I concur in the Court's order denying leave to appeal because I agree with the Court of Appeals that any error in the trial court's decision to admit other-acts evidence under MRE 404(b) was harmless. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the Court of Appeals' 404(b) analysis. I believe that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the other-acts evidence.

Although the Court of Appeals correctly recited the relevant standard from People v. Golochowicz , 413 Mich. 298 , 309-311, 319 N.W.2d 518 (1982), it didn't apply it. Rather than determining whether the two acts shared "some special quality ... that tends to prove the defendant's identity," id . at 309, 319 N.W.2d 518 , the Court of Appeals compared the similarities and differences of the two shoplifting offenses, concluding that "the peculiarities of defendant's conduct in each circumstance are sufficiently similar to each other and sufficiently *582 atypical as compared to the general class of offenses to earmark the charged offense as defendant's handiwork." People v. Chandler (On Remand) , unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 21, 2018 (Docket No. 333207), p. 5, 2018 WL 3998725 .

But more-alike-than-different is not the standard, as the panel recognized. Rather, the crime must be " 'so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature,' " Golochowicz , 413 Mich. at 310-311 , 319 N.W.2d 518 (citation omitted), and the "manners or systems employed by the perpetrator of the uncharged crime and the crime in question" must involve "such distinctive, unique, peculiar or special characteristics as to justify an ordinarily reasonable juror to infer that both were the handiwork of the same person," id . at 312, 319 N.W.2d 518 .

The "peculiarities" identified here were (1) robbing "a small, local business," (2) giving an excuse when confronted about the shoplifting, and (3) fleeing the scene at high speed on residential streets. Chandler (On Remand) , unpub. op. at 5. The panel did not describe the characteristics of "the general class of offenses" against which the defendant's crimes stood out as atypical. Id . Nor do these "peculiarities" seem peculiar enough to be like a signature.

Thus, in my view, the evidence did not satisfy Golochowicz and admitting it was error. But I agree with the Court of Appeals' alternative holding that any error was harmless in light of the "abundant other evidence" from which the jury could infer identity. Id . at 6.