This Court is presented with the question whether Michigan’s Double Jeopardy Clause, Const 1963, art 1, § 15, precludes the state from trying defendant when he was previously convicted in the federal courts1 on charges arising from the same criminal acts. We hold that the state prosecution was not prohibited, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and reinstate defendant’s convictions.

i

Defendant, a gunnery sergeant in the United States Marine Corps, was charged with violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice on the basis of the sexual molestation of his minor daughter at various locations around the country, including Michigan. In August of 1992, defendant pleaded guilty in court-martial proceedings of rape, sodomy, and indecent liberty, for which he was sentenced to twenty-four months confinement. Two of the counts concerned events that occurred in the state of Michigan, specifi*218cally, that he raped his daughter in or near Troy, Michigan, in August 1990, and that he committed sodomy with her in or near Troy, Michigan, in August 1990.

In July of 1993, defendant was charged in state court with four counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Defendant pleaded nolo contendere with respect to all four counts, reserving his right to appeal on the issue of double jeopardy. The circuit court imposed concurrent sentences of two to twenty years, to be served with defendant’s military sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed two of the convictions, but reversed two convictions that were duplicative of the prior military convictions. 218 Mich App 431; 554 NW2d 336 (1996). We granted the prosecutor leave to appeal. 456 Mich 904 (1997).

The sole issue before us is whether the state prosecution violated the Michigan2 constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy when it was based on the same criminal acts supporting the stipulations to which defendant pleaded guilty at his court martial.

n

Defendant argues that the state prosecution is prohibited under People v Cooper, 398 Mich 450, 461; 247 *219NW2d 866 (1976), which held that the Michigan Constitution “prohibits a second prosecution for an offense arising out of the same criminal act unless it appears from the record that the interests of the state of Michigan and the jurisdiction which initially prosecuted are substantially different.” We conclude that the prosecution was permissible under Cooper, because the social interests of the state of Michigan were not satisfied by the military court. martial of defendant. Although appellant urges us to overrule Cooper and adopt the dual sovereignty rule,3 we do not consider Cooper’s continuing validity at this time because of our finding that the prosecution was permissible even under Cooper.

It is clear that both the federal and state prosecutions were based on the same criminal acts. At his military court martial defendant pleaded guilty to one specification of raping his daughter in Troy, Michigan, in August 1990 and to one specification that he committed sodomy with his daughter in Troy, Michigan, in August 1990. In her testimony at the preliminary examination in the Michigan district court, the victim said that there was only one sexual encounter with her father during his visit to Michigan in July of 1990.

Therefore, the key point is whether the state and federal interests are substantially different. Cooper, supra at 461. Among the factors listed in Cooper that are pertinent to a determination whether a federal prosecution satisfies the state’s interest are: “whether the maximum penalties of the statutes involved are greatly disparate, whether some reason exists why *220one jurisdiction cannot be entrusted to vindicate fully another jurisdiction’s interests in securing a conviction, and whether the differences in the statutes are merely jurisdictional or are more substantive.” Id.

In the present case, the military statute and the Michigan statute both provide a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. However, under the military statute, defendant was only sentenced to twenty-four months. In contrast, under the Michigan statute, defendant received a two- to twenty-year sentence and is subject to incarceration beyond the minimum amount of time imposed. The disparity between the two sentences is evidenced by the fact that defendant, who was sentenced on the Michigan charges in 1994, currently remains incarcerated on these charges. Additionally, the Michigan prosecution subjects defendant to registration as a sex offender and mandatoiy mv testing. In short, the Michigan penalty is more comprehensive than the military penalty.

Secondly, the military prosecution does not, in real terms, seek to vindicate the victim’s interests.4 Conve*221rsely, the Michigan statute 5 seeks, among, other goals, to recognize a profound interest in protecting children. In fashioning the criminal sexual conduct statute,6 the Legislature specifically intended to pro*222tect young persons from sexual contact by persons with whom they have a special relationship, such as relatives. See People v Armstrong, 212 Mich App 121, 127; 536 NW2d 789 (1995). In Michigan, the distinction between sexual conduct with any other minor and with a member of one’s family or household is clear. This case makes an excellent example. The victim was thirteen years old at the time of the offenses in question.7 Had the victim and defendant not been related or of the same household, defendant would have been guilty only of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520d; MSA 28.788(4),8 instead of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The increased penalty embodied in first-degree criminal sexual conduct reflects the fact that there is a special relationship between those people who are related to each other, or living in the same household, and seeks to protect that relationship. People v Garrison, 128 Mich App 640, 645-646; 341 NW2d 170 (1983). In contrast, the Uniform Code of Military Justice article does not recognize such a distinction when a defendant has sexual conduct with a minor relative or a member of the defendant’s household.

*223Accordingly, we hold that the social interests of the state of Michigan were not satisfied by the military court martial of the defendant. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant’s convictions.

I dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority. While it is apparent that the defendant did, in fact, receive different sentences from the federal and state courts on these charges, his potential sentencing exposure was substantially similar. The majority correctly declines the unwarranted invitation of the prosecution to overrule People v Cooper, 398 Mich 450; 247 NW2d 866 (1976), but then erroneously attempts to stretch this case to fit within Cooper's “substantially different” exception. Id. at 462. Because it is clear to me that the case does not fit within that exception, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

i

Now and again, and more recently it seems, this Court is called on to revisit a longstanding doctrine in light of supposed changes in circumstances or logic. A scant two years ago, this Court reviewed a question nearly identical to the one we face today in People v Mezy, 453 Mich 269; 551 NW2d 389 (1996). While the Court did not reach the merits of the continuing vitality of Cooper, the lead opinion found cause to attack such vitality, compelling the dissent to defend the continuing applicability of Cooper. There were questions in Mezy regarding whether the defendant indeed had been charged twice for what was substantially *224the same act, and, eventually, this Court settled on remanding the matter for further proceedings.

Appellant now calls on us to revisit the basic question of Cooper, whether this state will subscribe to the doctrine of “dual sovereignty” in resolving double jeopardy questions dealing with subsequent federal and state prosecutions, a question Cooper clearly answered in the negative. While, once again, the parties expend considerable effort disputing whether the acts charged under the state and federal prosecution were in fact the same, it seems the Court has resolved this question affirmatively.1 The more interesting factual point, however, is that the Court of Appeals has left intact two other convictions of the defendant that resulted in concurrent sentences identical to the ones disputed in this case.2 Thus, while it is clear that the instant dispute is in no way moot, in that it involves two substantive convictions, it would seem the sole “real-world” effect of our review of this case is to once again subject Cooper to the peril of being overruled. I must wonder if the Court’s resources would not be better spent visiting areas where we are lacking clearly established precedent that has governed without difficulty over the last twenty years.

That said, the majority having declined to reach Cooper, I will refrain from yet another defense of it, continuing to favor the view of Justice Levin in part n *225of his dissent in Mezy. To the extent one might read the majority’s opinion to invite an opportunity to return to this area once again, that is expressly disavowed.3

n

Turning to the matter as decided by the majority, the majority correctly notes that “the key point is whether the state and federal interests are substantially different.”4 I would hold they are not. As the majority agrees, the Cooper factors include the questions “whether the maximum penalties of the statutes involved are greatly disparate, whether some reason exists why one jurisdiction cannot be entrusted to vindicate fully another jurisdiction’s interests in securing a conviction, and whether the differences in the statutes are merely jurisdictional or are more substantive.”5

As the majority again agrees, the maximum penalties under both the military and state statutes are identical — life imprisonment. The majority falters, *226however, when it proceeds beyond the bounds of the Cooper factors to assess the actual sentences imposed. Cooper deals in particular with the maximum penalties of the statutes in question. One could infer that this Court recognized a fact that is well known — among various judges there most certainly will be some level of disparity in sentencing. By turning to the maximum penalty proscribed by law, however, one can refer to a benchmark that reflects the seriousness with which a particular jurisdiction views the offense. Here such penalties are exactly equal, and quite severe. The proper conclusion to be drawn then is that both the military system and our state view criminal sexual conduct to be one of the most severe violations of law, and thus subject those who commit such offense to the severe sanction of life imprisonment.6

As to the second factor, the majority has pointed to no reason why the federal system could not be entrusted to vindicate Michigan’s interests, and, likewise, I can find none to exist. The last factor, how*227ever, is the most telling, and one where the majority, again, clearly fails to grasp the import of Cooper.

With regard to whether the differences in the statutes are “merely jurisdictional or are more substantive,” the majority seemingly answers with references to the Michigan sex-offender registry and mandatory hiv testing. Such differences are of the sort that seem to clearly be “merely jurisdictional,” which is to say, no two jurisdictions are likely to penalize a crime identically. The fact that minor differences may exist between the various federal and state statutes is exactly what Cooper was referring to in its exclusion of “merely jurisdictional” differences.7 Rather than pointing to an underlying disparity in the interests vindicated by the statutes, these minor inconsistencies seem to indicate that Michigan addresses the same basic interests in a slightly different fashion. Such slight distinctions do not amount to the substantive disparities spoken of in Cooper. The fact that two statutes might seek to serve interests differently does not mean they inherently serve different interests.

m

While the majority, appropriately, has declined an unwarranted invitation to overrule Cooper, I fear that in doing so it seeks to carve an exception to the rule of Cooper that would soon leave it but a hollow shell. Cooper contains an inherent recognition that the fed*228eral and state statutes applicable to a given matter will never be exactly identical. They need, under Cooper, only be substantially comparable. In the instant case, the statutes clearly were so, and prohibited substantially the same act in vindication of substantially the same interests. Accordingly, under Cooper, the state prosecution should be found to be both unwarranted and impermissible.

I would, therefore, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.