corey is not entitled to medical benefit^_

*69Affirmed.

Respectfully, I dissent. The majority departs from the clear and unambiguous language of § 3113(a) of the no-fault act1 to reach a result contrary to both its language and its legislative history. Because I conclude that coverage was excluded under the circumstances of this case, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.2

Because Corey Warfield is a relative of the insured, domiciled in the same household, he would ordinarily be eligible for the payment of personal protection insurance benefits under § 3114(1) of the act.3 However, § 3113(a) provides an exclusion:

A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:

(a) The person was using a motor vehicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle. [MCL 500.3113; MSA 24.13113. Emphasis added.]

The trial court found Corey’s taking and use of his mother’s car unlawful under the joyriding *70statute4 and held that he was excluded from coverage under § 3113(a). However, despite the clear and unambiguous language of both § 3113(a) and the joyriding statute, the majority holds that the exclusion does not apply in this case, finding, in effect, a "family member” exception to both provisions. I disagree.

i

The no-fault act does not define "unlawfully.” Where a word used is not defined in a statute, that word is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.5 According to one commonly used source, the word "unlawful” means "contrary to or prohibited by law; not authorized or justified by law . . . .” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966), p 2502. It is also defined as "acting contrary to, or in defiance of the law; disobeying or disregarding the law. While not necessarily implying the element of criminality, it is broad enough to include it.” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed), p 1377.

The joyriding statute provides, in pertinent part:

Any person who takes or uses without authority any motor vehicle without intent to steal the same, or who shall be a party to such unauthorized taking or using, shall upon conviction thereof be guilty of a misdemeanor .... [MCL 750.414; MSA 28.646.]

The elements of unlawful use of an automobile under this provision are:_

*711) The motor vehicle must have belonged to another.

2) Defendant must have taken or used the motor vehicle.

3) The taking or using must have been done without authority.

4) Defendant must have intended to take or use the vehicle, knowing that he had no authority to do so.[6]

The undisputed facts of this case satisfy each of the elements of a violation of MCL 750.414; MSA 28.646. Corey Warfield took and used an automobile belonging to his mother. It is conceded that he did not have permission or authority to drive his mother’s car, and that he knew he did not have permission or authority to drive the car.7 Nor could he have had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to take and use his mother’s car, since he was not licensed and had never been allowed to use the car.8

In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals *72panel suggested that Corey’s conduct was not unlawful because he was neither charged with nor convicted of violating the joyriding statute, and was a member of the vehicle owner’s family.9 However, conduct that is proscribed by statute is unlawful without regard to whether that conduct ultimately results in a criminal conviction. This view is consistent with the results reached in other states that have considered the issue.10 Section 3113(a) does not require a criminal conviction as a prerequisite to a finding that a taking was unlawful, and I would not read that requirement into the statute. Moreover, the-joyriding statute, applicable to "any person” who takes a motor vehicle without authority, clearly precludes the inference of an exception for minors or family members.

ii

When the language of a statute is certain, clear, and unambiguous, it is to be applied as written.11 While our task is to discern and give effect to legislative intent, where the statute is unambigu*73ous this intent is to be gleaned from the language of the statute itself.12

The majority departs from these principles to conclude that because legislators "generally are also parents and sometimes grandparents” and "[s]ome may have had experience with children, grandchildren, nephews, nieces, and children of friends who have used a family vehicle without permission,” (ante, p 68) they did not intend to exclude coverage in cases such as this. Although such an argument may have emotional appeal, it is not supported by the language of § 3113(a), nor by the legislative history of that provision.13

The present language of § 3113(a) first appeared in 1971 with the introduction of SB 782.14 Shortly thereafter, a House substitute bill was introduced, which provided that "a person who converts a motor vehicle is disqualified from basic or added reparation benefits . . . from any source other than an insurance policy under which the con*74verter is a basic or added reparation insured.”15 This language is identical to that found in § 21 of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (umvara),16 a model no-fault act.17 However, our Senate did not approve the language of the House substitute. Instead, both houses adopted a conference report enacting SB 782 with the present language of § 3113(a).18

In its current form, § 3113(a) differs from § 21 of the umvara in two significant ways. First, § 21 imposes a disqualification only when there is a "conversion” of the insured automobile, while § 3113(a) denies benefits to a person injured while using a motor vehicle that he has taken "unlawfully.”19 Second, under the umvara, a person who *75converts a motor vehicle is entitled to benefits under his own policy or under another policy if he is a basic reparation insured.20 However, under § 3113(a) a person who takes an automobile unlawfully cannot collect benefits under any no-fault policy.

Our Legislature chose to adopt an exclusion from no-fault coverage where the taking and use of a motor vehicle was "unlawful.”21 Before doing so, it had the opportunity to consider several versions of § 3113(a), one of which would have provided coverage for Corey under his mother’s policy. In addition, the umvara was before it for guidance. However, the Legislature chose to depart from the umvara when it adopted the language in § 3113(a). Under these circumstances, I cannot conclude that the Legislature intended any result other than the result required by the clear and unambiguous language of the statute: Any person *76who takes a vehicle unlawfully is excluded from no-fault coverage if he is injured while using that vehicle. Like the joyriding statute, § 3113(a) contains no exception for minors or family members.

The majority contends that the Legislature’s purpose in rejecting the umvara language was to exclude only car thieves from coverage, and to simplify the language of the exclusion. (Ante, pp 67-68.) I disagree. If the Legislature had intended to limit the operation of § 3113(a) to car thieves, it could have stated simply that a "car thief ” or one who has "stolen” a vehicle is not entitled to personal protection insurance benefits. It did not. Moreover, if the Legislature had intended to so limit the exclusion, the language "unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle” would be superfluous.

Because Corey’s taking and use of his mother’s car was unlawful under the provisions of the joyriding statute, I would hold, in accordance with § 3113(a) of the no-fault act, that Meridian properly withheld payment of personal protection insurance benefits.