Court of Appeals affirms summary judgment for an electrical contractor, holding that a transformer vault is an improvement to real property and that Minnesota's two-year § 541.051 limitations period, applied retroactively, bars the injured electrician's negligence claim.
Outcome: Affirmed for appellee.
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(as of 9/30/2026)
Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1998, among the opinions in this site’s citation index. Amendment history from the Minnesota Revisor of Statutes. A later amendment does not necessarily affect this decision's analysis — check the current statute text.Cites Minnesota statutes amended since this decision
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What happened
The facts of the case, in plain language.
On September 9, 1975, Lovgren, an electrician for North Star Steel Co., touched a high voltage bar in a transformer vault installed by Peoples and sustained severe electrical shock causing heart damage and an arm injury requiring amputation.
Peoples permanently installed the transformer vault, wiring it to the steel furnace and an electrical substation outside the plant and bolting it to the floor, making its installation an improvement to real property within the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 541.051.
The safety device Peoples allegedly negligently failed to install does not alter the vault's characterization as an improvement to real property, because it is the nature of the vault that is critical.
The two-year period under Minn.Stat. § 541.051 (1965), presumptively constitutional at the time of Lovgren's September 9, 1975 accident, ran out nine days before the Minnesota Supreme Court declared that version unconstitutional on equal protection grounds on September 16, 1977.
Section 541.051 was reenacted on April 7, 1980 with an effective date 115 days later, and the court concluded the legislature intended retroactive application because that interval was a reasonable time to bring suit, leaving Lovgren nearly five years in which to bring his action against Peoples.
What the court decided
In 1975, electrician Ellis Lovgren suffered severe electrical shock while touching a high voltage bar in a transformer vault that Peoples Electric Company had installed at the steel mill where he worked, sustaining heart damage and an arm injury requiring amputation. After serving an amended complaint naming Peoples in 1981, Lovgren faced Peoples' argument that Minn.Stat. § 541.051 — a two-year limitations period for tort claims arising out of defective improvements to real property — barred the claim, and the trial court granted Peoples summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed on two grounds: the permanently installed vault qualifies as an 'improvement to real property,' and the 1980 reenactment of § 541.051 could justifiably be applied retroactively because its 115-day interval between enactment and effective date gave plaintiffs reasonable time to act. Having had nearly five years, Lovgren's claim was correctly deemed barred.
- A structure permanently installed, wired into plant operations, and bolted to the floor—such as a transformer vault supplying energy to an electric steel mill—is an 'improvement to real property' within the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 541.051. (*18)
- The allegedly negligent omission of a temporary or readily detachable safety device does not remove a claim from the scope of § 541.051; it is the nature of the underlying structure, not the safety device, that determines whether the injury arose out of an improvement to real property. (*18)
- A statute of limitations reenacted without express retroactivity language may be applied to causes of action accruing before its enactment where the interval between enactment and effective date gives claimants a reasonable time to sue; the 115-day interval preceding the August 1, 1980 effective date of § 541.051 satisfied that standard. (*19)
- Because § 541.051 (1965) enjoyed a presumption of constitutionality when the plaintiff was injured, the two-year limitation period ran nine days before the Minnesota Supreme Court declared that version unconstitutional, furnishing an independent basis for barring the claim. (*19)
How the court reached its decision
The court's reasoning, step by step.
Whether the transformer vault installed by Peoples constituted an 'improvement to real property' within the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 541.051. Peoples permanently installed the vault, wired it to the steel furnace and to an electrical substation outside the plant, and bolted it to the floor inside the plant; Lovgren's contention that the omitted safety device was essentially temporary and immediately detachable failed because the nature of the vault itself is what is critical. The installation of a transformer vault supplying energy to an electric steel mill is an improvement to real property within the meaning of § 541.051.
Whether § 541.051 (1980), reenacted after the 1965 version was declared unconstitutional, could be applied retroactively to bar a cause of action accruing during the intervening hiatus. Section 541.051 was reenacted on April 7, 1980 with an effective date 115 days later, on August 1, 1980; measured against Kozisek's acceptance of a three-month interval, the 115-day postponement was a reasonable time for plaintiffs to bring their causes of action, and under the trial court's accrual analysis Lovgren had nearly five years in which to sue. The legislature intended the reenacted statute to be applied so as to bar Lovgren's claim; § 541.051 (1980) bars the action and the summary judgment is affirmed.
Whether the claim was independently barred because the two-year period under the presumptively constitutional 1965 statute expired before that statute was declared unconstitutional. Lovgren's accident occurred on September 9, 1975; the two years provided under § 541.051 (1965) ran nine days before Pacific Indemnity declared that version unconstitutional on equal protection grounds on September 16, 1977. The trial court could have rested its award of summary judgment on this analysis, although it instead determined that the cause accrued during the hiatus and addressed retroactive application of the 1980 statute.
Key quotes from the opinion
Notable passages from the opinion, in the court's own words.
Cases the court relied on
Earlier decisions the court cited as authority for its ruling.
Minnesota statutes cited
Sections of the Minnesota Statutes this opinion cites.
Cases that cite this one
11 later published cases cite this decision.
- Lee v. Industrial Electric Co. (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
- Lovgren v. Peoples Elec. Co., Inc. (Minn. 1986)
- Johnson v. Steele-Waseca Cooperative Electric (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
- Laue v. Production Credit Ass'n of Blooming Prairie (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
- Fisher v. County of Rock (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
- Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
- Farnham v. Nasby Agri-Systems, Inc. (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
- Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp. (Minn. 1988)
- Massie v. City of Duluth (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
- Moen v. Rexnord, Inc. (D. Minn. 1987)
- Schwardt v. Modern Grain Systems, Inc. (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Full opinion
The complete text of the court's opinion as published.
Opinion
OPINION
Appellant Ellis Lovgren (Lovgren) appeals from the judgment of the trial court which granted respondent Peoples Electric Company, Inc.’s (Peoples) motion for summary judgment on grounds that the statute of limitations barred the action. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 9, 1975, Lovgren, an electrician for the North Star Steel Co., sustained a severe electrical shock when he touched a high voltage bar in a transformer vault at the steel mill where he worked. Peoples had installed the vault. The shock caused severe injuries to Lovgren, including heart damage and an arm injury requiring amputation.
On April 24, 1978, Lovgren filed a complaint against Northern States Power Company (NSP). NSP filed a third party complaint against North Star Steel on June 15, 1978. Lovgren thereafter served an amended complaint on Peoples, Gamma Engineering, Ferraco Engineering, and Westinghouse Electric on August 14, 1981. Peoples filed an answer and a cross-claim against the other defendants on October 14, 1981. All defendants except Peoples were subsequently dismissed by Lovgren.
Peoples argued that Lovgren’s claims were barred by Minn.Stat. § 541.051 (1980), which imposes a two-year statute of limitations on actions brought in regard to improvements to real property. The trial court agreed, and granted summary judgment in favor of Peoples.
ISSUES
1. Did Lovgren’s injury arise out of an improvement to real property?
*18 2. Did the trial court err in determining that Lovgren’s negligence claim was barred by the statute of limitations?
ANALYSIS
I.
Lovgren contends that the trial court erred in characterizing the transformer vault as an “improvement to real property” within the meaning of § 541.051. That statute states, in relevant part:
Except where fraud is involved, no action by any person in * * * tort * * * to recover damages * * * for bodily injury * * * arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property * * * shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision materials, or observation of construction or construction of the improvement to real property * * * more than two years after the discovery thereof.
Lovgren relies upon the law of fixtures for his contention that the transformer vault is not an improvement to real property. While it is true that not every addition to real property is an improvement to real property, Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v. Ashbach Const. Co., 291 Minn. 429, 194 N.W.2d 767 (1971), the Minnesota Supreme Court has found that an “improvement” is:
[A] permanent addition to or betterment of real property that enhances its capital value and that involves the expenditure of labor or money and is designed to make the property more useful or valuable as distinguished from ordinary repairs.
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. 1977).
The law of fixtures was rejected by the Pacific Indemnity court in favor of the above interpretation. Id. at 554. The court wanted to avoid the vagaries of fixture law and sought to determine the statute’s meaning “on the basis of the common use of language.” Id. (citing Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D. Co., 66 Wis.2d 382, 386, 225 N.W.2d 454, 456 (1975)).
In this case, Peoples permanently installed a transformer vault in a steel mill. It was wired to the steel furnace and to an electrical substation outside the plant, and bolted to the floor inside the plant. It is clear that the installation of a transformer vault which supplies energy to an electric steel mill is an “improvement to real property” within the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 541.051.
Additionally, Lovgren argues that the safety device which Peoples allegedly negligently failed to install is not an addition to real property because such a device is essentially temporary in nature and immediately detachable. We are unable to discern the merit of such argument. The vault which Peoples constructed is an improvement to real property, and it is the nature of the vault which is critical here.
II.
Peoples argues, and the trial court found, that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 541.051 (1980) applied, and barred Lovgren’s claim. We note that section 541.051 (1965), in effect at the time of Lovgren’s accident, also contained a two-year statute of limitations. Because there is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Minnesota, this section enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(c) (1984). Lovgren’s accident occurred on September 9, 1975. On September 16, 1977, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared section 541.051 (1965) unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (1977). Therefore, the two years provided under this presumptively constitutional statute had run nine days before Pacific Indemnity was decided.
We believe that the trial court could have rested its award of summary judgment to Peoples upon this analysis. How *19 ever, the trial court instead determined that Lovgren’s cause of action accrued during the hiatus between Pacific Indemnity and the 1980 reenactment. It then determined that the current section 541.051 (1980) should be applied retroactively. Therefore, we shall address this issue.
After the declaration of unconstitutionality, section 541.051 was reenacted on April 7, 1980 in amended form. It did not become effective until 115 days later, on August 1, 1980 (1980 Minn.Laws. Ch. 518, § 541.051, subd. 1). As a general rule, “[n]o law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.21 (1984). However, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he constitutional prohibitions against retrospective legislation do not apply to statutes of limitation, ‘for such a statute will bar any right, however, high the source from which it may be deduced, provided that a reasonable time is given a party to enforce his right.’ ” Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 108, 83 N.W.2d 800, 817 (1957).
In Kozisek v. Brigham, 169 Minn. 57, 60, 210 N.W. 622, 623 (1926), the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the applicability of a two-year medical malpractice statute which had superseded an existing six-year limitation period. As in the instant case, the legislature did not expressly state that the new statute was to be retroactively applied, but did leave a three-month period between the statute’s enactment and effective date. In holding that the three months was enough time to allow those having causes of action to commence them before the new statute became effective, the Kozisek court stated:
[Statutés of limitations] “are to be applied to all cases thereafter brought, irrespective of when the cause of action arose, subject, of course, to the universally recognized rule that they cannot be used to cut off causes of action without leaving a reasonable time within which to assert them.” * * * The time cannot be pronounced unreasonable unless “so short as under the circumstances to amount to a practical denial of the right itself.”
Id., 169 Minn. 57, 60, 210 N.W. 622, 623 (1926) (citations omitted).
In view of the provision for an effective date 115 days after the enactment of section 541.051 (1980) on April 7, 1980, we conclude that the Minnesota legislature intended that section to be applied so as to bar Lovgren’s claim. The 115-day postponement of the effective date was a reasonable time for plaintiffs to bring their causes of action. Under the trial court’s! analysis of this case, Lovgren had nearly five years in which to bring his action against Peoples. Because he failed to satisfy the statutory requirements, the trial court correctly determined that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
DECISION
Construction of a transformer vault on the premises of a steel mill constituted an improvement to real property. Safety devices which were not installed do not alter the characterization of the construction as improvement to real property.
Minn.Stat. § 541.051 (1980) applies to bar Lovgren’s action.
Affirmed.
Continue your research
- Minnesota cases applying the § 541.051 improvement-to-real-property definition to industrial equipment and installations
- Later decisions addressing retroactive application of the 1980 reenactment of § 541.051 and the reasonable-time standard
- Secondary commentary on Minnesota's statute of limitations for defective improvements to real property
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.