In People v Goecke, we granted leave to decide two issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to bind defendant over on a second-degree murder charge, and (2) whether the circuit court properly granted the prosecution’s motion to amend the information to reinstate the second-degree murder charge. In People v Baker and People v Hoskinson, we granted leave to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to uphold defendants’ second-degree murder convictions.

In Goecke, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. We reject the conclusion that the circuit court must obtain jurisdiction through an appeal as of right or an application for leave to appeal to review the magistrate’s decision to dismiss some but not all felony charges. Jurisdiction vests in the circuit court when a return is filed by the magistrate. Neither statute nor court rule requires the prosecutor to appeal from the magistrate’s refusal to bind defendant Goecke over on charges of second-degree murder. *448The prosecution’s motion to amend the information was proper and the circuit court did not err in granting that motion. We also hold that there was sufficient evidence to bind defendant Goecke over on the charge of second-degree murder. In Baker and Hoskinson, we find that the evidence supported the juries’ findings of guilt.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. PEOPLE v GOECKE

Six witnesses called at the preliminary examination1 gave a factual basis for the finding that on November 11, 1993,2 at 7:00 P.M., defendant and a friend met at a liquor store in Troy where they purchased beer. From 7:00 P.M. until 8:30 P.M., the defendant and his friend drank beer as they sat in the parking lot of the liquor store. Defendant consumed approximately seven to nine bottles of beer. When a police cruiser drove into the parking lot, the defendant and his friend drove off, with defendant driving, in order to find another place to drink. The two drank *449beer as they drove around the area, waiting for the police to leave the parking lot.

Several hours later, at approximately 11:30 P.M., the defendant and his friend were driving on Wide Track Drive near Cass Road in the city of Pontiac. Wide Track Drive is a main thoroughfare through the city of Pontiac and is a five-lane southbound highway, with four lanes for through traffic and one turn lane.3 One witness testified that he first noticed the defendant when the defendant’s car came “flying” past his car, nearly hitting his van. Defendant’s speed was estimated at approximately seventy to eighty miles an hour.4 According to the testimony, this witness attempted to drive up to the defendant’s vehicle to advise the defendant that he almost hit the witness’ van and that he should slow down.

Defendant’s passenger on the night of November 11, 1993, also testified at the preliminary examination and indicated that the defendant may have driven through a red stoplight at the intersection just before the intersection of Wide Track Drive and Orchard Lake Road. As the defendant neared the intersection of Wide Track Drive and Orchard Lake Road, one witness stated that the stoplight was either yellow or red. A second witness testified that the stoplight was red. The defendant ran through the stoplight and struck an eastbound vehicle in the intersection. The other motorist died of injuries from the *450collision. Approximately fifteen to twenty empty beer bottles were observed on the floor of the defendant’s car, and defendant’s blood-alcohol level was measured at 0.17 percent. At the scene of the accident defendant admitted that he was to blame for the accident, stating:

I really fucked up. I was going way too fucking fast. I have had to[o] fucking much to drink. ... I have really fucked up bad this time. I was going way too fast. . . . [I]t was all my fault, I should not have been driving. I know I’m drunk.

The defendant was charged with second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, causing the death of another person, MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4). Following preliminary examination, the district court denied the prosecutor’s motion to bind defendant over on the second-degree murder charge, stating that, while defendant’s behavior was “reprehensible,” there was no evidence of the intent needed to support a murder charge. Instead, the court bound defendant over on the alternative charge of ouil, causing death.

The prosecutor filed a motion in circuit court seeking to amend the information to reinstate the second-degree murder charge. Defendant asked that the motion be denied, arguing that the prosecution should have proceeded by appeal and that a motion to amend the information was an improper means of gaining review of the district court’s decision. The circuit court granted the motion to amend, finding that defendant’s alleged intoxication, speeding, and disregard of traffic signals raised a question of fact for the *451jury regarding the intent element of second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s bindover decision where a timely appeal as of right or an application for leave to appeal was not filed in the circuit court.5 The Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to bind defendant Goecke over on the murder charge. We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal.6

B. PEOPLE v BAKER

On July 21, 1988, at approximately 11:30 P.M., defendant Baker was driving a pickup truck south on Grand Traverse Road in the city of Flint. The speed limit was thirty-five miles an hour. Witnesses estimated that defendant was traveling between sixty and seventy miles an hour. Defendant failed to stop for a red stoplight at the intersection of Grand Traverse Road and Atherton Road. He collided with the victims’ vehicle, which was on Atherton Road properly crossing the intersection with the green light. Both occupants in the victims’ car were killed. Approximately three hours after the accident, defendant’s blood-alcohol level was 0.18 percent.

*452Defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that there was insufficient evidence of defendant’s state of mind to support a finding of malice, and that evidence of drunk driving and the reckless driving behavior that often goes with it could not, without more support a finding of malice.7 We granted the prosecutor’s appli*453cation for leave to appeal.8

C. PEOPLE v HOSKINSON

On July 3, 1994, defendant Hoskinson and some friends were drinking beer and working on defendant’s automobile. At approximately 7:00 P.M., defend*454ant and his friends drove to a bar where they drank beer and shots of liquor for approximately two hours. Defendant was staggering when he left the bar. Testimony indicated that defendant may have refused the offer of one of his friends to drive. Defendant twice drove his vehicle into a parked car while trying to leave the parking lot. He next drove through a residential neighborhood at speeds of approximately forty to sixty miles an hour. Speed dips were located at almost every intersection throughout this neighborhood. Defendant had driven down this street numerous times and was aware of the speed dips.

A vehicle traveling westbound just ahead of the defendant was stopped at a stop sign. Defendant swerved into the eastbound lane and passed the stopped vehicle, and then immediately swerved back into the westbound lane in order to avoid hitting an oncoming vehicle. Defendant hit a speed dip and lost control of his vehicle. He hit the westbound curb, swerved left, then swerved right, and struck a car parked on the right side of the street. Defendant jerked his wheel to the left, accelerated, drove across the eastbound lane, over the curb, and across some grass where he hit four-year-old Miranda Andres who was riding her tricycle on the sidewalk. Miranda’s body was dragged across two lawns before defendant’s automobile returned to the street.9 Defendant continued to drive before bringing his vehicle to a stop approximately six blocks from the victim’s home.

*455An officer who was called to the accident scene testified that defendant approached him and admitted that he was the driver. A blood alcohol test disclosed that defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.22 percent. In a statement to the police, defendant admitted that he knew he was drunk when he left the bar and that he was driving too fast. Testimony indicated that before the accident occurred the occupants of defendant’s car told defendant to slow down.

The jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, and failure to stop at a serious personal injury accident, MCL 257.617; MSA 9.2317. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction of involuntary manslaughter, finding that insufficient evidence of malice had been produced at trial.10 We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal. 454 Mich 922 (1997).

H. ANALYSIS

A. PEOPLE v GOECKE

We first address the procedural issue. The prosecution contends that where a district court binds a *456defendant over on one of two counts, review of the dismissed count is obtainable by a motion to amend the information. Defendant argues that the prosecutor must formally appeal to the circuit court in order to challenge the district court ruling. We agree with the prosecution.

i

The refusal to bind defendant Goecke over on charges of second-degree murder and the subsequent bindover on the charge of ouil, causing death, was not a final order appealable under MCL 770.12; MSA 28.1109.11 The magistrate’s decision to bind the defendant over on less than all the charges was not a *457final order12 and the prosecution was not authorized to take an appeal of right.13 Assuming, arguendo, that the prosecution was required to proceed by filing an appeal, the only appeal process available would be an application for leave pursuant to subsection 12(2)(c).14

It is unnecessary to dispute whether the magistrate’s bindover decision was appealable by leave as provided under MCL 770.12(2)(c); MSA 28.1109(2)(c) and MCL 600.8342(2); MSA 27A.8342(2). Given that there is no basis to conclude that the prosecution was required to proceed by application for leave to appeal, there is no need to resolve whether this method of review is available to the prosecution.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the prosecution must proceed by an appeal as of right or an application for leave to appeal, but offered no reason to conclude that the Legislature intended to supplant the court rule. MCR 6.112(G) provides:

*458The court before, during, or after trial may permit the prosecutor to amend the information unless the proposed amendment would unfairly surprise or prejudice the defendant.

Thus, the court rules allow the prosecution to have such a motion heard by the trial court and specifically authorize the circuit court to permit the prosecutor to amend the information.

We conclude that the prosecution may seek review of the magistrate’s findings under these circumstances by filing a motion to amend the information and that the circuit court does not have discretion to deny review on the ground that the prosecution was required to file an application for leave to appeal.

a

The circuit court is a “court of general jurisdiction,” MCL 600.151; MSA 27A.151, having “original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law . . . .” Const 1963, art 6, § 13.15 Subject matter jurisdiction is presumed unless expressly denied by constitution or statute, Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 38; 490 NW2d 568 (1992). It is the right of the court to exercise jurisdiction over a class of cases, such as criminal cases.16 In personam jurisdiction is vested in the circuit court upon the filing of a return of the magistrate before whom the defendant waived preliminary examination, In re Elliott, 315 Mich 662, 675; 24 NW2d 528 *459(1946), or “before whom the defendant had been examined.” Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115, 119; 215 NW2d 145 (1974). Having once vested in the circuit court, personal jurisdiction is not lost even when a void or improper information is filed. In re Elliott, supra at 675.

Following a preliminary examination, the district court in Goecke denied the prosecution’s motion to bind the defendant over on charges of second-degree murder and instead bound the defendant over on the alternate charge of OUIL, causing death. The return having been filed, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the class of case and personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Had no return been filed, the circuit court would not have acquired jurisdiction over the case or the accused. People v Evans, 72 Mich 367, 387-388; 40 NW 473 (1888). In such a case, the prosecution would be required to file an appeal if charges were dismissed because that is the only way the case could come within the jurisdiction of the circuit court.

MCL 767.76; MSA 28.1016 provides that the court may amend an information at any time before, during, or after trial.17 The rules of criminal procedure as *460adopted in 1989 implement then existing law to provide that the court may permit the prosecutor to amend the information unless to do so “would unfairly surprise or prejudice the defendant.” MCR 6.112(G). Thus, a conclusion that a motion to amend the information is not permitted would violate this Court’s directive that the court rules supersede any statutory procedure pertaining to and inconsistent with an established procedural rule.18

It is unnecessary, however, to conclude that the statute and court rule are inconsistent. MCL 770.12; MSA 28.1109 was designed to put a prosecutor’s appeals on the same grounds of availability as that of a defendant, except where precluded by jeopardy.19 *461The requirements attendant to filing timely applications supported by written briefs introduce procedural obstacles that are not imposed on defendant’s seeking review of the magistrate’s decisions, MCR 6.106(H); MCR 6.110(H),20 and are contrary to the clear legislative objective. Substituting the appellate process would not only attenuate the convenient, speedy, and inexpensive review by motion, it would also tend to insulate the bindover decision from circuit court scrutiny, a result that would likewise frustrate the presumed intent of the Legislature. In short, there is no basis to conclude that the Legislature intended to substitute the appellate process as the *462exclusive method to obtain circuit court review of the bindover decision.

b

Jurisdiction having vested in the circuit court, the only legal obstacle to amending the information to reinstitute an erroneously dismissed charge is that amendment would unduly prejudice the defendant because of “unfair surprise, inadequate notice, or insufficient opportunity to defend.” People v Hunt, 442 Mich 359, 364; 501 NW2d 151 (1993).21 Where a preliminary examination is held on the very charge that the prosecution seeks to have reinstated, the defendant is not unfairly surprised or deprived of adequate notice or a sufficient opportunity to defend at trial, and defense counsel here does not so claim. The evidence introduced on charges of second-degree murder would also be used to support the charge of OUIL, causing death. In addition, because the standard of review is abuse of discretion, the defendant is protected by the time-honored principle that the circuit court may not substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate.

The traditional means for reviewing the prosecution’s claim that the magistrate erred in dismissing some but not all of the charges is provided by the rules of this court, is consistent with the legislative purpose, and serves the institutional needs of the criminal justice system. The circuit court did not have discretion to decline to entertain the motion.

*4632

The substantive issue in Goecke is whether the district court abused its discretion by not binding the defendant over on the charge of second-degree murder.22 We hold that the district court’s failure to bind over on charges of second-degree murder was an abuse of discretion.

a

Murder is a common-law offense, defined as the unlawful killing of one human being by another with malice aforethought. People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250, 258; 247 NW2d 547 (1976); People v Potter, 5 Mich 1, 6-7 (1858).23 The elements of second-degree murder *464are: (1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse. People v Bailey, 451 Mich 657, 669; 549 NW2d 325 (1996).

Malice is defined as the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 728; 299 NW2d 304 (1980). The malice element for depraved heart murder is general mens rea.24 It is the third form of malice at issue in the cases presented.

b

The prosecution urges us to adopt an objective standard for the third form of malice, asserting that to do otherwise would define second-degree murder in terms of a specific-intent crime and would afford relief to an intoxicated offender in the form of a voluntary intoxication defense. We decline to do so. We have previously held that second-degree murder is a general-intent crime to which voluntary intoxication is not an available defense. People v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630, 651; 331 NW2d 171 (1982). Only a highly *465unusual case would require a determination of the issue whether the defendant was subjectively aware of the risk created by his conduct. 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 7.4(b), p 205.25 Because none of the consolidated cases is such a case, we reject the invitation to reach the issue and instead hold that, under either a subjective or an objective standard, sufficient proofs were presented to support a bindover on the charge of second-degree murder in Goecke and to sustain the defendants’ convictions in Baker and Hoskinson26

*466c

As a necessary element of second-degree murder, malice reflects the principle that criminal culpability must be tied to the actor’s state of mind. Aaron, supra. However, as we have repeatedly held, the mens rea for second-degree murder does not mandate a finding of specific intent to harm or kill. Bailey, supra at 669.27 The intent to do an act in obvious disregard of life-endangering consequences is a malicious intent.28

Because depraved-heart murder is a general intent crime, the accused need not actually intend the harmful result. One way of expressing this concept is that malice may be established even absent an actual intent to cause a particular result if there is wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of a defendant’s behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.

In the absence of any circumstance of exculpation or mitigation an act may be done with such heedless disregard of a harmful result, foreseen as a likely possibility, that it differs little in the scale of moral blameworthiness from an actual intent to cause such harm. At times such a state of mind is said to be “the same as if defendant had deliberately intended the act committed” . . . [and] is one way of expressing the fact that it is sufficient to meet the requirements of “malice.” Another method is to suggest that while such an act is not done with an actual intent to cause the harm, it is “constructively with a malicious intention.” . . . [0]ne may be guilty of other offenses for which malice is *467required . . . although he did not intend the resulting harm but acted under such circumstances that there was a plain and strong likelihood that it might happen. [Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed), ch 7, § 4, p 858.][29]

Another way to conceptualize this mental state is to recognize that because malice is implied when the circumstances attending the killing demonstrate an abandoned and malignant heart, “[t]his simply means that malice may be implied when the defendant does an act with a high probability that it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human life.” People v Fuller, 86 Cal App 3d 618, 628; 150 Cal Rptr 515 (1978) (citations omitted).30 The formulation is an appropriate reflection of our understanding that malice requires egregious circumstances, and we expressly approve it.31

*468Finally, we do not agree that if the third form of malice were defined in terms of an objective standard it would necessarily mean that all drunk driving cases that result in death could be submitted for trial on second-degree murder charges. In enacting the ouil, causing death, statute, the Legislature has made it clear that any person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and causes the death of another person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than fifteen years. MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325. That the ouil, causing death, statute does not limit the ability of the prosecution to charge an intoxicated driver with common-law offenses such as murder does not eliminate the people’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in “wanton” misconduct. More important, for purposes of avoiding the temptation to overcharge, it does not dilute the prosecutor’s responsibility to be mindful that “[t]he preliminary examination should identify not simply those who are probably guilty but more precisely those who are probably convictable.” MCR 6.107 *469(now MCR 6.110), Commentary to the Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure, 422A Mich 31 (1985). The dissent contends that by finding sufficient evidence to support a bindover and the convictions today we adopt the position that drunk driving alone is sufficient to establish probable cause of malice. Post at 479. We disagree. The cases before us today involve a level of misconduct that goes beyond that of drunk driving. The fact that sufficient proofs were presented in Goecke to support a bindover on the charge of second-degree murder and that sufficient evidence was presented in Baker and Hoskinson to support the juries’ findings of guilt does not mean that all drunk driving cases that result in death should proceed to trial on charges of second-degree murder.

3

In Goecke, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to bind the defendant over on charges of second-degree murder under either a subjective or objective standard. For purposes of preliminary examination, the proofs adduced must only establish probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it. If the district court determines that “probable cause exists to believe both that an offense not cognizable by the district court has been committed and that the defendant committed it,” the defendant must be bound over for trial. MCR 6.110(E). Some evidence must be presented regarding each element of the crime or from which those elements may be inferred. People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 100-101; 276 NW2d 9 (1979). It is not, however, the function of the examining magistrate to discharge the accused when the evi*470dence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt; that is the province of the jury. Id. at 103.

In Goecke, the prosecution was required to prove that probable cause existed to believe that the defendant acted with wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of the defendant’s conduct was to cause death or great bodily harm.

Evidence adduced at the preliminary examination established that a death occurred, that the death was caused by an act of the defendant, and that the defendant probably possessed the requisite mental state with respect to the actus reus of the crime. The defendant evaded the police while drinking alcohol in a liquor store parking lot, permitting the inference that the defendant was aware that his level of intoxication was too great to have been driving at 8:30 P.M.; that, despite such awareness, defendant drove recklessly at high speeds along a main artery in the city of Pontiac after having consumed a significant amount of alcohol; and that the defendant was aware of the extent of his impairment and lack of control after having narrowly missed hitting another vehicle, yet still continued to speed through at least one red traffic light before colliding with the victim’s car. Taken together, the evidence supported findings that the defendant was drunk and speeding in the middle of a city, that his lack of self-control caused him to narrowly miss striking a vehicle, and that he thereafter ran through a stoplight, struck another vehicle, and killed its occupant. Shortly after the accident, defendant was heard saying that he knew he should not have been driving, that the accident was all his fault, *471that he was driving too fast, and that he was too drunk to drive. There was sufficient credible evidence of probable malice to support a bindover on a charge of second-degree murder. The failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.

B. PEOPLE v BAKER AND PEOPLE v HOSKINSON

We also disagree with the Court of Appeals conclusions that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain the convictions of Baker and Hoskinson on charges of second-degree murder. The prosecution was required to submit evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants acted with malice. People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 366-368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979); Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307, 315-316; 99 S Ct 2781; 61 L Ed 2d 560 (1979). In each case, the prosecution met its burden.

For the reasons stated by the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals in Baker,32 we hold that the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to infer malice under either a subjective or objective standard. Testimony established that the defendant lived within one mile of the scene of the accident, had a blood-alcohol content of 0.18 percent, drove well in excess of the speed limit, ran a red stoplight, drove through an intersection at a time when he could have seen at least three vehicles properly traveling through the intersection, narrowly missed hitting two cars before hitting the victims’ car, and killed two people. A jury could reasonably infer that *472the defendant placed himself in a position the results of which a reasonable person would know had the natural tendency to cause death or great bodily harm. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

We also find there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction of defendant Hoskinson. Defendant was highly intoxicated when he left the bar in the early evening hours. While still in the bar’s parking lot, defendant twice backed into the same parked vehicle. It could be inferred that these collisions put the defendant on notice that he should not be driving. Despite such awareness, defendant drove at a high rate of speed through a residential subdivision. Having driven through this area before, defendant was aware of the speed dips in the road. He swerved to avoid hitting a car stopped at a stop sign, ran through the stop sign, and nearly hit a car driving in the opposite direction. The occupants of defendant’s car advised him that he was driving too fast and that he should slow down.

After colliding with a vehicle parked at the side of the road, defendant traveled across the eastbound lane, over a curb, across some grass, and struck the victim. Defendant continued to drive along the grass and sidewalk until he finally reentered the street several hundred yards from the point of impact. Despite the fact that defendant’s passengers jumped from the moving vehicle after informing the defendant that he had hit a child, the defendant proceeded to drive another several blocks before coming to a stop. We believe that a reasonable jury could find malice from these facts. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of *473the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for reinstatement of defendant’s second-degree murder conviction and sentence.

m

The prosecution’s motion to amend the information to reinstate defendant’s second-degree murder charge was proper, as was the amendment. The prosecution was not required to file an application for leave to appeal from the magistrate’s bindover decision. A motion to amend the information pursuant to MCR 6.112(G) is a proper vehicle to secure review where some but not all of the charges originally brought are dismissed by the examining magistrate.

There were sufficient proofs presented at the preliminary examination in Goecke to support a bindover on the charge of second-degree murder and sufficient evidence presented at trial in Baker and Hoskinson to sustain the defendants’ convictions of second-degree murder. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in Goecke and remand for further proceedings on the charge of second-degree murder. In Baker and Hoskinson, we reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and remand to the respective trial courts for reinstatement of the verdicts and sentences.

(concurring in part and dissenting in part). In the matter of People v Goecke, I concur with the majority with respect to the procedural issue only. Regarding the substantive issue, I disagree with the majority’s rationale and conclusion. I believe that the *474evidence was insufficient to bind defendant Goecke over on the charge of second-degree murder and to convict defendant Baker. I concur only in the result reached by the majority on the substantive issue in Hoskinson. I dissent from the rationale and result it reaches on the substantive issues in Goecke and Baker.

I. PEOPLE v GOECKE: ANALYSIS

A

The issue in Goecke is whether the district court abused its discretion by not binding over defendant on the second-degree murder charge. The elements of second-degree murder are: (1) a death, (2) caused by the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse. People v Bailey, 451 Mich 657, 668-669; 549 NW2d 325 (1996).

In People v Woods, this Court recognized that the word “malice” is arcane, confusing, and potentially misleading. 416 Mich 581, 625-626; 331 NW2d 707 (1982). We attempted to clarify the concept by requiring trial courts, when instructing on second-degree murder, to explain it in terms of a state of mind. Id. at 626-627. Malice is present if a defendant has one of three states of mind. The first two are not at issue in this case. They are: (1) the intent to kill, and (2) the intent to inflict great bodily harm. Id. at 627.

When describing the third type, this Court has used varying terminology. On one hand, we labeled it as the “wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of a [defendant’s] behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.” People v *475Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 728; 299 NW2d 304 (1980).1 Alternatively, we have stated that it is “the intent to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with the knowledge that death or great bodily harm is the probable result.” People v Dykhouse, 418 Mich 488, 495; 345 NW2d 150 (1984).2

The prosecution urges this Court to reaffirm the definition in Aaron and reject the definition in Dykhouse. It argues that, under the definition in Aaron, it is not necessary to determine whether the defendant subjectively knew that his actions were wilful and wanton. He need not have known that the natural tendency of the behavior was to cause death or great bodily harm. Rather, one could consider whether a reasonable person would believe that the defendant’s conduct created an unreasonable and very high degree of risk of death or great bodily harm.

The law has been unclear concerning whether a defendant must have been subjectively aware of the degree of risk his conduct created to be charged and convicted of second-degree murder. This Court has defined the third form of malice in both objective and subjective terms. Aaron and Dykhouse, supra. Today’s opinion ought to offer the bench and bar guidance on when it is sufficient to charge a defendant with om, causing death, and when a second-degree murder charge is appropriate. To accomplish this, we would have to determine whether the subjective or *476objective definition of the third form of malice applies.

Although the majority states that it does not reach the issue, I contend that it does and that, by default, it adopts the objective definition as stated in Aaron. See ante at 465, n 26. The majority states that the prosecution in Goeeke was required to prove that probable cause existed to bind over defendant under the objective standard of Aaron. See ante at 470. It specifically rejects the line of California cases that defines second-degree murder in terms of subjective intent. See id. at 467, n 31. The standard for malice recited throughout the majority opinion suggests the adoption of an objective standard.

I would reject the argument that an objective standard is proper. Under the definition recited in Aaron or Dykhouse, a defendant must be subjectively aware of the very high risk that his conduct creates in order to be convicted of murder.

Michigan courts long have held that murder permits an inference of a subjective awareness that one’s act is dangerous and will probably or naturally result in death or great bodily harm. As early as 1874, this Court held that, to be convicted of murder, an accused must have an intent the “equivalent in legal character to a criminal purpose aimed against life.” Wellar v People, 30 Mich 16, 19 (1874).

In Aaron, supra, we abolished the common-law felony-murder rule. One reason was that it punished all homicides committed during another felony, whether intentional or unintentional, without proving a relation between the homicide and the defendant’s state of mind. Id. at 708. We stressed that the most basic principle of criminal law is that criminal liability for *477causing a harm is not justified absent some culpable mental state regarding that harm. Id. See also Dykhouse, supra at 511 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).

Legal scholars have emphasized that a defendant must be subjectively aware of the high probability of the risk before a conviction for second-degree murder can stand. As one stated:

It is a question of how much fault should be required for murder; for one who consciously creates risk is morally a worse person than one who unconsciously does so, though each of the two persons may constitute an equal danger to his fellow man. On balance, it would seem that, to convict of murder, with its drastic penal consequences, subjective realization should be required. [LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (2d ed), § 7.4(b), p 621.]

Other legal scholars commented:

In other words, the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the obvious likelihood of causing death or great bodily injury is a malicious intent. [Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed), ch 2, § 1, p 60.][3]

I agree with these assessments. I would hold that, in order for the prosecution to secure a bindover on a second-degree murder charge, the prosecutor must submit evidence from which it can be inferred that (1) the defendant was subjectively aware that his *478action was dangerous and (2) the probable result or natural tendency of the act was to cause death or great bodily harm.

B

I disagree with the majority that defendant Goecke should have been bound over on a second-degree murder charge. The majority essentially adopts the prosecutor’s assertion that the fact Goecke was driving while intoxicated should have been sufficient, standing alone, to establish probable cause of malice. The prosecution relies on People v Lardie,4 for the proposition that causing an accident resulting in death while driving when drunk is grossly negligent as a matter of law. It argues that, because the difference between the necessary culpable mental states is one of degree, the case should always be decided by the trier of fact.

It is true that the difference between the risk involved for involuntary manslaughter, where gross negligence is the standard, and second-degree murder is one of degree. An unreasonable risk that is also a high degree of risk may be termed gross negligence. LaFave & Scott, supra, § 7.4(a), p 618. For murder, the risk of death or bodily injury is a “very high degree of risk.” Id.; Dykhouse, supra at 495-496. However, the applicable mental state is a distinguishing feature that is not just a matter of degree. Gross negligence requires an “omission to use such care and diligence to avert the threatened danger when to the ordinary mind it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove disastrous to another.” Lardie, supra *479at 252, citing People v Orr, 243 Mich 300, 307; 220 NW 777 (1928). Therefore, for gross negligence, the standard is an objective one. On the other hand, as noted above, the state of mind of the defendant is a key element of malice. Consequently, I would reject the prosecution’s argument that defendant can be bound over on a second-degree murder charge without proof of his state of mind.

By effectively adopting an objective standard today, the majority eliminates any real difference between the proof required for OUIL causing death and that required for second-degree murder. When the Legislature enacted the OUIL causing death statute, it presumed that driving while intoxicated is gross negligence as a matter of law. Lardie, supra at 251. Thus, the prosecution need not provide further proof of gross negligence when bringing an action under the act. Id. It must prove, simply, that the defendant voluntarily decided to drive and did so after knowingly consuming alcohol. Id. As we stated in Lardie: “[C]onsistent with the Legislature’s decision to presume gross negligence as a matter of law and its desire to deter intoxicated driving, the Legislature must reasonably have intended that the people prove a mens rea by demonstrating that the defendant purposefully drove while intoxicated or, in other words, that he had the general intent to perform the wrongful act.” Id. at 256.

It can be inferred from the majority opinion that this general intent element is the same element required for second-degree murder. In essence, the majority finds that the intent to drive while intoxicated is all that the prosecution need show to establish the malice required for second-degree murder. On *480the basis of this holding, I discern no difference between the mens rea requirement this Court stated in Lardie for OUIL causing death and the majority’s requirement for second-degree murder.

Moreover, the holding of the majority renders the causation requirement for OUIL causing death articulated in Lardie indistinguishable from the majority’s objective test. Lardie held that, to prove the causation required for OUIL causing death, the “people must establish that the particular defendant’s decision to drive while intoxicated produced a change in that driver’s operation of the vehicle that caused the death of the victim.” Id. at 258. “It is the change that such intoxication produces, and whether it caused the death, which is the focus of this element of the crime.” Id., n 47. The majority’s position articulated here is entirely inconsistent with this Court’s position in Lardie and renders the OUIL causing death statute a mere redundancy.

c

Finally, the prosecution argues that, even if driving while intoxicated is not sufficient to establish probable cause of malice, there were sufficient “aggravating circumstances” in this case to support a bindover.

As indicated above, I would require that the prosecution submit evidence from which it can be inferred that defendant knowingly acted in a wanton and wilful manner. The prosecution should have to show that the defendant knew that the natural tendency of his actions would cause death or great bodily harm.

This requirement comports with Justice Boyle’s concurrence in Dykhouse, supra, where she stated *481that if: “the defendant knowingly created a very high risk of death with knowledge of its consequences, but that the defendant did not intend to cause the victim’s death, then [the jury] could not find the defendant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder.” Id. at 517, n 3 (emphasis added). That is, the defendant could not be found guilty of the specific intent crime of first-degree murder unless the defendant intended to cause death. As Justice Boyle stated: “The mental element for first- and second-degree murder is the same: the act which causes death must be accompanied by a life-endangering state of mind. It is the additional element of premeditation and deliberation that requires a specific intent to kill for first-degree murder . . . .” Id. at 517. To be convicted of second-degree murder, the defendant need not intend death, but he must knowingly create a high risk of death and have knowledge of its consequences.

Until today, this Court had not determined under what circumstances intoxicated drivers can be bound over and convicted on second-degree murder charges. However, other jurisdictions have handled the issue and have established some parameters that are helpful to consider.

In Essex v Commonwealth of Virginia,5 the defendant was driving a truck southbound on a two-lane highway. The truck passed cars by crossing a solid centerline. This continued for six miles. He passed through an intersection on a red light, nearly colliding with a tractor-trailer. A mile and a half farther, his truck collided with a northbound pickup truck, killing *482three of its passengers. The defendant’s blood-alcohol content was 0.144 percent.

The court held that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a second-degree murder conviction. It held that the jury could only speculate whether the defendant had a malicious purpose in driving as he did.

In State v Jensen,6 the defendant was intoxicated and drove, weaving in and out of traffic. His car struck another vehicle, killing the occupant. The court held that the fact that defendant was driving while intoxicated was not sufficient, in and of itself, to support a finding of malice. It stated:

Without some circumstances showing malevolence other than the doing of a wrongful act toward another, the non-malicious crime of common-law manslaughter is not converted into the malevolent crime of murder at the common law. We do not say there may not be crimes arising even to first degree murder, committed by the instrumentality of an automobile. In that event, the instrumentality of its commission is a matter of no consequence where the evidence shows the ingredients of murder at the common law are present. [Id. at 445.][7]

In Griffin v State,8 the defendant left a nightclub where she had been drinking beer and got behind the wheel of her automobile. While driving, she hit a police officer who was talking to a driver whom he had stopped along the roadway. The defendant’s vehicle stopped 590 feet from the point of the impact and *483left no skid marks. It was determined that the defendant’s blood had a 0.13 percent alcohol content.

The court noted that there was evidence that the defendant had been driving at a high rate of speed. By her own admission, she was incapable of observing her side of the road. Her companion warned her to watch the vehicles on the shoulder. When she brought her car to a stop, she did not attempt to assist the person whom she had been told that she had struck. Looking at these facts, in addition to her intoxication, the court found sufficient evidence to sustain a second-degree murder conviction.

In People v Watson,9 the defendant consumed a large amount of alcohol at a bar. He entered an intersection on a red light and avoided a collision by skidding to a halt in the middle. The defendant then drove away at a high rate of speed and struck a car in another intersection, killing two of its occupants. The speed limit was thirty-five miles an hour. Expert testimony indicated that the car’s speed immediately before the brakes were applied was eighty-four miles an hour. At the point of impact, the defendant’s speed was approximately seventy miles an hour. One hour after the collision, the defendant’s blood-alcohol content was 0.23 percent.

The court noted that malice can be found where a person, knowing that his conduct endangers another’s life, nonetheless acts deliberately with conscious disregard for that life. This differs from manslaughter, because malice “contemplates a subjective awareness of a higher degree of risk than does gross negligence, and involves an element of wantonness which is *484absent in gross negligence.” Moreover, a finding of gross negligence is made by applying an objective test: If a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have been aware of the risk involved, then the defendant is presumed to have had such awareness. “However, a finding of implied malice depends upon a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard.” (Emphasis in the original.)

The court in People v Watson stated that malice may be found when a defendant (1) does an act with a high probability that it will result in death and (2) does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disregard for human life. Id. at 300. Under that definition, the court found sufficient evidence to bind the defendant over on a second-degree murder charge.

From these cases, one may draw several conclusions. First, the requisite mental state for second-degree murder may not be inferred solely from the fact that a defendant drove while intoxicated. Death or great bodily harm is not the natural tendency or probable result of drunk driving. See also White, Drunk driving as second-degree murder in Michigan, 41 Wayne L R 1433, 1447 (1995).10

Next, driving while intoxicated, coupled with reckless driving, can support a second-degree murder bindover and conviction. One may infer from certain evidence that an intoxicated driver is subjectively *485aware that his actions will probably result in death or great bodily harm. Numerous factors can be taken into account. Some are the time of day, length of the trip, speed traveled, route taken, recklessness of the driving, the defendant’s actions following the accident, degree of intoxication, and the defendant’s drunk driving history. See White, supra at 1461.

I disagree with the majority that, by adopting a subjective approach, voluntary intoxication would be a defense in these cases. Any claim that intoxication can negate the defendant’s subjective awareness should be rejected. Second-degree murder is a general intent crime, to which intoxication is not a defense. People v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630; 331 NW2d 171 (1982). A subjective awareness element in second-degree murder cases does not create a specific-intent crime. To be subjectively aware of the consequences of one’s actions is not the same as specifically intending to cause death.

Today, this Court essentially adopts an objective standard that could result in all drunk driving cases causing death being submitted for trial on second-degree murder charges. The prosecution has the discretion to bring charges it deems appropriate. On the basis of the majority opinion, there is little to prevent the prosecutor from charging every defendant allegedly causing such an accident with both second-degree murder and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, causing the death of another person, MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4).

In the instant case, I would find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to bind *486Jason Goecke over on the second-degree murder charge.

The magistrate’s duty is clearly established by statute. MCL 766.13; MSA 28.931.

If it shall appear to the magistrate at the conclusion of the preliminary examination either that an offense has not been committed or that there is not probable cause for charging the defendant therewith, he shall discharge such defendant. If it shall appear to the magistrate at the conclusion of the preliminary examination that a felony has been committed and there is probable cause for charging the defendant therewith, the magistrate shall forthwith bind the defendant to appear before the circuit court of such county, or other court having jurisdiction of the cause, for trial.

To establish probable cause to bind over a defendant, the prosecutor must submit evidence on each element of the crime charged or evidence from which the elements can be inferred. People v McBride, 204 Mich App 678, 681; 516 NW2d 148 (1994). A magistrate should not dismiss a charge merely because some of the evidence is conflicting. People v King, 412 Mich 145, 153-154; 312 NW2d 629 (1981).

Even if evidence is submitted on each element of the offense, the magistrate’s job is not to automatically bind over. The magistrate is to review the whole matter. Where satisfied that there was insufficient evidence either that the offense charged was committed or that the defendant was the one who committed it, the charges must be dismissed. Id. at 154.

In this case, the evidence at the preliminary examination revealed that defendant drove his automobile while intoxicated, drove above the speed limit, ran a red light, and hit another vehicle. There was no evidence that defendant became subjectively aware that *487Ms actions would probably result in death or great bodily harm.

Nor does Ms statement after the accident, admitting that he was drunk and that he was speeding, provide evidence of Ms state of mind. Defendant’s awareness at the time the accident occurs, not after the fact, is what must be determined. MicMgan law requires that there be umty between the act and the defendant’s state of mind. People v Patskan, 387 Mich 701, 714; 199 NW2d 458 (1972).11

Here, defendant admitted that he was going too fast and stated, “I know I’m drunk.” There was no umty of state of mind and act that would permit a finding of malice. Under the facts presented, I would not conclude that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to bind over the defendant on a second-degree murder charge, after finding insufficient evidence of malice. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

I would find that, even under an objective standard, Goecke’s actions do not support a second-degree murder charge. His speeding and running a red light caused the decedent’s injury, not the fact that he was intoxicated. Under the majority opimon, anyone who is speeding, runs a red light, and causes an accident resulting in death can now be charged with second-degree murder. I do not agree with the majority that a reasonable person would necessarily know that the natural tendency of these actions would result in death or great bodily harm. Even viewing Goecke’s *488actions objectively, I would not find sufficient evidence to support a second-degree murder charge.

n. PEOPLE v BAKER. ANALYSIS

Unlike Jason Goecke, defendant Richard Baker was tried and convicted of second-degree murder. In determining whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), modified 441 Mich 1201 (1992). We determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, I would conclude in People v Baker that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. Just as in Goecke, the evidence revealed that defendant was intoxicated, was speeding, and ran a red light. However, there was insufficient evidence that defendant subjectively knew that the natural tendency of his actions would likely result in death or great bodily harm to another person. Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals judgment in this case, as well.

For the same reason stated in my analysis in Goecke, I would likewise not find sufficient evidence to sustain the second-degree murder conviction of Baker under an objective standard.

m. CONCLUSION

In order for a defendant to be charged and convicted of second-degree murder when he drives while intoxicated and causes the death of another, I would hold that the prosecutor must establish that (1) the *489defendant was subjectively aware of the dangerous nature of the act involved, and (2) the natural tendency of the act was to cause death or great bodily harm.

In Goecke and Baker, I would find that the prosecution did not meet its burden. Therefore, I would affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals in those cases.