Order Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan May 16, 2014 Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice 147483 Michael F. Cavanagh Stephen J. Markman Mary Beth Kelly Brian K. Zahra Bridget M. McCormack GERARDO LORENZO TIENDA and SILVIA David F. Viviano, LOPEZ GOMEZ, Justices Plaintiffs-Appellees, v SC: 147483 COA: 306050 Allegan CC: 10-046088-NF INTEGON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a/k/a GMAC INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, and TITAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Intervening Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/ On April 30, 2014, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the April 23, 2013 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

MCCORMACK, J. (concurring).

I concur in the order denying leave to appeal. I agree with the Court of Appeals’ analysis in this case and write only to highlight the difference between domicile and residence clarified in Grange Ins Co v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475 (2013), which was released after the published Court of Appeals opinion in this case. Grange involved the meaning of the word “domicile” in the context of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.

This Court stated that the common law has necessarily distinguished between the concepts of “domicile” and “residence:” The former, in its ordinary acceptation, was defined to

be, ‘A place where a person lives or has his home,’ while ‘[a]ny place of abode or dwelling place,’ however temporary it might have been, was said to constitute a residence. A person’s domicile was his legal residence or home in contemplation of law.

Stated more succinctly, a person may have only one domicile, but more than one residence. For purposes of distinguishing “domicile” from “residence,” this Court has explained that “domicile is acquired by the combination of residence and the intention to reside in a given place . . . .

If the intention of permanently residing in a place exists, a residence in pursuance of that intention, however short, will establish a domicile.” [Id. at 494 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).]

It is in determining domicile, and not residence, that an individual’s intent to reside is relevant. Furthermore, because a person can have more than one residence, it is possible for an individual to be a resident of more than one state. In such a case, how the term “out-of-state resident” in MCL 500.3163 would apply to an individual who is a resident of both Michigan and another state is not one we need decide today, as this case presents no such question. The insured maintained no other living space in any other state at the time of the accident. He carried all his worldly possessions with him as he followed agricultural seasonal work from state to state. The insured had only one residence at the time of the accident, and that residence was in Michigan. 1

Although I agree with the Court of Appeals that the insured was not an out-of-state resident at the time of the accident, I believe that the Legislature might wish to review the language of MCL 500.3163 because the statute would seem to place liability on Michigan’s Assigned Claims Facility even when an out-of-state insurance company has collected monthly premiums for an out-of-state insurance policy.

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

May 16, 2014 t0513 Clerk