The question before us is whether a claim for relief may be maintained by plaintiffs who claim the right to damages in nuisance for property depreciation caused by environmental contamination of ground water despite testimony by both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts that their properties were not and would never be subject to ground water contamination emanating from the defendants’ property.

The trial court dismissed, these plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that it found no support for recovery in Michigan law. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, rejecting its conclusion that the facts presented no cognizable claim for nuisance.

We are persuaded that the boundaries of a traditional nuisance claim should not be relaxed to permit recovery on these facts. Compensation for a decline in property value caused by unfounded perception of underground contamination is inextricably entwined with complex policy questions *298regarding environmental protection that are more suitably resolved through the legislative process.

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the trial court’s judgment in favor of defendants, and remand to the trial court for a continuation of proceedings as to the remaining plaintiffs.

i

In 1984, the plaintiffs sued the Thomas Solvent Company in the Calhoun Circuit Court for damages and injunctive relief from injuries allegedly resulting from the improper handling of chemicals and industrial waste. Claiming that the Thomas Solvent Company’s and other defendants’ improper handling and storage of toxic chemicals and industrial waste had contaminated the ground water, the plaintiffs brought claims sounding in negligence, continuing nuisance, continuing trespass, strict liability, and ultrahazardous activities.

Originally, approximately fifty plaintiffs brought suit against the Thomas Solvent defendants,1 the Grand Trunk Railroad defendants,2 Wesley E. Carter, a private individual doing business as Ray*299mond Road Landfill and O.K. Wrecking Company, and Hannah’s Cement Products, Inc., the lessor of the land used as Raymond Road Landfill. The plaintiffs claimed that toxic chemicals and industrial wastes were released accidentally or intentionally at sites owned by the defendants. The plaintiffs complained of contaminants emanating from two sites owned or operated by the Thomas Solvent defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that contamination issued from a facility on Raymond Road which included an office building, a warehouse, a dock for storing drums, and twenty-one underground bulk storage tanks. In addition, the plaintiffs complained that contamination stemmed from a facility on Emmett Street, which the Thomas Solvent defendants allegedly leased from Grand Trunk Western Railroad. The Emmett Street facility included two underground bulk storage tanks, one aboveground tank, and a loading dock adjacent to a railroad spur. The plaintiffs also complained that contamination originated at the Raymond Road Landfill.

In 1985, the complaint was amended and approximately nineteen plaintiffs were added. Discovery continued, and various motions for summary disposition were brought as the parties and the court sought to sharpen and narrow the issues. As discovery continued, it became clear that contaminants allegedly discharged into the ground water by the defendants never reached these plaintiffs’ property. The plaintiffs’ expert, Yaron Sternberg, concluded that a ground water divide separated the flow of ground water in the area, with water on the north side of the divide flowing generally north or northwesterly and the water on the south side of the divide flowing in a westerly direction. He testified that no contaminants from the Thomas Solvent facilities had any effect on the *300properties of these plaintiffs, which were located south of the divide.

This appeal involves the claims of twenty-two plaintiffs who live over 2000 feet south and east from the Thomas Solvent facilities and whose claims were eventually dismissed by the trial court. The Grand Trunk Railroad defendants filed a motion for summary disposition, seeking to dismiss the claims of those plaintiffs whose property was not affected by the contaminants allegedly released by Grand Trunk. The Thomas Solvent defendants joined in the motion.3 The plaintiffs filed a responsive brief and stipulated that the claims of these twenty-two litigants be dismissed except to the extent that they claimed damages for property depreciation. On June 16, 1987, the trial court heard oral arguments on the motion. The plaintiffs argued that a tortious event and a range of damages occurred when toxic substances left the defendants’ property. They conceded that no contaminants ever reached these twenty-two plaintiffs’ property, but urged the court to impose liability on the defendants for any loss in property values due to public concern about the contaminants in the general area. Concluding that any damages that these plaintiffs suffered resulted from unfounded public perception that their ground water was contaminated, the trial court dismissed their claims. On June 29, 1987, an order was entered, dismissing the property depreciation claims of these twenty-two plaintiffs against the Thomas Solvent defendants and concluding that no reason existed for delay and that a final judgment should enter in favor of the Thomas Solvent *301defendants. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration and to amend their complaint to add claims regarding contamination of municipal well'water. The trial court denied these motions.4

The plaintiffs claimed an appeal as of right from the trial court’s summary disposition order. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Recognizing that no contamination had reached or would reach the well water of the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that the trial court had erred in finding that the plaintiffs had not shown some damage "and in summarily dismissing plaintiffs’ claims merely because the ground water beneath their properties had not been contaminated.” 184 Mich App 693, 696; 459 NW2d 22 (1990). Emphasizing that to recover damages for nuisance, a litigant need not show physical intrusion onto the land, and distinguishing nuisance from trespass, the Court of Appeals relied on this Court’s opinions in Whittemore v Baxter Laundry Co, 181 Mich 564; 148 NW 437 (1914), and Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139, 151; 422 NW2d 205 (1988), citing Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 87, p 622.

This Court granted the defendants’ application for leave to appeal to consider whether the Court *302of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order. 437 Mich 929 (1991).

ii

The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). The parties had agreed, both in a stipulation filed with the court and during oral argument on the motion, that no ground water contamination from the defendants’ property ever reached the plaintiffs’ property because of a ground water divide which acted as a hydrogeological barrier that precluded the possibility of migration of any contaminants from defendants’ property. The trial court concluded that the defendants would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. General Motors Corp v Detroit, 372 Mich 234; 126 NW2d 108 (1964), cert den 377 US 977 (1964). For a summary disposition to be upheld on appeal, the Court must review the record to ascertain whether the defendants would have been entitled to the judgment as a matter of law. American Employers’ Ins Co v Christman & Bros Co, 284 Mich 36; 278 NW 750 (1938).

The Court of Appeals held that because a physical intrusion or physical effect is not required to sustain a claim for nuisance, the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims. For the reasons that follow, we find that the trial court did not err in dismissing the claims.

in

Historically, Michigan has recognized two distinct versions of nuisance, public nuisance and private nuisance. Hadñeld, supra, p 205. A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. *3034 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 821D, p 100. It evolved as a doctrine to resolve conflicts between neighboring land uses.5 Because nuisance covers so many types of harm, it is difficult to articulate an encompassing definition. Imprecision in defining nuisance leads to confusion regarding the interest it is designed to protect.6 Nevertheless, the gist of a private nuisance action is an interference with the occupation or use of land or an interference with servitudes relating to land.7 There are countless ways to interfere with the use and enjoyment of land including interference with the physical condition of the land itself, disturbance in the comfort or conveniences of the occupant including his peace of mind, and threat of future injury that is a present menace and interference with enjoyment. The essence of private nuisance is the protection of a property owner’s or occupier’s reasonable comfort in occupation of the land in question. Prosser & Keeton, supra, p 619. It involves "not only a defect, but threatening or impending danger ... to the property rights or health of persons sustaining peculiar relations to the same . . . .” Kilts v Kent Co Supervisors, 162 *304Mich 646, 651; 127 NW 821 (1910).8 The pollution of ground water may constitute a public or private nuisance. 4 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 832, p 142.

According to the Restatement, an actor is subject to liability for private nuisance for a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land if (a) the other has property rights and privileges in respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion results in significant harm (c) the actor’s conduct is the legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either (i) intentional and unreasonable, or (ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous conduct. 4 Restatement Torts, 2d, §§ 821D-F, 822, pp 100-115.

Prosser & Keeton’s enumeration of the requirements to recover on a private nuisance theory is similar. They set forth the following requirements:

(1) The defendant acted with the intent of interfering with the use and enjoyment of the land by those entitled to that use;

(2) There was some interference with the use and enjoyment of the land of the kind intended, although the amount and extent of that interference may not have been anticipated or intended;

(3) The interference that resulted and the physical harm, if any, from that interference proved to be substantial. It is this requirement and the next that is most important in distinguishing between trespassory-type invasions from those that are actionable on a nuisance theory. Any intentional and unprivileged entry on land is a trespass without a showing of damage, since those who own land have an exclusive right to its use; but an act *305that interferes with use but is not in itself a use is not actionable without damage. The substantial interference requirement is to satisfy the need for a showing that the land is reduced in value because of the defendant’s conduct;

(4) The interference that came about under such circumstances was of such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land. This does not mean that the defendant’s conduct must be unreasonable. It only means that the interference must be unreasonable and this requires elaboration.[9] [Prosser & Keeton, supra, pp 622-623.]

Once these general definitions have been stated, application to any given set of facts is, nevertheless, problematic. Despite almost a century during which this Court has repeatedly recognized the difficulty in defining the concept of nuisance,10 Michigan jurisprudence has focused on delineating the contours of various defenses, but has seldom elaborated the elements and proofs necessary to sustain a claim in nuisance, absent special defenses. In this case, the Court considers whether property depreciation based on unfounded fears falls within the boundaries of an action for private nuisance in Michigan.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ improper handling and storage of toxic chemicals and hazardous waste contaminated underground water in the area, thus supporting their recovery of money damages for nuisance. Although the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint failed to specify whether their claims were founded on public or private nuisance, the parties have argued, and the *306case was considered in the lower courts pursuant to, a theory of private nuisance.11

The Court of Appeals focused upon the lack of any physical intrusion onto plaintiffs’ land, stressing that an interference with the use and enjoyment of land need not involve a physical or tangible intrusion. We do not disagree with this rule of law.12 Nevertheless, we conclude that the trial court properly found that the plaintiffs failed to trace any significant interference with the use and enjoyment of land to an action of the defendants.

The crux of the plaintiffs’ complaint is that publicity concerning the contamination of ground water in the area (although concededly not their ground water) caused diminution in the value of the plaintiffs’ property. This theory cannot form the basis for recovery because negative publicity resulting in unfounded fear about dangers in the vicinity of the property does not constitute a significant interference with the use and enjoyment of land.13

*307Examination of the historic development of nuisance law helps to clarify the fallacy underlying plaintiffs’ theory of recovery. Initially, the assize of novel disseisin was available for a complainant whose enjoyment of his free tenement was disturbed by the defendant. The tort of trespass later developed to remedy this situation in which the defendant interfered with the complainant’s interest in land. The source of the injury was always on the complainant’s land.14 Later, the assize of nuisance arose to redress injury due to an act of the defendant that interfered with the complainant’s interest, although the injury did not involve an entry onto the complainant’s land.15 Eventually, the action for trespass upon the case for nuisance developed. The appeal of this form of action was its remedy, damages, rather than abatement.16

The doctrine of nuisance traditionally encompassed geographic, temporal, and proprietary aspects. In geographic terms, nuisance arose when occupants of neighboring land had a dispute, typically over the proper use of the defendant’s land.17 *308This Court articulated a geographic component to liability for nuisance in Kilts, supra, p 650. The Kilts Court differentiated between a weak structure on a private person’s land "so far from the street and other’s property” that it would not constitute a nuisance and a structure that "was adjacent to an adjoining proprietor’s land so that it was a menace to his property, or to his person in the use of his land . . . .” Id.

In temporal terms, nuisance normally required some degree of permanence. If the asserted interference was "temporary and evanescent,” there was no actionable nuisance.18 This requirement is normally subsumed in the question whether the interference with the use and enjoyment of property is substantial. In proprietary terms, nuisance required that the plaintiff have some interest in the land that was interfered with. Unlike the early assize of novel disseisin, nuisance did not limit suit to freeholders, but permitted lessees and then occupants to sue.19

As the doctrine of trespass was gradually transmuted into the action upon the case for nuisance, the requirement that the injury involve entry onto the complainant’s land was eliminated.20 To limit *309the broader action on the case for nuisance, courts added the requirement that a litigant seeking to recover for nuisance must show a legally cognizable injury, requiring proof of a significant interference with the use and enjoyment of land.21 Although much confusion has arisen because of the failure to discern that injury and damage are different concepts, an interference that is not substantial and unreasonable does not give rise to an action for damages against the person causing it, damnum absque injuria.22 Stated otherwise, while nuisance may be predicated on conduct of a defendant that causes mental annoyance, it will not amount to a substantial injury unless the annoyance is significant and the interference is unrea*310sonable in the sense that it would be unreasonable to pérmit the defendant to cause such an amount of harm without paying for it.23

Nuisance on the case thus involved the common law’s attempt to ensure accommodation between conflicting uses of adjoining property. An early opinion from this Court explains:

As a rule, the owner may make such use of his premises as his business or taste may dictate, and the only limitation upon his right is that he must so use his property as not to cause injury to the property or rights of those owning property in the vicinity. [McMorran v Fitzgerald, 106 Mich 649, 652; 64 NW 569 (1895).]

Because the doctrine sought to acknowledge the right of both the property owner to carry out a particular use and the neighbor whose property or use and enjoyment of property might be injured by the use, de minimus annoyances were not actionable. Only for a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of property would an action lie. As a part of this scheme, courts frequently concluded that diminution in property values alone constitutes damnum absque injuria.24

The reasoning in Gunther v E I DuPont de *311Nemours & Co, 157 F Supp 25 (ND W Va, 1957), app dis 255 F2d 710 (CA 4, 1958), exemplifies this reluctance to find a nuisance for mere diminution of property value on the basis of unfounded beliefs or fear of injury. In Gunther, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought damages and injunctive relief for claimed injuries to their property and person from test explosions conducted by the defendant in the vicinity of their property. The court refused to find nuisance, reasoning:

The Court believes it a fair inference from the evidence that the Gunthers’ enjoyment of their property was lessened because they believed that the test blasting had injured them. If such belief is unfounded, what is left other than depreciation in value? Mere diminution of the value of property because of the use to which adjoining or nearby premises is devoted, if unaccompanied with other ill results, is damnum absque injuria — a loss without injury, in the legal sense. [Id., p 33. Emphasis in original.]

That same reasoning applies to this case. Plaintiffs have stipulated the dismissal of all claims except those predicated upon an alleged depreciation in the market value of the property because of the unfounded fears of purchasers. The fact, as the dissent recognizes, that plaintiffs make no claim for "relief arising out of their own 'fears,’ ” post, p 362, illustrates the point that defendants’ activities have not interfered with their use and enjoyment of property.25

This Court has held that property depreciation alone is insufficient to constitute a nuisance. Plassey v S Loewenstein & Son, 330 Mich 525, 530; 48 *312NW2d 126 (1951); Warren Twp School Dist v Detroit, 308 Mich 460, 469-470; 14 NW2d 134 (1944); Garfield Twp v Young, 348 Mich 337; 82 NW2d 876 (1957). Although there is early authority to the contrary involving circumstances largely subsumed in zoning regulations,26 most recently this Court has held that a cause of action for nuisance may not be based on unfounded fears.27 Smith v Western Wayne Co Conservation Ass'n 380 Mich 526, 543; 158 NW2d 463 (1968). In Smith, the plaintiffs sought to have a gun range declared a nuisance, contending that it created fear of injuries, thus decreasing their property values. Adopting the trial court’s opinion that "no real or actual danger” existed from the use of the gun range, the Court further held that, even assuming a decrease in property values, this was not "in itself sufficient to constitute a nuisance.” Id., pp 542-543.28

Just as the development of nuisance on the case responded to the limitations of trespass by recognizing a cause of action when there was damage, but not injury amounting to use, the modern formulation of nuisance in fact, acknowledges changing conditions by declining to recognize a cause of action where damage and injury are both predicated on unfounded fear of third parties that depreciates property values. The rationale may be *313expressed by observing that reasonable minds cannot differ that diminished property value based on unfounded fear is not a substantial interference in and of itself. Thus, in rejecting a claim that tort liability could be based on the creation of fear that depreciates property values, one federal district court observed that the theory was based on "a public reaction which is conjectural, transitory and ephemeral.” Good Fund, Ltd — 1972 v Church, 540 F Supp 519, 534 (D Colo, 1982), rev’d on other grounds sub nom McKay v United States, 703 F2d 464 (CA 10, 1983).29

This response also corresponds with the historical premise underlying tort liability for nuisance in fact, i.e., that when some significant interference with the use and enjoyment of land causes the property value loss, courts of law accommodate conflicting interests by recognizing claims designed to shift the loss.30 However, on the present state of the record, plaintiffs do not contend that the condi*314tion created by the defendant causes them fear or anxiety. Thus, not only have these plaintiffs not alleged significant interference with their use and enjoyment of property, they do not here posit any interference at all.

Plaintiffs correctly observe that property depreciation is a traditional element of damages in a nuisance action. See, e.g., Prosser, supra, § 89, pp 637-640. We are not persuaded, however, and the dissent has not cited authority to the contrary, that an allegation of property depreciation alone sets forth a cognizable claim in private nuisance of significant interference with the use and enjoyment of a person’s property. Diminution in property values caused by negative publicity is, on these facts, damnum absque injuria — a loss without an injury in the legal sense.

Contrary to the dissent’s observation, neither Garfield Twp, Smith, Plassey, nor Warren Twp School Dist stand for the proposition that plaintiffs in this case have a cognizable claim of nuisance. Defendant’s business is a lawful business, and the fact that violations of the law may have occurred on the property does not make the conduct of the business a nuisance in fact. Indeed, Garfield Twp rejects the precise argument upon which the dissent relies.31

*315Nor can we accept the dissent’s suggestion that because some authorities relied on here involve claims for equitable relief, they do not support a damage award in this case. We agree that different considerations apply to the remedies appropriate, and that injunctive relief is sometimes available when a tort is merely threatened or denied on the basis that damage is the more appropriate relief. In both law and equity, however, there must be a cognizable claim of a substantive interest invaded or threatened. Thus the dissent misperceives the use of authority holding that equitable relief is not available to address unfounded fears. Our point is that unfounded fears cannot constitute an allegation of a nuisance in fact with regard to these plaintiffs.32

We are thus unpersuaded by the dissent’s attempt to avoid the stipulation of the parties by referring throughout the opinion to facts and counts that are not before us. Nor do we find convincing the dissent’s disparagement of the 600-year provenance of the concept of damage without injury, or the assertion that the assumption on which we proceed “presents an abstract, desiccated *316question of law . . . (Post, p 328.) Unlike the dissent, we proceed on the assumption the parties presented to us. We do not know why counsel chose not to assert claims of personal discomfort or annoyance as he did with regard to other plaintiffs, or to appeal from the trial court’s order denying leave to amend. These were probably strategy decisions based on his clients’ responses in discovery. We are entitled to assume that counsel’s present posture is motivated by legitimate interest in securing an appellate court decision that diminution in value is recoverable without a showing of substantial interference with use or enjoyment of property. In that event, these plaintiffs could become judgment creditors in the bankruptcy action. So viewed, the structuring of this lawsuit involves not a hypertechnical issue, but an issue of considerable significance to these plaintiffs, to litigants similarly situated, and to the jurisprudence.

In short, we do not agree with the dissent’s suggestion that wholly unfounded fears of third parties regarding the conduct of a lawful business satisfy the requirement for a legally cognizable injury as long as property values decline. Indeed, we would think it not only "odd” (Levin, J., post, p 349), but anachronistic that a claim of nuisance in fact could be based on unfounded fears regarding persons with aids moving into a neighborhood, the establishment of otherwise lawful group homes for the disabled, or unrelated persons living together,33 merely because the fears experienced by third parties would cause a decline in property values.34

*317When appropriate, we have not hesitated to examine common-law doctrines in view of changes in society’s mores, institutions, and problems, and to alter those doctrines where necessary. Myers v Genesee Co Auditor, 375 Mich 1, 7; 133 NW2d 190 (1965); Gruskin v Fisher, 405 Mich 54, 58; 273 NW2d 893 (1979); Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 656-657; 275 NW2d 511 (1979); People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 722-723; 299 NW2d 304 (1980); Falcon v Memorial Hosp, 436 Mich 443, 472-473; 462 NW2d 44 (1990).35 In a given case, the dangers posed by environmental contamination may not be adequately addressed by statutorily created private actions or by traditional rules adopted prior to the existence of these problems.36 This case does not present that situation. We do not deal with a situation here in which plaintiffs have alleged that "the character of the neighborhood has changed for the worse.” (Post, p 328.) Nor have plaintiffs asserted that "an unusual number of abandoned, neglected, and otherwise depressed *318properties in the neighborhood” interfered with their use and enjoyment of land. (Post, p 328.) After defendants moved for summary disposition against any claims by plaintiffs who failed to show that their properties or persons were contaminated by exposure to chemicals emanating from the defendants, counsel stipulated to dismiss all claims of this group of plaintiffs except those based upon property depreciation. Thus, we are not presented with plaintiffs who allege an increased risk of illness, threat to safety, or lack of a habitable dwelling caused by contaminants released by the defendants.

The plaintiffs concede that a ground water divide prevented the migration of contaminated water to their property. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs seek to recover for damages because the defendants allegedly contaminated property in the general area. Under such a theory, a cause of action could be stated on behalf of any individual who could demonstrate an effect on property values even if the polluted ground water had neither strayed from defendants’ own property, nor disturbed a plaintiff’s enjoyment by the fear that it would do so.

If any property owner in the vicinity of the numerous hazardous waste sites that have been identified37 can advance a claim seeking damages when unfounded public fears of exposure cause property depreciation, the ultimate effect might be a reordering of a polluter’s resources for the benefit of persons who have suffered no cognizable *319harm at the expense of those claimants who have been subjected to a substantial and unreasonable interference in the use and enjoyment of property.38 Thus, while we acknowledge that the line drawn today is not necessarily dictated by the spectral permutations of nuisance jurisprudence, if the line is to be drawn elsewhere, the significant interests involved appear to be within the realm of those more appropriate for resolution by the Legislature.39 Crampton & Boyer, Citizen suits in the environmental held: Peril or promise?, 2 Ecol L Q 407, 412 (1972).

IV

For these reasons, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court’s grant of the defendants’ summary disposition motion. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the trial court’s judgment granting summary disposition in favor of the defendants, and remand to the trial court for a *320continuation of proceedings with regard to the remaining plaintiffs.

(concurring). While I agree with the result reached by the majority, I disagree with certain statements made by the majority that suggest that this Court will not hesitate to expand the traditional common-law view or to even abandon such view if it is decided that some policy reason suggests doing so. Ante, p 317. I believe that such broad speculation concerning the future treatment by this Court of traditional common-law doctrine is unwarranted.

(dissenting). Plaintiffs, a group of Battle Creek homeowners, claim that the Thomas Solvent defendants contaminated soil and ground water in the vicinity of their homes through negligent or intentional discharge of toxic chemicals and industrial wastes. The contamination has not reached and will not reach plaintiffs’ land. Plaintiffs nevertheless claim that the contamination of neighboring land has adversely affected the value of their homes.

A

The majority holds, as a matter of law, that because "diminution in property values alone constitutes damnum ábsque injuria,”1 and the instant plaintiffs, whose land was not contaminated, do not seek to recover damages other than for a reduction in the market value of their homes, plaintiffs may not maintain a nuisance action.

*321Plaintiffs should, in our opinion, be allowed to recover damages in nuisance on proofs introduced at a trial tending to show that the defendants actually contaminated soil and ground water in the neighborhood of plaintiffs’ homes with toxic chemicals and industrial wastes, that the market perception of the value of plaintiffs’ homes was actually adversely affected by the contamination of the neighborhood, and thus that plaintiffs’ loss was causally related to defendants’ conduct.

Preservation of property value is, in itself, a legally cognizable interest in this setting, whether any structure on the land is a home or rental2 or other commercial or industrial property.

A condition, tortiously or intentionally created or maintained on neighboring property, that is a substantial and unreasonable nontrespassory interference with the use and enjoyment of property, may constitute a nuisance.3 Such a condition may cause personal injury, property damage, or a reduction in the market value of property. The condition may be reflected in a reduction of the market value of a home although no personal injury or other property damage is suffered by the homeowner.

We would hold that a homeowner may maintain a nuisance action to recover damages for a decline in the market value of his home that reflects interference with the use and enjoyment of his home by a condition tortiously created or maintained by the defendant on neighboring property, and that the homeowner may do so without demonstrating interference with use or enjoyment that *322might result in further, separately compensable injuries to persons or property.

B

The majority asserts, factually, that "unfounded fears of third parties,”4 rather than the conduct of defendants, were responsible for any reduction in the value of plaintiffs’ property.

In finding as a fact, without a trial on the merits, that any decline in the value of plaintiffs’ homes was attributable to unfounded fears, the majority proceeds on the assumption — without requiring defendants to evidentially support, or providing plaintiffs an opportunity to evidentially refute that assumption — that none of the reduction in value was attributable to well-founded concern about contamination by the defendants of soil and water supply in the neighborhood.

It appears — contrary to the majority’s "unfounded” fear characterization — that the claimed reduction in the value of plaintiffs’ homes was attributable both to factually well-founded concern about contamination of the soil and water supply in the neighborhood, and unfounded concern of soil and water supply contamination respecting plaintiffs’ homes.

If the majority were to allow plaintiff homeowners their day in court, plaintiffs might establish that the claimed decline in the value of their homes was in fact partly attributable to well-founded concern of potential buyers about contamination of soil and water supply in the neighborhood, although also in part attributable to unfounded concern about contamination of the soil and water supply for plaintiffs’ homes.

Even if potential buyers were to be made aware *323that the soil and water supply for plaintiffs’ homes is not contaminated, and thus were unfettered by "unfounded fear,” they nonetheless would pay no more for plaintiffs’ homes than the claimed reduced market value. Thus, to the extent that the value of plaintiffs’ homes has declined because of well-founded concern about the contamination of soil and ground water in the neighborhood, educating potential buyers that plaintiffs’ homes are not in fact contaminated would not necessarily rectify damage suffered by plaintiffs because of the contamination.

At a trial, defendants would have an opportunity to show, if they can, that any decline in the market value was temporary, and that fully informed buyers later offered to pay prices for plaintiffs’ homes that fully rectified any decline in the market value attributable to well-founded concerns that defendants had contaminated soil and ground water in the neighborhood.

C

This does not appear to be a case where the plaintiffs seek to recover damages for a decline in value that is attributable to mass hysteria without any unlawful or tortious misconduct on the part of defendants.

The plaintiffs seek only an opportunity to produce evidence in a court of law tending to show that the negligence or intentional misconduct of the Thomas Solvent defendants did in fact contaminate soil and ground water in the neighborhood and caused plaintiffs economic loss in the form of a decline in the market value of their homes.5

*324D

The general rule is that where there are multiple causes — here, well-founded fears concerning contamination of soil and water supply in the neighborhood and unfounded fears that soil and water supply for plaintiffs’ homes were contaminated — the tortfeasor is subject to liability as long as his misconduct is a cause of the decline in market value; it need not be the sole cause of plaintiffs’ loss.

It would be to announce an essentially , unprecedented but nevertheless somewhat trendy exception6 to this general rule for this Court to direct that in a nuisance action a jury should apportion damages on the basis of the jury’s assessment of the proportions of plaintiffs’ loss attributable to well-founded and unfounded perceptions of contamination. But the majority does not even allow the plaintiffs that much.

i

The Thomas Solvent defendants7 owned or operated two sites in Battle Creek where toxic chemicals and industrial wastes were stored.8 Plaintiffs *325claim that in late 1981 public health officials detected contamination of Battle Creek Municipal water supply wells by toxic chemicals and industrial waste. Similar contaminants were found in private residential wells in the vicinity of defendants’ facilities, all involving the same aquifer system.9

It does not appear on the record by what means this news was disseminated, whether plaintiffs were told by governmental agencies not to drink well water, or whether plaintiffs were supplied with or obtained bottled water. Plaintiffs argue in this Court that "the neighborhood was told not to drink their water, and bottled water was supplied by government agencies.”

During the course of discovery, it became apparent that the property of the twenty-two plaintiffs who are parties to this appeal had not been and never would be contaminated by any toxic substances migrating from defendants’ facilities. A feature of the underground landscape known as a hydrogeological divide prevented ground water *326flowing from the direction of defendants’ property from reaching the property of these plaintiffs.

The Thomas Solvent defendants, claiming that there was no genuine issue of material fact, moved for summary disposition with respect to all claims of the instant plaintiffs, whose properties are located over 2,000 feet south and. east of the Thomas Solvent facilities.

Plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal of their claims against defendants except to the extent that plaintiffs claimed damages for reduction in the market value of their homes. Defendants’ brief asserts that, by entering into the stipulation, plaintiffs have "abandoned any claims for loss of use and enjoyment of their property,” including any right to rely on allegations of altered conduct in response to the publicized contamination.10

The circuit court concluded that any reduction in value should be attributed to unfounded public perception of contamination, and not to the claimed conduct of defendants, and dismissed plaintiffs’ remaining claims against the Thomas Solvent defendants.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial, stating that "[pjlaintiffs are not precluded *327from bringing a nuisance cause of action, even assuming that their only damages are a decrease in property values.”11

ii

The majority acknowledges that "property depreciation is a traditional element of damages in a nuisance action.” The majority asserts, however, that "an allegation of property depreciation alone” does not set forth "a cognizable claim in private nuisance of significant interference with the use and enjoyment of a person’s property.”12 The majority continues that "[diminution in property values caused by negative publicity is, on these facts, damnum absque injuria — a loss without an injury in the legal sense.”13

A

In stating that the "issue [is] whether plaintiffs may proceed with their nuisance in fact claims solely on the basis of property depreciation due to public concern about contaminants in the general *328area,”14 the majority proceeds on the assumption that this case presents an abstract, desiccated question of law, divorced from actual conditions that may face residents and prospective residents of plaintiffs’ neighborhood. This approach likens the instant plaintiffs’ claims to the effect of a psychical neutron bomb, that deleteriously affects life in the neighborhood while leaving the physical condition of the property itself eerily untouched.

There is no basis in the record for assuming, without factual support, that the only change caused to plaintiffs’ neighborhood by the contamination of property in the area is an attitudinal shift in the community or a statistical shift in the value of homes and other property in the neighborhood.

Were this case to be remanded for trial, it might appear — indeed, it seems far more probable that it would appear — that the character of the neighborhood has changed for the worse. If, as plaintiffs have alleged, the conduct of defendants contaminated soil and ground water in the neighborhood with toxic chemicals and industrial wastes, efforts to "mop up” the contamination might be of limited efficacy, resulting in an unusual number of abandoned, neglected, and otherwise depressed properties in the neighborhood, with inimical effect on the market value of all property in the vicinity.

B

An award of damages for a reduction in the value of uncontaminated land was affirmed in Exxon Corp v Yarema, 69 Md App 124; 516 A2d 990 (1986). Exxon operated a service station with leaking underground gasoline storage tanks. Contamination reached property owned by some but *329not all the plaintiffs. The court held that no rule of law prevented an award of damages simply because there was "no tangible or physical impact on plaintiff’s property”:

According to the general view, there must be a substantial interference with the plaintiff’s reasonable use and enjoyment of its property. We believe that our conclusion does not violate the established rule that the mere diminution of property value, absent such tortious interference, is not sufficient basis for recovery.[15]

The plaintiffs, here as in Exxon, complain of "tortious interference.”16

The Maryland appellate court explained that its *330holding "does not mean that plaintiffs may recover for diminution of property value without proof of harm to their property but rather that harm to property should be construed broadly to include intangible tortious interferences” with the use and enjoyment thereof.17 The court observed that

Exxon has interfered with [the plaintiffs’] use and enjoyment of their land. Gasoline contamination of ground water imposed crippling restrictions not only on the contaminated land but on all the property adjacent to that land. The Baltimore County Health Department forbade plaintiffs from using their ground water, building houses on their land or selling the land even at a reduced price. These are injuries for which the plaintiffs are entitled to recover if the jury believed that they were caused by Exxon’s tortious interference with their property rights. The fact that the reputation of the plaintiffs’ land is inextricably interwoven in the assessment of damages is not reason to avoid an award.[18]

The instant plaintiffs similarly allege that they were told not to drink their well water and were unable to sell their property after adverse information was disseminated through governmental agencies.

Plaintiffs do not allege that the sale of their property was prohibited outright. Were this case remanded for trial, however, plaintiffs might be able to show that they have been unable to sell their property at any but a significantly reduced, *331or a ruinously low, price.19 "These are injuries for which the plaintiffs are entitled to recover if the jury believe[s] that they were caused by [the defendant’s] tortious interference with their property rights.”20

The majority distinguishes Exxon on the ground that the instant case presents "no claim of contaminated well water or the preclusion of sale. This case comes to us singularly on the issue whether plaintiffs may proceed with their nuisance in fact claims solely on the basis of property depreciation due to public concern about contaminants in the general area.”21

The majority misapprehends plaintiffs’ remaining claim for relief as a bare assertion that popular fears of contamination should subject defendants to liability for property depreciation. The complaint sought compensation for personal injury and property damage.22

Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are broader, than their remaining claim for a specific element of damages. They have alleged a range of facts amounting to an interference with interests in the use and enjoyment of property beyond "mere” reduction in the market value of their homes.23 *332Such indicia of interference with use and enjoyment remain relevant to the question whether property depreciation was caused by defendants’ conduct, and to the broader question whether defendants’ conduct substantially interfered with plaintiffs’ interests in the use and enjoyment of property.

Although plaintiffs have stipulated to relinquish the right to seek damages for interference with their use and enjoyment of property in forms distinct from depreciation, the disposition of this case should not depend on whether they so stipulated rather than continuing to insist on seeking to recover damages for personal injury as well as for a decline in market value. To rely on plaintiffs’ decision not further to seek damages for personal injury, a narrow point without legal foundation until today’s decision, reduces the jurisprudential significance of this case to a hypertechnicality, and encourages parties generally to give no quarter in litigation, lest the trial or an appellate court find against the stipulating party on a hypertechnicality.

c

According to the majority, "[t]his Court has held that property depreciation alone is insufficient to constitute a nuisance.”24

*333The majority relies largely on decisions of this Court denying injunctive relief to plaintiffs who claimed that the establishment or maintenance of a business would constitute a nuisance. This Court, in Warren Twp School Dist v Detroit, 308 Mich 460; 14 NW2d 134 (1944), and Plassey v S Loewenstein & Son, 330 Mich 525; 48 NW2d 126 (1951), held that the potential for property depreciation, without more, does not justify enjoining the establishment of a lawful business on neighboring property.25

Plaintiffs here, in contrast, assert a damage claim for actual, not potential, diminution of value, arising out of defendants’ past, allegedly unlawful activity.

In Warren Twp, the plaintiffs sought to prevent condemnation of a site for a proposed airport. In declining to enjoin condemnation to preclude potential damage to the plaintiffs’ property, the Court said that the plaintiffs would have a cause of action for damages "if conditions they now claim are threatened should hereafter arise.”26

In Plassey, the Court reaffirmed the rule that equity " 'will not interfere in advance of the creation of a nuisance where the injury is doubtful or contingent, and anticipated merely from the use to which the property is to be put.’ ”27 The conduct *334complained of in the instant case — intentional, negligent, or accidental discharge of toxic chemicals and industrial wastes — was not, in contrast with the slaughterhouse and rendering plant at issue in Plassey, a "lawful business” free from violations of "applicable law.”28

D

Decisions denying injunctive relief in nuisance cases do not necessarily justify dismissal of an action for damages, because a judgment denying injunctive relief may turn on application of rules relating to equitable remedies.

The usual rule of equity applies to the instant plaintiffs’ claim for property depreciation; before an injunction will issue,

there must be such an injury as from its nature is not susceptible of being adequately compensated by damages at law, or such as from its continuance or permanent mischief must occasion a constantly recurring grievance, which cannot be otherwise prevented but by an injunction. ... So a mere diminution of the value of property by the nuisance without irreparable mischief will not *335furnish any foundation for equitable relief. [2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, § 1253, p 602 (14th ed, 1918). Emphasis added.]

This Court has recognized that refusal to enjoin a lawful business as a nuisance does not preclude a damage recovery for property depreciation, stating that "[a]s to such injury, if any, complainants have an adequate remedy at law.” Ballentine v Webb, 84 Mich 38, 45; 47 NW 485; 13 LRA 321 (1890) (emphasis added).29

Decisions granting injunctive relief against an alleged prospective nuisance, however, generally support damage awards in factual settings in which the harm has already occurred, because an injunction will not issue absent evidence of a significant interference with the use and enjoyment of property.30_

*336E

The Second Restatement of Torts explains that "[a] potent cause of confusion” in private nuisance is the citation of cases in equity "as precedents in actions at law without regard to their differences.” The Restatement observes that "[Considerations enter into the determination of the right to an injunction that are inapplicable or have less weight in determining the right to damages”:

An injunction may be obtained in a proper case against a threatened private nuisance, but an action cannot be maintained at law unless harm already has been suffered. Even when there is present harm, it is one thing to say that a defendant should pay damages for the harm his factory is causing but it is a different thing to say that he must close his factory if the harm cannot be stopped.[31]

*337An order enjoining operation of a lawful business, unlike the damage remedy, is not generally available unless the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff outweighs the utility of the defendant’s conduct.32

The majority acknowledges these considerations, but disposes of them by stating that, "[i]n both law and equity, . . . unfounded fears cannot constitute an allegation of a nuisance in fact with regard to these plaintiffs:”33 Rules of law that modulate outcomes in equitable and legal actions are not, however, rendered inoperative simply because fears, either factually founded or unfounded, are involved.

F

Warren Twp and similar cases34 hold that where the plaintiff failed to establish that the proposed operation of an airport would constitute a nui*338sanee per se, the court will not enjoin construction merely on a showing that airport operation may reduce the value of neighboring property.35

The business at issue in these cases, unlike defendants’ conduct in the instant case, was not only "lawful,” but was regarded as an essential public service. All the cases relied on by Warren Twp characterize aviation as crucial to modern *339commercial development. All devote considerable attention to public policy pronouncements, stressing the need for expanded air-travel capacity, lest the community fall behind the times.

Protecting polluters of the water supply against the consequences of their conduct' is not, in contrast with facilitating airport development and operation, an interest deserving of judicial indulgence.

G

Where the plaintiff’s primary claim of loss is property depreciation, courts have traditionally been reluctant to enjoin the operation of a lawful business as a nuisance. This reluctance derived in large measure from recognition of the adequacy and appropriateness of the damage remedy.36 Where the plaintiff complains of property depreciation, rather than other interferences with the use and enjoyment of property, damages are readily ascertainable and suffice to make the plaintiff whole.37

The law of nuisance has recognized that property depreciation, in itself, may constitute an interference with an interest in the use and enjoy*340ment of property.38 In Conway v Gampel, 235 Mich 511, 514; 209 NW 562 (1926), this Court affirmed an injunction against operation of a slaughterhouse in a residential neighborhood, and said:

There is evidence that the claimed nuisance has depreciated the value of the property of some of the plaintiffs. For this element alone there may be an adequate remedy at law. (Ballentine v Webb, 84 Mich 38 [13 LRA 321]), but. the evidence may be considered as regards the fact of nuisance. [Emphasis added; citations omitted.][39]

As the majority’s historical survey suggests, the remedy of damages for property depreciation is at the core of the nuisance action;40 only comparatively recently have courts recognized other interferences with use and enjoyment, including annoyance and discomfort, as separately compensable in damages.

Injuries to property value and to a plaintiff’s peace of mind are aspects of the same general kind of harm in nuisance actions; both flow from the relationship of a plaintiff to the land.41 Damages *341for property depreciation may be awarded separately from damages for other interferences with interests in the use and enjoyment of the affected property, even where the factual predicates for both types of damages are closely related.42

iii

After repeatedly adverting to the business of the instant defendants as "lawful,”43 the majority states: "[T]he fact that violations of the law may have occurred on the [defendants’] property does not make the conduct of the business a nuisance in fact. Indeed, Garfield Twp [v Young, 348 Mich 337; 82 NW2d 876 (1957),] rejects the precise argument upon which the dissent relies.”44

Garñeld Twp held that operation of an otherwise lawfully conducted junkyard could not be enjoined as a nuisance per se merely because the owner had flouted a local ordinance requiring that such businesses be licensed.45 Similarly, Village of St Johns v McFarlan, 33 Mich 72; 20 Am Rep 671 (1875), on which this Court largely relied in Garñeld, and which the majority quotes in support of the broad proposition that "illegal conduct alone [is] not *342enough” to "prove nuisance,”46 held that "a court in chancery” had "no jurisdiction to restrain the threatened violation of a village ordinance, unless the act threatened to be done, if carried out, would be a nuisance.”47

Such holdings do not suggest that as long as the "[djefendant’s business is a lawful business,”48 as distinct, presumably, from a brothel or gambling casino, which might be a public nuisance per se, defendant’s unlawful use of land is of no consequence in determining whether a plaintiff may recover damages in nuisance.49

Rather, as set forth in the Second Restatement formulation, because recovery for unintentional nuisance may be predicated on a showing that the defendant’s conduct is independently actionable in tort:

[A]n actor is subject to liability for private nuisance for a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land if . . . the invasion is either (i) intentional and unreasonable, or (ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous conduct.[50]

Plaintiffs in the instant case have alleged that defendants’ discharge of toxic chemicals and hazardous waste, even if unintentional, was "otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability *343for negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous conduct.” In contrast, violation of the local ordinance involved in Garfield Twp was not "otherwise actionable” by a private party claiming to be aggrieved thereby, because "a penalty, only, [was] imposed for failure to comply with its provisions.”51

This Court has also recognized not only that violations of "applicable law or restrictions” may be pertinent to a finding of nuisance, but that even in the absence of such a violation a lawful business may be enjoined as a nuisance if circumstances otherwise warrant.52

The majority’s other references to cases involving claimed property depreciation in the context of siting of business operations cast no light on the instant case.53

*344IV

Similarly unpersuasive is the majority’s statement adverting to an unrelated passage of the dissent as follows:

[W]e would think it not only "odd,” but anachronistic that a claim of nuisance in fact could be based on unfounded fears regarding persons with aids moving into a neighborhood, the establishment of otherwise lawful group homes for the disabled, or unrelated persons living together, merely because the fears experienced by third parties would cause a decline in property values.[54]

The "conditions” on adjoining property enumer*345ated by the majority are not only "lawful,” but may be accorded special legal protection on constitutional or statutory grounds.55 No constitutional or statutory protection attaches to the condition the instant defendants are alleged to have created or maintained on their property.

To the extent that the majority’s illustration has any bearing at all on the instant case, it is contrary to the principle that an interference with use and enjoyment of property will not constitute actionable nuisance unless it affects

the ordinary comfort of human existence as understood by the American people in their present state of enlightenment. The theories and dogmas of scientific men, though provable by scientiñc reference, cannot be held to be controlling unless shared by the people generally. [Everett v Paschall, 61 Wash 47, 52; 111 P 879; 31 LRA (NS) 827 (1910). Emphasis added, citations omitted.]

Although it would undoubtedly be considered "anachronistic” to enjoin the placement of a woman with leprosy in a residential district in 1992, the public understanding, or misunderstanding, of leprosy in 1898 justified such action.56 The court reaching'that conclusion expatiated on

the popular belief of [leprosy’s] perils founded on the Biblical narrative, on the stringent provisions of the Mosaic law that show how dreadful were its ravages and how great the terror which it excited, and an almost universal sentiment, the result of a common concurrence of .thought for centuries, *346[that] cannot in this day be shaken or dispelled by mere scientific asseveration or conjecture.[57]

If equally overpowering fears now grip the public with regard to toxic waste, radioactive contamination, or similar modern perils, this Court may not properly dismiss such fears out of hand.

v

The majority’s analysis implicitly assumes that resolution of this case is governed by the doctrine that mere apprehension of injury, based on an unfounded perception of danger, is not actionable in tort. In general, this proposition is indisputable as applied to the wholly unreasonable fears of a plaintiff. However, even fears without factual foundation may permit of recovery in nuisance if the fears are of a kind to be expected from a normal member of the affected community.58

Further, the instant case does not present a claim based on plaintiffs’ own apprehension of injury or perception of dánger. Plaintiffs assert, rather, that the normal fears of potential buyers, both factually founded and unfounded, precipitated a decline in the value of plaintiffs’ property.

A

The majority declares:

Diminution in property values caused by negative publicity is, on these facts, damnum absque injuria — a loss without an injury in the legal sense[59]

*347Fear-inspired property depreciation will support a nuisance action where (a) the fears are such as would ordinarily be experienced by a person confronting the activity conducted, or the condition created or maintained, on neighboring property,60 and (b) competent evidence establishes that the fears manifested themselves in a decline in the value of plaintiffs’ property.

Rockenbach v Apostle, 330 Mich 338; 47 NW2d 636 (1951),61 concerned the proposed operation of a funeral home in a residential district. The plaintiffs, neighboring homeowners, sought to enjoin establishment of the business as a nuisance. The Court, finding that the mortuary "would have a depressing influence upon [the plaintiffs],”62 and that potential purchasers of the plaintiffs’ property would likely react the same way,63 granted an injunction.64 The Court concluded that the fear or dread evoked by the proximity of a mortuary— *348"'hot well founded, as we have seen, but nevertheless present in the mind of the normal layman’ ” — tended to have an adverse effect on market values.65

In Dillon v Moran, 237 Mich 130, 131; 211 NW 67 (1926), this Court enjoined as a nuisance the proposed establishment of a funeral home in a residential district on the sole ground that "plaintiff would suffer material pecuniary loss” if defendant’s plans were carried out. (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff’s property was adjacent to the proposed site. The Court cited no interference with an interest in the use and enjoyment of property, and no inconvenience that might be suffered by the plaintiff, except "pecuniary loss.”66

Dillon makes clear that "diminution in property values alone” is not always "damnum absque injuria,”67 and the absence of other interferences with the use and enjoyment of property does not automatically preclude maintenance of a nuisance action.68 Similarly, Rockenbach echoed Kundinger v Bagnasco, 298 Mich 15; 298 NW 386 (1941), in stressing that, to recover in nuisance, plaintiffs need not demonstrate that they were threatened by a traditionally recognized intrusion on their enjoyment of land, such as offensive odors:_

*349The evidence in this case would not support a finding that the establishment proposed by the defendants will in its operation become a nuisance by reason of noises, odors, fumes, dies, or dissemination of disease. In fact, plaintiffs have abandoned such claims, and there is no probative value in any testimony to show that a parking problem or traffic congestion will necessarily arise.[69]

It is odd to assert that although relief is available against a defendant conducting a lawful business and committing no independently actionable wrong, it is unavailable where plaintiffs’ allegations, if proved, render defendants at least subject to liability to numerous property owners in plaintiffs’ immediate neighborhood.

Further, if the proposed establishment of a lawful business may be enjoined as a nuisance in fact, a damage remedy should be available to compensate for pecuniary harm already suffered as the result of unlawful or tortious conduct.

B

This Court has oh other occasions held that the prospect of residential property depreciation, even when based on the unfounded fears of the community constituting the market for such property, is *350evidence of a threatened nuisance and supports an injunction.

In Birchard v Lansing Bd of Health, 204 Mich 284; 169 NW 901 (1918), this Court enjoined the establishment of a "pesthouse” (hospital for contagious diseases) that was to be operated by the city pursuant to its charter. The Court followed Barth v Christian Psychopathic Hosp Ass’n, 196 Mich 642; 163 NW 62 (1917),70 and Saier v Joy, 198 Mich 295; 164 NW 507 (1917); here, as in those cases,

there might be no actual danger if properly conducted, but . . . maintenance [of the facilities] in close proximity to the home would create . . . dread and fear in the mind of the normal person . . . [thus] reducing the value of the property so situated .... [A] pesthouse may be so conducted, and well-regulated ones are, as to cause no actual danger to nearby residents. But substantially all the experts who testify to this effect agree that their opinion is not shared by the general public, and that the normal person has a horror and dread of a pesthouse, and a fear of infection from proximity to it.[71]

*351The normal and emotionally justified but factually unfounded fears of third parties cannot properly be dismissed as "conjectural, transitory and ephemeral.”72 Nor should plaintiffs who can establish at trial that their property has declined in value through the agency of such fear be required to await beneficent market forces that might ameliorate their losses.73

We again emphasize that the claimed decline in the value of the instant plaintiffs’ homes appears to be attributable to factually founded as well as unfounded fear.74

c

Courts in other jurisdictions addressing the *352effect of fear on property values in nuisance actions have also recognized that the relevant inquiry is not whether a fear is factually founded, but whether it is the normal consequence of the defendants’ conduct.75 In Everett v Paschall, supra,76 much as in the instant case, the trial court had agreed with the defendants

that there is no real danger; that the fear or dread of the disease is, in the light, of scientific investiga*353tion, unfounded, imaginary, and fanciful; and that the injury, if any, is damnum absque injuria.[77]

The Washington Supreme Court, focusing on emotional reaction as a factual reality of the case, concluded that the hospital would interfere with "the comfortable enjoyment of the property”78 to which the plaintiffs were entitled. The court rejected the argument that, because the fear was "unfounded and unsustained by science, a demon of the imagination — the courts will take no account of it . . . .” The court said:

[W]e question our right to say that the fear is unfounded or unreasonable, when it is shared by the whole public to such an extent that property values are diminished. The question is, not whether the fear is founded in science, but whether it exists; not whether it is imaginary, but whether it is real, in that it affects the movements and conduct of men. Such fears are actual, and must be recognized by the courts as other emotions of the human mind.[79]

*354D

The majority of jurisdictions addressing the question holds that when property owners are awarded damages in compensation for diminution of property value attributable to easements for power lines, gas or oil pipe lines, or related structures, the elements and measure of compensation include potential purchasers’ fear or apprehension of danger. Most of these authorities hold that because such fears in fact materially affect property values, they should be included in the calculus of damage.80

The court in Texas Electric Service Co v Nelon, 546 SW2d 864, 868 (Tex Civ App, 1977), adopted a typical formulation addressing normal fear that depresses the value of the subject property:

"[To determine market value after a taking, fear is relevant if] there is a basis in reason or experience for the fear; [the] fear enters into the calculations of persons who deal in the buying and selling of similar property; and . . . [depreciation of market value because of the existence of such fear.” [Emphasis added.]

Like Everett v Paschall, supra, condemnation cases illustrate that the relevant "truth” is not whether there is actual danger, but whether the *355average person interested in the plaintiff’s property believes there is danger. The market, of course, behaves accordingly, and the fortunes of property owners follow. As the court in one easement case observed:

The argument . . . that there is no real danger or reason for such fear has no force against the fact that the fear exists and is unavoidable. The fear of danger in some cases is as bad as the danger itself — it is a condition — not a theory.[81]

E

Plaintiffs have not alleged the existence of a condition that no reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities could find worrisome or offensive.82

A particular use of neighboring land may be offensive to some persons and not to others. Accordingly, for both hypersensitive and insensitive property owners, "[r]ights and privileges as to the use and enjoyment of land are based on the general standards of normal persons in the community and not on the standards of the individuals who happen to be there at the time.”83 The Restatement explains that a hypersensitive invalid

cannot found an action for a private nuisance upon the normal ringing of a church bell across the street from his house, on the ground that the noise . . . throws him into convulsions and threatens his health or even his life, if a normal member of the community would regard the sound as unobjectionable or at most a petty annoyance. . . ■

*356On the other hand, when the invasion is of a kind that the normal individual in the community would find definitely annoying or offensive, the fact that those who live in the neighborhood are hardened to it and have no objection will not prevent the plaintiff from maintaining his action. For example, the noise of a boiler factory next door may be a private nuisance even though the plaintiff and others who live in the vicinity are stone deaf and cannot hear it. The deafness of the plaintiff himself will affect the damages that he can recover, but it does not prevent the existence of a genuine interference with the use and enjoyment of his land as, for example, for the purpose of entertaining guests.[84]

The instant plaintiffs, by virtue of superior knowledge and the lapse of time, might be inured to any fears manifesting themselves in property depreciation in their neighborhood. Nonetheless, just as a deaf plaintiff suffers a "genuine interference with the use and enjoyment of his land” when the use of neighboring property reduces the willingness of other persons to visit his property, plaintiffs here should be able to recover damages for a "genuine interference with the use and enjoyment of [their] land” if defendants’ use of neighboring property reduces the willingness of potential purchasers to occupy property in the neighborhood, substantially and adversely affecting the value of plaintiffs’ property.

F

The majority rejects plaintiffs’ claim that the conduct of defendants, rather than negative publicity or the "unfounded fears of third parties,”85 *357caused an interference with plaintiffs’ interest in the use and enjoyment of property.86

One might hypothesize a category of cases in which "negative publicity” only remotely connected with the defendant’s conduct adversely affects the value, of the plaintiff’s property, but defendants have not established that the instant case belongs in such a category.87 Notwithstanding the majority’s concerns, plaintiffs have not asked to be excused from the "requirement that a litigant seeking to recover for nuisance must show ... a significant interference with the use and enjoyment of land.”88 It is rather the majority that, by deciding this case on its own factual assumptions and barring remand for trial, has prevented plaintiffs from making such a showing.

G

Manifesting greater concern about the diffusion of liability than the instant defendants are alleged to have shown for the diffusion of hazardous waste, the majority sounds an alarm:

Under [plaintiffs’] theory, a cause of action could be stated on behalf of any individual who could demonstrate an effect on property values even if the polluted ground water had neither strayed from defendants’ own property, nor disturbed a plaintiff’s enjoyment by the fear that it would do so.[89]

The majority’s hypothetical case, in which con*358tamination never "strayed from defendants’ own property,”90 is counterfactual; plaintiffs allege that contamination "strayed” from defendants’ facilities, and rendered homes in the neighborhood unsafe to inhabit.91

vi

The majority concludes by animadverting upon a claim that recognition of the instant plaintiffs’ cause of action might lead to "reordering of a polluter’s resources for the benefit of persons who have suffered no cognizable harm at the expense of those claimants who have been subjected to a substantial and unreasonable interference in the *359use and enjoyment of property.”92 The majority observes that polluters sometimes seek refuge in the bankruptcy courts "as a result of clean-up costs required under various statutes and private litigation seeking money damages for injuries due to the contamination,” and that Thomas Solvent Company did so in 1984.93

The majority’s fears are unfounded — possibly the only truly unfounded fears in this case. We doubt that actions of the kind before us today would even ripple the surface of the sea of troubles that engulfed the instant defendants as a result of their handling of toxic waste.94 In any event, we are not swayed by the suggestion that to permit the instant plaintiffs to proceed to trial is' to threaten the rightful recoveries of individuals stricken with disease of environmental etiology, or of communities blighted by toxic waste. Again, trial courts possess sufficient discernment to resolve the problems of proof presented by the instant case.

*360We would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

APPENDIX

We here further respond to observations in the majority opinion concerning Smith v Western Wayne Co Conservation Ass’n, 380 Mich 526, 543; 158 NW2d 463 (1968), and Gunther v E I DuPont de Nemours & Co, 157 F Supp 25 (ND W Va, 1957).

A

The majority cites Smith for the proposition that "a cause of action for nuisance may not be based on unfounded fears.”95

The Smith plaintiffs asserted that operation of a gun range in the neighborhood adversely affected the value of their property, supporting this claim with evidence of the noise of the gun range.96 The *361plaintiffs did not, however, claim that "fear of injuries” from operation of the gun range "decreased] their property values,”97 but rather " 'that the range . . . endangers the lives and property of persons living in the area; and that even if found safe, the fears in the minds of the residents resulting from its operation and use render it a nuisance.’ ”98 The plaintiffs in Smith sought to enjoin operation of the gun range as a nuisance in fact; evidence relating to property values was offered in support of this plea, but, as in Warren Twp and Plassey, damages for lost value formed no part of the relief requested.

The primary focus of the opinion in Smith was not safety, but noise. The trial court reviewed testimonial and demonstrative evidence of the degree of disturbance caused by operation of the range, and found that the noise was not " 'such as would shock a person of ordinary sensibilities or cause actual physical discomfort.’ ”99 The trial court declared itself " 'convinced that no real or actual danger exists from the use of defendants’ range,’ ”100 and said that relief cannot

"be granted to plaintiffs merely on the claim that *362there 'exists’ a fear in their minds, even though there is no actual danger. Mere apprehension is insufficient to grant injunctive relief against a claimed nuisance.”[101]

The instant plaintiffs do not seek an injunction, and assert no claim for any kind of relief arising out of their own "fears” (founded or not).102

B

Gunther said by the majority to "exemplif[y] *363this reluctance to find a nuisance for mere diminution of property value on the basis of unfounded beliefs or fear of injury,”103 is similar to Smith. The plaintiffs’ home was located approximately two miles from a site used by the defendant for testing explosives.104 The court refused "the extraordinary remedy of injunction,”105 not damages, where the plaintiffs had failed to show any cognizable interference with their use or enjoymeht of property.106

The plaintiffs presented no evidence of property depreciation and did not request damages therefor. The court declined to enjoin the defendant’s business on the basis of the plaintiffs’ "unfounded” belief "that the test blasting had injured them”107 only after expressly ñnding that none of their underlying allegations were supported by the evidence.

The jury in Gunther found, in response to questions submitted by the court, that the testing operations had not caused physical damage to the *364plaintiffs’ property108 or personal injury to Mrs. Gunther.109

Thus, in the words of the majority, "not only ha[d] these plaintiffs not alleged significant interference with their use and enjoyment of property, they do not here posit any interference at all.”110

The court in Gunther held that characterization of noise as a nuisance "depends on its effect on a person of ordinary sensibilities, not the effect on a particular individual.”111 Testimony of local residents did not establish that the noise of the defendant’s business met this standard. Addressing one of the plaintiffs’ claims of personal injury, the court said:

Mrs. Gunther stated that she was frightened by each test explosion and became nervous and upset. However, she admitted that she was quite nervous *365over the pending litigation and that she became nervous when she drove a car in traffic or went shopping. The evidence disclosed that Mrs. Gunther has suffered from a nervous disorder almost all of her adult life.[112]

The court declined to enjoin the defendant’s testing operations, an aspect of a lawful business carried on without negligence, because the plaintiffs had shown no cognizable tangible or intangible injury to their property or their persons.113 In particular, the court did not credit the plaintiffs’ only remaining basis for injunction, property depreciation, because the only evidence was a subjective account of Mrs. Gunther’s personal belief in harm, not supported by the experience of normal members of the aifected community.114

In contrast, it is precisely the claim of the instant plaintiffs that normal members of the community in which they live were alarmed by *366the prospect of occupying property in the vicinity of contaminated soil or ground water, and were therefore unwilling to pay the former market price for any property in the vicinity.115