(dissenting). The question presented is whether Robert A. McWhorter should be reinstated as a member of the state bar. McWhorter was disbarred following his convictions of federal and state crimes. The hearing panel ordered reinstatement with conditions. The Attorney Discipline Board affirmed.1

The majority concludes that McWhorter should not now be reinstated because sufficient time has not elapsed since he was under the supervision of *147parole .officers. .The majority imposes a five-year period after which McWhorter may reapply for reinstatement. I would affirm the order of reinstatement.

i

McWhorter was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan of conspiracy to import cocaine, unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine, and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. In circuit court, Mc-Whorter was convicted of kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap, and was sentenced two to five years imprisonment.2 He served the federal and state sentences concurrently in federal prison and was paroled in June, 1985. He remained on parole until June, 1992.

McWhorter was disbarred effective February 24, 1981. After his release from prison, he worked as an automobile salesman, and then started a legal research business. He petitioned for reinstatement in April, 1992, before completion of his parole. In April, 1993, the hearing panel reinstated Mc-Whorter with conditions. These included continued psychotherapy, regular attendance at church, and supervision by a local attorney.3 The panel majority said:_

*148[W]e are persuaded on the whole record, that Mr. McWhorter has established by clear and convincing evidence that he should be reinstated to the practice of law. Mr. McWhorter has become an active member of his church. He had been able to rebuild his relationship with his wife, daughter and son. He has established a productive business and appears to be handling the pressures associated with it. He has resumed a life in the community in spite of the opposition he has faced.[4]

The Grievance Administrator appealed the reinstatement order, claiming that McWhorter had failed to establish compliance with MCR 9.123(B)(6)5 and (7)6 by clear and convincing evidence and that sufficient time had not elapsed since Mc-Whorter’s release from parole to properly judge his rehabilitation and fitness to practice law. In response to this Court’s peremptory reversal in In re Reinstatement of Callanan, 440 Mich 1207 (1992), the board remanded this case to the hearing panel for further testimony concerning the *149nature and extent of McWhorter’s supervision while on parole. In May, 1994, the board affirmed the hearing panel’s order and eliminated the conditions.

The board, citing this Court’s decision in Grievance Administrator v August, 438 Mich 296; 475 NW2d 256 (1991), observed that eleven years had elapsed between revocation of McWhorter’s license and his petition for reinstatement, and more than fourteen years since McWhorter committed the acts that resulted in the convictions. Relying on its interpretation of August, the board rejected the Grievance Administrator’s claim that the seriousness of McWhorter’s crimes alone requires that he never be reinstated as a member of the state bar. It determined that sufficient time had elapsed to assess McWhorter’s fitness to practice law, distinguishing the circumstances in the instant case from those presented in Callanan. The board concluded that the hearing panel’s determination was based on ample evidence and "was an appropriate application of the subjective judgment which is inherent to a determination of eligibility for reinstatement under MCR 9.123(B).”

ii

In August, supra, this Court held that "the nature of the offense and the time elapsed since its commission and since disbarment are relevant and important considerations in deteriñining whether a disbarred attorney should be recommended to the position of public trust that is held by members of the Michigan State Bar.”7 Thus, "an attorney may be denied readmission on the grounds that sufficient time has not passed to determine the present fitness of the applicant for readmis*150sion. Such a denial should not be deemed a permanent disbarment.”8

In Callanan, following the August decision, the Court peremptorily reversed the board’s reinstatement order, stating, "[t]he misconduct that led to the revocation of the petitioner’s license to practice law was substantial, and, because the petitioner had spent little or no time outside the supervision of federal authorities since his license was revoked, it was not possible for the hearing panel and the Attorney Discipline Board to determine the present fitness of this applicant for readmission.”9

Both August and Callanan suggest that the length of time following disbarment and unsupervised release into society, in addition to the seriousness of the underlying misconduct, is relevant to the determination whether and when, if at all, the disbarred lawyer should be reinstated. The Grievance Administrator argues, and one of my colleagues would hold, that McWhorter’s crimes should permanently prevent his reinstatement.10

*151In most jurisdictions reinstatement is possible, even in egregious circumstances, unless a court rule or law precludes reinstatement. The Washington Supreme Court ordered reinstatement in a case involving the misuse of client funds, stating,

We have based this decision upon the longstanding doctrine of this court and of virtually every other jurisdiction that disbarment is not a permanent disability. Upon a proper showing of rehabilitation, an attorney may be reinstated.[11]

McWhorter provided ample evidence in support of the hearing panel’s and the board’s determination.12 The record, read as a whole, demonstrates that McWhorter has the moral and professional fitness to practice law again in this state. In a similar case, In re Reinstatement of Wegner, 417 NW2d 97, 98 (Minn, 1987),13 the petitioner had *152been convicted of conspiracy to smuggle marijuana in 1975, was disbarred in December, 1979, was released from prison in 1980, and entered treatment for alcoholism in 1982. In granting reinstatement, the Minnesota Supreme Court observed that the petitioner had acknowledged the wrongfulness of his conduct, the misconduct had occurred twelve years before the court’s decision, and the petitioner had been released from prison for 7 Vz years and had been chemical-free for five years. Further, the petitioner offered substantial evidence of a change for the better in character.14 The court said:

We recognize the severity of petitioner’s prior misconduct. Indeed, we are not quick to reinstate a lawyer who committed such a reprehensible crime, which led to disbarment in the first instance. However, petitioner has demonstrated by clear *153and convincing evidence that he has had a change in his professional moral character![15]

In emphasizing the seriousness of the underlying offenses committed by McWhorter, the majority ignores other relevant factors that should be considered in deciding whether to order reinstatement.

hi

Sufficient time has elapsed since McWhorter’s offense and his release from incarceration to determine his moral fitness to practice law, in compliance with MCR 9.123(B)(7). McWhorter was convicted for acts that occurred over seventeen years ago, he was disbarred fourteen years ago, and was released from prison ten years ago. He has been free from parole supervision for almost three years. His parole officers reported that he fully complied with the conditions of parole.16

The majority concludes that "the mere fact that petitioner had not been away from the supervision of parole authorities [at the time of petitioning for reinstatement] greatly influences the determination whether he has sincerely and sufficiently demonstrated that he will be able to understand and operate within the standards of the bar.”17 As other courts have concluded in similar circumstances, requiring McWhorter to wait five years to reapply at some future time serves little or no *154useful purpose.18 It is undisputed that McWhorter complied with all the conditions of his parole and that no adverse incidents were reported by his parole officers. By requiring McWhorter to wait additional time before reapplying, the majority summarily discounts what is indisputably a solid record of rehabilitation since release from prison under the guise that McWhorter was required to comply with parole regulations. This approach ignores the quality of the substantial evidence presented to the hearing panel and the Attorney Discipline Board.

Finally, I agree with Justice Cavanagh that the imposition of a five-year period from release from parole supervision should be done only by court rule under the Court’s rule-making authority. By creating this new requirement at this time, the majority avoids the publication and comment procedure and deprives the profession of an opportunity to comment and suggest alternative approach^_

In this case we decide whether the decisions of the tri-county hearing panel and the Attorney Discipline Board to reinstate petitioner’s license to practice law are supported by proper evidence on the whole record. We believe that a review of the entire record does not support the decision of the hearing panel or the Attorney Discipline Board to reinstate petitioner Robert McWhorter to the practice of law in this state at this time. We conclude that petitioner has not spent adequate time outside the supervision of *133parole authorities sufficient to demonstrate that he has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards imposed on members of the bar or that he will conduct himself in conformity with those standards. We therefore would reverse the decision of the Attorney Discipline Board and deny Mr. McWhorter’s petition for reinstatement, and would hold that petitioner may not reapply for reinstatement until June 28, 1997, five years from the date of his release from federal parole.

i

In December 1978, Robert McWhorter was found guilty in federal court of a ten-count indictment for the offense of aiding and abetting the manufacture of methamphetamine. 21 USC 841(a)(1), 18 USC 2(a), and 21 USC 841(b)(1)(B). He was sentenced to five years imprisonment with a special parole term of two years. As a result of this conviction, the Attorney Grievance Commission filed a formal complaint against petitioner in January, 1979.1 Petitioner was disbarred by order filed June 8, 1979. However, the order of disbarment was later vacated by notice dated September 15, 1980, because the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for trial.2

Meanwhile, petitioner was convicted in Kalama*134zoo Circuit Court on May 29, 1980, for an unrelated incident of kidnapping, MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581, and conspiracy to kidnap, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1). As a result, a second formal complaint was filed on June 20, 1980, charging petitioner with violation of GCR 1963, 953(2) to (5), and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 1-102(A)(3) and (4). The convictions arose out of the abduction of David Nixon from Mc-Whorter’s law office. The kidnapping was arranged by petitioner in order to extort money for the payment of McWhorter’s legal services. Petitioner’-s license to practice law was ultimately revoked, effective February 24, 1981, as a result of these convictions.

After remand on the federal charges, on October 3, 1980, petitioner was convicted of drug-related offenses in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Southern Division. A jury found petitioner guilty of conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States, aiding and abetting the manufacture of methamphetamine, and using a communication facility, i.e., a telephone, to facilitate the manufacture of methamphetamine. The jury also convicted Mc-Whorter of conspiracy to manufacture, possess with intent to distribute, and distribute methamphetamine. 21 USC 841(a)(1). Petitioner was sentenced to ten years imprisonment with a two-year special parole term.3

The federal convictions arose out of petitioner’s attempt to finance a drug-smuggling trip to South America to purchase cocaine and marijuana. Mc-Whorter and an undercover Drug Enforcement Administration agent met and discussed McWhorter’s drug-smuggling scheme and his contacts with *135various drug sources. The dea agent told Mc-Whorter that he was interested in chemical drugs, and McWhorter responded that he knew a chemist who would manufacture drugs. Additionally, Mc-Whorter offered to render legal services to the undercover agent, proposing to set up a strawman chemical company in order to make detection of the drug scheme more difficult. On appeal, Mc-Whorter contended that he was involved in only one drug conspiracy, i.e., the manufacturing of methamphetamine in order to finance the South American drug-smuggling scheme. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected his argument and affirmed the convictions.4

Petitioner served prison terms for both his federal and state convictions. He was released on parole in 1985 and sent to a halfway house in Grand Rapids for the following two months. On June 28, 1992, he was released from federal parole. Approximately three months before being released from federal parole, petitioner filed a petition for reinstatement of his license to practice law in Michigan.

A hearing was held by the tri-county hearing panel and it was determined that petitioner had established the requirements for reinstatement pursuant to MCR 9.123(B) by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner was therefore reinstated with conditions, including payment of expenses, continuance of weekly therapy sessions, maintenance of church activities, and monitoring by a licensed attorney every two months for one year.

The Attorney Grievance Commission filed a petition for review of the hearing panel’s decision with the Attorney Discipline Board. Petitioner filed a cross petition for review, requesting that the condi*136tions imposed by the hearing panel be removed. The Attorney Discipline Board remanded the case to the hearing panel, stating that there was not "sufficient evidence in the record upon which to evaluate the nature and scope of the 'supervision of federal authorities’ . . . .” In May, 1994, the Attorney Discipline Board concluded that the monitoring of petitioner by parole authorities was minimal and issued an order modifying the hearing panel’s order of reinstatement. The Attorney Discipline Board reinstated petitioner and removed the conditions imposed by the hearing panel. The Attorney Grievance Commission filed an application for leave to appeal, requesting review of the Attorney Discipline Board’s decision. We granted leave to appeal5 and now reverse.

ii

We review the decision of the hearing panel and the Attorney Discipline Board "for proper evidentiary support on the whole record.”6 Grievance Administrator v August, 438 Mich 296, 304; 475 NW2d 256 (1991).7 We simultaneously recognize that "[t]he power to regulate and discipline members of the bar rests ultimately with this Court pursuant to constitutional mandate.” Id. at 304.8 A *137license to practice law is "a continuing proclamation by the Supreme Court that the holder is fit to be entrusted with professional and judicial matters and to aid in the administration of justice as an attorney and counselor and as an officer of the court.” MCR 9.103(A). Cognizant of this responsibility, we review the decisions of the hearing panel and the Attorney Discipline Board to reinstate petitioner to determine if they are supported by the record as a whole.

A

In order to be reinstated, petitioner must establish that he is eligible for reinstatement by clear and convincing evidence, by proof that he has satisfied the criteria set forth in MCR 9.123(B)(1) to (7):9

(1) he or she desires in good faith to be restored to the privilege of practicing law in Michigan;

(2) the term of the suspension ordered has elapsed or 5 years have elápsed since revocation of the license;

(3) he or she has not practiced or attempted to practice law contrary to the requirement of his or her suspension or revocation;

(4) he or she has complied fully with the order of discipline;

(5) his or her conduct since the order of discipline has been exemplary and above reproach;

(6) he or she has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are imposed on members of the bar and will conduct himself or herself in conformity with those standards;_.

*138(7) taking into account the nature of the misconduct which led to the revocation or suspension, he or she nevertheless can safely be recommended to the public, the courts, and the legal profession as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence, and in general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of the court ....

The record appears to support both the hearing panel’s and the Attorney Discipline Board’s determination that petitioner has complied with sub-rules 1- to 5. We are therefore concerned only with whether the record as a whole supports the conclusion that petitioner has established the requirements set forth under subrules 6 and 7.10

We initially note that the decision whether to reinstate a disbarred attorney is a balancing process. Moreover, we conclude that a proper analysis of subrules 6 and 7 requires the balancing of several factors.11 In reviewing the various factors, *139we recognize that no one factor is conclusive, but, rather, each must be evaluated in light of the others. Specifically, we must consider whether petitioner has spent sufficient time outside the supervision of parole authorities to clearly and convincingly establish that he has satisfied the requirements of subrules 6 and 7.

B

The passage of time, by itself, is not sufficient to support reinstatement.12 The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner has spent an appreciable time outside the supervision of parole authorities in order for the hearing panel to fully evaluate the disbarred attorney’s present ability to comport with the fitness requirements. See In re Reinstatement of Callanan, 440 Mich 1207 (1992); see also August, supra. Moreover, the five-year period after which a disbarred attorney may petition for reinstatement is but "a minimum period in which rehabilitation may occur following revocation of the license to practice law; the passage of five years in no way guarantees eligibility for reinstatement.” Id. at 310. In Callanan, supra at 1207, this Court held by order that "[t]he misconduct that led to the revocation of the petitioner’s license to practice law was substantial and, because the petitioner had spent little or no time outside the supervision of federal authorities since his license was revoked, it was not possible for the hearing panel and the Attorney Discipline Board to determine the present fitness of the applicant for readmission.”

In August, an attorney was disbarred after, he *140was convicted of attempting to defraud the United States by conspiring with a court clerk in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan to manipulate the blind-draw system of assigning judges.13 In an attempt to avoid a judge known to carefully examine and reduce attorney fee awards, August and the clerk arranged the assignment of judges so that August’s firm avoided the judge in a significant number of cases.

August was imprisoned for approximately one year and was transferred to a halfway house. He remained there until November 19, 1985, when the district judge reduced his sentence to time already served. August filed a petition for reinstatement of his license to practice law in October, 1988. The Wayne County hearing panel denied his request.’ The Attorney Discipline Board held that August was eligible for reinstatement. 438 Mich 302-303. On appeal to this Court, we remanded the case to the Attorney Discipline Board to reexamine whether the petitioner could be recommended to a position of trust as a member of the bar. Significantly, we held that the hearing panel is not limited to a choice between reinstatement and permanent disbarment. Rather, we stated that a third alternative exists where it is determined that a sufficient period of time has not elapsed to judge whether the petitioner may be recommended for reinstatement.14_

*141Petitioner in the present case applied for reinstatement three months before his release from his federal parole. The Attorney Discipline Board remanded the case to the hearing panel to determine the nature and scope of the federal parole authorities’ supervision. The board held that petitioner was not subject to rigid authority during his final period of parole.15 However, the critical consideration is not necessarily the extent of supervision, but rather the fact that petitioner was under the supervision of parole authorities at the time he applied for reinstatement. Although in these proceedings the nature and scope of supervision may be relevant, the mere fact that petitioner had not been away from the supervision of parole authorities greatly influences the determination whether he has sincerely and sufficiently demonstrated that he will be able to understand and operate within the standards of the bar. Therefore, it is only after a petitioner has spent sufficient time outside the control of parole officers that the hearing panel or the Attorney Discipline Board is able to determine whether the petitioner has been rehabilitated and may therefore be safely recommended for reinstatement. Although he may not have been subject to strict scrutiny by parole authorities, petitioner was still serving his parole and, upon petition for reinstatement, must demon*142strate his honorable behavior outside such authorities for a period that would enable this Court to safely recommend him to the public.16 To prevent the petitioner’s immediate reapplication in the present case, we hold that petitioner is not eligible for reinstatement until June 28, 1997, five years from the date of his release from federal parole.

We borrow this time span from MCR 9.123 and analogize it to the present case. For the same reasons, five years is the minimum period after which a disbarred attorney may be eligible for reinstatement, we would hold that it is a sufficient period outside the supervision of parole authorities and the contemplation of petition for reinstatement to fully evaluate his fitness to practice law. In August, supra at 310, this Court stated that five years was the minimum time in which a petitioner could apply for reinstatement, but in no way guaranteed eligibility for reinstatement. In accord with this decision, even though five years have elapsed since petitioner’s disbarment, we find that he is not eligible for reinstatement and wbuld impose this additional period of time to review his fitness. We are persuaded that this addresses the problem identified by one commentator: "The disbarred attorney may file another petition at a later date. In light of this, it would be helpful if the rules provided a minimum spacing between subsequent petitions to prevent a lawyer whose petition is denied from immediately filing another petition.” Martin, Dean & Webster, Michigan Court Rules *143Practice (3d ed), p 579, author’s comment to MCR 9.123.

We further note that petitioner should not automatically be entitled to reinstatement at the expiration of five years; it is merely the minimum time before he should be permitted to apply for reinstatement because more time may be necessary to demonstrate his fitness. August, supra. If petitioner chooses to petition again for reinstatement after the specified date, he would be subject to a full review, including consideration whether he should be subject to permanent disbarment.

hi

We conclude that petitioner has not spent sufficient time away from the authority of parole officers to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he may be safely recommended to the public, the courts, and the legal profession as a person fit to be consulted by others or to represent them and act in matters of trust and confidence. MCR 9.123(B)(7). Nor has sufficient time passed in order that he may demonstrate a proper understanding of and attitude imposed on members of the bar pursuant to MCR 9.123(B)(6). We therefore would reject petitioner’s application for reinstatement and would hold that he may not reapply for reinstatement until June 28, 1997, five years from the date of his release from federal parole. We therefore would reverse the decision of the Attorney Discipline Board.

(concurring). I agree with much of the lead opinion. For example, I agree that the petitioner has not spent enough time outside the supervision of parole authorities to demonstrate that he understands, and will conform to, the standards imposed on members of the bar. I agree that he cannot now be safely "recommended to the *146public, the courts, and the legal profession as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence . . . .” MCR 9.123(B)(7). I also agree that it would be helpful if the rules provided a minimum spacing between subsequent petitions.

I write separately, however, because I do not feel that a published opinion is the appropriate vehicle to set that minimum spacing at five years. I do not necessarily disagree with the five-year ban; I merely believe that the proper way to effect the change is by amending the court rules. The same can be said regarding the issue of permanent disbarment. If such a penalty is to be created, it should be done through the rule-making process provided in MCR 1.201.

The primary benefits of pursuing such a course are that it provides an opportunity for any interested parties to comment on the proposed changes, and it would let disbarred attorneys know exactly where they stand vis-á-vis reinstatement. Moreover, amending the court rules is superior to constantly interfering with the discretionary decisions of the Attorney Discipline Board each time we feel a wrong decision is made.

(concurring). We agree with Justice Weaver’s assessment that this record calls for the permanent disbarment of Mr. McWhorter. How*144ever, in the absence of a majority recognizing the proposition that there should be "permanent” disbarment, with no opportunity ever to reapply, we join in the ruling of the lead opinion imposing a five-year waiting period following a period of parole supervision.

(concurring in the result only). While I concur in the result of continuing disbarment reached by the lead opinion, I write separately because I would permanently disbar petitioner Robert McWhorter. The thorough recitation in the lead opinion of the facts that led to petitioner’s suspensions from practice, disbarment, and criminal convictions can leave no doubt that he cannot be safely recommended to the "public, the courts, and the legal profession.”1 Nor am I convinced that petitioner has now or ever will have a "proper understanding of the attitude toward the standards that are imposed on members of the bar and will conduct himself ... in conformity with those standards.”2

This Court is charged with the responsibility of overseeing the conduct of the membership of the State Bar and has the power to "make any order it deems appropriate . . . .”3 It has the power to impose, as proposed by the lead opinion, an arbitrary waiting period before petitioner can file for reinstatement. However, what logic there is in imposing an arbitrary waiting period in this case is lost because the petitioner will remain under our scrutiny and therefore will probably attempt to conform his conduct to our standards until he reaches his goal of readmittance._

*145No matter what the duration of petitioner’s disbarment, the conduct that led to it will not change. While this petitioner was an attorney, he was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to import cocaine, unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine, using a telephone to facilitate the manufacture of methamphetamine, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and kidnapping a client to extort money. He used his legal training to set up a strawman corporation to conceal the drug conspiracies. He had also previously been suspended for mishandling client funds. Regardless of the sympathy or compassion we may have for the situation petitioner McWhorter has made for himself, ever readmitting him to the Michigan State Bar would make a mockery of this Court’s duty to protect the public and the profession.

I do not, however, believe that it is practical or advisable to attempt to enumerate types of conduct or categories of crimes that should automatically result in disbarment. This Court should continue to review petitions for reinstatement case by case. In this case, the totality of this petitioner’s conduct cannot be ignored. The finality of permanent disbarment is in the best interests of the public, the courts, and the legal profession. This finality will also allow petitioner to go forward with his life plans, knowing he need never consider practicing law in Michigan again.