In this case we are asked to review the award of workers’ compensation benefits granted on the basis of alcoholism and a related nervous condition suffered by plaintiff.1 We find that the wcab erroneously included the plaintiff’s personal addiction to alcohol as a' variable in its decision to award disability benefits. Thus, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to the board to determine whether plaintiff sustained any disabling personal injury that is separate and apart from any disability caused by his alcoholism.

I

Plaintiff, born January 11, 1942, began his em*140ployment with defendant in May 1963. In his petition for hearing, plaintiff claimed disability in the form of personal injury or disablement from occupational disease resulting from repeated and injurious harassment in the course of employment. The nature of the disability was indicated as nerves and a nervous disability. Before the hearing referee, plaintiff testified that when he began working for defendant he drank moderately and experienced no nervous problems. Plaintiff testified further, however, that he developed a nervous condition in 1967 or 1968.2

During his employment, plaintiff took several sick leaves, citing "nerves” as his complaint. The record establishes that he was hospitalized several times for acute alcoholism and associated nervous problems, including once, in September 1981, after he discontinued working for defendant. Plaintiff alleged several general incidents of harassment, such as being given work outside his job assignment, being blamed for the malfunction of defective machines, and not being properly trained to operate the larger trucks. Plaintiff alleges that this harassment provoked him to drink and caused him to develop a nervous disorder. He testified that until the last year of his employment, he was able to drink, control his nervous condition, and still function at work.

Plaintiff asserts that his last year at work with defendant was the most devastating, and was the cause of the ultimate permanent disability that ■ precludes him from working. In January 1981, just before his final disability leave, plaintiff was involved in a mishap while operating a plant truck. The truck tipped over because of improper loading *141and unloading. Plaintiff blamed his supervisor for the mishap, alleging a failure to instruct him regarding the proper loading of a truck. Plaintiff’s last day of work was January 9, 1981. The hearing referee determined the date of the disability to be January 19, 1981. Plaintiff retired with permanent disability effective September 1, 1981. At the time of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board decision, plaintiff was still a drinking alcoholic.

The hearing referee granted plaintiff’s claim for an open award on the basis of a nervous disability. The wcab, in a two to one decision, affirmed the hearing referee’s decision. The wcab majority found that "plaintiff’s disability stems from emotional problems and drinking, such that we cannot extract one from the other.” Slip op at 1. The board majority further found that plaintiff’s father was an alcoholic, that plaintiff began drinking at age thirteen or fourteen, that he is presently unable to control his drinking, id. at 9, and then proceeded to analyze the facts under Deziel v Difco Laboratories, Inc (After Remand), 403 Mich 1; 268 NW2d 1 (1978):

[I]f plaintiff’s emotional problems are linked to his work and were caused or aggravated by his work, contributing to his disability, in our view, plaintiff is entitled to compensation .... [Id. at 9.][3]

The board majority concluded that 1) plaintiff is totally disabled; 2) although plaintiff’s testimony is vague with respect to dates, his testimony regarding job transfers, consultations with his union, and a work mishap establish the existence of work *142incidents triggering his emotional condition, and constitute personal injuries; and 3) that plaintiff honestly believes that work caused his disability. The wcab majority refused to utilize the analysis of Gacioch v Stroh Brewery Co, 426 Mich 612; 396 NW2d 1 (1986), finding the circumstances in Gacioch to be so unique as to limit the decision to its facts.

In a separate opinion, the dissenting board member stated that she would find that plaintiff failed to establish a sufficient causal nexus between his employment and his chronic alcoholism. WCAB, slip op at 13. The dissent concluded that a work nexus was not established because plaintiff’s nervous condition began in 1967, but plaintiff continued to work until 1981, and by plaintiff’s own admission, he could drink alcohol and still work.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and decision of the wcab.4 The Court identified plaintiff’s illness as a psychiatric disability that caused or aggravated plaintiff’s alcoholism. It distinguished Gacioch on the basis of the plaintiff’s allegation in Gacioch of a disability due solely to alcoholism, while in the present case plaintiff alleges a psychiatric disability that is only partially linked to alcoholism.5 The Court then opined that the test established in Deziel was applicable, and that there was sufficient, competent evidence to support the board’s findings.6 We then granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal.7

*143II

It is unclear from the findings of the wcab8 whether plaintiff’s alcoholism stemmed from an underlying psychiatric disorder or whether the psychiatric disorder arose out of an increase in plaintiff’s alcoholic condition.9 Hence, we disagree with the Court of Appeals identification of plaintiff’s illness as a psychiatric illness that caused plaintiff’s alcoholism. We also disagree with plaintiff’s assertion on appeal that it has been established that plaintiff’s alcoholism is a sequela of his nervous disorder.

The deposition testimony of the medical experts produced by both defendant and plaintiff demonstrates the ambiguity of plaintiff’s disability. From their testimony, it is not evident which disorder precipitated the other, or if either could have existed independently. Plaintiff was a moderate *144drinker before beginning work in 1963 for defendant, and before 1963, he did not suffer from any nervous condition. Plaintiff testified that his nervous condition developed about 1967 or 1968, and his drinking became progressively heavier during his employment with defendant. Plaintiff further testified that until his last year he could function at work despite his drinking and nervous condition. Although ambiguous with regard to the exact etiology of plaintiff’s disability, the factual findings made by the board and other evidence in the record clearly demonstrate that alcoholism played a primary role in plaintiff’s claimed injury.

We reject the invitation by plaintiff to expand the chapter three personal injury analysis of workers’ compensation claims to cover diseases of addiction.10 In order to be awarded benefits under a chapter three personal injury analysis, the claimant must show that he suffered a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Although no compensation is awarded for a disability caused by an ordinary disease of life, a claimant may recover workers’ compensation benefits when his employment aggravates, accelerates, or combines with a preexisting condition to produce a personal injury.

Alcoholism is a progressive disease.11 The compulsion and the consumption will accelerate until it is interrupted.12 It is in the nature of the disease *145that its victims will find conditions and circumstances at home, at work, and in between to justify the increased need for alcohol.13 It is not work and its attendant stresses that aggravate alcoholism; it is alcohol.14 It is not a job or occupation that compels alcoholics to consume alcohol; it is the disease from which they suffer.15 Individuals who suffer from alcoholism hold the most essential key to their recovery.16 It defies logic and what is now *146known about the nature of alcoholism to declare that a job or occupation is responsible for accelerating or aggravating a worker’s alcoholism when alcoholism is a progressive disease, and aggravation of which is caused by the alcohol itself rather than by employment.17

In Gacioch, we recognized that chronic alcoholism is a disease. Id. at 618.18 We remanded that *147case to the wcab for a determination whether the plaintiff satisfied his burden of proving his claim: that the claimant, as a brewery worker, was more prone to develop alcoholism than the general public because of conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the defendant. The Gacioch analysis confined compensation for diseases of addiction into a chapter four occupational disease analysis. Justice Brickley, writing separately, favored denial of compensation for aggravation of preexisting diseases where the "aggravating conditions are not required by the job and the disease is one from which recovery primarily depends upon personal motivation.” Id. at 629. Where a personal addiction plays a significant role in a claimed mental or emotional injury, a finding that such an injury is work related should be precluded.19 Justice Boyle, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Riley, indicated that she was not convinced that "alcoholism or a predisposition thereto, whether or not aggravated or accelerated by the conditions of employment, was contemplated as a compensable injury.” Id. at 621.

Because there is no indication that the Legislature intended to include alcoholism as a chapter three personal injury or a preexisting condition that is aggravated, accelerated, or combined with conditions of employment resulting in disability or death, and because there exists persuasive evi*148dence to the contrary, we adhere to the view that alcoholism is not a "personal injury” that arises out of and in the course of employment for purposes of a workers’ compensation disability. In this case, we conclude that alcoholism is not a compensable personal injury under chapter three of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act.

In the present case, the wcab found that plaintiff’s disability resulted from emotional problems and alcoholism. Because the plaintiff’s alcoholism was a significant factor in the board’s decision that the plaintiff was disabled, we vacate the Court of Appeals decision and remand to the board to determine whether the plaintiff suffered a disabling personal injury that is separate and apart from his alcoholism. If there is insufficient evidence of an independent disabling personal injury, plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proof, and compensation should therefore be denied.

(dissenting). The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board found that Paul E. Pierce "has emotional problems and these are inextricably connected to his drinking problems, which, together, disable” him from working, and that "his drinking was aggravated by his work” at General Motors. The wcab further found that Pierce established the requisite "work-related nexus” and "work incidents that triggered mental or emotional disequilibrium” that were "personal injuries.” The Court of Appeals, on remand from this Court, affirmed.1_

*149The issue presented is whether there is any evidence2 to support those findings, and, if so, whether those findings support, as a matter of law, the award of benefits for a disabling mental disorder.

1 would affirm the Court of Appeals and the wcab because there was evidence that supports the findings of the wcab, and because those findings, as a matter of law, support an award of benefits for the injury found by the wcab to have disabled Pierce from working.

The majority ignores the constitutional imperative3 that "[f]indings of fact in workmen’s compensation proceedings shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law.”4 The statute does not "otherwise provide,” but rather reaffirms the principle embedded in the constitution.5

(separate opinion). The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board found, as set forth in the majority opinion, that Paul E. Pierce suffered a disabling personal injury resulting "from emo*150tional problems and alcoholism.”1 The wcab further found that Pierce’s "emotional problems” were "inextricably connected to his drinking problems, which, together, disable” him from working, and that "his drinking was aggravated by his work” at General Motors,2 and awarded compensation. The Court of Appeals, on remand, affirmed.3

The majority vacates the Court of Appeals decision and sets aside the award of compensation because Pierce’s "alcoholism was a signiñcant factor in the board’s decision” that Pierce was disabled, and remands to the wcab to determine whether Pierce "suffered a disabling personal injury that is separate and apart from his alcoholism.”4 The majority directs that "[i]f there is insufficient evidence of an independent disabling personal injury,” compensation shall be denied.5

A

The majority concludes, as a matter of law, that the stress of work can never be "responsible for accelerating or aggravating” the "progressive disease” of alcoholism.6 The sole cause of alcoholism and of any resulting disability, as a matter of law, is always the failure of the worker to stop drinking. This is so because a worker who is an alcoholic has the "most essential key” — abstinence—to the avoidance of disability, and thus could avoid *151the progression of the disease and resulting disability by eliminating consumption of alcohol.7

The majority thus transforms a factual issue, within the exclusive province of the wcab, into a question of law, within the exclusive province of this Court, premised on the majority’s findings of fact and conclusion that the sole cause of what it acknowledges is the "disease” of alcoholism8 is always the worker’s failure to abstain from drinking.

The essence of the majority’s analysis is that, to the extent alcoholism plays a "significant”9 role in the worker’s personal injury and disability, the worker is "responsible”10 for his personal injury and disability — the personal injury and disability is the worker’s fault — because he did not stop drinking.

Workers’ compensation is, however, the paradigmatic no-fault liability act. Unless the worker intentionally causes his own injury, the worker may recover benefits even though he is at fault and even though the work or stress of work is not the sole cause. Although the worker is suffering from a preexisting condition — here the disease of alcoholism, in another case heart disease or emphysema — that is accelerated or aggravated by the work or the stress of work, compensation ordinarily may be awarded for a resulting disability.

B

The majority’s analysis ignores a basic premise *152of the law, fault or no fault, civil or criminal. A person who is subject to liability is not absolved of responsibility although, as it is generally put, the victim has an eggshell head. A person with a weak back, a weak heart, or a mental disorder may recover workers’ compensation benefits if the stress of work accelerates or aggravates to the point of disability the back, heart, or mental condition. The majority does not adequately explain why a person who comes to the job with a tendency to alcoholism and mental problems, should not also be entitled to recover benefits if the stress of work accelerates or aggravates his alcoholism and mental condition, in combination, to the point of disability.

It is well established that, where an injury or disability arises from a preexisting physical or mental condition and events at work, the worker need not establish that the work connection is “primary,”11 and thus it is not material, and com*153pensation cannot properly be denied because Pierce’s alcoholism played a "significant role.”12

When employment and personal risks concur to produce injury, the injury arises out of the employment, since the employment need not be the primary cause, but need only contribute to the injury. [1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation, § 7.00, p 3-12. Emphasis added.]

It is not necessary that a worker’s employment be the proximate cause, the sole cause, or in any way the cause of his or her disability. It is enough that the employment contribute to the disability or aggravate a preexisting condition. Furthermore, it is not necessary that the work be unusually strenuous, or that it would have resulted in disability in a healthy individual. The disability is compensable if the injury was severe enough or the work strenuous enough to cause a given worker to become disabled.

A disability is compensable if either a single event at work or the repeated stress of the work combines with other causes to contribute to a *154disability or aggravates a preexisting condition. [Welch, Worker’s Compensation in Michigan: Law & Practice, § 7.3, pp 7-3 through 7-4. Emphasis in original. Citations omitted.]

Adherence to the rule of law should constrain the majority to observe these principles without regard to whether the ordinary disease of life is cardiovascular or mental, or is aggravated by overeating or overdrinking, as long as the requisite work connection, stress in this case, is established.

It should not be necessary to explain to a professional audience the rationale for an established rule of law that pervades the civil and criminal jurisprudence.13 The trier of fact, here the wcab, found that the stress of work at General Motors aggravated Pierce’s disease of alcoholism and combined with his mental disorder to produce an injury that disabled him from continuing to work.

C

To be sure, an alcoholic can slow or arrest the progress of the disease of alcoholism by reducing or eliminating the consumption of alcohol.

Physicians and the media repeatedly advise against smoking, to eat wisely, and exercise regularly. Some follow this advice. Many do not. It has never been thought that in assessing whether a worker can recover benefits for a disabling disease the wcab should decide whether the worker "suffered a disabling personal injury separate and apart” from and "independently” of his smoking, gluttony, or failure to exercise.

Also noteworthy, as set forth in the majority *155opinion,14 is that a person addicted to alcohol may have no more ability to stop drinking than a person addicted to smoking, excessive eating, and physical inactivity, may be able, when subjected to job stress, to stop smoking, overeating, or a pattern of physical inactivity.

D

There is indeed a moral hazard where the consumption of alcoholic beverages is involved.15 It is, nevertheless, beyond the province of this Court to seek to discourage the award of compensation by the wcab for disabilities resulting from a mental disorder linked to alcoholism where the wcab has found that the alcoholism was aggravated by the stress of work. The well-established rule of law regarding causation should guide the decision in the instant case, although the use of alcoholic beverages is involved:

Some people are outraged that Michigan law permits recovery when the employment did nothing more than aggravate a preexisting condition. It would be extremely unusual, however, if the law did not do so. All first-year law students are *156taught that a tortfeasor "takes his victim as he finds him,” and are given the example of "the man with the eggshell skull.” The principle is that if you hit a person on the head and a cracked skull results, you are responsible for the consequences, even if the skull was weak to begin with and you gave only a slight blow as a joke.

If private citizens are expected to be responsible to the victims of their negligence, even when a resulting injury is largely influenced by a preexisting weakness in the victim, there is no reason employers should escape liability to their workers under the same circumstances. [Welch, supra, p 7-4.]

Under the majority’s logic, a person who works in a dusty factory and who smokes to relieve stress caused by work might or would be unable to recover workers’ compensation benefits for lung damage.

E

The majority states that "[b]ecause there is no indication that the Legislature intended to include alcoholism as a chapter three personal injury or a preexisting condition that is aggravated, accelerated, or combined with conditions of employment resulting in disability or death, and because there exists persuasive evidence to the contrary, we adhere to the view that alcoholism is not a 'personal injury’ that arises out of and in the course of employment for purposes of a workers’ compensation disability.”16

The workers’ compensation act does not define a chapter three personal injury, and thus does not identify specific injuries. Concern regarding compensation of "[m]ental disabilities and conditions *157of the aging process/’ including "heart and cardiovascular conditions,” led to a 1980 amendment of the act to provide that such disabilities and conditions "shall be compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant manner.”17 (Emphasis added.) Alcoholism is not mentioned. The failure to mention or exclude alcoholism, when recently enacting the higher "significant manner” standard respecting compensation for "[m]ental disabilities and conditions of the aging process” is, I think, an "indication” that the Legislature did not intend to exclude alcoholism as a "preexisting condition.”

The majority does not identify the "persuasive evidence to the contrary” of legislative intent not to "include alcoholism.” The majority simply asserts, without citation or reference to any authority, that there is "persuasive evidence to the contrary.”18 Courts in other states, construing essentially the same workers’ compensation provisions, have concluded that workers can recover benefits when the stress of work aggravates to the point of disability a tendency to alcoholism. See part in.

The statement, "we adhere to the view that, alcoholism is not a 'personal injury’ ” suggests that this Court has previously so ruled.19 The Court *158cites no such precedent, and there is none. The "we” possibly refers to the views stated by some of the justices in their separate opinions in Gacioch v Stroh Brewery Co, 426 Mich 612; 396 NW2d 1 (1986). Those separate statements do not support the assertion that "we” — the Court as a court — has heretofore ruled that alcoholism is not a personal injury, and that the Court is simply "adhering” to that view.

F

In Gacioch, this Court analyzed the plaintiff’s claims of disability as a result of alcoholism under chapter four concerning occupational disease.20 Pierce claimed personal injury under chapter three; he does not claim that his disability is the result of an occupational disease.

As the majority states, an award under chapter three is appropriate when the claimant has shown that he suffered á personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.21 Compensation may be awarded for disabilities resulting from ordinary diseases of life if the claimant can show that his employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with a preexisting condition to produce a personal injury.

The majority’s ipse dixit rejects the application of chapter three personal injury analysis "to cover diseases of addiction.”22 In so doing, it erects its "prejudices into legal principles.” New State Ice Co v Liebmann, 285 US 262, 311; 52 S Ct 371; 76 L Ed 747 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

The wcab’s award of compensation to Pierce *159under chapter three should be affirmed because the wcab found that work stress aggravated his alcoholism in combination with his emotional disorders.

I

The issue presented is whether there is any evidence23 to support the findings of the wcab that Pierce has emotional problems connected to his drinking problems, that his drinking problem was aggravated by his work at General Motors, and that the emotional and drinking problems together disabled him from working. And, if so, whether those findings support, as a question of law, the award of benefits for a disabling mental disorder.

I would affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the wcab because there was evidence that supports the findings of the wcab, and because those findings, as a matter of law, support an award of benefits for the injury found by the wcab to have disabled Pierce from working.

The majority ignores the constitutional imperative24 that "[findings of fact in workmen’s compensation proceedings shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law.”25 The statute does not "otherwise provide,” but rather reaffirms the principle embedded in the constitution.26_

*160A

The majority remands the case to the wcab stating — as a matter of law — that the "wcab erroneously included the plaintiff’s personal addiction to alcohol as a variable in its decision to award disability benefits,”27 that "alcoholism is a progressive disease, . . . aggravation of which is caused by the alcohol itself rather than by employment”28 and that "there is no indication that the Legislature intended to include alcoholism as a chapter three personal injury or a preexisting condition that is aggravated, accelerated, or combined with conditions of employment resulting in disability or death . . . .”29 The majority adds: "Alcoholism is a progressive disease. The compulsion and the consumption will accelerate until it is interrupted.”30 The findings of the wcab, fairly read, reject the claim that Pierce sought to recover for the natural "progression,” whatever that may be, of his alcoholism, an "ordinary disease of life” that, in itself, is not compensable:31

Defendant [General Motors] argues that plaintiff’s [Pierce’s] chronic alcoholism is an ordinary disease of life and not compensable .... From the testimony of Dr. Bengisu that work stresses were a signiñcant factor in plaintiff’s anxiety and drinking problem and contributed to his disability, I find that plaintiff has established a work-related nexus. . . . [P]laintiff has established *161by a preponderance of the evidence from his treating psychiatrist that his drinking was aggravated by his work. . . .

We have found an emotional component to plaintiff’s disability. At the same time, we recognize that his emotional difficulties are also linked to his drinking problem. We believe plaintiff that he was upset and stressed by his work for defendant. We believe him that he was transferred out of seniority more. than once and became very upset. We so find.

. . . [W]e have found an emotional component in plaintiff’s diagnosed emotional and alcoholic condition.

. . . [B]ased upon the testimony of Drs. Lian and Bengisu, plaintiff is totally disabled. We likewise find that the medical evidence meets the preponderance standard ....

... We find plaintiff’s testimony to be vague as to precise dates; however, plaintiff clearly testified to job transfers which caused him emotional upset .... [W]e find that plaintiff has established work incidents that triggered mental or emotional disequilibrium and were personal injuries. . . . [Emphasis added.]

Those findings include findings of an emotional component to Pierce’s disability linked to his drinking problem, that work stress was a "significant” factor in Pierce’s anxiety and drinking problem and contributed to his disability, that his drinking "was aggravated by his work,” and thus implicitly a finding that the disabling personal injury found by the wcab was not simply the manifestation of an inexorable "progression” of Pierce’s alcoholism.

B

The majority speaks of how "[a]lcoholism is a progressive disease” as if the progressive nature of *162alcoholism is a well-defined concept.32 Some alcoholics die from drinking, some drink continuously at the same level, some reduce to social drinking, and some become abstinent.33

The medical sources relied on by the majority do not support its conclusion that Pierce was doomed to become disabled because of the "progressive” nature of his alcoholism without regard to the stress of work. The majority cites authorities stating that " '[o]nce the alcoholic begins to drink, he may be no more able to control the compulsion to continue drinking than the tuberculosis patient can voluntarily control his coughing’ ” and that alcoholism is "often progressive.”34 (Emphasis added.) None of these sources indicate that alcoholism is always progressive and that alcoholism necessarily degenerates into disability even if the alcoholic is not subjected to the stress of work. Yet it is upon these statements that the majority appears to base its conclusion that Pierce’s alcoholism was "progressive.”35

The wcab found a personal injury that was not simply the result of the "progression” of Pierce’s alcoholism, and thus found a personal injury independent of the "progression” of his alcoholism. The wcab reviewed the actual work events related by Pierce and found that those work events "triggered mental or emotional disequilibrium and were personal injuries . . . .” The majority, constitutionally barred from fact finding, has nevertheless found that Pierce would have continued drinking even if he had not experienced work stress.

That alcoholics can always give a reason why *163they drink36 should not control the outcome of this case. There was a specific finding of fact by the wcab that Pierce was not just imagining that work stress caused his problems — Pierce was not just making work a scapegoat for his drinking. According to the wcab, work stress was the problem, or at least a problem, causing Pierce’s disability.37

C

The majority acknowledges that "[t]he deposition testimony of the medical experts produced by both defendant and plaintiff demonstrates the ambiguity of plaintiff’s disability. From their testimony, it is not evident which disorder precipitated the other, or if either could have existed independently."38

*164The majority does not explain how the wcab, on remand, should separate the alcoholism from the emotional disorder, given the wcab’s finding that the two are intertwined "such that we cannot extract one from the other.”

II

The majority cites no Michigan authority in support of its pronouncement.39 It observes that Florida and Georgia have reached the result it concludes is sound public policy. As indicated by the majority, the statutes in those two states were amended to specifically exclude recovery for work claims in which alcoholism is the claimed disability.40

This Court is bound to enforce the workers’ compensation act as enacted by the Michigan Legislature, and may not graft onto the act the explicit prohibitions and policy choices set forth in statutes enacted in other jurisdictions. Unless the Michigan Legislature amends the act to exclude recovery for acceleration or aggravation of the ordinary disease of alcoholism, this Court should sustain an award of compensation where alcohol*165ism is a factor as it routinely sustains awards compensating for the aggravation or acceleration of ordinary diseases of life thought to be less blameworthy than alcoholism.

After stating that "[ordinary diseases of life to which the public is generally exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable” (the part of the statute quoted by the majority),41 the statute provides (in the part omitted by the majority):

Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant manner. [MCL 418.401(2)(b); MSA 17.237(401)(2)(b).]

The workers’ compensation definition of "personal injury” enumerates exceptions to coverage— different rules for mental disabilities, diseases of the aging process, heart and cardiovascular conditions. It enumerates no exception for alcoholism.

The majority thus states that, because the Legislature did not specifically mention alcoholism as being included, it must be excluded from coverage. This conclusion turns logic and traditional rules of statutory construction on their heads. "The enumeration of exclusions from the operation of a statute indicates that the statute should apply to all cases not specifically excluded.”42

While expressio unius can be overcome "by a strong indication of contrary legislative intent or policy,”43 the majority points to nothing indicative of legislative intent to exclude disabilities involv*166ing alcoholism from coverage and no policy other than their essentially personal views that alcoholism is primarily a motivational disorder.

III

Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed the question whether a claimant can recover workers’ compensation benefits when alcoholism played a direct role in the claimed disability.44

Most recently, a New York appellate court, applying a substantial evidence standard of review, affirmed an award of benefits for mental disability involving alcoholism. The worker in Beames v Warren Co Sheriff’s Dep’t, 190 AD2d 877; 593 NYS2d 127 (1993), was a correction officer for a sheriff’s department. The worker’s son, then sixteen years old, was incarcerated in the facility in which the worker was employed.

The worker was apparently subjected to constant harassing and taunting about his son’s incarceration, both from inmates and fellow correction officers. His fears about the future imprisonment of his son, as well as the taunting, caused considerable stress. The worker had a physical confrontation with an inmate who allegedly threatened to sodomize the claimant’s son. Following this incident, the worker was fired.

Although the worker had longstanding problems with alcohol abuse, depression, and marital difficulties, these were apparently under control until the imprisonment of his son.45_

*167The New York court held that there was substantial evidence to support the finding that the worker’s disability was causally related to an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.46

An Oregon appellate court after de novo review affirmed awards of compensation for injuries in which alcoholism and mental disorders combined. The worker in Adsitt v Clairmont Water Dist, 79 Or App 1; 717 P2d 1231 (1986), was a billing clerk in a three-person office who felt harassed by what she considered to be a continuous barrage of unfair criticism about her job performance. She was found to have a long history of alcohol abuse accompanied or caused by depression and low self-esteem, superimposed upon an hysterical personality. The worker claimed that work stress aggravated her mental disorders and alcoholism.

The court found that while work stress did not cause her mental illness and alcoholism, "an exacerbation of an underlying condition caused by work activities is itself a compensable occupational disease if it reflects a worsening of the condition and involves an increase in pain which produces disability or requires medical services.” Id., p 6. The court further found that work conditions were the major contributing cause of the worker’s physical condition. It added that it "does not matter *168who is responsible for the work conditions or whether claimant’s perceptions of those conditions is the same as an objective outside observer’s. The conditions could produce stress and did produce a worsening of claimant’s condition.” Id.

A similar result was reached by the Oregon court in Globe Machine v Yock, 79 Or App 9; 717 P2d 1235 (1986), decided contemporaneously with Adsitt. The court affirmed an award finding that the worker’s disabling psychological breakdown and alcohol abuse were the result of stress experienced on the job.

The worker was the president of a Globe Machine subsidiary that had filed for bankruptcy. He had presided over the liquidation of the company, including laying off employees and dealing with creditors. The worker had been a heavy drinker before his job at Globe Machine, but had always been able to work. He began to drink even more heavily after several months on the job.

The Oregon court was convinced by the evidence that work caused a worsening of the worker’s condition. "If his alcohol abuse is a symptom of underlying depression and anxiety, the work stress produced or exacerbated those problems. If alcoholism is in itself a disease, he lost control of the disease because of work stress.” Id., p 15. The court further concluded that "[cjlaimant’s loss of control over his alcoholism together with his depression. and anxiety constituted a compensable worsening of his underlying disorder.” Id., pp 15-16.

A Louisiana appellate court, in Proyer v Monsanto Co, 606 So 2d 1307 (La App, 1992), affirmed an award of compensation where work stress, alcoholism, and mental injuries were interrelated. The worker was a production technician operating a control board processing the mixing and manu*169facturing of chemicals. Mishandling could lead to spontaneous reactions called fusions. A number of fusions occurred while the worker was at the controls, for which he was blamed. One evening he received a telephone call from a co-worker informing him that he was being blamed for a fusion that did not occur on his watch.

Feeling stressed by his work situation, the worker began to envision a plan to kill his boss. He suffered a severe breakdown or psychotic episode upon being sent home,47 becoming delusional, suicidal, and homicidal. The worker was admitted to a substance abuse clinic five days later. Monsanto appealed a finding of total and permanent disability due to mental stress from work.

The worker’s expert witness testified that the worker was suffering from depression, alcohol abuse, a borderline personality disorder, and paranoia, and that alcohol aggravated the situation, but was not the primary problem. Rather, work stress was primary. Monsanto’s expert witness testified that the worker’s problem was chiefly the result of alcoholic hallucinosis, although he acknowledged that the worker was under work stress. The Louisiana court affirmed an award of benefits under a standard of review that permitted reversal only for manifest error, and declined to set aside the award because alcohol played a role in the injury.

The majority’s citation of Darnell v North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 450 NW2d 721, 726 (ND, 1990),48 is misplaced. There, the court wrote that "we determine only whether a reasoning mind could have reasonably determined that the agency’s factual conclusions were sup*170ported by the weight of the evidence.” Id., p 723. The court thus was bound to affirm the denial of benefits to the worker because it found the decision denying benefits to be reasonable on the factual record.

The standard applied in Darnell is similar to the standard that limits this Court’s powers of judicial review, and which requires that this Court affirm wcab findings of fact unless there is no evidentiary support.

In the instant case, the wcab found from the evidence that Pierce’s employment activities were not an excuse for voluntarily drinking. Rather, work stress aggravated Pierce’s alcoholism and combined with or caused emotional disorders, leading to his disability.

A related group of cases from other jurisdictions involves claims that the worker drank or used drugs to ease the pain of compensable physical injury. The workers sought to recover the costs of substance abuse treatment.49 None of these cases adopts a blanket rule denying benefits for alcohol treatment. Some deny benefits because statutes mandate a denial, while at least one court, for public policy reasons, has refused to award benefits for treatment for addiction to an illegal drug.

In Hansen v Weyerhaeuser, 89 Or App 349; 749 P2d 1183 (1988), the claimant had injured his knee *171in June, 1981, was awarded permanent partial disability, and returned to work in a different capacity. He subsequently injured his back in May, 1983. Two weeks into his second stay at a pain center, in November, 1984, it was discovered that the worker was an alcoholic. The employer denied responsibility for the cost of an alcohol rehabilitation program as well as the second stay at the pain center.

The worker contended that the pain of his injuries caused him to drink heavily and that, as a result, he became an alcoholic needing treatment. The Oregon court, after review de novo, affirmed the denial of benefits. The court, relying in part on Globe Machine, wrote that "[treatment for the alcoholism would be compensable if the injury caused it to become symptomatic, or caused a preexisting psychological condition to become symptomatic in the form of alcoholism.” Id., p 352. The worker proved neither of these conditions.50

The Nebraska Supreme Court in Elliott v Midlands Animal Products, 229 Neb 823; 428 NW2d 920 (1988), reviewed an award of benefits to a worker who sought payment for alcohol abuse treatment. He contended that he drank to ease the pain of a compensable hand injury.51 The court affirmed an award of benefits for treatment occurring after a 1979 hand injury because there was testimony that he drank heavily after the injury, when before he only drank socially. The court, *172however, denied payment for alcohol treatment occurring after a 1982 hand injury, because there was no testimony that the worker’s alcoholism had been aggravated by the 1982 injury.

Benefits have been denied when statutes explicitly so require. In Milmir Construction v Smith, 582 So 2d 52 (Fla App, 1991), the worker had an alcohol and drug abuse problem subsequent to suffering a work-related back injury. The Florida statute specifically excluded from the definition of injury arising out of employment "disability or death due to the accidental acceleration or aggravation of a venereal disease or of a disease due to the habitual use of alcohol or . . . narcotic drug . . . .”52 A Georgia statute provides that "alcoholism or disabilities attributable thereto shall not be deemed to be 'injury’ or 'personal injury’ by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.”53

One court has denied benefits for drug abuse treatment for public policy reasons. In Dumas v Hartford Ins Co, 583 So 2d 31 (La App, 1991), the worker claimed that his attempts to relieve the pain of a compensable back injury caused him to *173turn to street drugs (cocaine) when medical attention failed to provide relief. The court ruled:

[T]he defendants cannot be held liable for payment of the costs of plaintiff’s drug abuse therapy, even if the cocaine use was precipitated by the work-related accident. As a matter of public policy, the plaintiff’s decision to forego legal medical treatment in preference for the use of illegal drugs cannot be sanctioned.-Other avenues for relieving the pain of the back injury were available. [Id., p 35.]

Denying benefits as a matter of public policy for a disability resulting from the illegal use of drugs is clearly different than denying benefits for disability resulting from the legal, albeit unwise, consumption of alcohol.54

The largest group of cases in which courts have considered alcoholism is that in which alcohol or drug abuse was claimed to have been or was found to be an intervening or actual cause of the disability for which the claimant sought workers’ compensation benefits. In those cases, workers claimed that work injury caused disabilities unrelated to alcohol or drug use. The issue discussed by the courts was whether the board correctly found that the use of alcohol or drugs was an intervening cause in the nexus between the work-place injury and the disability for which benefits were sought. Typically, the appellate courts affirmed findings of fact on a narrow standard of appellate review.55

*174At the heart of the majority’s reasoning is its belief that Pierce should not be compensated because alcoholism is a self-inflicted disorder. Alcoholism, according to the majority, is an addictive disorder for which the only person at fault is the alcoholic.

As the cases from other jurisdictions demonstrate, this is not a position that has been generally adopted. Further, the federal courts have awarded social security disability and supplementary income benefits in cases in which alcoholism played a role in claimant’s disability.56

At least two jurisdictions have considered a *175worker’s alcoholism in assessing the amount of disability caused by a compensable, physical work injury.57

I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the award of the wcab.