At issue in the instant case is whether proximate cause in a legal malpractice action alleging negligence during an appeal is an issue of law reserved for the court or an issue of fact reserved for the jury. More specifically, we are presented with the question whether a court or a jury should determine whether the underlying appeal would have been successful. We hold that the issue is reserved to the court because whether an appeal would have been successful intrinsically involves issues of law within the exclusive province of the judiciary. Furthermore, we find that the trial court failed to resolve the issue as a matter of law, and that a determination of the issue by a court does not deprive a litigant of the *583right to trial by jury. Thus, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

i

Dr. and Mrs. William Kauffman brought suit against plaintiff The Charles Reinhart Company,1 a real estate firm located in Washtenaw County, Michigan. The Kauffmans alleged that plaintiff had improperly altered an instrument conveying real estate that they had purchased by reserving a previously undisclosed utility easement. In July 1983, the jury found that plaintiff defrauded the Kauffmans and awarded $70,000 in damages. The jury also found that plaintiff negligently conveyed the property and awarded an additional $30,000 in damages.2

Plaintiff’s corporate counsel, deciding to proceed with another attorney on appeal, retained Ronald C. Winiemko as counsel. In September 1983, they discussed the case and determined that the appeal would focus on the claim that the jury awards for both fraud and negligence were cumulative. Although Winiemko timely filed an appeal, he failed to timely file his brief and formally answer his adversary’s motion for dismissal.3 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. Winiemko also failed to timely file a motion for rehearing *584pursuant to MCR 7.215(H).4 Furthermore, he failed to respond to repeated requests of plaintiff’s corporate counsel to inform him of the progress of the appeal.

Thus, in September 1987, plaintiff filed the instant action against Winiemko and his law firm, Bell, Hertler & Winiemko, P.C., averring that Winiemko had committed professional malpractice by, inter alia, irretrievably losing plaintiff’s right to appeal. Plaintiff alleged that but for Winiemko’s negligence, plaintiff would have succeeded in its appeal of the underlying litigation. Furthermore, plaintiff alleged that it was denied the opportunity to negotiate a more favorable settlement,5 and was confronted with a license revocation proceeding begun by the Kauffmans.6

Winiemko filed several motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), contending that plaintiff did not present a prima facie case because no proximate cause could be proven; Winiemko argued that the underlying appeal, as a matter of law, could not have succeeded.7 Winiemko posited that because the trial attorney had not objected to the pertinent jury instructions, the appeal could not have prevailed, and that in any event the tactics utilized by the trial attorney foreclosed any possibility of a successful appeal. *585Finding the question a jury issue, the trial court denied Winiemko’s motions and permitted plaintiff’s legal experts to testify that the appeal would have succeeded. The jury found Winiemko guilty of professional malpractice and breach of contract, and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.8 It ruled that proximate cause in a legal malpractice suit is a question of fact,9 and found that even in an appellate malpractice action "issues that were questions of law in the underlying case . . . become questions of fact” in the malpractice action.10 Thus, the Court held that "[i]n a case charging appellate malpractice, the question for the trier of fact is whether a reasonable appellate court would, more likely than not, have granted the appellant in the underlying case some relief.”11

This Court granted leave to appeal on June 10, 1993.12

ii

A

A unanimous opinion of this Court recently defined the elements of a legal malpractice action in Michigan:

(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship;

(2) negligence in the legal representation of the plaintiff;

(3) that the negligence was a proximate cause of an injury; and_

*586(4) the fact and extent of the injury alleged. [Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 63; 503 NW2d 435 (1993).]

As in other tort actions, the plaintiff has the burden of proving all the elements of the suit to prevail. Id.

Often the most troublesome element of a legal malpractice action is proximate cause. As in any tort action, to prove proximate cause a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must establish that the defendant’s action was a cause in fact of the claimed injury.13 Hence, a plaintiff "must show that but for the attorney’s alleged malpractice, he would have been successful in the underlying suit.” Id. (emphasis added).14 In other words, "' "the client seeking recovery from his attorney is faced with the difficult task of proving two cases within a single proceeding.” ’ ” Id. at 64, quoting Basic Food Industries, Inc v Grant, 107 Mich App 685, 691; 310 NW2d 26 (1981), quoting 45 ALR2d 5, § 2, p 10. To hold otherwise would permit a jury *587to find a defendant liable on the basis of speculation and conjecture. 443 Mich 65.15 Although the "suit within a suit” concept is not universally applicable, it applies where the alleged negligent conduct involves the failure of an attorney to properly pursue an appeal. Id.16_

*588In a legal malpractice action alleging negligence in an appeal a plaintiff must prove two aspects of causation in fact: whether the attorney’s negligence caused the loss or unfavorable result of the appeal, and whether the loss or unfavorable result of the appeal in turn caused a loss or unfavorable result in the underlying litigation. 2 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice (3d ed), §24.39, p 538.17 Whether the court as a matter of law or the jury as an issue of fact determines these aspects of proximate cause is the issue in the instant case.18

B

Plaintiff urges this Court to affirm the Court of Appeals by holding that whether an appeal would have been successful is an issue of fact for the jury in a legal malpractice case because cause in fact is an issue for the jury in other professional malpractice cases. Plaintiff suggests that to hold otherwise would simply be an elitist ruling by this Court to protect attorneys from the rigors of the jury system. Defendants, on the other hand, suggest that the trial court is vested with the exclusive authority to determine the threshold issue whether the underlying appeal possessed legal merit as a component of proximate cause because the issue is inherently one of law.19_

*589"Since the basic premise of trying the underlying action is to prove what the result should have been, the guiding principle in identifying issues of law and fact is to utilize the same classifications as should have been applied in the underlying case.” 2 Mallen & Smith, supra, §27.10, p 652.20 Thus, whether an appeal lost because of an attorney’s negligence would have succeeded if properly pursued is an issue for the court because the resolution of the underlying appeal originally would have rested on a decision of law. See, e.g., Chocktoot v Smith, 280 Or 567, 574-575; 571 P2d 1255 (1977). With rare exception, appeals are based on and resolved as matters of law, not fact.21 Demill v Moffat, 45 Mich 410; 8 NW 79 (1881); Keiser v Enterprise Foundry Co, 357 Mich 159; 97 NW2d 737 (1959). Thus, an appellate malpractice action presents an issue of law regarding the success of the underlying appeal within its proximate cause analysis.

The Texas Supreme Court has reasoned:_

*590The question of whether an appeal would have been successful depends on an analysis of the law and the procedural rules. [The plaintiff’s] petition that the jury should make this determination as a question of fact would require the jury to sit as appellate judges, review the trial record and briefs, and decide whether the trial court committed reversible error. A judge is clearly in a better position to make this determination. Resolving legal issues on appeal is an area exclusively within the province of judges .... [Millhouse v Wiesenthal, 775 SW2d 626, 628 (Tex, 1989).]

Although juries may often decide the issue of proximate cause in nonappellate malpractice suits,22 the nature of appellate practice mandates *591judicial resolution of the issue. The Washington Supreme Court has explained:

In cases involving an attorney’s alleged failure to perfect an appeal . . . [t]he cause in fact inquiry becomes whether the frustrated client would have been successful if the attorney had timely filed the appeal. . . .

The determination of this issue would normally be within the sole province of the jury. Underlying the broad inquiry, however, are questions bearing legal analysis. The determination of whether review would have been granted and whether the client would have received a more favorable judgment depends on an analysis of the law and the Rules of Appellate Procedure. [Daugert v Pappas, 104 Wash 2d 254, 258; 704 P2d 600 (1985).]

The Michigan Constitution exclusively vests the "judicial power” of the state in one court of justice composed of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the courts of original jurisdiction. Const 1963, art 6, § 1. In Michigan, the judicial power includes the exclusive power to determine and apply the law. Justice Cooley has noted:

"To adjudicate upon and protect the rights and interests of individual citizens, and to that end to construe and apply the laws, is the peculiar province of the judicial department.” [Johnson v Kramer Bros Freight Lines, Inc, 357 Mich 254, 258; 98 NW2d 586 (1959), quoting Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed), p 132.][23]

Chief Justice Marshall of the United States

*592Supreme Court similarly expounded in the landmark case Marbury v Madison:

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. [Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177; 2 L Ed 60 (1803).[[24]

Indeed, "courts will not permit even expert witness testimony on a question of . . . law because it is the exclusive responsibility of the trial judge to find and interpret the applicable law.” People v Lyons, 93 Mich App 35, 46; 285 NW2d 788 (1979).25

Thus, in the instant case, because the issue whether the underlying appeal would have succeeded is resolved by legal principle, the issue is one for the court, not the jury. Simply because issues of law are presented in a unique procedural posture does not eviscerate this basic governing principle of Michigan jurisprudence.26

Noting that the field of law is no more complicated than the fields of medicine or engineering and that juries determine causation in professional malpractice cases dealing with those fields, plaintiff contends that issues presented in the instant case are readily resolved by the jury. The dissenting opinion in Millhouse concurs:_

*593The field of appellate law is no more complicated or obscure than the fields of medicine, chemistry, engineering, biology, construction, or any of a myriad of professions. In all negligence cases involving these professions, the issue of causation is submitted to the jury. The rule should be no different — and no less — for attorneys. Further, to say that the court is entitled to rule upon the question of causation as a matter of law in an appellate legal malpractice case gives the appearance that the bench is in the position of protecting the bar.

The privilege of being an attorney should not carry with it immunity from the jury system. The argument that attorney-judges are better equipped to decide appellate legal malpractice cases is elitist. We do not impanel a jury of physicians to decide a medical malpractice case. [Id. at 628-629.]

Yet, our reasoning is not based on the assumption that a jury is incapable of correctly deciding an issue of law presented before it through expert testimony. Issues of extreme complexity, including intricate matters of medicine and engineering, are often submitted to juries. Rather, our holding is based on the premise that the province of the court in our constitutional system is to determine the law, regardless of its procedural posture in any given case. The court makes this legal determination not only because of any special skills it may possess, but also because it is a court of law and its role in the constitutional order and justice system is to declare what the law is.27

Moreover, justice requires that a court decide the issues of law in the instant case. If the *594plaintiff’s position is accepted, then errant juries may find a defendant liable on the basis of an incorrect interpretation of the law, and that finding may become immune from effective judicial review. In Martin v Hall, 20 Cal App 3d 414, 421-424; 97 Cal Rptr 730 (1971), for instance, the plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action against an attorney who was retained to defend him in a criminal action. The jury found that the attorney should have argued the issue of double jeopardy and awarded the plaintiff damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, as a matter of law, some of the jury’s findings because they were inconsistent with the state of the law — in other words, the jury had erroneously concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause would have precluded some of the criminal convictions. If that court had accepted the plaintiff’s suggestions, then the defendant would have been subjected to liability because of erroneous legal reasoning. Furthermore, the jury’s verdict, as findings of fact, would be subject to stricter standards of review that would effectively limit an appellate court’s ability to reverse a jury’s errant findings. Unlike a trial court’s rulings of law that *595may be reviewed de novo, a jury’s verdict generally only may be reversed pursuant to the standards of summary disposition28 or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.29

Furthermore, the analogy to medical and engineering cases is inapposite. If the "laws of science” dictate a particular result with which reasonable persons may not disagree, then summary disposition is appropriate — only when scientific probabilities conflict does the jury resolve an issue.30 Unlike medicine or science, however, legal issues are not resolved by conflicting probabilities. The law is more akin to mathematics: only one result exists, it need only be deduced. After all, when an appellate court binds the jurisprudence of the state by resolving a legal issue, it has deduced that answer. Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, there are no conflicting probabilities, and no guesswork. Hence, summary disposition regarding a legal issue is always appropriate because no clash of scientific probabilities exists. Causation in a medical or accounting malpractice action is usually an issue of fact because there is no predetermined rule discoverable by man that determines causation in such cases. The dissent suggests that in the instant case, whether the appeal would have been successful is unknown. Indeed, the dissent admits that under its holding, "the jury is simply guessing what principle of law might have been applied by the appellate court.” Post at 618. Guesswork, however, is simply not the correct method to determine the legal consequences of an attorney’s failure to perfect an appeal. The outcome of appellate cases is decided on the basis of predetermined *596principles of law.31 There simply is no disputed issue of fact for a jury to decide with respect to how a legal issue would have been decided on appeal. In other words, a jury is not permitted to decide causation on the basis of a finding that the appellate court would have decided the legal issues incorrectly.

The Oregon Supreme Court elaborated regarding this very issue:

There is a famous view that prediction, or, as Justice Holmes put it, "[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,” is all that is meant by law. Such a view of law might imply that the probable legal ruling in the earlier case, being only a prediction of what the court would have done in fact, should be left to the jury’s belief in the competing prophecies of counsel and expert witnesses. Or it might imply that the task of predicting this ruling, being "law” by definition, belongs to the court in the malpractice case. But we do not believe that the issue of causation in the malpractice case is the retrospective prediction of the actual behavior of a court on an issue of law, any more than that of a factfinder of an issue of fact. The object in the second trial is not to reconstruct what [the trial court] would actually have done, or what the judges of the Court of Appeals would actually have done on appeal. Rather, with respect to an issue of law in the earlier case, the issue in the malpractice case is what the outcome should have been if the issue had been properly presented, under the law as it was at the time or *597could have been convincingly argued to be. [Chock-toot, supra at 573.]

Of course, some legal issues do not have clear answers.32 This is especially so in the context of legal issues presented before appellate courts, and even more true for those in the courts of last resort. Nevertheless, simply because "a case is hard” does not mean that "it is indeterminate.” Solum, On the indeterminacy crisis: Critiquing critical dogma, 54 U Chi LR 462, 475 (1987). Issues of law are resolved by a reasoned application of neutral principles to a particular factual situation.33 That the resolution of a particular case *598may not appear obvious at the outset of litigation or an appeal does not belie the notion that a neutral and principled application of legal authority will result in one principled result.34 While ambiguities within the law exist, they are resolved not by the predilections of individual judges, but by a reasoned application of legal principles. That dissents and conflicting opinions exist within the same legal system reveal only that some members of the judiciary disagree over the application or interpretation of guiding principles, not that a correct result is not achievable, or has not been achieved.35

*599Furthermore, to embrace the plaintiff’s view is to invite denigration of the rule of law.36 Underlying plaintiff’s position is the implicit assumption that appellate courts will differ in their application of the law and that no correct answer to legal issues exists — otherwise plaintiff must concede that the issue of proximate cause in the instant case should be taken from the jury because reasonable minds could not disagree on the legal outcome. Thus, plaintiff’s position rests on the notion that courts in the same jurisdiction applying the sáme principles of law to the same facts may, for varying and unidentified factors, differ regarding the outcome of purely legal decisions, and that such differences are inherent in the law. Thus, the *600law is not determined by a neutral application of guiding principles. Such an hypothesis is repugnant to legal decision making and the rule of law. As Thomas Paine declared, "in America The Law is King. For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no other.”37 We are a nation, and a Court, ruled by law. Any suggestion that this Court or others might deviate from a pure application of the law and its guiding principles is unwarranted and contrary to the fundamental principles of adjudication. Furthermore, this hypothesis must be rejected wholeheartedly for it strikes at the very core of the law’s legitimacy. The rulings of this Court are legitimate only as long as they rely primarily on the application of neutral principles originating from the constitution, statutes, regulations, or the common law. Hence, the "law is distinguished from other forms of public or authoritative decisionmaking not by its heavy use of outcome-determining rules laid down in advance, but by the use of procedures designed to ensure that legal decisionmaking is not merely the ad hoc imposition of personal will or the practice of politics.” Schauer, Rules and the rule of law, 14 Harv JL & Pub Policy 645, 657 (1991).38 Although the rule of law may be said to be *601an ideal, we do violence to this fundamental principle by encouraging its disregard.

Nor is this holding elitist. Juries traditionally do not decide the law or the outcome of legal conflicts. Juries are not appellate courts. To maintain the traditional role of the jury, the jury must remain the factfinder; a jury may determine what happened, how, and when, but it may not resolve the law itself. The determination of questions of law by the courts is not a new elitist prerogative— to the contrary, it is a vindication of the existence of the judiciary. Indeed, it is the very purpose of the judiciary.39

Moreover, this reasoning is overwhelmingly embraced by our sister jurisdictions. Indeed, at least nineteen jurisdictions directly addressing the issue have found it to be one of law, and no reported decisions have held otherwise.40 Furthermore, *603while not directly addressing the specific issue, many other jurisdictions have unhesitantly resolved the legal issues present in the underlying litigation in attorney malpractice actions as if proximate cause was an issue for the court.41 Acknowledged legal commentators also agree that *604the issue is one of law for the courts.42 We find these authorities persuasive.

Thus, we hold that the issue of proximate cause in the instant case is reserved to the court because whether an appeal would have been successful intrinsically involves issues of law within the exclusive province of the courts, and remand the legal issue presented in the underlying litigation for resolution by the trial court.

in

Plaintiff also contends that the trial court in the instant case decided the issue of proximate cause as a matter of law because it found that plaintiff would have prevailed on appeal. Plaintiff argues that the jury decided the issue of cause in fact by finding that Winiemko should have identified and appealed the error in the underlying litigation and that doing so would have resulted in a lower award of damages on retrial. Defendants counter that the issue was left to the jury.

A review of the transcript clearly reveals that the judge ruled that the issue whether the underlying suit would have been successful was one for the jury to determine.43 Although the court held *605that plaintiff had met the "test as to causation,”44 the court’s analysis indicated that it had determined that no question of law was before it, and that proximate cause "can be a question for a jury.”45 Thus, the court did not address the issue as a matter of law, and its ruling must be reversed.

iv

Finally, plaintiff suggests that to reverse the Court of Appeals in the instant case infringes the right to a jury trial protected by Const 1963, art 1, *606§ 14.46 This Court has long held that "[t]he object of construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people adopting it.” 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed), p 124 (emphasis in original).47 Hence, the primary source for ascertaining its meaning is to examine its plain meaning as understood by its ratifiers at the time of its adoption. Committee for Constitutional Reform v Secretary of State, 425 Mich 336, 342; 389 NW2d 430 (1986). Often an examination of history is necessary to the proper interpretation of the constitution, therefore, this Court may " 'endeavour to place [itself] in the position of the framers of the Constitution, and ascertain what was meant at the time ....”’ Id., quoting Pfeiffer v Detroit Bd of Ed, 118 Mich 560, 564; 77 NW 250 (1898). See also Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 443 Mich 744, 764; 506 NW2d 209 (1993). This is especially true when determining the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury. See, e.g., Tabor v Cook, 15 Mich 322, 325 (1867) ("The intention here is plain, to preserve to parties the right to have their controversies tried by jury, in all cases where the right then existed”); Abner A Wolf, Inc v Walch, 385 Mich 253; 188 NW2d 544 (1971).

Thomas Jefferson described the jury as " 'the only anchor yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.’ ”48 Strongly embracing this principle, *607Michigan, from its very origins as a territory in the American Union, has vigorously protected the ancient right of a trial by jury.49

Yet, at no time has the right to a jury trial in any fashion been understood to displace the authority and duty of the judiciary to determine legal issues. For as long as the right to a jury has been recognized, the exclusive province of the court to rule on matters of law has been acknowledged. See, e.g., Demill v Moffat, supra at 411-412. As Justice Cooley summarized, over a century and a half of jurisprudence has recognized that a judge’s duty is to inform the jury "what . . . the law is,” while the jury "should be left free and unbiased by [the judge’s] opinion to determine for themselves whether the facts in evidence,” under the instructions of the judge, show a guilty verdict. Cooley, supra at 678. See also Demill, supra at 411-412; Johnson, supra at 258. Nor does evidence exist that suggests that the ratifiers or framers of the 1963 Constitution intended to alter this long-established division between judge and jury. In fact, the Address to the People notes that "[n]o change” was intended from prior constitutions. 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3364. See also Abner A Wolf, supra. Hence, the right to a jury trial is in no manner infringed when the court proceeds to evaluate the legal merits of an underlying appeal in a legal malpractice action alleging negligence in the pursuit of the appeal. Cf. Buckley v Gibbs, 321 Mich 367, 370; 32 *608NW2d 483 (1948) ("Defendant’s appeal was properly dismissed ... as a matter of law. It therefore cannot be said that defendant was deprived of her right to trial by jury”).

v

In summary, we hold that the question whether a court or a jury should determine whether the underlying appeal would have been successful is reserved to the court because whether an appeal would have been successful intrinsically involves issues of law within the exclusive province of the judiciary. Furthermore, we find that the trial court failed to resolve the issue as a matter of law, and that a determination of the issue by a court does not deprive a litigant of the right to a trial by jury. Thus, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

(concurring). I agree with the result reached by the plurality because treating this issue as a question of law represents the best we can do. The circuit court will decide the question as a matter of law. If the Court of Appeals disagrees, it will reverse. This result is only possible if causation in appellate malpractice cases is treated as a question of law.

The aim of both civil and criminal litigation is to determine the truth and apply our laws to it. Because our courts are run by and for people, however, the goal is inherently unobtainable. In other words, the system is not perfect, but we do the best we can.

In a typical case where causation is an issue, the question might be whether a car’s allegedly defective steering mechanism caused an accident. The issue would be cause in fact — would the accident have happened if the steering had not been defective? The most accurate answer to this question could be obtained by reenacting the events leading up to the accident using a car that does not have defective steering. This type of reenactment, however, is usually neither possible npr, because of the expense and potential danger, desirable. For those reasons, the best we can do is give the evidence and expert advice* to a jury and let it decide.

This method does not represent the best we can do with cases alleging appellate legal malpractice. At issue is how the courts would have decided a *610legal question had it been properly raised or filed. Unlike cases alleging malpractice by doctors or engineers, in which the issue is what result would have been produced by a different procedure or structure, the issue in appellate malpractice cases is what the courts would have decided. If they would have decided the underlying case in favor of the plaintiff, then the plaintiff’s damages were caused by the defendant’s malpractice. Letting a jury decide how an appellate court would answer a legal question, however, is akin to letting a jury decide what a person in the courtroom is thinking. In both instances, a better way to find out would be to ask.

I am not saying that the law is nothing more than what judges say. It is unnecessary to pretend we have answered this ancient and very complex question that relates to how an appeal should be decided. The issue in this case is how an appeal would have been decided if the appeal had been timely filed. For the purpose of answering this question, we need only agree that the answer is what the judges would have decided, regardless of whether that might be right in a metaphysical sense. The best way to determine what they would have decided is to ask them by framing the question as one of law.

(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from this Court’s decision that a determination of causation in cases of appellate malpractice is a question of law that must be decided by a trial judge and not a question of fact to be resolved by a jury-

INTRODUCTION

Foundationally, the majority opinion works from an apparently simple premise — namely, that judicial appeals are resolved exclusively as matters of *611law, not fact. Because courts decide matters of law, while juries must "remain the factfinder,”1 the majority concludes that only the trial judge may determine if an underlying legal appeal would have been successful.2 For the reasons stated below, I do not subscribe to this reasoning.

i

A prima facie case of appellate malpractice requires that a plaintiff establish, inter alia, that the defendant’s negligence "was a proximate cause of [the plaintiff’s] injury. . . .” Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 63; 503 NW2d 435 (1993); Basic Food Industries, Inc v Grant, 107 Mich App 685, 690; 310 NW2d 26 (1981). This "causation” mandate requires a plaintiff to prove that, absent the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff would have succeeded in the underlying, never-taken appeal. Coleman, supra at 63. In this respect, the plaintiff is charged with proving what is often referred to as a " 'suit within a suit.’ ” Id. at 64; Basic Food Industries, supra at 691 (quoting 45 ALR2d 5, § 2, plO).

A

In an action for appellate malpractice, the determination of "causation” demands that a decision-maker decide, at trial, how a particular panel of the appellate court should have ruled if the underlying appeal had been properly taken by the defen*612dant.3 It is notable that, in making this determination, the decisionmaker is not guided by an appellate record: an appellate court has not rendered a ruling or decision. Accordingly, the underlying "suit within a suit” is simply a hypothetical inquiry — one that requires the decisionmaker to retroactively examine the law as it existed at the time of the never-taken appeal in a suit between different parties in an entirely different legal contest. I believe that such an inquiry concerns an issue of fact to be answered by the factfinder.

The question "What is the applicable law?” is unmistakably one of the most important inquiries to be resolved at a trial. This query — which generally requires the decisionmaker to determine what the law presently is — raises an "issue of law” properly resolved by the trial judge. This is because the question demands an articulation of those particular laws that must be applied in the actual dispute presently before the court. This articulation, therefore, represents a precedential legal conclusion properly made by the trial court.4

However, this important inquiry must and does change when determining causation in an action for appellate malpractice. Because the decision-maker, at trial, must look retroactively to the law *613as it existed at the time the appeal would have been taken, the important issue is no longer "what is the law?” but, instead, "what was the law?” Simply, how this law is examined at trial changes greatly in the context of an appellate malpractice action.

The important query, therefore, is straightforward:

What law was in existence at the time an appeal would have been taken?

Notably, the answer is equally simplistic: this inquiry into the past is like any other search for fact. What the law was is not a legal conclusion to an "issue of law” but, instead, is a present assertion of fact properly deduced by examining the field of law as it existed at the time an appeal should have been taken.5 While this assertion arises in the present (i.e., at the malpractice trial), it is inextricably founded in the past — based on a prior set of facts and affairs objectively determinable by any layperson. Further, the query does not demand that a judge articulate a binding, prece*614dential legal decision on the present state of law. Rather, it simply asks the decisionmaker to gaze into the past and identify what the law was. The answer, given in the context of a hypothetical appeal that never took place, is neither binding nor precedential as a legal ruling — it is simply an assertion of fact made for the purposes of determining "causation.”

The remaining issue is who should answer this "question of fact.” The general rule in Michigan is that questions of fact are properly resolved by a jury. I am unpersuaded that this rule should be altered simply because the factual issue arises in an appellate malpractice case and, accordingly, would leave the determination to a jury.6

B

Even if one concludes that the identification of applicable law in an underlying appeal is a task properly entrusted to the trial court, this does not suggest (although the majority does)7 that there is no proper role for a jury in the "causation” determination. The fact is that law, no matter how adduced, must be applied to fact to reach a determination of causation.8 Such an application is *615unquestionably a task within the province of a jury.9

This hybrid process of applying law to fact is mistakenly ignored by the majority.10 This oversight disregards well-recognized distinctions between the roles of trial judge, and of jury, in our system of justice. However, because the issue was neither discussed by the majority nor by the Court of Appeals, I decline to address it in greater detail.

c

I am also troubled that a determination of causation by the trial court in an appellate malpractice case may be inconsistent with Michigan case law and court rules. This conclusion is based on the fact that resolution of the "case within a case” *616is analogous to an action for a declaratory judgment. In effect, the decisionmaker is being asked to declare the rights of certain persons in an underlying appeal that has never taken place.

Michigan law requires that declaratory judgments be made "[i]n a case of actual controversy . . . .” MCR 2.605(A)(1); Allstate Ins Co v Hayes, 442 Mich 56, 65; 499 NW2d 743 (1993). This prerequisite — similar in purpose to the "case or controversy” requirement of federal law11 — is aimed at insuring the justiciability of certain cases brought before Michigan courts. Id. at 66 ("Properly understood . . . the actual controversy requirement is simply a summary of justiciability as the necessary condition for judicial relief ”). Importantly, the requirement has been recognized by this Court as "prevent [.ing] a court from deciding hypothetical issues. ” Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 589; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). (Emphasis added.) Without satisfying the requirement, a case may not be resolved by the court:

[I]f the issue is not justiciable because it does not involve a genuine, live controversy between interested persons asserting adverse claims, the decision of which can definitively affect existing legal relations, a court may not declare the rights and obligations of the parties before it. [442 Mich 66. Citations omitted. Emphasis added.]

Because the underlying appeal in an appellate malpractice case — the determination of causation *617—is a hypothetical inquiry not actually before the trial court, the underlying appeal itself does not involve a "genuine, live controversy” between interested persons.12 Accordingly, resolution of this "hypothetical issue” as a question of law is arguably violative of the court rule, as well as Michigan case law, in spirit if not in fact.

ii

I am also troubled by the majority’s attempt to distinguish appellate attorney malpractice decisions from other professional malpractice cases where this Court has permitted juries to make causation determinations. The majority argues that while in other professions there are "no predetermined rule[s] discoverable by man that determine[ ] causation,” ante at 595, appellate malpractice cases are decided by predetermined, neutral principles of law that dictate only one correct result. I believe that this rationale is both tenuous and self-serving, and fear that this Court’s holding will only further alienate other professions from the legal system.

A

The majority premise that there can be but one "correct answer” to a legal issue is somewhat accurate insofar as judicial resolution of a legal issue is also a ñnal pronouncement on a question of law. It has been said that, like the proverbial baseball umpire, an appellate court does not have the final word because it is correct, but is nevertheless correct because it has the final word. Therefore, there may arguably be one "correct” answer to a legal question insofar as that answer *618is ultimately given by a particular jurisdiction’s highest court.13

Be that as it may, the majority’s premise is only relevant if its first assumption, i.e., that the causation issue is also a question of law, is valid. As previously discussed, it is my view that the causation determination in an appellate malpractice case does not require that a jury decide what the law is — i.e., the jury does not pronounce, resolve, or otherwise create a principle of law. Rather, the jury is asked to identify what the law was, and apply it to the facts of a never-taken appeal. In effect, the jury is simply guessing what principle of law might have been applied by the appellate court. This guess is not binding on subsequent courts or juries; it will never be annotated or summarized as a "legal ruling”; it will appear in neither hornbook nor case text as a "legal principle” or "rule of law.” It is not the resolution of a "legal issue,” but, instead, a causation determination made by the jury to resolve that malpractice case before it.

B

The majority’s premise concerning predetermined, neutral principles is used to distinguish causation determinations in appellate malpractice cases from identical determinations in other professional malpractice scenarios, particularly medical malpractice. Because the premise supposedly forecloses alternative or dissenting viewpoints, it also demands that legal issues have only one *619"correct” resolution.14 There being no possibility for a legitimate dispute about an issue of law, prediction of a legal outcome by a jury is absolutely precluded — a decision must be made by the trial judge.15 For the reasons detailed below, I subscribe neither to the premise nor to its application by the majority.

Even if one concedes the existence of such neutral principles in the law, I fail to see how this conclusion distinguishes the legal profession from other fields of expertise. Similar principles certainly exist in other professions. There is in medicine, for example, always an ultimate medical explanation of why a person becomes ill or dies. Just because this reason cannot be accurately discerned, or just because different doctors may disagree on its validity or applicability in a certain factual scenario, does not make the explanation any less "neutral” in its applicability. Similarly, in the engineering profession there are ultimate scientific principles — rules of mathematics and physics, for example — that, if accurately discerned, explain why certain events or results occur in specific factual situations. Again, while the existence of the principle may be difficult to identify, and reasonable engineers or scientists may disagree on its validity or applicability to a specific factual scenario, this does not make the principle any less "neutral” or "predetermined.” The same can be said for the fields of accounting, finance, psychology, mathematics, and virtually any other profession._

*620Therefore, if the majority rationale is accepted it must also be acknowledged that there is always, in almost any professional malpractice question, one "correct” answer or response to a specific factual situation. The existence of this "correct” answer does not preclude the existence of alternative, and apparently valid, explanations. Rather, the existence of these alternative explanations gives rise, as the majority references, to "probabilities”16— scientific probabilities, medical probabilities and, I believe, legal probabilities. Such probabilities do not necessarily mean that there is no one universally "correct” answer — rather, they only suggest that the "correct” answer to a particular factual scenario may deviate from the actual answer by virtue of its probability. Because reasonable jurists may disagree on the appropriate answer to a given factual scenario in the law, the legal profession is really no different than any of its professional counterparts.

The important question, therefore, is this: If a jury may decide issues of causation in medical, engineering, accounting, and scores of other complicated professional malpractice scenarios, why preclude such a determination in the legal malpractice case? The majority explains that, because the appeal presents issues of law exclusively, and because there is only one correct answer to an issue of law, that there is no room for disagreement and a jury verdict is thus precluded. Ante at 595-596. There are two problems with this reasoning. First, appeals do not exclusively present issues of law. Even if "neutral” principles of law do exist, and even if they must be resolved, articulated, or *621determined by the trial judge, the determination of a "correct” answer requires that such principles be applied to unique factual patterns, and this is a task within the exclusive province of the jury. See ns 13-15 and accompanying text.

More problematic, however, is the implicit assumption that permeates the majority opinion: namely, that when it comes to identifying the "correct” answer, " '[a] judge is clearly in a better position to make this determination.’ ”17 In effect, the majority would have the trial court both articulate the legal principle and apply it to the facts of an underlying appeal to reach a decision regarding causation (the "correct” result) on its own. Presumably, such a broad grant of power is justified because a judge is more qualified to understand the law than is a jury. If this sort of reasoning is adopted, however, then must we also concede that the doctor is better able to understand "issues of medicine,” the engineer better able to understand "issues of engineering,” and the accountant better able to understand "issues of accounting” than is the ordinary jury of laypersons? And, if we must continue to insist that juries decide causation in these types of malpractice cases, then must we not also concede that a jury of doctors, engineers, or accountants is more appropriate?

The answer is in the negative.18 We trust juries of laypersons to make important determinations of causation in malpractice cases involving other professions. Similarly, we should trust juries to make such determinations — to apply law to fact— *622in appellate attorney malpractice cases. The dilemma, if it exists, really lies in the structure of our legal system. The majority argues that in an appellate malpractice action an underlying appeal is decided as an "issue of law.” Even assuming the accuracy of this assertion, such a unique situation could never arise in other nonlawyer malpractice cases simply because there are no "underlying appeals” in these sorts of malpractice actions. Accordingly, the issue of causation in a medical malpractice case (or any other malpractice case with the exception of legal malpractice) will never be decided as an "issue of law” and, accordingly, will never not be decided by a factñnder. What the majority really does, therefore, is advantageously utilize the unique procedural posture of appellate malpractice cases to carve out an exception — for attorneys only — from the jury system. This approach is self-serving and has the potential to reinforce an already problematic image of systemic attorney self-protection and further alienate from the legal system our peers in the other professions.

c

In summary, even if I were to concede that there is only one "correct” answer to a legal question, I cannot conclude that permitting a jury to make a causation determination in a case of appellate malpractice — i.e., to guess how a never-taken appeal would have been resolved by a hypothetical appellate court — is any more denigrating to the law or the judiciary than are similar determinations in malpractice scenarios involving other professions. Juries in medical malpractice cases are routinely asked to determine what would have happened to a patient had an alternative medical procedure been employed by a doctor. Similarly, *623juries in products liability or engineering malpractice cases are often required to determine whether an accident or event would have occurred had a different design or manufacturing process been employed. These determinations of what might have transpired, had an alternative course of action been taken, are precisely the sorts of questions we routinely call upon juries to resolve. Their answer, in an appellate malpractice action, is no more caustic to the law than it is to other professional endeavors.19

I certainly agree with the majority that we should not allow the jury to make law. However, my position does not permit a jury to "make law” any more than it allows a jury to articulate medical or engineering principles. Nor does it argue that juries are as good, or better than, the judiciary at determining or articulating the law. Juries are no more qualified for this task than they are for discerning and applying principles of medicine or engineering. Indeed, even if so qualified, *624such articulation and determination is simply not the role of a jury. The jury should merely be permitted to do that for which it is impaneled— determine, among competing probabilities, what result might have occurred had something different been done by a defendant.

hi

Another aspect of the majority opinion that I find troubling is the blurring of important distinctions between determinations of "proximate cause” and "cause in fact” in cases of appellate malpractice. This oversight has the effect of intruding upon traditional roles of a jury in vitally important causation determinations — a role that is not, and should, not be, diminished simply because it is implicated in an appellate malpractice appeal.

As previously discussed, a prima facie case of appellate malpractice requires that a plaintiff establish that the defendant’s negligence " 'was a proximate cause of [the plaintiff’s] injury . . . .’ ”20 This Court has previously alluded to the fact that the issue of "cause in fact” may properly be analyzed as part of a "proximate causation” determination.21 Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that "proximate cause” and "cause in fact” are distinct and separate issues, and that the resolution of each rests upon unique considerations.22 Indeed, the majority concedes this *625very point.23 However, the majority also concludes that the distinction between "proximate cause” and "cause in fact” is "irrelevant to the resolution of the instant case.” Ante at 586, n 14.241 disagree.

In Michigan, proximate causation " 'is essentially a problem of law.’ ’,25 Often referred to as "legal cause” or "responsible cause,”26 proximate cause is basically a determination whether an actor may be held legally responsible for a harm.27 Being a subject for legal determination, proximate cause questions may properly be resolved by the trial judge. In the context of an appellate malpractice appeal — where it is one of the prima facie elements of a valid claim28 — proximate cause is *626essentially a preliminary determination whether a plaintiff has alleged enough to get to a jury.

Cause in fact, also known as "but for” causation,29 is simply "[t]hat particular cause which produces an event and without which the event would not have occurred.”30 While often "hopelessly confused” with proximate causation,31 the cause in fact question is well recognized as the quintessential issue of fact to be decided by a jury:

[T]he simplest and most obvious problem connected with "proximate cause” is that of causation in "fact.” This question of "fact” ordinarily is one upon which gill the learning, literature guid lore of the law are largely lost. It is a matter upon which lay opinion is quite as competent as that of the most experienced court. For that reason, in the ordinary case, it is peculiarly a question for the jury. [Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), §41, pp 264-265. Emphasis added.]

The distinction between "cause in fact” and "proximate causation” cgmnot be overemphasized in cgises of appellate malpractice. Proximate cause is an "issue of law” appropriately determined, as a preliminary matter, by the trial judge. Cause in fact questions are "issues of fact” that must be decided by the factfinder — commonly a jury.

In the case at bar, the trial court’s ruling that *627plaintiff had established sufficient elements to submit the question to the jury was, in fact, a completely appropriate proximate cause determination. The majority’s conclusion that the lower court erred by leaving the proximate causation issue to the jury32 simply ignores the fact that the trial judge explicitly ruled on proximate causation when she determined, in the context of plaintiff’s summary disposition motion, that plaintiff had established all of the elements of a prima facie case of appellate malpractice:

The Court fínds that Plaintiff has met the Basic Foods test[33] as to causation and damages as well as the attorney-client relationship and claimed negligent acts, and thus has established a prima facie case of professional negligence.[34]

*628Having properly determined that a prima facie case had been established, it was then within the exclusive province of the jury to determine whether defendant’s actions (or inactions) were those particular "causes in fact” that resulted in plaintiff’s injury. The majority would apparently abrogate this important distinction between the role of judge, and that of the jury, in an appellate malpractice case.

I also disagree with the majority that the trial judge "ruled that the issue whether the underlying suit would have been successful was one for the jury to determine.” Ante at 604. Not only does this conclusion ignore the trial judge’s express ruling on the prima facie elements of an appellate malpractice case, but in fact all the trial judge said concerning who could make causation determinations was that

the suit within a suit doctrine does not ipso facto call for this finding to be made as a matter of law before trial but can be a question for a jury with proper instructions on proximate cause and damages including not only the result of an appeal, but the loss of the value of the opportunity to appeal . . . including the lost opportunity for settlement pending appeal. [Citing Ignotov v Re-iter, 425 Mich 391; 390 NW2d 614 (1986). Emphasis added.]

I interpret this language as holding that not every "suit within a suit” must be resolved exclusively by the trial judge. The rationale for this conclusion is that some underlying suits will raise issues of fact — such as whether there was a lost opportunity to settle or what sort of actual damages resulted from the failure to appeal — that must be resolved by a jury considering factual evidence. I subscribe to this reasoning and note *629that it finds some support, albeit nonbinding, in a prior Court of Appeals decision authored by a member of this Court. Then Judge Riley’s opinion in Basic Food explained the general purpose of the "suit within a suit” concept:

[I]t is at least arguably true that the suit within a suit requirement serves to insure that the damages complained of due to the attorney’s negligence are more than mere speculation.2

[Id. at 693.][35]

In the case at bar, plaintiff’s complaint included allegations that, had a proper appeal been taken by defendant, plaintiff would not have been required to pay the damage judgment.36 This judgment represented the actual "cost” or "damages” to plaintiff arising from defendant’s failure to appeal. I agree with the Basic Food Court that the "suit within a suit” requirement is aimed, in part, at insuring the certainty of alleged damages. Coleman, supra at 64. I further agree with the Basic Food Court that proof of damages must be based on factual evidence, not mere speculation. Basic Food, supra at 693, n 2. This question of "cer*630tainty,” however, is an issue of "fact” that must be resolved by a jury. I do not believe, therefore, that the trial judge erred by simply (and accurately) recognizing that some underlying appeals in a case of appellate malpractice will involve issues of fact —decided on factual evidence — that must be resolved by a jury.

IV

Finally, I write to express my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that its reasoning "is overwhelmingly embraced by our sister jurisdictions,” and that "at least nineteen jurisdictions directly addressing the issue have found it to be one of law, and no reported decisions have held otherwise.” Ante at 601. In fact, many of the cases cited in support of this conclusion do not justify the majority holding here. For example, the court in Phillips v Clancy, 152 Ariz 415; 733 P2d 300 (Ariz App, 1986), did not hold that an underlying appeal in an appellate malpractice case must be resolved as an "issue of law” by a trial judge exclusively. Rather, the Phillips court concluded that such appeals present mixed questions of law and fact and that the jury should apply the law to the facts to resolve the underlying appeal and determine causation:

Therefore, on remand, in the "case within the case,” the jury should be instructed on the applicable . . . law and regulations and be asked if, based on the facts presented, but for the alleged negligence, [the plaintiff] would have been entitled to disability benefits. In short, legal issues are to be decided by the judge; factual issues are to be decided by the jury.[37] [Id. at

*631Similarly, at least one reported decision from a state supreme court has apparently held that the causation issue in an appellate malpractice case demands jury resolution. The Nevada Supreme Court in Selsnick v Horton, 96 Nev 944; 620 P2d 1256 (1980), reversed a lower court grant of summary judgment in favor of an attorney defendant and noted:

Whether [the defendant’s] conduct in not pursuing the appeal . . . fell below that of a reasonable attorney is an issue of fact which should have been resolved at trial. [Id. at 946.]

Clearly, the Selsnick majority believed that the question whether defendant’s conduct constituted the tort of negligence was an "issue of fact” to be resolved by the jury. This determination necessitates a finding of "causation.” Id. at 946 (Gunder-son, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).38 Accordingly, it is also clear that the Nevada Supreme Court decided that the lesser-included issue of "causation” was one properly entrusted to a jury.

Further, I find the following decisions — cited as supportive by the majority — unpersuasive for the reasons indicated: Chicago Red Top Cab Ass’n, Inc *632v Gaines39 (summary disposition was awarded on other grounds; the causation issue was never discussed by the court because the plaintiff failed to allege an "injury”); Jones v Psimos40 (the causation question was not an issue; the only relevant language is dicta); Dings v Callahan41 (the causation question was neither an issue nor discussed by the court); Cabot, Cabot & Forbes Co v Brian, Simon, Peragine, Smith & Red fearn42 (the federal court narrowly construed a prior Louisiana Supreme Court decision [Jenkins],43 which held that, in an action for an attorney’s failure to file suit, causation and damage questions are up to the jury to decide); Romano v Weiss44 (the causation issue was narrowly addressed; the court did not decide who makes the causation determination where the dispute centers on unsettled law; the malpractice case was not even tried before a jury); Rinehart v Maiorano45 (the causation question was never raised by the parties or addressed by the court); Goldstein v Kaestner46 (the court only discusses the standard of review; the decision says nothing about who determines causation in a malpractice *633trial); Better Homes, Inc v Rodgers47 (the causation issue was not discussed by the court); Sutton v Whiteside48 (the causation issue was not discussed by the court; in fact, the entire trial court case, including "causation” presumably, was tried before a jury and the reviewing court found no error in this); Chocktoot v Smith49 (the underlying appeal may present mixed questions of law and fact; the judge must decide questions of the law; the jury must decide questions of fact).

In sum, at least twelve of the cases cited as supportive by the majority do not, in fact, directly support the position taken in the case at bar. Indeed, many of these decisions do not even address the issue decided by this Court today. Notably, of the remaining eight decisions that arguably support the majority position, only two are from the state’s highest court.50

I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

(concurring). I am in general agreement with the majority’s holding and analysis. To the extent that an underlying appeal involves an issue of law, decision making on the likely success of that appeal should be reserved to the court. Since the early days of the republic, our legal system has required the court, not the jury, to declare what the law is. The unusual procedural posture of an appellate malpractice case does not warrant abrogation of this well-established and constitutional mandate. Despite my basic accordance, I write separately to distance myself from the majority’s discourse on the "rule of law” and the process of legal decision making. While scholarly, the majority’s exposition on such matters is *609unnecessary to the holding in this case, and I regard it as dicta.

Accordingly, I respectfully concur.