A Minnesota appellate court affirmed a trial court's refusal to enforce a $150,000 farm mortgage because the written loan agreement tied it solely to a $46,500 cattle loan that the borrowers had already repaid.
Outcome: Affirmed for appellee.
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(as of 9/30/2026)
Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 2016, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.
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What happened
The facts of the case, in plain language.
The December 19, 1985 loan agreement specified a $46,500 loan secured by a $150,000 mortgage on 160 acres and nowhere stated that the mortgage would secure the borrowers' other outstanding debts.
Respondents repaid the $46,500 loan but never delivered the promised $150,000 mortgage, and they subsequently defaulted on their other debts with the bank and declared bankruptcy.
Bank vice-president Gary Gabrielson testified the mortgage was intended to secure all of respondents' debts but could not remember whether respondents were ever told this, while respondents testified they understood it secured only the $46,500 loan.
The bank's executive loan committee approved the $46,500 loan only on condition that the Devereauxs supply a $100,000 mortgage on their land, later modified by both parties to $150,000.
The trial court found the agreement's only references to the borrowers' $290,000 in other outstanding loans were indirect: a provision that the peak balance on all loans not exceed $340,000, and a February 1, 1986 deadline for delivering the mortgage that coincided with the due date of the $290,000 loan.
What the court decided
Douglas and Helen Devereaux borrowed $46,500 from Empire State Bank to buy cattle, agreeing in a written loan agreement to give the bank a $150,000 mortgage on their 160-acre farm as collateral. They repaid the $46,500 but never delivered the mortgage, then defaulted on their other bank debts and declared bankruptcy. The bank sued to compel delivery of the mortgage, arguing it secured the couple's entire debt; the borrowers testified they were told it covered only the cattle loan. The trial court found the agreement referenced only the $46,500 loan and entered judgment for the Devereauxes. On appeal, the court reasoned that if the agreement's meaning came wholly from the writing, interpretation was a question of law; if extrinsic evidence was needed, the trial court's factual finding should stand unless clearly erroneous. Under either theory the judgment was affirmed.
- A mortgage pledged as collateral in a written loan agreement secures only the loan identified in the instrument where the agreement contains no express provision extending the mortgage to the borrower's other outstanding debts; once the identified loan is repaid, the mortgage cannot be enforced. (*588)
- The construction of a written contract is a question of law for the court where the parties' intention may be gained wholly from the writing, but where the language is ambiguous, resort may be had to extrinsic evidence and construction becomes a question of fact unless the evidence is conclusive. (*587)
- A trial court's resolution of conflicting extrinsic testimony regarding the intended scope of collateral is a finding of fact that must stand unless clearly erroneous, with due regard given to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. (*587)
How the court reached its decision
The court's reasoning, step by step.
Whether the loan agreement's terms, construed as a matter of law, confined the $150,000 farm mortgage to the $46,500 cattle loan rather than the borrowers' entire outstanding debt. The agreement identifies the $150,000 real-estate mortgage only within the collateral clause for the $46,500 loan. Its sole references to the borrowers' roughly $290,000 in other debt are indirect: a provision capping the peak balance on all loans at $340,000, and a February 1, 1986 mortgage-delivery deadline coinciding with the due date of the $290,000 loan. Neither reference lends sufficient support to the bank's assertion that the mortgage covered the complete line of credit, so the language of the agreement alone supports a legal determination that the mortgage secured only the specified loan. Construed as a matter of law, the mortgage applied only to the $46,500 loan, and because that loan had been timely repaid, the bank could not enforce the $150,000 mortgage against the farm.
Whether, if the agreement's language is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence is considered, the trial court's contrary factual determination was clearly erroneous. The record contained directly conflicting testimony: two bank loan officers testified the mortgage was intended to cover the borrowers' complete line of credit including all previous debts, while both borrowers testified it was to secure only the $46,500 loan; the vice-president who drafted the agreement could not remember whether the borrowers were ever told it would secure all of their debts. On this conflicting evidence, and under the clear-error standard applicable to such factual questions, the trial court's finding that the mortgage was intended to secure only the specified loan was not clearly erroneous, and the judgment denying enforcement was properly affirmed.
Key quotes from the opinion
Notable passages from the opinion, in the court's own words.
Cases the court relied on
Earlier decisions the court cited as authority for its ruling.
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- Alpha Real Estate Co. of Rochester v. Delta Dental Plan of Minnesota (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)
- Swanson v. Parkway Estates Townhouse Ass'n (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
- Mark B. Wessman and Mary Wessman Stenbach v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (8th Cir. 1991)
- Bari v. Control Data Corp. (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
- David Waterworth v. Elaine Ekman (Minn. Ct. App. 2016)
- Collins v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc. (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)
- Banbury v. Omnitrition International, Inc. (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
- Wolfson v. City of St. Paul (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
- Litton Microwave Cooking Products v. Leviton Manufacturing Company (8th Cir. 1994)
- Litton Microwave Cooking Products, A Division of Litton Systems, Inc. v. Leviton Manufacturing Co. (8th Cir. 1994)
- Stinson v. Clark Equipment Co. (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
- Mrozik Construction, Inc. v. Lovering Associates, Inc. (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
- National Union Fire Insurance v. Schwing America, Inc. (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Full opinion
The complete text of the court's opinion as published.
Opinion
OPINION
Empire State Bank appeals from a judgment in favor of respondents Douglas and Helen Devereaux. The trial court determined appellant may not enforce a mortgage against respondents’ property since the mortgage only secured a $46,500 loan and that loan had already been repaid. Appellant claims the mortgage is enforceable because it was to act as security for respondents’ entire previous debt with the bank. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 17, 1985 respondents Douglas and Helen Devereaux went to the Empire State Bank and talked with Gary Gabriel-son about a loan of $46,500 to pay for some cattle they had just purchased. Gabriel-son, the Vice-President of the bank, was familiar with the Devereauxs and their history of dealings with the bank. At that time they had an outstanding loan balance of $280,000. The projected income on their farm had caused some concern relating to repayment of this existing loan. The Dev-ereauxs also had not received prior approval on some previous purchases as required by the bank. Additionally, the $46,500 loan would put the Devereauxs over the bank’s $325,000 loan limit for individual customers. Because of these issues Gabrielson took the Devereauxs’ request to the executive loan committee for approval. The executive committee approved the Dever-eauxs’ loan request on the condition that the Devereauxs supplied a $100,000 mortgage on their land. Later this was modified by both parties to amount to a $150,-000 mortgage.
*586 Gabrielson drew up the loan agreement as follows:
LOAN AGREEMENT
LENDER: EMPIRE STATE BANK
BORROWER: Doug and Helen Devereaux
Empire State Bank of Cottonwood, MN has established a line of credit to Doug and Helen Devereaux for the fiscal period ending August 8, 1986. The peak balance to be extended is $46,500 evidenced by credit application dated 12/19/85 and note dated 12/19/85. Interest rate will be 14%. The parties agree:
1. Loan purpose of the $46,500 set up is to be used as follows:
Renewal of present notes Operating line of credit Capital line of credit Feeder livestock line of credit 46,500
TOTAL AMOUNT OF NOTE 46,500
2. Loan Peak Balance, not including interest, not to exceed 46,500. Loan peak may be less than total amount of note. Loan peak on all loans not to exceed $340,000.
3. Repayment to be $46,500 plus_interest. Repay sources and dates are as follows:
DATE SOURCE AMOUNT
August 1, 1986 Cattle 46,500 plus interest
TOTAL REPAY 46,500
Repay to be applied first to interest and then to principle. Repay is based upon cash flow dated_
4. Collateral to secure this loan will be all livestock, machinery, equipment, feed, crop, coop and elev. dividends and real estate mortg. for $100,000 (crossed out) $150,000 (written in and initialed) on 160 acres.
It is understood that all proceeds from the sale of collateral is to be applied to the loan. Written authorization from the bank is necessary prior to transfer of any secured asset.
This loan agreement is also supported by: Application, Note, Financing Statement, and Security Agreement. Security interest in 160 acres for $100,000 (crossed out) $150,000 (written in and initialed) to be given by February 1, 1986. Any significant change in debtor’s financial condition should be reported to the bank as soon as possible. Debtor agrees to permit bank to view collateral upon request. Empire State Bank requests that borrower seek total refinancing as soon as possible. Debtor agrees to supply the bank with accurate financial statements (Balance Sheet and Operating Statement).
EMPIRE STATE BANK
(signature) (signatures)
LENDER BORROWER
Respondents repaid the $46,500 they borrowed pursuant to this agreement, but they failed to ever deliver the $150,000 mortgage to appellant. Subsequently appellants defaulted on their other debts with the bank and declared bankruptcy. Appellant brought suit to compel delivery of the $150,000 mortgage under the agreement. Appellant claimed the mortgage was to act as security for respondent’s entire debt with the bank.
Bank Vice-President Gabrielson testified at trial that the mortgage was to secure all of respondents’ debts with the bank. Yet, when asked whether respondents were ever told this was the case he responded that he could not remember. Respondents testified they were told the mortgage was to only secure the $46,500 loan.
Based on the agreement in evidence and this testimony, the trial court found:
[T]he promised mortgage of $150,000.00 contained in the loan agreement dated December 19, 1985 was only applicable by its terms to the $46,500.00 loan. [T]he $46,500.00 loan having been timely repaid, the plaintiff may not enforce the $150,000.00 mortgage against defendants.
The trial court therefore entered judgment in favor of respondents denying appellant’s motion for amended findings or a new trial.
ISSUE
Did the trial court properly find that the $150,000 mortgage on respondents’ farm was unenforceable since it only secured respondents’ $46,500 loan with appellant bank and that loan had been repaid?
ANALYSIS
The trial court found that respondents entered into a loan agreement with appellant bank for a $46,500 loan secured by a $150,000 mortgage on respondents’ land. The court noted Vice-President Gabriel-son’s testimony that the promised mortgage was to cover all of respondents’ line of credit, but that Gabrielson did not remember whether respondents were made aware of this intent. In examining the loan agreement itself the court found:
This loan agreement makes reference to a loan of $46,500.00. This loan agreement does not state that the $150,000.00 *587 security interest was to be applied to the balance of other outstanding loans. The only direct reference to the other outstanding loans of $290,000.00 is a reference in the agreement stating: “Loan Peak of all loans not to exceed $340,-000.00.” An indirect reference to the $290,000.00 debt is contained in the last paragraph of the agreement where it is stated: “This loan agreement is also supported by: Application, Note, Financial Statement, and Security Agreement. Security Interest in 160 acres for $150,-000.00 to be given by February 1, 1986.” The February 1, 1986 date is the date when the $290,000.00 loan was due.
Based on these findings the court concluded that the $150,000 mortgage only secured the loan specified in the agreement. Since that loan had been paid, appellants could not enforce the $150,000 mortgage. We find that the trial court’s conclusion was correct.
The fundamental approach to construing contracts is to allow the intent of the parties to prevail. Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House, 276 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. 1979). It is a well settled general rule that where the intention of the parties may be gained wholly from the writing, the construction of the instrument is a question of law for the court to resolve. Donnay v. Boulware, 275 Minn. 37, 44, 144 N.W.2d 711, 716 (1966). In such a case this court would not be required to defer to the trial court’s findings. See e.g. Janssen v. Johnson, 358 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984). Yet, where the language is ambiguous resort may be had to extrinsic evidence. Donnay, 275 Minn. at 44, 144 N.W.2d at 716. Construction then becomes a question of fact unless the evidence is conclusive. Id. As such the trial court’s construction should not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous and due regard must be given to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Minn.R.Civ.P. 52.01. Additionally, where there are ambiguous terms or the intent is doubtful, the contract will be construed against the drafter. Turner, 276 N.W.2d at 66.
Here it is unclear whether the trial court’s interpretation of the loan agreement was confined to the bounds of the document itself, and was thus made as a matter of law or, whether the determination was based on extrinsic evidence, and was thus made as a finding of fact. Under either theory the trial court’s conclusion, that the mortgage was unenforceable since it applied only to the repaid $46,500 loan, was correct.
The loan agreement itself makes no mention of applying the $150,000 mortgage to anything but the $46,500 loan specified in the instrument. As the trial court indicated, the agreement only referred to respondents’ other debts tangentially. Neither of the two references noted by the court lend sufficient support to appellant bank’s assertion that the mortgage was to cover respondents’ complete line of credit. The language of the agreement refers only to the $46,500 and a $150,000 mortgage as security. Thus the language of the agreement alone supports a trial court finding as a matter of law that the disputed mortgage applied only to the loan specified in the instrument itself.
If the trial court found the instrument to be ambiguous and considered parol evidence to explain its meaning, the result is still the same. The record contains testimony on both sides of the issue. Two loan officers for appellant Empire State Bank claimed the mortgage was intended to cover respondents’ complete line of credit, including all previous debts. Respondents both testified that the agreement was intended to only secure the $46,500 loan specified in the agreement. Based on this and other conflicting evidence, and this court’s standard of review for such a question, the trial court’s finding was not clearly erroneous. There was sufficient evidence supporting a finding that the instrument was intended to apply the mortgage only as security for the particular specified loan and not all previous debts. Consequently, the trial court properly found the $150,000 mortgage to be unenforceable.
*588 DECISION
The trial court properly found that the $150,000 mortgage on respondents’ farm was unenforceable since it only secured respondents’ $46,500 loan with appellant bank and that loan had been fully repaid.
Affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.