The question presented is whether a person who applies to Wayne County for a permanent position that involves driving heavy equipment near and on public highways1 may, consistent with the Search and Seizure Clauses of the *154state and federal constitutions, be required to submit to urinalysis testing.

The permanent position involves operation of heavy equipment that might result in serious injury from even a "momentary lapse of attention” characteristic of illegal drug use.2

We find that, as a result of his application for such a position with a governmental agency, Middlebrooks had a reduced expectation of privacy in not being subjected to urinalysis drug screening by the government.

We conclude that urinalysis testing in connection with an application for this permanent position with a governmental agency is not violative of the Search and Seizure Clause, and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

i

Segrett Middlebrooks was a seasonal service worker with Wayne County from May, 1984, until November, 1984.3 Middlebrooks applied in October, 1984, for a permanent position as a general service worker or laborer. The tasks he would perform as a permanent employee would be the same as those he performed as a seasonal employee, including:

• operation of saws, wood chippers (used to grind brush into wood chips), and a front-end loader on Wayne County Road Commission premises;

• operation of a riding lawn mower on highway medians and embankments;_

*155• driving trucks, including dump trucks carrying equipment and stake trucks and other equipment, from work sites to repair facilities used by the road commission.

Middlebrooks submitted to a preemployment physical on November 1, 1984, conducted by May-bury Medical, which included urinalysis testing for controlled substances.4 The urinalysis test was "positive for opiates and cocaine,” and it was determined that he was "[n]ot qualified for the position sought.”

Middlebrooks had completed and signed a "Consent Form and Questionnaire” that indicated he had not taken any prescription medication within the past month or any nonprescription medication within the last ninety-six hours, and which provided that he "understand^] that the results of this examination will be reported to the agency that referred me for the tests.”

Middlebrooks had also signed a "Medical Examination” form that indicated he was not "taking any medication at the present time.” He acknowledged a "habit” of tobacco,5 and did "certify that the above information is true and agree and understand any misstatement of material facts contained in this form may cause forfeiture of all my rights to employment with the County of Wayne.”

Middlebrooks began performing the tasks of a permanent general service worker on November 9, 1984, as a "provisional employee[ ] subject to passing the physical including the drug screen, and subject to later passing a civil service examina*156tion.” He was discharged on November 20, 1984, for failure to pass a physical examination.6

ii

Middlebrooks commenced this action7 against *157Wayne County, Maybury Medical, and Bioanalytical Procedures, alleging violations of his rights, under the Fourth Amendment and 42 USC 1983, to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and of due process of law, both substantive and procedural, and privacy, along with violations of analogous rights under the Michigan Constitution. Middlebrooks also claimed violations of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act,8 the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act,9 the Civil Rights Act,10 and breach of an implied contract, negligence, and violation of common-law privacy.

The circuit court granted summary disposition for Wayne County, Maybury Medical, and Bioanalytical Procedures on all counts, on the ground that urinalysis testing is permitted under the Fourth Amendment where the position involves the operation of heavy machinery.11

The Court of Appeals reversed on Middlebrooks’ § 1983 and Fourth Amendment claims against Wayne County, and remanded the case to deter*158mine whether Middlebrooks stated a § 1983 claim against Maybury Medical and Bioanalytical Procedures, and to determine Middlebrooks’ damages. The Court of Appeals ruled that "Wayne County failed to establish that its interest was sufficient to overcome plaintiff’s privacy expectations,” and concluded that the urinalysis test was unreasonable as a matter of law.12 The permanent position did not involve "any unusual degree of danger” or a risk that was "significant or . . . special.” Middlebrooks would not have been required to carry passengers or security-sensitive materials,13 or - to operate heavy equipment involving great risk of harm to others.14 General laborers are not "traditionally highly regulated.”15

This Court granted leave to appeal "limited to whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined *159that the urinalysis drug testing was unconstitutional as a matter of law.”16

III

The United States Supreme Court ruled in Skinner v Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n17 that mandatory urinalysis testing is a search under the Fourth Amendment,18 but that such a search will survive constitutional scrutiny, in the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion, if the "important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion” outweighs the "privacy interests implicated by the search . . . .”19

The Court upheld Federal Railroad Administration regulations providing for mandatory urinalysis testing of railroad employees, without warrants or individualized suspicion, when the employee was involved in a train accident, or violation of *160certain safety rules. The Court said that the governmental interest was "compelling”:

Employees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences. Much like persons who have routine access to dangerous nuclear power facilities, employees who are subject to testing under the fra regulations can cause great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others.[20] [Citations omitted.]

The Court also said that the privacy expectations of employees were "diminished” through "their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively tó ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered employees.”21 The reason for the pervasive regulation is "obvious”: "An idle locomotive, sitting in the roundhouse, is harmless. It becomes lethal when operated negligently by persons who are under the influence of alcohol or drugs.”22

In Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab,23 decided the same day as Skinner, the Court employed the balancing analysis announced in Skinner to affirm the validity, under the Fourth Amendment, of United States Customs Service regulations requiring urinalysis testing of employees seeking transfer or promotion to positions involving drug interdiction or the carrying of firearms. The Court said that it

agree[d] with the Government that the public *161should not bear the risk that employees who may suffer from impaired perception and judgment will be promoted to positions where they may need to. employ deadly force.[24]

United States district and circuit courts of appeals interpreting Skinner and Von Raab have generally held that positions that require operation of heavy machinery or motor vehicles involve "duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.”25 Other federal courts have suggested that positions that require operation of motor vehicles would not be "fraught with such risks of injury to others” under the rationale of Skinner and Von Raab where the risk *162is no greater than the risk of "even a momentary lapse of attention” by a citizen operating a motor vehicle.26

Skinner and Von Raab have also been interpreted to permit urinalysis testing of applicants for positions that involve "duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.”27

IV

Pursuant to the analysis of the federal cases interpreting Skinner and Von Raab, we conclude *163that dismissal of Middlebrooks’ claims under the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment and § 1983 was appropriate. Operation of a riding lawn mower, especially on highway medians and embankments, and driving front-end loaders, trucks, and other equipment between a work site and repair facility, might result in serious injury from "momentary lapse[s] of attention” characteristic of illegal drug use.28 Middlebrooks had a reduced expectation of privacy in not being subjected to urinalysis drug screening by the government as a result of his application for a position with a governmental agency as a laborer,29 in which potentially serious accidents might result from collision's between a mower, being operated on a median or embankment, and vehicles on the highway, often traveling at high rates of speed.30 A riding lawn mower, front-end loader, or truck might become "lethal” when "operated negligently.”31 Thus, we conclude that the balance mandated by the Fourth Amendment tips in favor of permitting the state to require urinalysis testing of Middlebrooks although the general service-worker position that he sought is not "regulated pervasively” like that of a railroad employee,32 or commercial driver.33

*164This case is distinguishable from American Federation • of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v Sullivan34 and Nat’l Treasury Employees v Watkins.35 Unlike the employees in those cases, who drove cars and vans to transport documents and, in Watkins, passengers as well, similar to the way ordinary citizens would use the roads, Middle-brooks would have been required to operate a riding lawn mower on highway medians and embankments, and front-end loaders, trucks, and other heavy equipment from a work site to different facilities of the Road Commission. The specialized duties that Middlebrooks would have performed cannot be analogized to "vehicle use by the general public.” The operation of lawn mowers and other mechanical equipment on and near roads designed primarily for cars, vans, and trucks poses a greater threat to traffic safety than the operation of ordinary automobiles, vans, and trucks.36

v

There is no evidence that Wayne County failed to provide notice to applicants that urinalysis testing would be included in the physical examination, that applicants for positions were arbitrarily selected for urinalysis testing, or that information from urinalysis testing was used for purposes other than determining the suitability of appli*165cants for Wayne County general service-worker positions. Nor is there evidence that Maybury Medical unduly intruded on the privacy of applicants in collecting urine samples, that Bioanalytical Procedures employed unreliable or biased methods in analyzing urine samples, or that candidates were not given the opportunity to contest the results or submit their urine to physicians of their own choosing.

In the absence of evidence suggesting such procedural inadequacies, which might suggest due process concerns with Wayne County’s urinalysis testing policy that were flagged in Von Raab37 and Skinner,38 we interpret Skinner and Von Raab in light of the federal cases, and hold that the urinalysis testing administered to Middlebrooks in connection with his application for a permanent position with a governmental 'agency was not violative of the Fourth Amendment.

vi

We turn to a consideration of whether dismissal was properly entered of Middlebrooks’ claims under the Michigan Constitution. While "[w]e have, on occasion, construed the Michigan Constitution in a manner which results in greater rights than those given by the federal constitution, and where there is compelling reason, we will undoubtedly do so again,”39 we are not convinced, in light of Middlebrooks’ diminished expectation of privacy in not being subjected to urinalysis drug screening by the government as a result of his application for a position with a governmental agency, that urinaly*166sis testing of Middlebrooks constituted "a major contraction of citizen protections under our constitution . . . .”40 On the facts of the present case, we decline the invitation to construe art 1, §11, and other provisions of the Michigan Constitution relating to personal privacy and due process of law, to provide broader protection against urinalysis testing of operators of vehicles than the Fourth Amendment.41

Reversed.

(concurring). I agree with the result reached by the majority. I write separately, however, to clarify my view of the application of Skinner v Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 US 602; 109 S Ct 1402; 103 L Ed 2d 639 (1989), and Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab, 489 US 656; 109 S Ct 1384; 103 L Ed 2d 685 (1989).

i

A

The recent United States Supreme Court opinions concerning Fourth Amendment restrictions on government drug screening, Skinner and Von Raab, employ balancing tests. But a balancing test is not a theory of how cases ought to be decided. It is only a method of applying such a theory. For that reason, it is helpful to review the theories behind or goals of the balancing tests that are employed.

In both opinions, the Court first "balance[s] the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements . . . .” Skinner, 489 US 619; Von Raab, 489 US 666-667. The Court held that "a warrant is [not] essential to render the intrusions here at issue reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Skinner, 489 US 624; see also Von Raab, 489 US 666-667.

The question thus becomes whether a drug test could be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause or some quantum of suspicion. The Court held that it could.

*168In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. [Skinner, 489 US 624.][1]

In Von Raab, the Court phrased the same rule in the form of a second balancing test: "the Government’s need to conduct suspicionless searches . . . outweighs the privacy interests of employees . . . .” 489 US 668.

The goal of this balancing test, on which the outcome of the case before us hinges, bears repeating: when the government does not have any reason whatsoever to suspect drug use by the individual it is testing, it may only impose drug tests when a requirement of individual suspicion would jeopardize an important governmental interest. In this case, a requirement of individual suspicion would jeopardize an important governmental interest because the plaintiff has not previously held the position for which he applied, and thus the county has not been able to scrutinize his performance of those duties for signs that he could not perform them safely.

B

The majority states that the defendant has an *169interest in testing the plaintiff for illegal drug use because "[a] riding lawn mower, front-end loader, or truck might become 'lethal’ when 'operated negligently.’ ” Ante at 163. The majority cannot be saying that the Fourth Amendment permits testing the plaintiff without probable cause or individualized suspicion simply because his job would involve driving a lawn mower. The cases cited in the majority opinion demonstrate that this fact alone would be insufficient to justify suspicionless drug testing.

The majority frames the question of reasonableness around whether a worker’s job would involve " 'duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.’ ” Ante at 161. Then it claims that federal courts are divided on the question. Id. at 161-162. Authority appears divided, however, only because of the misleading way this question is framed.

Under the great weight of federal authority, there is a clear line between suspicionless testing of motor vehicle operators who carry passengers and suspicionless testing of those who do not. In American Federation of Government Employees; AFL-CIO v Skinner, 280 US App DC 262; 885 F2d 884 (1989), the court agreed that "strong safety interests support the testing of most Department motor vehicle operators, who are responsible for, inter alia, the transportation of visiting foreign dignitaries and key Department officials and the operation of passenger-laden shuttle buses.” Id. at 270. It acknowledged, however, that safety considerations alone could not justify testing a "driver whose exclusive duties entail driving a mail van . . . .” Id.

The importance of this distinction was reiterated *170in Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v Yeutter, 287 US App DC 28; 918 F2d 968 (1990) (opinion of Mikva, J., joined by Edwards and Silberman, JJ.). Among the plaintiffs in that case were employees of the Department of Agriculture who primarily chauffeured officials and who drove shuttles only during the lunch hours and sick days of private drivers. The court rejected their attempt to distinguish themselves from the plaintiffs in American Federation of Government Employees v Skinner, supra, on the ground that the latter carried many more passengers. Addressing the argument that this result would "open the door to” testing all government employees who drive to work, the court noted a bright line between workers who carry passengers and those who do not: "It is not obvious to us that the government could show a special need, unrelated to law enforcement, to test drivers who do not carry passengers; nor do most drivers have diminished privacy expectations with respect to drug testing.” Id. at 32.

The principle is stated more directly in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v Sullivan, 787 F Supp 255, 257 (D DC, 1992):

The government’s interest here is the safety risk that an impaired government driver might pose to other drivers on the road. While not insubstantial, this is obviously no different than the interest the public and the government have in keeping any potentially impaired driver off the road. If this is a sufficient "special government need[]” to permit warrantless searches under Von Raab [489 US 665], then the federal government could proceed to test any and all drivers on the road.

See also Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v Watkins, 722 F Supp 766, 769 (D DC, 1989) (issuing a preliminary injunction against random drug test*171ing of motor vehicle operators in the Department of Energy because "the safety risks involved with the motor vehicle operators carrying out their duties are no greater than the normal risks associated with vehicle use by the general public”).

In evaluating whether the plaintiff’s drug test violated the Fourth Amendment, the relevant question is not whether riding a lawn mower "can[ ] be analogized to” motor vehicle use by the general public, but whether the government has a more compelling interest in suspicionless drug testing of lawn mower operators. Lacking clear directive from the United States Supreme Court, the answer would seem to hinge upon a comparison of the potential danger. However, the Court is spared from having to decide this case solely on the basis of the questionable empirical assumption that lawn mowers on embankments next to the road pose a greater threat to traffic safety than vehicles on the road, because the plaintiff in this case is an applicant for this position.

c

The majority adds that "Middlebrooks had a reduced expectation of privacy in not being subjected to urinalysis drug screening by the government as a result of his application for a position with a governmental agency as a laborer, in which potentially serious accidents might result . . . .” See ante at 163. I agree that this factor is critical but feel that further elaboration is necessary. In Willner v Thornburgh, 289 US App DC 93, 98; 928 F2d 1185 (1991), the court elaborated on the difference between testing applicants for employment and testing current employees:

If individuals view drug testing as an indignity *172to be avoided, they need only refrain from applying. This too is an important distinction between applicants and incumbents. The choice presented to current employees — undergo random drug testing or lose your job — is not comparable to that facing applicants. In Judge Friendly’s words, "there is a human difference between losing what one has and not getting what one wants.”

The precise situation at issue here was discussed in Natl Treasury Employees Union v Watkins, supra, in which the court enjoined random drug testing of motor vehicle operators despite the fact that they also carried guns. The court opined that "[t]he government would be on surer footing in the factual setting of ... a one-time scheduled testing as a prerequisite for promotion, as [was] at issue in . . . Von Raab.” 722 F Supp 770.

Commentators who oppose drug testing employees in other circumstances have argued that the government should be permitted to test applicants. According to Professor LaFave, the Supreme Court’s decisions support the proposition that suspicionless drug testing is permissible under the Fourth Amendment only when close on the job supervision plus reasonable suspicion testing do not provide a sufficient alternative. Consequently, it may be reasonable to test an employee at the time of application when it would not be reasonable to test the same employee once he held the position:

The point was made earlier that on-the-job random or blanket drug testing is unnecessary because proper supervision of employees plus the reasonable suspicion test should ordinarily suffice to turn up those who ought to be tested. But for beginning employees there has been no prior opportunity for such ongoing scrutiny, and thus it is certainly arguable that testing as a matter of *173course is appropriate in such circumstances. [3 LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d ed) (1994 Supp), § 10.3, p 234.]

See also Miller, Mandatory urinalysis testing and the privacy rights of subject employees: Toward a general rule of legality under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U Pitt L R 201, 236-237 (1986).

ii

In addition, I feel compelled to point out that statements in the majority opinion that do not relate to whether defendant violated plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution are dicta. The only issue before this Court is whether the circuit court properly granted summary disposition in favor of Wayne County on plaintiff’s claim for damages under 42 USC 1983 for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

The plaintiff’s complaint is described very specifically by the Court of Appeals:

In count ii of his ten-count amended complaint, plaintiff sought damages under 42 USC 1983, claiming that defendants, acting in concert, violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by searching him without individualized suspicion and with no compelling state interest. In other counts he alleged that defendants violated his right to due process of law, both substantive and procedural, and invaded his constitutionally protected right to privacy. In a separate count, plaintiff claimed that defendants violated his right to due process under the Michigan Constitution. He also claimed violations of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC 701 et seq., and the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq., *174alleging discrimination on the basis of false perception of a handicap (drug addiction) and on improper use of a physical examination to refuse employment. [Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 9, 1992 (Docket No. 128482), pp 1-2.]

The circuit court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition on all counts. The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals, in a two to one decision, reversed in part:

In summary, with respect to defendant Wayne County, we reverse the order of the trial court dismissing count n of the amended complaint and affirm the court’s dismissal of all other counts. With respect to defendants Maybury Medical Clinics, Inc., Bioanalytical Procedures, Inc., and Perry Health Net Laboratory Services, Inc., we remand for further proceedings with respect to their liability for deprivation of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. We affirm the court’s order in all other respects. [Id. at 3.]

This Court granted defendants’ applications for leave to appeal. See 444 Mich 858 (1993). The plaintiff did not cross appeal.

Nevertheless, the majority finds occasion to address the Michigan Constitution:

On the facts of the present case, we decline the invitation to construe art 1, § 11, and other provisions of the Michigan Constitution relating to personal privacy and due process of law, to provide broader protection against urinalysis testing of operators of vehicles than the Fourth Amendment. [Ante at 166.]

It should be perfectly clear that no member of this Court is suggesting that the plaintiff may obtain relief under § 1983 for violation of his state consti*175tutional rights. Section 1983 provides a remedy for violation of federal constitutional and statutory rights. See, e.g., City of Greenwood v Peacock, 384 US 808, 829-830; 86 S Ct 1800; 16 L Ed 2d 944 (1966). It does not provide a federal remedy for violation of state rights. See Smith v Dep’t of Public Health, 428 Mich 540, 612-637; 410 NW2d 749 (1987). The Court of Appeals ruled that, on the facts alleged by the plaintiff, he could obtain relief under § 1983. We could not affirm this ruling on the basis of state constitutional rights because it is not possible to obtain § 1983 relief for violation of state-created rights.

Instead, the majority considers discussion of state constitutional law appropriate on the ground that an appellee who has taken no cross appeal may still urge in support of the judgment in its favor reasons that were rejected by a lower court. Ante at 166, n 41. Although I agree with this proposition,2 I do not think such a situation is presented here. The Michigan Constitution cannot provide an alternative reason why the plaintiff should be allowed to proceed to trial with his § 1983 claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. It forms the basis only for an argument that he should be able to proceed to trial on a (non § 1983) claim that Wayne County violated the Michigan Constitution. In other words, the plaintiff is not advancing grounds for affirmance, but for reversal.

In any event, a mere reference in the plaintiff’s brief to the search and seizure provision of the Michigan Constitution does not require us to embark on a discussion of whether damage remedies *176are available under our constitution, an issue as yet unresolved in our jurisprudence.3

On the other hand, the plaintiff does assert an alternate ground for affirmance to the extent he is claiming that his federal due process rights were violated. Cf. ante at 165. However, I decline the invitation to advance alternate factual scenarios that "might suggest due process concerns” not articulated by the plaintiff. It seems particularly inappropriate to opine on the future course of federal law when such speculation is unsupported by our own reference to any authority.

III

For the foregoing reasons, I agree with the majority that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.