We granted leave to determine *436whether defendants established a prior nonconforming use of their property as a mobile home park before passage of a referendum rejecting defendants’ rezoning proposal. The Court of Appeals answered affirmatively. We hold that defendants failed to prove the requisite tangible change in the property to establish a prior nonconforming use.

i

In 1985, defendants Gerald and Joyce Sail purchased approximately 16 acres of land in Heath Township with the intention of building a mobile home park on the property.1 On the purchase date, the land was zoned R-2 (single-family residential zone) within which mobile home parks were not permitted. On October 13, 1986, however, the township board granted defendants’ request to rezone the property to R-3 (multiple-family residential). Subsequently, the residents, opposed to the zoning change, petitioned for a referendum pursuant to MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12).2

*437On February 2, 1987, local residents voted to return the property to its original single-family residential classification. However, during the time between the board’s vote and the referendum, defendants spent approximately $18,000 preparing the site for construction. The work included developing detailed construction plans, procuring several local permits for future excavating and plumbing, purchasing sewer pipe, drilling a water well, constructing a wellhouse, installing four test wells, excavating for roads, removing topsoil, clearing trees, and obtaining a topographical survey.

Before the referendum, defendants filed an application with the state for a mobile home park license. Their initial application was returned with a request for additional information. In April 1987, defendants resubmitted the application after the unfavorable referendum vote. In late July, 1987, the state orally notified defendants and plaintiff that it intended to issue a mobile home park permit to the defendants.3 At this point, defendants began further construction.4 On August 17, 1987, the township wrote a letter to defendants insisting that they stop constructing the mobile home park. After defendants refused, the township filed an action for injunctive relief.

The Allegan Circuit Court enjoined defendants from occupancy, but allowed construction "at their own risk.” Relying on Gackler Land Co, Inc v Yankee Springs Twp, 427 Mich 562; 398 NW2d *438393 (1986), the trial court held that defendants’ actions before the referendum were insufficient preliminary operations that did not establish a prior nonconforming use. Accordingly, the court opined that the referendum zoning controlled, and that use of the property as a mobile home park would violate the zoning ordinance. Ultimately, on February 8, 1990, the trial court granted the township a permanent injunction.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, stating:

In the case at bar, we agree with defendants that they took sufficient action toward changing the character of the land while the zoning permitted construction of a mobile home park on the parcel so as to grant the defendants vested rights and create a prior nonconforming use of the property as a mobile home park before the electorate’s decision to return the zoning to R-2. Specifically, while the preparation of the survey and site plans and the clearing of trees and debris would not be sufficient to create a prior nonconforming use, defendants’ conduct went beyond mere preparation for a change in use of the property. They installed a commercial water well, drilled four additional test wells, constructed a wellhouse, and excavated for the construction of roads for the mobile home park. We are satisfied that this action constitutes a tangible change in the land by excavation and construction that goes beyond mere preliminary operations to establish the nonconforming use. [191 Mich App 716, 719-720; 478 NW2d 678 (1991).]

Plaintiff Heath Township appeals the Court of Appeals decision granting defendants vested rights sufficient to create a prior nonconforming use of the property as a mobile home park. We reverse.

*439II

A prior nonconforming use is a vested right in the use of particular property that does not conform to zoning restrictions, but is protected because it lawfully existed before the zoning regulation’s effective date. Dusdal v City of Warren, 387 Mich 354, 359-360; 196 NW2d 778 (1972). In other words, it is a lawful use that existed before the restriction, and therefore continues after the zoning regulation’s enactment. Generally, to establish a prior nonconforming use, a property owner must engage in "work of a 'substantial character’ done by way of preparation for an actual use of the premises.” Bloomfield Twp v Beardslee, 349 Mich 296, 307; 84 NW2d 537 (1957). Once a nonconforming use is established, a subsequently enacted zoning restriction, although reasonable, will not divest the property owner of the vested right. Dusdal, supra. Thus, a prior nonconforming use is an exception to zoning’s general principle that certain uses should be confined to certain localities.5

This Court recently examined the standard for establishing a nonconforming use in Gackler, supra. There, the plaintiff platted approximately twenty acres of a 103-acre plat consisting of fifty-four lots. The zoning permitted mobile, prefabricated and site-built homes. After the township approved the plat, restrictions were implemented *440excluding mobile homes from twelve lakefront lots on the site. Later, the township enacted a zoning ordinance restricting mobile homes to mobile home parks. At this time, eleven single-wide mobile homes occupied the restricted lots. The township amended the ordinance to permit mobile homes meeting the definition of "dwelling” in any zoning classification where site-built or modular single-family residences were permitted. The effect of the ordinance was to exclude single-wide mobile homes from the plaintiff’s lots unless they met the definition of dwelling. Among other challenges, the plaintiff contended that he established a prior nonconforming use as a single-wide mobile home plat by constructing a road, surveying the plat, erecting monuments, completing grading and excavation work, and installing eleven mobile homes.

*439The lawful use of a . . . premise as existing and lawful at the time of enactment of a zoning ordinance, or in case of an amendment of an ordinance, then at the time of the amendment, may be continued although that use does not conform with the provisions of the zoning ordinance or amendment.

*440In holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a nonconforming use, we stated that

"there must be work of a 'substantial character’ done by way of preparation for an actual use of the premises.” Bloomfield Twp v Beardslee, 349 Mich 296, 307; 84 NW2d 537 (1957). The actual use which is nonconforming must be apparent and manifested by a tangible change in the land, as opposed to intended or Contemplated by the property owner. In this regard, preliminary operations such as ordering plans, surveying the land, and the removal of old buildings are insufficient to establish a nonconforming use. [Citations omitted.] The test in each case is not whether a little or a lot has been spent in reliance upon the past zoning classifications, but, rather, " 'whether there has been any tangible change in the land itself by excavation and construction.’ ” [Id. at 574-575.]

Applying these legal standards to the facts, we held that because the improvements only made the lots equally suitable for single-wide mobile *441homes and conventional dwellings, they did not constitute "work of a substantial character which makes apparent an actual use of the plat as a single-wide mobile home plat.” Id. at 576. Thus, to constitute a legally cognizable nonconforming use, work of a substantial nature beyond mere preparation must materially and objectively change the land itself.

in

The zoning restriction’s enactment date is the critical point in determining when a nonconforming use vests. Dingeman Advertising, Inc v Algoma Twp, 393 Mich 89; 223 NW2d 689 (1974).6 Construction undertaken after the zoning regulation’s enactment is inapposite to determining whether a property owner tangibly changed the land. To hold otherwise would encourage noncompliance with the regulation and disparage the import and effect of a referendum.7 In the instant case, defendants understood as early as October 13, 1986, that a referendum was possible, if not likely. In fact, less than one month later, they knew that petitions were being circulated to initiate a referendum. Nonetheless, defendants decided to proceed with the construction of their proposed mobile home park. On February 2, defendants learned that the referendum passed, returning the property to its original R-2 classification. Accordingly, only construction between October 13, 1986, and February 2, 1987, the date the referendum invali*442dated the R-3 zoning, is germane to the current inquiry.

Defendants posit that they established a vested nonconforming use as a mobile home park before February 2, 1987, by (1) obtaining a topographical survey, (2) clearing trees and removing topsoil, (3) installing four test wells, (4) excavating roads, (5) drilling a commercial water well, and (6) building a wellhouse. An independent examination of each activity is necessary.

First, obtaining a topographical survey8 of the property is a classic example of an insufficient preparatory operation. In fact, in Gackler, supra, we expressly denounced "surveying the land” as a preliminary operation. Id. at 575. In City of Lansing v Dawley, 247 Mich 394, 397; 225 NW 500 (1929), this Court stated that "[defendant] did nothing of a substantial character. He went no farther than to order the plans and cause a survey to be made of the lot. This preliminary work was not sufficient to create a vested right to erect the building.” Second, under the facts of this case, clearing trees and removing topsoil are also preliminary ventures. In Gackler, supra, we also listed "the removal of old buildings” as an insufficient preparatory activity. Id. at 575. Clearing trees and removing topsoil are no more substantial than removing permanent structures such as buildings. As a result, they do not constitute work of a "substantial character.”

Third, defendants rely on the installation of four test wells on November 4, 1986. Because the sole purpose of these test wells was to determine the direction of water flow to locate an appropriate .place for a sewage system,9 and nothing more enduring, they are also preliminary in nature.

*443Fourth, defendants contend that in furtherance of roadway construction, they removed topsoil and deposited a sand subgrade on November 19-20, 1986. The only helpful testimony regarding roadway construction was that of a defense expert who worked on the site.

Well, first you’ve got to strip the topsoil and then you level the sand off for a subgrade and that gravel goes on, then later on you blacktop it.

Because of our admitted unfamiliarity with roadway construction, we would have greatly benefited from further testimony regarding the necessary steps for completion of a residential roadway. Without this assistance, it is difficult to determine whether removing topsoil and putting down a sand *444subgrade constitute work of . a "substantial character.” Nevertheless, as the defense expert’s testimony implies, we assume, at the very least, that a permanent road requires a grade, such as gravel, and a durable outer shell, like asphalt or concrete. Therefore, because defendants had not yet commenced the more cumbersome and conclusive stages of construction, their road excavation work was insufficiently substantial to constitute a prior nonconforming use.

Fifth, defendants rely on the construction of a five-inch, 184-foot deep commercial water well about October 14, 1986. The purpose of the well was to determine the quantity and quality of the site’s water. However, unlike the four test wells, the commercial water well was intended to eventually serve as the mobile home park’s permanent water source.10 Finally, defendants built a concrete block wellhouse in November, 1986. The eight foot high structure was insulated and entirely self-contained. Although testimony did not so indicate, because of the sound construction of the wellhouse, we assume that it was intended for permanent use. Thus, because of the perpetual nature and intended future use of both the commercial water well and the wellhouse, we tentatively conclude that they may constitute work of a "substantial character” that tangibly changed the land.

Michigan case law is clear that there must be construction beyond preliminary preparation to establish a prior nonconforming use. It is the present state of the property, not the present *445intention to put property to a future use, that must be the criterion. This examination of defendants’ activities indicates that only the commercial water well and wellhouse are individually pertinent. Neither of these activities, in light of the total construction a mobile home park requires, is sufficiently substantial to satisfy defendants’ burden.11 A review of the record evinces that defendants have not borne the burden of proving that work of a "substantial character” toward construction of a mobile home park predated the referendum election.

Additionally, defendants’ activities, in the aggregate, are not substantial. In Gackler, supra, this Court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prior nonconforming use despite a fully constructed road, erected monuments, graded and excavated plats, and installation of eleven mobile homes. Comparatively, in the instant case, the defendants removed topsoil and deposited a sand subgrade, but did not complete the construction, and cleared trees and removed soil, but did not fully grade or excavate the property; and, unlike Gackler, there were no occupied trailers on the property. Clearly, the construction undertaken in Gackler was more substantial than that in the present case. However, this Court in Gackler refused to recognize a nonconforming use.12 Accordingly, on the basis of an individual analysis of defendants’ activities and Gackler, we find that *446defendants failed to establish a legally cognizable preexisting nonconforming use.

IV

Defendants not only failed to commence construction of a "substantial character,” they failed to obtain a mobile home permit before the referendum.13 As previously noted, defendants applied for a mobile home permit in December 1986. Because of the application’s deficiencies, it was returned to defendants for additional information. In April 1987, defendants resubmitted the application without informing the state authorities of the referendum. Ultimately, in July 1987, five months after the referendum passed, the mobile home commission granted defendants a verbal building permit. Under Michigan case law,14 a building permit, or its counterpart, a permit to commence operations, is an important factor in procuring a "vested right.”15 The significance of a permit is embodied in Dingeman, supra:

Once a city or township issues a valid permit to an applicant, that applicant has every reason and *447right to rely thereon in his business dealings. Permits are not issued by local authorities when the contemplated use for which the permit is issued conflicts with a local zoning ordinance. Should these ordinances change, the average holder of such a permit, even if he had notice of the change of ordinance, would not necessarily presume that the new ordinance applied to him. After all, he has within his possession an official document of the local community authorizing him to proceed with his contemplated project.

While it is true that the issuance of a permit itself will not give vested rights to a nonconforming use to the holder thereof, the possession thereof, and substantial reliance thereon, will give such rights. [Id. at 98-99.]

This Court recently further examined building permits vis-á-vis nonconforming uses in Bevan v Brandon Twp, 438 Mich 385; 475 NW2d 37 (1991). We stated that "[w]here building permits have been applied for, but have not been issued, vested rights are not acquired, even though significant sums may have been expended by the applicant.” Id. at 402. Finally, a building or mobile home permit alone does not confer "vested rights.” Actual construction must begin. Dawley, supra.

v

We cannot state a comprehensive formula for precisely what activities are sufficiently substantial to eclipse the prior nonconforming use threshold. It is not a question susceptible of precise quantitative measurements. An evaluation of whether construction is substantial is "necessarily subjective and varies from case to case.”16 In this case, under the specific facts demonstrated in the record, we hold that defendants did not establish a *448prior nonconforming use before February 2, 1987. Their construction was not of a "substantial character,” nor did they obtain a mobile home permit.17

Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for determination of the issues not previously resolved.

(concurring in part and dissenting in part).

i

While I agree with the majority that no nonconforming use was established by defendants’ construction, I would also hold that defendants did not possess a nonconforming use because the citizens of the municipality, by filing a petition and reversing the zoning designation pursuant to MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12), precluded the establishment of the property expectations and good faith necessary to constitute a nonconforming use. To hold otherwise would eviscerate the statute by permitting developers to circumvent its requirements by quickly engaging in construction sufficient to establish a nonconforming use before a referendum pursuant to the act may be held.

ii

A

In Michigan, the nonconforming use doctrine *449permits a citizen to utilize property in contradiction of a zoning ordinance if the property was utilized for that purpose before the enactment of the ordinance. Dusdal v City of Warren, 387 Mich 354, 359-360; 196 NW2d 778 (1972). The citizens of Heath Township, through referendum, certainly possessed the right to reject the zoning ordinance in question, "but this right was subject to vested property interests . . . .” City of Lansing v Dawley, 247 Mich 394, 396; 225 NW 500 (1929).1 This must be so because the revocation of a zoning " 'ordinance requiring immediate cessation of a nonconforming use may be held to be unconstitutional because it brings about a deprivation of property rights out of proportion to the public benefit obtained ....”’ Gackler Land Co, Inc v Yankee Springs Twp, 427 Mich 562, 574; 398 NW2d 393 (1986), quoting Austin v Older, 283 Mich 667, 676; 278 NW 727 (1938).2

However, because the existence of nonconforming uses undermines the goals of zoning legislation —i.e., the uniform utilization of land to promote economic development, maintenance of property values, and high standards of living3 — the right is *450strictly construed.4 In fact, this Court has recognized that the aim of public policy is the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses. South Central Improvement Ass’n v St Clair Shores, 348 Mich 153, 158; 82 NW2d 453 (1957).5

Michigan has codified the doctrine of nonconforming uses in MCL 125.216(1); MSA 5.2961(16)(1), which mandates:

The lawful use of a building or structure and of land or a premise [sic] as existing and lawful at the time of enactment of a zoning ordinance, or in the case of an amendment of an ordinance, then at the time of the amendment, may be continued although that use does not conform with the provisions of the zoning ordinance or amendment.[6]

Not only are the zoning decisions of municipalities modified by the doctrine of nonconforming uses, MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12) mandates a popular check upon those decisions:

Within 30 days following the passage of the zoning ordinance, a petition signed by a number of qualified and registered voters residing in the portion of the township outside the limits of cities and villages equal to not less than 8% of the total vote cast for all candidates for governor, at the last preceding general election at which a gover*451nor was elected, in the township may be filed with the township clerk requesting the submission of an ordinance or part of an ordinance to the electors residing in the portion of the township outside the limits of cities and villages for their approval. Upon the filing of the petition, an ordinance or part of an ordinance passed by the township board shall not be invalidated until it is rejected by a majority of the registered voters ....

Through the mechanism of the popular referendum, the Legislature has placed the resolution of zoning decisions in unincorporated municipal areas directly to the will of the people.7 The referendum, therefore, is " 'entitled to respect and should not be abridged by withdrawal from [its] processes of matter with which [it is] intended to deal.’ ” Stadle v Battle Creek Twp, 346 Mich 64, 69; 77 NW2d 329 (1956), quoting 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (rev 3d ed), § 16.48, p 241.

B

At issue in the instant case is the ancient contention between the protection of individuals’ property rights and society’s power to regulate property. More concisely, this case presents the interaction between individuals’ property rights as protected by the nonconforming use doctrine and the citizenry’s right to reverse unpopular zoning decisions. Although evoking monumental questions involving the fundamental basis of our government,*4528 the specific inquiry is very narrow: was a nonconforming use created either within the thirty-day petition period of MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12), or after the filing of a petition and before the referendum?

The purpose of the nonconforming use doctrine is to protect the property expectations of the prior user and to avoid imposition of hardship upon the owners of property. Penning v Owens, 340 Mich 355, 365; 65 NW2d 831 (1954). Hence, MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12) should preclude such expectations because when a township rezones a parcel of property the owner is presumed to understand that a petition might be filed within thirty days that could lead to a referendum reversing the township’s decision. Even apart from this presumption, in the instant case the majority recognizes that "defendants understood as early as October 13, 1986, that a referendum was possible, if not likely. In fact, less than one month later, they knew that petitions were being circulated to initiate a referendum.” Ante at 441. Hence, defendants understood that the favorable zoning desig*453nation was subject to revocation, and any expectation that defendants possessed of maintaining the desired zoning was merely wishful thinking. No nonconforming use, therefore, could be established because defendants were continuously aware of the possibility of a quick revision in zoning because of the filing of the petition and the impending referendum. Cf. Harding v Bd of Zoning Appeals, 159 W Va 73, 87; 219 SE2d 324 (1975); State ex rel Re-Lu, Inc v City of Kenner, 284 So 2d 866, 868 (La App, 1973).9

*454Similarly, defendants did not possess a nonconforming use because they lacked the good faith necessary for such a finding. "It is only to avoid injustice that zoning ordinances generally except existing nonconforming uses.” 8A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (rev 3d ed), § 25.183, p 22 (citations omitted). Hence, "[rjeliance upon official conduct will not establish a right to nonconforming use unless the landowner relies [upon that conduct] in good faith.” 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, 3d, § 6.13, p 478 (citations omitted). A finding of good faith, however, is seriously undermined if a landowner is on notice "of a proposed change in the zoning ordinance . . . .” Id. at 480. Indeed, "[t]he requisite good faith is lacking if a landowner proceeds with improvements which will be proscribed by the adoption of an ordinance which he knows or should know is pending.” Id. (citations omitted). In fact, if developers begin or continue construction after they have notice that zoning changes have been proposed, they merely undertake a " 'calculated risk’ in proceeding with their construction and [are] not relying in good faith on the absence or non-adoption of the ordinance.” Biggs v Town of Sandwich, 124 NH 421, 427; 470 A2d 928 (1984).10 In the instant case, *455defendants were well aware that their newly won zoning designation was at risk of quick revocation. Hence, defendants lacked the prerequisite good faith, and no nonconforming use may be recognized. Biggs, supra at 426-427; Kenner, supra at 868.11

Furthermore, the majority eviscerates the statute by encouraging developers to engage in quick construction before a referendum can occur. The majority concludes that "construction between October 13, 1986, and February 2, 1987, the date the referendum invalidated the R-3 zoning, is germane to the current inquiry.” Ante at 441-442. This analysis clearly circumvents the statute by potentially finding that a prior nonconforming use was created during the period either before the expiration of the thirty-day petition filing period or after the filing of petition but before the holding of a referendum. The statute, therefore, becomes moot if a developer is clever enough to quickly undertake sufficient construction to meet the general nonconforming use doctrine. Contrary to its assertion, the majority opinion will almost certainly "encourage a frantic race toward an arbitrary percentage of completion” by developers to the denigration of the democratic process. Ante at 448, n 17. Indeed, if in the instant case defendants had simply completed more construction in a *456shorter time, the majority would have found a nonconforming use; such a result circumvents the intent of the Legislature. Hence, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that "[t]he zoning restriction’s enactment date is the critical point in determining when a nonconforming use vests,”12 ante at 441, and would hold instead that no nonconforming use could vest until after the thirty-day petition period had expired (if no petition was filed) or after a referendum (if a petition was filed).13

Such a holding could have the unfortunate effect of delaying development or improvements upon newly zoned properties. Developers often would wait thirty days before beginning construction, and those awaiting a referendum would be required to postpone construction even further.14 The *457wisdom of this policy, of course, is not for this honorable Court to debate, but for the Legislature.