Minnesota Court of Appeals, 1986 The Minnesota Court of Appeals holds that a manufacturer's knowing failure to report product hazards to the Consumer Product Safety Commission does not constitute intentional wrongdoing barring its right to contribution from a co-defendant.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals holds that a manufacturer's knowing failure to report product hazards to the Consumer Product Safety Commission does not constitute intentional wrongdoing barring its right to contribution from a co-defendant.

Jendro v. Honeywell, Inc.
Minnesota Court of Appeals · Decided September 2, 1986 · No. C2-85-2349 · Heard
392 N.W.2d 688; 55 U.S.L.W. 2192; 1986 Minn. App. LEXIS 4726 (North Western Reporter, Second Series)

Outcome: Affirmed for appellee.

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Counsel

George W. Flynn, Robert L. Collins, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, for respondent., Greer E. Lockhart, Gregory P. Bulinski, Bassford, Heckt, Lockhart & Mullin, Minneapolis, for appellant.

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Jendro v. Honeywell, Inc.

What happened

The facts of the case, in plain language.

Kathleen Jendro was seriously burned in April 1979 when gas leaked from her furnace and ignited.

Honeywell entered into a complete settlement with Jendro for $3,315,000 and sought contribution from the other defendants, including Northwest LP Gas Co.

The jury found that Honeywell intended to harm Kathy Jendro and knowingly failed to report valve hazard information to the CPSC in a timely manner, apportioning 96 percent of the fault to Honeywell and 4 percent to Northwest.

The trial court set aside the jury's intent determination as unsupported by the evidence, ruled that Honeywell's knowing violation of the CPSC reporting rules did not bar contribution, found the $3,315,000 settlement fair and reasonable, and ordered judgment against Northwest for $132,600, representing 4 percent of the settlement.

The evidence established that Honeywell knew of serious defects in its valves, initially decided against a recall, and failed to timely report the problems to the CPSC, but did not show that Honeywell intended any valve to fail and cause injury.

What the court decided

Kathleen Jendro suffered serious burns in April 1979 when gas leaked from her furnace and ignited; she sued Honeywell, which manufactured a defective gas control valve, along with other defendants including Northwest LP Gas Co. Honeywell settled with Jendro for $3,315,000 and pursued a cross-claim for contribution against Northwest. The jury apportioned 96 percent of fault to Honeywell and 4 percent to Northwest but also found, on a special interrogatory, that Honeywell had intended to harm Jendro. The trial court set aside that intent finding as unsupported by evidence and ordered Northwest to pay $132,600, representing 4 percent of the settlement. On appeal, the court affirmed, reasoning that although Honeywell's conduct may have been grossly negligent or reckless, nothing showed it intended the valve to fail and cause injury, so it did not forfeit its contribution rights under Minn.Stat. § 604.02.

  1. A tortfeasor forfeits its right to contribution from a co-defendant only where both the act and the resulting harm were intended; knowledge of serious product defects, an initial decision against a recall, and failure to timely report hazards to the CPSC evidence at most gross negligence or recklessness, not "intentional wrongdoing." (*690)
  2. A manufacturer's knowing failure to comply with the CPSC's product hazard reporting rules does not bar its right to contribution from a jointly liable tortfeasor under Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1. (*691)
  3. A tortfeasor who violates a statute remains entitled to contribution unless the tort was committed with actual, conscious intent to cause harm to others. (*691)

How the court reached its decision

The court's reasoning, step by step.

Whether the jury's special-verdict finding that Honeywell intended to harm Jendro was sufficiently supported by the evidence to stand. The evidence established that Honeywell was well aware of serious defects in its valves, initially decided against a recall, and failed to timely report the problems to the CPSC, but nothing demonstrated that Honeywell knowingly supplied a defective valve with the intent that it fail, cause an explosion, and injure Jendro or any other consumer. Although Honeywell's actions may have been grossly negligent or even reckless, its conduct does not constitute "intentional wrongdoing," so the trial court properly set aside the jury's intent determination as unsupported by the evidence.

Whether Honeywell's knowing violation of the CPSC's product hazard reporting rules precludes its claim for contribution against Northwest. It is unclear whether noncompliance with the reporting rules violates a rule issued by the CPSC or a federal statute, but no authority holds that violation of an administrative rule precludes contribution; even if the failure constituted a statutory violation, there is no evidence Honeywell consciously intended its valve to fail, its conduct is more akin to negligence than to an intentional tort, and the actions of Honeywell and Northwest have essentially been "of the same kind." Honeywell remains entitled to contribution from Northwest notwithstanding its significantly more serious negligence, because tortfeasors bear damages commensurate with their relative culpability, and the judgment ordering Northwest to pay $132,600 is affirmed in all respects.

Key quotes from the opinion

Notable passages from the opinion, in the court's own words.

“However, a tortfeasor may lose its entitlement to contribution if it acts with a conscious intent to cause harm or if its conduct constitutes “intentional wrongdoing.””
Rule: contribution entitlement lost only through intentional wrongdoing — *690
“The evidence established that Honeywell was well aware of serious defects and problems with the valves, that Honeywell initially decided against a recall, and that the problems were not timely reported to the CPSC.”
Scope of the evidence of Honeywell's knowledge and non-reporting — *690
“While, under the evidence, Honeywell’s actions may have been grossly negligent or even reckless, Honeywell’s conduct does not constitute “intentional wrongdoing” such that it must forfeit its right to contribution from a party determined to be partly at fault.”
Core holding: negligence or recklessness is not intentional wrongdoing — *690
“A tortfeasor who violates a statute is entitled to contribution, unless the tort was “committed with actual, conscious intent to cause harm to others.””
Rule: statutory violator keeps contribution rights absent conscious intent to harm — *691

Cases the court relied on

Earlier decisions the court cited as authority for its ruling.

  • Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co. (370 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 1985)) — Supplies the governing definition of "intentional wrongdoing"—requiring intent as to both the act and the resulting harm—which the court applies to conclude that Honeywell's grossly negligent or reckless conduct does not forfeit its contribution rights.
  • Lange v. Schweitzer (295 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1980)) — Establishes that a tortfeasor who violates a statute remains entitled to contribution absent actual, conscious intent to cause harm, and its characterization of comparable conduct as "more akin to negligence than to the commission of an intentional tort" anchors the court's rejection of Northwest's statutory-violation argument.
  • Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Company (281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657 (1968)) — Cited by Northwest as support for the proposition that knowing or intentional violation of a statute precludes contribution, a position the court declined to adopt for violations of the CPSC reporting rules or of a statute without conscious intent to harm.
  • Swenson v. Emerson Electric Co. (374 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 1985)) — Minnesota Supreme Court interpretation indicating that noncompliance with the product hazard reporting rules constitutes a violation of a "rule issued by the Commission" under 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a), which the appellate court is obligated to follow and which frames the administrative-rule branch of its analysis.
  • Drake v. Honeywell, Inc. (797 F.2d 603 (8th Cir. 1986)) — Eighth Circuit holding that the product hazard reporting rules are merely interpretive and that their violation may constitute a violation of the federal statute 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b), presenting the alternative statutory-violation scenario the court addresses and rejects as a bar to contribution.

Minnesota statutes cited

Sections of the Minnesota Statutes this opinion cites.

Cases that cite this one

15 later published cases cite this decision. The 14 that cite it most often are listed here.

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Full opinion

The complete text of the court's opinion as published.

Opinion

OPINION

PARKER, Judge.

This is a personal injury action. Kathleen Jendro sued several defendants, including respondent Honeywell and appellant Northwest LP Gas Co. (Northwest), for damages she suffered when her furnace exploded. Honeywell entered into a settlement with Jendro to which all the other defendants contributed except Northwest. Honeywell pursued its cross-claim for contribution against Northwest, and the jury found that Northwest was partially liable for Jendro’s injuries and that Honeywell was entitled to contribution from Northwest. We affirm.

FACTS

Kathleen Jendro was seriously burned in April 1979 when gas leaked from her furnace and ignited. She commenced an action against Honeywell, Northwest, and several other defendants involved in the manufacture of the furnace and its component parts. Jendro claimed the explosion was caused in part by the failure of a gas control valve manufactured by Honeywell. Honeywell entered into a complete settlement with Jendro for $3,315,000 and sought contribution from the other defendants.

Honeywell admitted at trial that the valve was defective and that it was negligent but claimed that Northwest was also at fault. Arguing that a defendant who intentionally causes damage is not entitled to contribution from a co-defendant, Northwest requested and received a special interrogatory asking, “Did Honeywell intend to harm Kathy Jendro?” Northwest also presented evidence that Honeywell knew that its gas control valves contained defects which could create a substantial product hazard under the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (b) (1982), and that Honeywell failed to report that information in a timely manner to the *690 Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC).

The jury found that Honeywell had intended to harm Kathy Jendro and that Honeywell had knowingly failed to report in a timely manner relevant information to the CPSC concerning the gas control valve. The jury apportioned 96 percent of the fault to Honeywell and 4 percent to Northwest; no other party involved in the occurrence was found negligent.

Honeywell moved to set aside the jury’s special verdict determining that Honeywell intended to harm Kathy Jendro, as not supported by the evidence. The trial court granted this motion and also ruled that Honeywell’s knowing violation of the CPSC’s product hazard reporting rules did not bar Honeywell from obtaining contribution from Northwest. The trial court found that the $3,315,000 settlement was fair and reasonable and ordered judgment against Northwest for $132,600, representing 4 percent of the settlement. Northwest appeals from the judgment.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court err in setting aside the jury’s determination that Honeywell intended to harm Jendro?

2. Does Honeywell’s knowing violation of the CPSC’s product hazard reporting rules preclude Honeywell’s claim for contribution?

DISCUSSION

I

Under Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1 (1984), Northwest is obligated to contribute to Honeywell an amount in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to Northwest. However, a tortfeasor may lose its entitlement to contribution if it acts with a conscious intent to cause harm or if its conduct constitutes “intentional wrongdoing.” Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co., 370 N.W.2d 414, 420-21 (Minn. 1985). In order to establish intentional wrongdoing, it must be shown that both the act and the harm resulting from the act were intended by the actor. Kempa, 370 N.W.2d at 421 (citing State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 21 N.W.2d 480 (1946)).

We agree with the trial court that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that Honeywell intended the harm that befell Kathy Jendro. The evidence established that Honeywell was well aware of serious defects and problems with the valves, that Honeywell initially decided against a recall, and that the problems were not timely reported to the CPSC. Such evidence, however, is insufficient to demonstrate that Honeywell knowingly supplied Jendro with a defective valve with the intent that the valve would fail and cause an explosion that would injure her. Indeed, this evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Honeywell intended any of the defective valves to fail and cause injury to anyone. While, under the evidence, Honeywell’s actions may have been grossly negligent or even reckless, Honeywell’s conduct does not constitute “intentional wrongdoing” such that it must forfeit its right to contribution from a party determined to be partly at fault. See Kempa, 370 N.W.2d at 421.

II

Northwest, citing Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Company, 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657 (1968), argues that “the knowing or intentional violation of a statute” (here, the CPSA) by Honeywell precludes any right of contribution from Northwest.

It is presently unclear just what a product manufacturer has violated when it does not comply with the product hazard reporting rules issued by the CPSC. In Swenson v. Emerson Electric Co., 374 N.W.2d 690, 698-99 (Minn. 1985), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 1998, 90 L.Ed.2d 678 (1986), the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated that a violation of the product hazard reporting rules constituted a violation of a “rule issued by the Commission” under 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a). In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Drake v. Honeywell, Inc., 797 F.2d 603 (8th Cir. 1986), held that a violation of the product hazard reporting rules, as merely *691 interpretive rules, may constitute an actual violation of federal statute, specifically 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b).

If failure to comply with the reporting rules constitutes the violation of a rule issued by the CPSC, 1 then we have been cited to no authority and found none which holds that the violation of an administrative rule by a party precludes the recovery of contribution by a joint tortfeasor. In the absence of precedent, we decline to recognize a new circumstance barring contribution when the Minnesota legislature has established a general rule that contribution to awards shall be in proportion to the fault attributable to each tortfeasor see Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1, and where a jury has found a party partly at fault.

Even if failure to comply with the product hazard reporting rules constitutes violation of a statute, 2 we do not believe Honeywell is precluded from obtaining contribution. A tortfeasor who violates a statute is entitled to contribution, unless the tort was “committed with actual, conscious intent to cause harm to others.” Lange v. Schweitzer, 295 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 1980).

As has been discussed above, there is no evidence to demonstrate that Honeywell consciously intended its valve to fail, causing gas explosions and injury to Jendro or any other consumer. Honeywell’s conduct “is more akin to negligence than to the commission of an intentional tort.” Lange, 295 N.W.2d at 389-90. Therefore, the actions of Honeywell and Northwest have essentially “been of the same kind,” id. at 390, and Honeywell is still entitled to contribution. While Honeywell’s negligence is significantly more serious than the conduct of Northwest, “tortfeasors must now accept responsibility for damages commensurate with their own relative culpability; while the more culpable wrongdoer bears a greater portion of the loss, the less culpable tortfeasor no longer escapes all liability.” Kempa, 370 N.W.2d at 421.

DECISION

The judgment is affirmed in all respects.

Affirmed.

1

. We are obligated to follow the statutory interpretation of the Minnesota Supreme Court. See Cooper v. Morin, 398 N.Y.S.2d 36, 91 Misc.2d 302 (1977) (construction given by lower federal courts to federal law is entitled to due respect in state courts, but only decisions of United States Supreme Court bind state courts).

2

. It must be noted that the statute which assert-edly bars contribution here is a federal, as opposed to a Minnesota, statute. We have found no decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court discussing whether violation of a federal statute should bar claims for contribution made under state law. Even if violations of a Minnesota statute by a party precluded contribution, it does not necessarily follow that violations of a federal statute also bar contribution rights. State courts are, of course, obligated to respect and enforce federal statutes, but a state is not bound to alter its tort law as a result of the existence of a federal statute unless Congress clearly intends to pre-empt the state law. See Blackburn v. Doubleday Broadcasting Co., 353 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Minn. 1984). We find nothing in the CPSA which would indicate Congress intended that a failure to report information to the CPSC would bar a manufacturer’s claim for contribution against a co-tortfeasor who is also partly to blame for a consumer’s injuries.

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