Minnesota Court of Appeals, 1985 Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed confirmation of a settlement reached between attorneys, holding the record supported findings of attorney authority, implied acceptance through eighteen-month retention of the settlement check, or equitable estoppel.

Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed confirmation of a settlement reached between attorneys, holding the record supported findings of attorney authority, implied acceptance through eighteen-month retention of the settlement check, or equitable estoppel.

Rosenberg v. Townsend, Rosenberg & Young, Inc.
Minnesota Court of Appeals · Decided November 5, 1985 · No. C8-85-749 · Parker, Wozniak, Huspeni
376 N.W.2d 434; 1985 Minn. App. LEXIS 4775 (North Western Reporter, Second Series)

Outcome: Affirmed for appellee.

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Counsel

David L. Olson, St. Louis Park, for appellant., Patrick J. Neaton, Minneapolis, for respondents.

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Rosenberg v. Townsend, Rosenberg & Young, Inc.

What happened

The facts of the case, in plain language.

Appellant A. Barry Rosenberg was an officer and shareholder of respondent Townsend, Rosenberg and Young, Inc., an independent insurance agency, until his status as officer and employee was terminated at a July 1981 corporate meeting.

On or about September 12, 1983, the attorneys for the parties discussed the matter by telephone and agreed the matter would be settled according to the previous arrangement, but it is disputed whether Rosenberg's attorney conditioned the settlement upon obtaining his client's approval.

The corporation's attorney mailed executed settlement papers, a $5,000 cashier's check, and a bank letter releasing Rosenberg's personal guaranty, delivering them upon the express condition that Rosenberg sign the Settlement Agreement.

No action was taken for a year and a half: the cashier's check was not negotiated, Rosenberg did not execute the settlement, yet he expressed no dissatisfaction with the arrangement.

In March 1985 the corporation moved to confirm the settlement agreement, dismiss Rosenberg's pending action, and cancel his shares; the trial court granted that relief after reviewing memoranda, affidavits, exhibits, and oral argument, without issuing findings of fact.

What the court decided

A. Barry Rosenberg, a former officer and shareholder of an independent insurance agency, sued the corporation for the $33,333.33 he believed his shares were worth after his status as officer and employee was terminated in July 1981. After earlier settlement talks collapsed, the parties' attorneys agreed by telephone in September 1983 to a deal paying Rosenberg $5,000 and releasing his personal guarantee of corporate debt. The corporation sent executed settlement papers and a cashier's check, but Rosenberg never signed the agreement or negotiated the check, and took no action for a year and a half. When the corporation moved in March 1985 to confirm the settlement, dismiss the suit, and cancel his shares, the trial court granted the motion without findings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning the record supported any of three grounds: express authority in Rosenberg's attorney, implied acceptance through prolonged silence and retention of the check, or equitable estoppel.

  1. Except in an emergency, an attorney has no authority to settle a case in the absence of the client's knowledge or consent; settlement authority must be expressly conferred rather than implied, and whether express authority was given is a question of fact for the trial court. (*436-38)
  2. A client may ratify an attorney's unauthorized settlement of the client's claim, either impliedly or expressly, and is thereafter bound by the agreement. (*437)
  3. Where a check is tendered as an offer of compromise and the recipient retains it for an unreasonable length of time without indicating refusal to accept it, the retention constitutes acceptance of the offer even if the check is never cashed or negotiated. (*437)
  4. A party invoking equitable estoppel must show representations or inducements upon which it reasonably relied and that will cause it harm if estoppel is not applied; silent receipt of executed settlement papers, without disputing their terms, can supply the reasonable reliance. (*437-38)
  5. Findings of fact are not required when a trial court rules on a motion.

How the court reached its decision

The court's reasoning, step by step.

Whether the record supports a determination that Rosenberg's attorney had express authority to enter into a settlement agreement on his behalf. Four items in the record would support a finding of authority: the corporation's September 1983 letters stating that a settlement had been reached, its counsel's oral representation that he understood Rosenberg's attorney had authority to settle, Rosenberg's earlier agreement to settle for the same amount, and his failure to take any action repudiating the settlement for a year and a half. The trial court could properly have determined that Rosenberg's attorney had authority to settle the claim, and the judgment confirming the settlement was affirmed.

Whether Rosenberg's eighteen-month retention of the settlement check constituted an implied acceptance or ratification of the settlement agreement. Rosenberg retained the corporation's $5,000 cashier's check for eighteen months without negotiating it, executing the settlement, or notifying the corporation that it would not be accepted as payment in full, while expressing no dissatisfaction with the arrangement. The court could properly have concluded that Rosenberg impliedly accepted the offer of settlement through prolonged retention of the check.

Whether Rosenberg should be equitably estopped from repudiating the settlement agreement. By mailing executed settlement papers and the settlement check, the corporation expected Rosenberg to sign; his failure to respond or dispute the terms made that expectation and reliance reasonable, a situation analogous to Albert, where a party that took advantage of a stipulation's sixty-day stay was estopped to assert the stipulation was unauthorized. The trial court could properly have confirmed the settlement agreement on grounds of equitable estoppel, and the judgment was affirmed.

Key quotes from the opinion

Notable passages from the opinion, in the court's own words.

“Except in an emergency, an attorney has no authority to settle a case in the absence of his client’s knowledge or consent.”
Rule limiting attorney settlement authority absent client consent — *436
“In this instance, where Rosenberg or his attorney retained the check for eighteen months without notifying the corporation that it would not be accepted as payment in full, the court could properly have concluded that Rosenberg had impliedly accepted the offer of settlement.”
Application of implied-acceptance doctrine to eighteen-month retention of the settlement check — *437
“To invoke this doctrine, [a party] must show that [another party] made representations or inducements upon which [the first pary] reasonably relied that will cause [the first party] harm if estoppel is not applied.”
Formulation of the equitable estoppel standard — *437
“Whether an attorney has been given express authority to settle a claim is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court.”
Allocation of settlement-authority and estoppel questions to the trial court as fact questions — *438

Cases the court relied on

Earlier decisions the court cited as authority for its ruling.

  • Albert v. Edgewater Beach Building Corp. (218 Minn. 20, 15 N.W.2d 460 (1944)) — Supplies both the rule that an attorney has no implied power to compromise a client's cause of action and the analogy for estopping a party who took advantage of a stipulation's benefits.
  • Gran v. City of St. Paul, Board of Education (274 Minn. 220, 143 N.W.2d 246 (1966)) — Establishes that a client may ratify an attorney's unauthorized settlement impliedly or expressly and is thereafter bound by the agreement, grounding the implied-acceptance theory.
  • Bethesda Lutheran Church v. Twin City Construction Co. (356 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)) — Supplies the elements of equitable estoppel—representations or inducements, reasonable reliance, and harm—that supported the third independent basis for affirmance.
  • Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Anderson (310 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 1981)) — States the baseline rule that, absent an emergency, an attorney cannot settle a case without the client's knowledge or consent, framing the express-authority inquiry.
  • Holt v. Swenson (252 Minn. 510, 90 N.W.2d 724 (1958)) — Recognizes that silence may constitute acceptance where there is a duty otherwise to deny, supporting the implied-acceptance theory based on retention of the settlement check.

Cases that cite this one

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Full opinion

The complete text of the court's opinion as published.

Opinion

OPINION

PARKER, Judge.

This is an appeal by A. Barry Rosenberg from a judgment confirming a settlement agreement entered into between the parties’ attorneys in September 1983. Rosenberg alleges that the settlement was contingent upon his consent thereto and that such consent was never given. We affirm.

FACTS

For several years, appellant A. Barry Rosenberg was an officer and shareholder of the respondent corporation, Townsend, Rosenberg and Young, Inc., an independent insurance agency. In July 1981, at a corporate meeting, Rosenberg’s status as an officer and employee was terminated. Rosenberg subsequently opened his own independent insurance agency, and attempted to recover from the corporation the $33,333.33 which he believed his shares were worth. A settlement was reached, whereby the corporation agreed to pay Rosenberg $5,000 and to obtain a release of his personal guarantee of the corporation’s indebtedness.

Rosenberg’s attorney prepared the necessary settlement papers, but the corporation subsequently refused to sign the agreement, claiming that it had discovered Rosenberg had been “rolling” some of the corporation’s policyholders on to his own insurance policies. Rosenberg commenced a lawsuit against the corporation in May 1983 for the $33,333.33, and served the corporation with several discovery requests. When faced with the prospect of substantial legal fees, the corporation again pursued settlement discussions.

On or about September 12, 1983, the attorneys for the parties discussed this matter on the telephone. It was agreed that the matter would be settled according to the previous arrangement; however, it is disputed whether Rosenberg’s attorney conditioned the settlement upon obtaining his client’s approval. The attorney for the corporation sent Rosenberg’s attorney a follow-up letter the next day, which stated:

This letter is to confirm that we have reached an agreement to settle the above referenced matter in consideration of my clients paying your client $5,000.00.
In looking through the file, I believe that the mutual release and agreement that you prepared last year * * * and a stipulation of dismissal should take care of the paper work. If that is satisfactory with you, I will have those doc *436 uments prepared accordingly, have my client execute them, and forward them to you with our check.

One week later the attorney for the corporation mailed Rosenberg’s attorney the following letter:

Enclosed herewith is an original and one copy of a proposed Settlement Agreement executed by my clients, and the Stipulation of Dismissal in the above entitled matter executed by myself, as well as the $5,000.00 Cashier’s Check for the settlement, and a letter dated September 19, 1983 from Norwest Bank releasing Mr. Rosenberg’s personal guaranty, and the guaranty itself.
I am delivering the check and the letter from the bank and guaranty, to you upon the express condition that you obtain Mr. Rosenberg’s signature to the Settlement Agreement, and provide me with the original, together with his stock certificate, endorsed in blank (or an affidavit of lost certificate, endorsed in blank).

No action was taken for a year and a half. The cashier’s check was not negotiated and Rosenberg did not execute the settlement; however, he also expressed no dissatisfaction with the arrangement. In March 1985 the attorney for the corporation finally brought a motion to confirm the settlement agreement, to dismiss Rosenberg’s pending action and to cancel Rosenberg’s shares of stock. The corporation’s attorney attached an affidavit and memorandum to his moving papers, claiming that the settlement agreement was binding and that Rosenberg should be estopped from denying he had agreed to the settlement terms.

Rosenberg’s attorney opposed the motion, alleging that the settlement agreement had been tentative and subject to the approval of Rosenberg, and that such approval had never been obtained.

The trial court after reviewing the mem-oranda, affidavits and exhibits submitted, and after hearing oral argument by both attorneys, issued an order confirming the settlement, dismissing the complaint and counterclaim, and cancelling Rosenberg’s stock in the corporation. The court did not issue any findings of fact which might have explained its decision, nor does the transcript reveal the court’s intentions. Rosenberg has appealed from the judgment entered pursuant to the court’s order.

ISSUES

1. Does the record support a determination that Rosenberg’s attorney had authority to enter into a settlement agreement upon his behalf?

2. Does the record support a determination that Rosenberg’s actions constituted an implied acceptance of the settlement agreement?

3. Does the record support a determination that Rosenberg should be estopped from repudiating the settlement agreement?

DISCUSSION

Because the trial court did not issue any findings of fact, it cannot be determined upon which basis it rendered its decision. 1 Several theories were presented to the trial court and have been raised in this appeal. We find that the trial court could properly have affirmed the settlement agreement upon any of three separate grounds.

I

Rosenberg argues that his attorney had no authority to enter into a settlement agreement on his behalf. Except in an emergency, an attorney has no authority to settle a case in the absence of his client’s knowledge or consent. Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Anderson, 310 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Minn. 1981). However, an attorney may settle a claim with the authorization of his client. Burner Service and *437 Combustion Controls Co., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 250 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn. 1977). This authority, however, must be express; it has been stated that “an attorney has not by implication the right to compromise his client’s cause of action.” Albert v. Edgewater Beach Building Corp., 218 Minn. 20, 25, 15 N.W.2d 460, 463 (1944), quoting from Gibson v. Nelson, 111 Minn. 183, 187, 126 N.W. 731, 733 (1910).

The following evidence in the record would support a determination by the trial court that Rosenberg’s attorney had the authority to settle his claim:

a) The letters by the corporation’s attorney mailed in September 1983 which indicated that a settlement had been reached;
b) The oral argument to the court by the corporation’s attorney that he understood Rosenberg's attorney had the authority to settle the case;
c) The fact that Rosenberg had previously agreed to settle the case for the same amount; and
d) The absence of any action by Rosenberg for a year and a half repudiating the settlement.

II

Our supreme court has indicated that even an unauthorized settlement of a client’s claim by an attorney may be ratified, either impliedly or expressly, by a client, who is thereafter bound by the agreement. Gran v. City of St. Paul, 274 Minn. 220, 223, 143 N.W.2d 246, 249 (1966).

The settlement of a lawsuit is “contractual in nature,” Jallen v. Agre, 264 Minn. 369, 373, 119 N.W.2d 739, 743 (1963); therefore, before a settlement is reached there must first be an offer and acceptance, resulting in a meeting of the parties’ minds. Id.

An acceptance has been defined as “a manifestation of assent when evaluated under an objective standard.” Holman Erection Co. v. Orville E. Madsen & Sons, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn. 1983). Conduct, as well as verbal expression, may at times constitute acceptance, and silence may be acceptance where there is a duty otherwise to deny. Holt v. Swenson, 252 Minn. 510, 516, 90 N.W.2d 724, 728 (1958).

Regarding implied acceptance, one commentator has stated:

An offer of compromise may be accepted expressly, or there may be an implied acceptance. Thus, where an obligor tenders a check as an offer of compromise, and the obligee retains it for an unreasonable length of time without indicating his refusal to accept it as an offer of compromise, his retention of the check constitutes an acceptance of the offer even if he does not cash the check or derive any benefit from it.

15A Am.Jur.2d, Compromise and Settlement, § 8 (citations omitted). Several courts have adopted this reasoning. See Anno, 13 A.L.R.2d 736, Creditors Retention of Check Without Cashing or Negotiating It as Acceptance in Payment or Settlement of an Unliquidated or Disputed Claim. In this instance, where Rosenberg or his attorney retained the check for eighteen months without notifying the corporation that it would not be accepted as payment in full, the court could properly have concluded that Rosenberg had impliedly accepted the offer of settlement.

Ill

Many of the same facts which support a finding of implied acceptance would also support the court’s confirmation of the settlement agreement upon grounds of equitable estoppel.

Equitable estoppel is a doctrine which has been designed to prevent a party from unfairly benefitting from his own actions. Bethesda Lutheran Church v. Twin City Construction Co., 356 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984). “To invoke this doctrine, [a party] must show that [another party] made representations or inducements upon which [the first pary] reasonably relied that will cause [the first party] harm if estoppel is not applied. Id.

*438 When the attorney for the corporation mailed Rosenberg the settlement papers, it was expected that Rosenberg would sign them. In the absence of any response by Rosenberg disputing the terms of the settlement, the trial court could properly find that this expectation and reliance was reasonable. This situation is analogous to Albert v. Edgewater Beach Building Corp., 218 Minn. at 25, 15 N.W.2d at 463., where a party was effectively estopped from asserting that a stipulation was unauthorized after taking advantage of a 60-day stay provided for therein.

DECISION

Whether an attorney has been given express authority to settle a claim is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court. Similarly, whether a settlement has been reached and whether equitable estop-pel should be applied are questions of fact for the trial court. The trial court could properly have concluded that a settlement was reached by the attorneys and by the parties upon a theory of implied acceptance or upon grounds of equitable estoppel.

Affirmed.

1

. Findings of fact are not required on motions. Minn.R.Civ.P. 52.01; Kelzenberg v. Kelzenberg, 352 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984).

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