odissenting). I dissent. I would not have granted leave to appeal in this case because I am not persuaded that the Court of Appeals erred or that there was any material injustice.

In these consolidated cases, we must determine the proper interpretation of the venue statute1 in the Civil Rights Act (CRA).2 Specifically, we are asked to decide whether venue was proper in Wayne County under MCL 37.2801(2).

*154Plaintiffs filed their suits in Wayne County, alleging that defendant terminated their employment in violation of the CRA. The Court of Appeals, relying on its decision in Barnes v Int’l Business Machines Corp,3 concluded that venue was proper only in Oakland County, where defendant made the decisions to terminate plaintiffs’ employment. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts’ orders denying defendant’s motions to change venue to Oakland County.4

We disagree with the Barnes decision and overrule it.5 In the cases before us, part of the alleged discrimination occurred in Wayne County, where plaintiffs worked and where the allegedly discriminatory actions were implemented. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand these cases to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings on plaintiffs’ claims.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs are African-Americans formerly employed by defendant. They worked for defendant at banking centers in Wayne County. On or around May 17, 2007, defendant terminated their employment for alleged misconduct. Plaintiff Sharon Champion learned of her dismissal through a telephone call from defendant’s office in Oakland County to her home in Wayne County. The parties dispute where plaintiff Brandon Brightwell *155received notice of his dismissal.6

Plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits in Wayne County, each alleging that defendant had terminated their employment for reasons of racial discrimination in violation of the CRA.7 Defendant moved in both lawsuits to change venue to Oakland County. It supported the motions with an affidavit from Michael Andrzejewski, an employee relations consultant who worked in defendant’s Southfield regional office in Oakland County.

Andrzejewksi averred in his affidavit that he was personally involved in the final decisions to terminate plaintiffs’ employment and that those decisions were made in the Southfield regional office. Defendant claimed that because it made the decisions in Oakland County, venue was proper only there. Both trial courts declined to change venue. Defendant sought interlocutory appeals in both cases.

The Court of Appeals granted both applications for leave to appeal, consolidated the appeals, and reversed the trial courts’ rulings in a divided decision. Relying on Barnes, the lead opinion concluded that “the appropriate venue for a CRA cause of action. .. depends on where the defendant’s violation occurred, not where the plaintiff was injured.”8 It noted that “[t]his Court has held that the alleged violation of the CRA is the action which gives rise to liability under the act, i.e., the corporate decision affecting the plaintiffs employment.”9

*156The Court of Appeals concurrence agreed that “venue is appropriate where the CRA was violated through the use of improper characteristics in making an employment decision.”10 It criticized the dissenting opinion’s discussion of the statutory tort venue provision, MCL 600.1629, as interpreted in our decision in Dimmitt & Owens Fin, Inc v Deloitte & Touche (ISC), LLC.11

The Court of Appeals dissent argued that the employment decisions constituted only a “potential violation” of the CRA and that it was the actual discharges that constituted the adverse employment actions.12 The dissent would have held that venue was proper in Wayne County.13 Plaintiffs sought review in this Court, and we granted their applications for leave to appeal.14

ANALYSIS

An appellate court uses the clearly erroneous standard to review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to change venue.15 Statutory interpretation involves questions of law that are reviewed de novo.16

The relevant statutory provision, MCL 37.2801, provides in part:

(1) A person alleging a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both.

(2) An action commenced pursuant to subsection (1) may be brought in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, or for the county where the *157person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business.

As always, our analysis begins with the language of the statute.17 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the statute.18

These cases involve only the first clause of subsection (2), which makes venue proper “in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred.”19 In Barnes, the Court of Appeals held, without citation or analysis, that the “violations alleged are adverse employment decisions” and that “the place of corporate decision making is an appropriate venue.”20 Judge WHITE concurred separately, opining that “[discrimination also ‘occurs’ in the county where the decision is implemented and the discrimination is inflicted.”21 She rejected the majority’s implication that “venue of a civil rights action is proper only in the county where the *158discriminatory decision is made.”22

The question of where venue properly lies for a lawsuit brought under the CRA turns on the meaning of the phrase “where the alleged violation occurred” found in MCL 37.2801(2). “Violation” is defined in part as “1. the act of violating or the state of being violated. 2. a breach or infringement, as of a law or promise.”23 Plaintiffs alleged that defendant violated MCL 37.2202(1), which provides in part:

An employer shall not do any of the following:

(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status.

A “violation” of MCL 37.2202, therefore, is equally dependent on an adverse employment action (in these cases the act of “discharging]”) and an improper motive for taking that action (a decision to discriminate “because of” a protected status). We believe it logically follows that a violation of the CRA “occur[s]” when the discriminatory decision is made and adverse employment actions are implemented.

Thus, we agree with Judge White’s concurrence in Barnes, which is also consistent with other courts’ interpretations of similar venue provisions. The majority in Barnes erred by restricting what constitutes a violation of the CRA to “adverse employment decisions.”24 Relying heavily on Barnes, the Court of Appeals lead and concurring opinions here reached the same erroneous conclusion.

We overrule Barnes because it restricted the analysis of a violation of the CRA to the adverse employment *159decision. Barnes is inconsistent with MCL 37.2202(l)(a) and the meaning of “violation” and “occurred” in MCL 37.2801.

However, this determination does not fully resolve the issue before us. A remaining question is: What specific actions constitute the unlawful discharge that establishes the CRA violation? Venue in these cases was clearly proper in Oakland County because it is undisputed that defendant resides in Oakland County. However, plaintiffs filed suit in Wayne County. The Court of Appeals determined that the trial courts erred by denying defendant’s motions to change venue to Oakland County because venue did not properly lie in Wayne County. Therefore, we must determine whether a CRA violation occurred in Wayne County that would provide a basis for venue in that location as well.

Defendant asserts that, even if Barnes is overruled, venue is proper only in Oakland County because that is where defendant completed several actions necessary to effectuate each plaintiffs discharge. For example, it removed plaintiffs from its payroll system at its Oakland County office. Plaintiffs counter that the only action that was relevant was the communication of the discharge decisions to them.

We reject both parties’ arguments. It would be arbitrary to consider any of the suggested actions entirely dispositive of where the CRA violation occurred. Discrimination claims often involve numerous actions concerning employers’ practices. Moreover, often it is unclear where the actions occurred that the parties claim are dispositive. Indeed, these cases provide a good illustration of the problem. If the location where the employment decision was communicated to a plaintiff is solely dispositive, a court must still determine where *160that decision was “communicated.”25

Finally, under this approach, defendants could unilaterally control venue by completing administrative tasks related to terminating a plaintiffs employment in their choice of locales. Or they could order an employee to report to a location in the venue they desire and fire the employee there. We believe these are not results that the Legislature intended in enacting the CRA.26

We conclude that the adverse employment actions in these cases occurred where plaintiffs’ place of employment was located.27 That is where most relevant actions involving the employer-employee relationship occur. Moreover, it is the severing of the employment relationship that is the truly adverse employment action. This action happens when the employee is no longer entitled to enter his or her place of work and perform the responsibilities of employment.

As Judge WHITE observed, it is also at this point that the allegedly unlawful discharge is fully “implemented *161and the discrimination is inflicted.”28 Applying that logic to these cases, we note that plaintiffs worked in Wayne County. Because defendant’s allegedly unlawful actions precluded plaintiffs from continuing to do so, the CRA violations occurred in Wayne County.29

The concurrence/dissent erroneously limits the occurrence of a violation solely to the place where a discriminatory decision is communicated to an employee. In doing so, it attaches too much significance to where the disclosure of the allegedly discriminatory discharge occurs. Indeed, the essence of the concurrence/dissent’s conclusion is found in its statement that “it can only be the actual communication, which itself implements a discriminatory decision, that amounts to the actual ‘discharge’ ... ,”30 Our reaction to this assertion is to ask: Why is this inherently so?

The concurrence/dissent offers no persuasive analysis to support its conclusion that the CRA violation must occur where the discharge is communicated. The right being violated under the CRA is not the right to be free from communication of adverse employment actions. Rather, it is the right to be free from actions that actually separate the employee from gainful employment for discriminatory reasons.31 The justices joining the concurrence/dissent convey an incorrect interpretation of this opinion when they write “that scarcely one in a thousand people would believe that a person is not *162‘discharged’ from employment at the moment an employer says to the employee: ‘You’re fired.’ ”32 In a world where snappy soundbites often distort the facts, this statement fits well and has face appeal. In truth, we justices do not disagree that “You’re fired” means “You are discharged from your employment.” Rather, this case addresses a quite different question, which is: If you are fired, in what location are you entitled to bring suit?

It is true that the actus reus and the mens rea of a CRA violation converge when a defendant communicates a discriminatory decision to an employee. But while that convergence causes the CRA violation, it does not settle the issue of what constitutes discharging the employee: the communication of the discriminatory decision or removing the employee’s right to work at his or her place of employment.33

*163Decisions from other jurisdictions involving similar statutes have generally taken a more nuanced approach in evaluating where an employment discrimination violation occurs.34 Other jurisdictions have consistently *164analyzed similar statutory language as including “ ‘the place where the decisions and actions concerning the employment practices occurred.’ ”35 We believe that it is the severance of the employment relationship that constitutes the actual discharge, not the mere communication of an adverse employment decision.36

The concurrence/dissent’s definition of “discharge” provides greater support for our interpretation.37 To “relieve of obligation,” “deprive of. . . employment,” or “dismiss from service” involves many decisions and *165actions. One is the communication of the dismissal to the employee, which the concurrence/dissent concludes is the basis for a CRA violation. However, it is not the communication of the discharge that violates the CRA, it is the actual discharge of the employee from his or her employment. This act occurs where the employee works because the employer has discharged the employee by removing his or her ability to work in that location.

The concurrence/dissent’s determination of when a CRA violation occurs leads it to assert that the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius undermines our conclusion.38 However, this argument is premised on the concurrence/dissent’s erroneous construction of the term “discharge” and of the language “where the alleged violation occurred” in MCL 37.2801(2). Since the Legislature intended the interpretation we ascribe to the language, there was no reason to expressly include an employee’s place of employment as an alternative basis for venue. Hence, if “where the *166alleged violation occurred” encompasses acts precluding an employee from continuing to work at his or her place of employment, why would additional language be necessary?

Moreover, the last portion of the provision furnishing a basis for venue in MCL 37.2801(2) is explicitly tied to locations over which the employer has exclusive control; specifically, it provides for proper venue in “the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business.” Presumably, if the Legislature had also intended that “where the alleged violation occurred” be a place over which a defendant had full control, it would have said so.

The Legislature certainly could have provided venue in “the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides, has its principal place of business, or communicates the alleged violation to the employee.” It did not do so. This omission suggests that the phrase “where the alleged violation occurred” was not similarly meant to be limited to locations subject to a defendant’s exclusive control.39 In sum, there is no textual basis in the CRA for reading the language of MCL 37.2801(2) as the concurrence/dissent reads it.

*167Finally, our analysis avoids the arbitrariness of the approaches suggested by the parties and accepted by the concurrence/dissent. Employers and employees generally both have some influence in determining where an employment relationship is formulated. “Venue rules traditionally have served to ensure that proceedings are held in the most convenient forum,”40 and it defies common sense to conclude that the county in which the employee actually worked for the employer would be an inconvenient forum for either party.

We again reject the concurrence/dissent’s assertion that our decision is policy driven and that our analysis is merely justification for a predetermined interpretation. In fact, our decision is reasonably derived from the language of the statute. This decision invokes at least the following exercises in statutory interpretation: (1) an attempt to reasonably comprehend the meaning of “violation,” “occurred,” and “discharge” in the CRA, (2) an attempt to reasonably comprehend the meaning of these terms in the context of MCL 37.2801(2) as a whole, (3) an attempt to assess where the actus reus and the mens rea of the statute converge, (4) an attempt to compare the language of MCL 37.2801(2) with that of its predecessor statute, (5) an assessment of the relevance of traditional maxims of statutory construction, in this case expressio unius est exclusio alterius, (6) an attempt to assess alternative meanings of the relevant statutory terms, including those adopted by the concurrence/dissent, in light of the overall purposes of *168the statute, and (7) an attempt to compare and contrast the caselaw of other states construing similar language. That we additionally point out that our interpretation results in a considerably more convenient forum than that of the concurrence/dissent does not detract from the focus of our interpretative approach.

APPLICATION

Plaintiffs both worked for defendant in Wayne County. Because adverse employment actions — the severance of plaintiffs’ employment relationships — took place in Wayne County, the CRA violations occurred in Wayne County. Thus, venue properly lay in Wayne County under MCL 37.2801(2). Therefore, the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that the trial courts clearly erred by denying defendant’s motions to change venue to Oakland County.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that, under MCL 37.2801(2), a violation of the CRA occurs when the alleged discriminatory decision is made and the allegedly adverse employment actions are implemented. We overrule the Court of Appeals’ decision in Barnes v Int’l Business Machines Corp to the extent that it held otherwise.

We further conclude that the CRA violation in a case alleging discharge from employment is the severance of the employment relationship. The decisions and actions constituting that violation are implemented, and therefore occur, when the employee is no longer entitled to enter the workplace and perform the responsibilities of employment.

In these cases, each plaintiffs employment relationship with defendant was based and severed in Wayne County. *169Thus, defendant’s alleged violations of the CRA. occurred in Wayne County. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand these cases to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings there on plaintiffs’ claims.

(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the majority to the extent that it reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals and instead holds that venue is proper under the Civil Rights Act (CRA) in the places where the allegedly discriminatory decision was made and implemented. I dissent, however, from the majority’s analysis regarding when this implementation occurs. In order to justify its interpretation that venue is always proper at an employee’s place of work, the majority holds that a violation of the CRA has not occurred at the moment when an employer communicates a discriminatory employment decision to an employee. This conclusion is contrary to the basic principle that the CRA violation occurs with the convergence of a prohibited act and a discriminatory intent. In light of that principle, I believe that the communication of the discriminatory decision is itself the CRA violation. Thus, once an adverse employment action is actually communicated, a violation has occurred and the plaintiffs claim becomes actionable, thereby making venue proper under the plain language of the CRA only in those places where the violation occurred. I also dissent from the majority’s related holding that where an employee physically works provides an independently proper place of venue, even when a violation of the CRA did not occur in that location. While the location of employment may present a convenient or logical forum, because it is not necessarily where a statutory violation occurs for the purposes of the CRA’s venue provision, I *170dissent from the portion of the majority’s opinion manufacturing it as a proper venue.

ANALYSIS

The venue provision within the CRA provides, in relevant part: “An action commenced pursuant to [MCL 37.2801(1)] may be brought in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, or for the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business.”1 The CRA itself describes what constitutes a violation. It provides, among other things, that an employer shall not “[f]ail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment ... because of... race ... .”2

Our interpretation of this statute is governed by clear and uncontroversial rules of statutory construction. “In interpreting statutory language, this Court’s primary goal is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. If the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent in the language of the statute, that statute must be enforced as written, free of any ‘contrary judicial gloss.’ ”3 In doing so, “[w]e first review the language of the statute itself. If it is clear, no further analysis is necessary or allowed to expand what the Legislature clearly intended to cover.”4

*171The language of the CRA clearly requires that a defendant commit an actus reus (an adverse employment action, such as a “discharge”) with a specific mens rea (a discriminatory intent) in order to violate its provisions. Moreover, a violation of the CRA only occurs when an improper discriminatory intent is actually communicated within the context of the adverse employment action.5 Stated otherwise, for venue purposes, I believe that a violation occurs under the statute only at the time and in the place or places where the actus reus and the 'mens rea converge: where the defendant implements the discriminatory adverse employment action.6

The majority disagrees with this straightforward understanding and application of the CRA’s venue *172provision, although it cannot explain why the convergence of the mens rea and the actus reus does not equate with a statutory violation — here, two discharges. The majority confusingly explains that “it is not the communication of the discharge that violates the CRA, it is the actual discharge of the employee from his or her employment.”7 Yet when an employer fires an employee for a discriminatory purpose, as was alleged here, why is the communication of that adverse employment decision not itself the violation of the CRA?

I think that scarcely one in a thousand people would believe that a person is not “discharged” from employment at the moment an employer says to the employee: “You’re fired.” Yet in the context of discriminatory discharges under the CRA, the majority holds otherwise. The majority thus believes that the communication or implementation of a discriminatory decision only causes a future violation of the CRA at some later, indeterminate time (when an employee is actually prevented from returning to the workplace or performing his work duties) and is not itself the *173actual violation of the CRA. I fail to see how this can be true. An employer who tells an employee that he is fired actually severs the employment relationship at that time; if he also communicates a discriminatory intent to the employee at this time, he has violated the CRA. Such a convergénce is more than a mere discriminatory statement devoid of meaning or consequence until some later time. The majority fails to understand that the issue of when a person is fired is inextricably linked to where the person is fired, given that the location(s) at the time the discharge occurs establish the statutory venue.8

The majority’s analysis on this point is also internally inconsistent. If the communication terminating employment only caused a later violation that occurred at the employee’s place of work, then only the place of employment could ever be the locus of the violation that establishes venue under the CRA. However, the majority opinion also holds that a violation may occur elsewhere at some place other than the place of employment. Under the majority’s theory, why would the place where the communication is received, if it is not the place of actual employment, ever be a proper venue if it were not the place where the actus reus and the mens rea converge to cause the violation? The majority cannot explain this anomaly.

Similarly, the majority opinion additionally provides that the “adverse employment actions in these cases occurred where plaintiffs’ place of employment was located”9 — that is, where plaintiffs physically worked. It is difficult to see how the majority’s “place of employ*174ment” theory of violation relates in any relevant way to the occurrence of the actual discharge.10 In effect, the majority’s analysis establishes as a matter of law that venue is proper not only where the discriminatory communication terminating the employment occurred, but also where the “effects” of the discrimination occurred, namely at an employee’s place of work. 11

The majority’s position is further undermined by the fact that the CRA explicitly makes the defendant’s place of business a proper venue, while at the same time it *175says nothing about the plaintiffs place of employment. The CRA’s venue provision provides that a CRA action “may be brought in the circuit court for the county where .. . the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business.”12 This language underscores the fact that the majority essentially creates a new venue provision that is contrary or in addition to the statutory language regarding where a violation occurs, as well as the structure and specific language chosen by the Legislature.13

If the Legislature had wished to make a plaintiffs place of employment a proper venue, it could have easily *176and explicitly done so.14 Indeed, if the Legislature wishes to establish parallel venue provisions, it is capable of doing and has done so.15 However, when the Legislature has not done so, this Court may not expand upon the clear language chosen by the Legislature. Simply put, the CRA’s venue provision says nothing about the plaintiffs place or locus of employment as an independent site of proper venue.

That the majority is expanding the scope of the CRA is further underscored when considering potential violations that are not discriminatory discharges, but are nonetheless CRA violations that will therefore be implicated by this decision. As previously noted, the CRA prohibits discriminatory “failures] or refus[als] to hire or recruit” and other unnamed types of general employment discrimination against a person.16 Under the majority’s formulation, venue would be proper in a plaintiffs place of potential employment even if the plaintiff never worked in that place because of a refusal *177to hire.17 By way of contrast, my interpretation of the venue provision appropriately prevents venue from being established in such a location because neither the actus reus nor the mens rea — which together comprise a violation — would occur in that place. Moreover, whereas Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act explicitly contemplates such a result,18 the Michigan Legislature declined to adopt comparable language when it crafted Michigan’s CRA.19 Thus, the majority’s con*178struction ascribes additional meaning to the words of Michigan’s CRA not contemplated by the Legislature.

Finally, the majority notes several policy considerations supporting its position, but I believe that each is unavailing to displace the clear language of the statute. The majority argues that its additional rule creates another convenient forum and that it also prevents an employer from controlling the place of venue by choosing where he fires an employee. First, the resort to “convenience” as a justification for the rule in this case conflates forum non conveniens theory with the statutory venue provision.20 They are not based on similar principles — the latter being predicated on where the forum is proper, not convenient. Additionally, even if a defendant tries to control venue by firing the plaintiff from a place wholly unrelated to the actual place of employment, the plaintiffs remedy at that time is a motion for a change of venue based on forum non conveniens.21 It is not this Court’s duty to manufacture *179alternative forums as a matter of law merely because they would also be convenient to the parties.

For these reasons, I would restrict venue solely to the place of the violation, as defined by where the mens rea and the actus reus converge, in accordance with the clear terms of the statute. To the extent that the majority interprets this state’s civil rights laws in a way that prevents a putative plaintiffs claims from becoming actionable the moment a violation of the CRA occurs, I dissent.