Minnesota Court of Appeals, 1992 Holding each loan application a discrete transaction under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a time-barred age-discrimination claim but revived a promissory-estoppel claim on an allegedly promised $5 million credit line.

Holding each loan application a discrete transaction under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a time-barred age-discrimination claim but revived a promissory-estoppel claim on an allegedly promised $5 million credit line.

Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A. v. Midwestern Machinery Co.
Minnesota Court of Appeals · Decided March 10, 1992 · No. C8-91-1750 · Forsberg, Porsberg, Klaphake, Davies
481 N.W.2d 875; 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 219; 1992 WL 42555 (North Western Reporter, Second Series)

Outcome: Affirmed in part.

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Counsel

Wendy J. Wildung, Michael A. Ponto, Paegre & Benson, Minneapolis, for respondent., Richard Ihrig, Jonathan M. Bye, Helen Mary Hughesdon, Lindquist & Vennum, Minneapolis, for appellants.

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Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A. v. Midwestern Machinery Co.

What happened

The facts of the case, in plain language.

In early 1986 Norwest refused MMC's request to increase its credit line for the Brown Boveri purchase, and loan officer Reginald Kroskin's contemporaneous memo cited Platzer's age of 71 and lack of a management succession plan; the ECOA counterclaim was not served until February 20, 1990.

Because the parties' dealings comprised separate projects requiring variant business considerations, the court viewed each loan application as a discrete transaction and concluded MMC's claims were setoff rather than recoupment, and setoff does not save an ECOA claim from the two-year limitations period.

Affidavits of Platzer and his attorney Leonard Lindquist support a jury-findable promise by Ernest Pierson of an indefinite $5,000,000 credit line to induce Platzer's buy-sell agreement, and the Bank admitted the line remained available for three years despite the absence of an integrated writing.

Whether Platzer's reliance on the credit line extending indefinitely was reasonable is a fact question for the jury and not generally amenable to summary judgment.

Platzer signed an integrated and unambiguous security agreement, and his claimed subsequent assurances were reaffirmations of an alleged prior parol agreement rather than separate subsequent agreements, falling short of the clear-and-convincing standard needed to alter the written terms.

What the court decided

After Norwest Bank called Midwestern Machinery Company's (MMC's) demand note, MMC and its principal owner Peter Platzer countered that the bank denied credit because of Platzer's age in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), broke a promise to keep a $5,000,000 credit line, and kept collateral despite a release condition. The trial court granted the bank summary judgment on all counts. On appeal the court held the ECOA claim time-barred because the 1986 refusal of a loan increase occurred over two years before the February 20, 1990 counterclaim, and each loan application is a discrete transaction, rendering the claim setoff, not recoupment. But fact issues remained on whether the bank promised an indefinite $5,000,000 credit line to induce Platzer's buy-sell agreement and whether his reliance was reasonable, so that claim was reversed for trial. Parol evidence could not vary the integrated security agreement, dooming the collateral-release claim.

  1. For purposes of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act's two-year limitations period, each loan application is a discrete transaction, so a discrimination claim arising from a particular credit denial is time-barred unless asserted within two years of that denial, even where the parties have an ongoing banking relationship. (*879)
  2. A recoupment defense may save a statutory claim from the applicable statute of limitations only where the claim arises out of the same transaction as the creditor's action; a defensive claim arising from a separate transaction is a setoff, which does not extend the limitations period. (*880)
  3. Whether a lender promised an indefinite line of credit and whether the borrower's reliance on that promise was reasonable are fact questions for the jury, precluding summary judgment on a promissory-estoppel claim that takes the promise outside the statute of frauds. (*880)
  4. Where a written contract is integrated and unambiguous, prior or contemporaneous oral agreements may not vary its terms, and post-signing assurances that merely reaffirm an alleged prior parol agreement do not constitute separate subsequent agreements absent clear and convincing evidence of abandonment or substitution. (*881)

How the court reached its decision

The court's reasoning, step by step.

Is MMC's ECOA age-discrimination claim barred by the two-year statute of limitations notwithstanding the parties' decades-long banking relationship? The only alleged violation presenting a material fact issue was the Bank's early 1986 refusal of MMC's request to increase its credit line for the Brown Boveri purchase, documented in loan officer Kroskin's memo citing Platzer's age of 71 and lack of a management succession plan; the ECOA counterclaim was not served until February 20, 1990, more than two years later. Appellants' argument that an ongoing banking relationship makes the applications parts of a single transaction fails because the various loan applications involved separate projects requiring variant business considerations. Each loan application must be viewed as a discrete transaction for ECOA purposes lest the limitations period be rendered a nullity; the ECOA claim is time-barred and the trial court committed no error in dismissing it.

Does raising the ECOA claim defensively as recoupment against the Bank's collection action save it from the limitations period? Because the loan applications and other commercial transactions involved separate projects requiring variant business considerations, the ECOA claim does not arise out of some feature of the transaction upon which the Bank's collection action is grounded; accepting appellants' view would expose creditors to claims dating back decades, defeating the purpose of a limitations statute. While recoupment may save an ECOA action from the statute of limitations, the claims here are properly characterized as setoff rather than recoupment, and setoff does not save an ECOA claim; judgment for the balance of the demand note involved no error.

Do material fact questions about a promised $5,000,000 credit line and the reasonableness of reliance preclude summary judgment on MMC's breach-of-contract counterclaim? Affidavits of Platzer and his attorney Leonard Lindquist support a jury-findable promise by Pierson of an indefinite $5,000,000 credit line inducing Platzer's buy-sell agreement; the Bank admits the line remained available for three years despite the absence of an integrated writing; Platzer's 1986 attempt to draw on the line evidences reliance; and attribution of millions of dollars in lost-business-opportunity damages presents additional material fact issues. Material fact issues remain as to whether the promise was made, whether reliance was reasonable, and which losses are attributable to the credit denials, so the trial court erred in dismissing the breach-of-contract claim, which is reversed and remanded for trial on promissory estoppel.

May oral assurances that the collateral-release conditions could be satisfied after the June 30, 1987 deadline vary the integrated security agreement? Platzer signed a security agreement that is integrated and unambiguous; his claimed subsequent assurances, including Kroskin's statements that the collateral would be released whenever the conditions were met, were reaffirmations of the original alleged parol agreement altering the written terms rather than separate subsequent agreements, and even if treated as separate agreements the affidavit evidence fell far short of the clear-and-convincing standard. Consideration of the parol evidence is contrary to Minnesota law; the clear and unambiguous terms of the security agreement were not altered, and the trial court is affirmed on the collateral-release issue.

Key quotes from the opinion

Notable passages from the opinion, in the court's own words.

“Each loan application must be viewed as a discrete transaction for purposes of ECOA, lest the applicable statute of limitations be rendered a nullity.”
Discrete-transaction rule confining ECOA claims to individual applications — *879
“is 71 years old and a very strong-willed individual who does not have a management succession plan which is another reason for keeping the pressure on him to reduce MMC’s loan.”
Kroskin memo tying the credit denial to Platzer's age — *879
“The reasonableness of a party’s reliance is a fact question for the jury and not generally amenable to summary judgment.”
Reliance reasonableness reserved for the jury, precluding summary judgment — *880
“Where a written agreement is integrated, no prior oral agreement relating to that agreement may vary its terms.”
Parol evidence rule applied to the integrated security agreement — *881

Cases the court relied on

Earlier decisions the court cited as authority for its ruling.

  • Household Finance Corp. v. Pugh (288 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. 1980)) — Supplies the controlling Minnesota framework distinguishing recoupment from setoff and counterclaim, which the court adapts to conclude the ECOA claim is setoff and therefore not saved from the limitations period.
  • Bull v. United States (295 U.S. 247 (1935)) — Federal authority establishing that recoupment permits a defense although limitations would bar an independent action, and framing the inquiry as whether the claim arises out of some feature of the transaction underlying the plaintiff's action.
  • Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc. (306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981)) — Source of the promissory-estoppel elements—promise, reasonable reliance, and necessity of enforcement to avoid injustice—that the court applies to find a jury question on the promised credit line.
  • Brenner v. Nordby (306 N.W.2d 126 (Minn. 1981)) — Establishes that the reasonableness of a party's reliance is a jury question not generally amenable to summary judgment, defeating the Bank's argument that Platzer's indefinite reliance was unreasonable as a matter of law.
  • Lehman v. Stout (261 Minn. 384, 112 N.W.2d 640 (Minn. 1961)) — States the parol-evidence principle that no prior oral agreement relating to an integrated writing may vary its terms, which forecloses Platzer's claimed extension of the collateral-release deadline.

Minnesota statutes cited

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Full opinion

The complete text of the court's opinion as published.

Opinion

OPINION

FORSBERG, Judge.

Appellants Midwest Machinery Company (MMC) and its principal owner, Peter Plat-zer, brought this action claiming they were denied credit by respondent Norwest Bank (Bank) on the basis of Platzer’s age, in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). Appellants also claim the Bank breached promises to honor a $5,000,-000 line of credit, with additional amounts available on an as needed basis, and to release certain security interests. The trial court granted the Bank’s summary judgment motion on all counts. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for trial on the merits of MMC’s breach of contract claim.

PACTS

Platzer and Clarence O’Heron formed MMC in the early 1950’s. The company bought and sold used industrial equipment, apparently quite profitably, as its main line of business. O’Heron died in 1983. After O’Heron’s death, his estate requested Plat-zer buy out O’Heron’s interest in MMC. Ernest Pierson, who at that time was the president of Norwest Midland Bank and a close personal friend of O’Heron, aggressively encouraged such a buy-sell agreement. MMC had a long banking history with Norwest Bank and its predecessors. In 1983, MMC had an $8,000,000 line of credit with the Bank.

Platzer, then age 68, claims to have agreed to the buy-sell plan only with assurances by the Bank that a line of credit of at least $5,000,000 would remain in place after his assumption of full ownership in MMC. In fact, a $5,000,000 line of credit remained in place until February 1986.

In December 1985, MMC began negotiations to purchase the manufacturing equipment and building of Brown Boveri Turbo Machinery, Inc. for $5,000,000. MMC would have required a short-term increase in its credit line to make the transaction. The application for the funds was refused by Norwest, specifically by Reginald Kros-kin, a loan officer. During the two-year period preceding denial of the loan, MMC lost over $1,000,000. Norwest claims it refused the loan due to these losses and, among other things, lack of a viable succession plan in the face of Platzer’s advanced age. Platzer claims the Bank simply denied his request because he was too old. Eventually, Platzer acted as a broker on the equipment, which was sold for $11,700,-000. MMC claims the credit denial resulted in lost profits of approximately $5,700,000.

In February 1986, the Bank reduced MMC’s credit line to $3,500,000. By December 1986, MMC’s line of credit was down to $2,500,000. Additionally, the Bank requested certain mortgages and personal guarantees to collateralize the line of credit. Platzer executed these mortgages and guarantees as well as a $2,500,000 demand promissory note. The security agreement provided the additional collateral would be released if MMC reduced its indebtedness to the Bank to $1,000,000, reported net income before taxes of $175,000 or more for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1987, and reported a ratio of total liabilities to *878 tangible net worth plus subordinated debt of three to one or less as of June 30, 1987. MMC failed to timely meet the conditions. However, Platzer claims the Bank repeatedly told him this was a flexible deadline and so long as the conditions were met at some later date, it would still release the collateral. The conditions were not met until the end of fiscal year 1989, and the Bank refused to release the collateral.

The financial distress at MMC continued and Norwest transferred the MMC account to its loan support unit. The loan support unit is a division of the Bank dealing with troubled loans. Thereafter, Reginald Kros-kin had no further authority over or dealings with the MMC account.

In 1990, MMC had an opportunity to purchase the equipment of Capital Gears, Inc. for $2,900,000. The Bank again refused to increase the credit line after an informal request. MMC brokered the equipment for approximately $5,000,000 and claims it lost profits of $1,700,000 as a result of the “refusal.” Platzer claims the Bank again turned down the loan request due to age discrimination. The Bank has repeatedly denied this assertion, claiming the loan decision was based upon the poor earning history of MMC over the last four years. The age discrimination claims are supported by affidavits of Platzer and Donald Rittenhouse, controller of MMC.

The $1,000,000 principal on the demand note continued outstanding despite a number of requests by the Bank to pay it down. Interest payments on the principal have been made regularly and are current as of the time of hearing. On November 15, 1990, the Bank called the loan, payable by December 15, 1990. MMC refused payment and on December 18, 1990, the Bank commenced this collection action. MMC asserted its defenses and counterclaims in an answer denying liability while admitting the indebtedness. The Bank was granted summary judgment, and this appeal followed entry of that judgment.

ISSUES

1.Did the trial court err in concluding MMC’s allegations of ECOA violations are time-barred by the statute of limitations?

2. Did the trial court err in deciding MMC’s recoupment defense is inapplicable?

3. Did the trial court err in determining the statute of frauds precludes the existence of any issues of material fact as to MMC’s claim of breach of an oral contract?

4. Did the trial court err in determining no material issues of fact exist as to whether there was an agreement to release the personal guaranty and collateral?

ANALYSIS

1. Appellants claim the trial court erred in granting the Bank summary judgment on its ECOA claim based on the applicable statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(f) (West 1982). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, and whether the district court erred in its application of the law. Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium, 281 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn. 1979).

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Rule 56, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere averments or denials of the adverse party’s pleading but must present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.

Minn.R.Civ.P. 56.05.

The ECOA makes it unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against an applicant “with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction,” on the basis, inter alia, of age. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(a)(1) (West 1982). Among the remedies provided is civil liability of the creditor to any party who has suffered discrimination as described in the ECOA. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e. The provisions of the ECOA may be enforced by any court of competent jurisdiction including federal and state district courts. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(f). The statute of limitations for such action is “two years from the date of the occurrence of the violation.” Id.

*879 The only instance of alleged ECOA discrimination presenting a material issue of fact occurred in early 1986 when MMC’s request for an increase in its line of credit to complete the Brown Boveri deal was refused. At that time, Kroskin, the loan officer in charge of the request, authored a memo to the file indicating Platzer “is 71 years old and a very strong-willed individual who does not have a management succession plan which is another reason for keeping the pressure on him to reduce MMC’s loan.” Since the counterclaim contending violation of ECOA was not served until February 20, 1990, in excess of two years after the alleged discrimination, the ECOA action is time-barred.

Appellants contend there was an on-going banking relationship on which ECOA violations can be based. In fact, there is evidence in the record of a banking relationship between the parties spanning several decades. However, we do not view the Brown Boveri application as only a part of a single transaction spanning the history of the parties’ relationship. The various loan applications and other commercial transactions involved separate projects requiring variant business considerations, albeit based on a single line of credit. If appellants’ view were to prevail, the Bank could be held responsible for violations going back to the inception of the ECOA. We do not believe that was the intent of Congress. Each loan application must be viewed as a discrete transaction for purposes of ECOA, lest the applicable statute of limitations be rendered a nullity.

2. Appellants also contend the district court erred by not, in essence, tolling the statute of limitations because the ECOA action is brought in conjunction with a recoupment defense. The issue of whether an ECOA action is saved from the statute of limitations by a recoupment defense has never been directly addressed by any Minnesota court. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court directly addressed the issue in the context of whether a recoupment defense saves a civil action under a provision of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640 (West 1982). That court explained that both federal common law and Minnesota law recognize the doctrine “that a defense in the nature of recoupment is generally permitted even though the applicable statute of limitations would have barred an independent action on the same claim.” Household Fin. Corp. v. Pugh, 288 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Minn. 1980) (citing Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 55 S.Ct. 695, 79 L.Ed. 1421 (1935)). In the TILA context, the Pugh court followed that general doctrine and found debtors “should be able to recover on their recoupment defense notwithstanding the running of the pertinent statute of limitations.” Id. at 704.

However, the Pugh court went on to explain that the key question to decide the applicability of the doctrine “is whether a TILA claim is properly characterized as recoupment.” Id. The elements of recoupment are set out as:

“[rjecoupment or reduction of a demand is said to arise where there is an action upon a contract, and there has been a breach of the contract, or some divisible part of it, or obligation connected with it.”

Id. at 705 (quoting C. Aultman & Co. v. Torrey, 55 Minn. 492, 493, 57 N.W. 211, 211 (1893)) (emphasis omitted). The Pugh court further noted that “[a]s long as the two claims arise from the same transaction and can be adjusted in the same proceeding, recoupment is available.” Id. n. 7 (quoting Comment, Truth in Lending and the Statute of Limitations, 21 Villanova L.Rev. 904, 916-18 (1976)).

Assuming the ECOA may be considered analogous to the TILA, the question in this case becomes whether the ECOA claim arises “out of some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff’s action is grounded.” Bull, 295 U.S. at 262, 55 S.Ct. at 700. As already stated, we believe the transactions must be viewed separately. We therefore conclude the claims made here are actually for setoff rather than recoupment. The Pugh court defined the differences between these various defenses by noting recoupment

*880 is distinguished from a counterclaim, which may arise out of a separate transaction and allows for recovery in excess of that sought by the plaintiff, or a set-off, which involves a transaction unrelated to the plaintiffs action.

Id., 288 N.W.2d at 704 n. 5.

This view of the transaction makes sense in light of the purpose of a statute of limitations. Once again, by accepting appellants’ view, we would be exposing creditors to claims which could, as in this case, date back decades. Recoupment is appropriate for extending the statute of limitations because the defense limits itself to the same transaction, which is a fortiori timely related to the claim. Setoff, on the other hand, recognizes that while countervailing claims may exist, they may arise from longstanding relationships made up of a number of discrete transactions, as is the case here.

We conclude that while the recoupment defense may save an ECOA action from the statute of limitations, this defense is not properly raised in this action. And, while setoff may be the more appropriate remedy in this case, it does not save an ECOA claim. Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in entering judgment for the balance of the demand note in the Bank’s favor.

3. Appellants counterclaimed for breach of contract, contending the Bank was es-topped from reducing the line of credit, and that such reduction caused MMC’s failure to execute the Brown Boveri and Capital Gears deals. The district court found any agreement reached at the time of execution of the buy-sell agreement was ineffective under the statute of frauds, Minn.Stat. § 513.33 (1990). We believe a jury question remains as to the factual basis of appellants’ claims, and as to whether Plat-zer’s reliance on the credit line remaining in place was reasonable.

An agreement may be taken outside the statute of frauds by equitable or promissory estoppel. Berg v. Carlstrom, 347 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Minn. 1984). This policy makes sense since promissory estoppel is employed to imply a contract in law where none in fact exists. Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981). Promissory estoppel will be found where a party makes a promise knowing another party reasonably relies and acts upon that promise, and the promise must be enforced to avoid injustice. Id., (quoting Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1932)).

Here, there is an outstanding fact issue as to whether a promise to indefinitely extend a $5,000,000 credit line was made to Platzer by Pierson to induce him to sign the buy-sell agreement. The record contains affidavits of Platzer and his attorney, Leonard Lindquist, to that effect. The Bank admits the line of credit was made available to MMC for three years, despite the absence of an integrated writing to that effect. There is competent testimony, both direct and circumstantial to allow a jury to conclude a promise was in fact made to Platzer. His signing of the buy-sell agreement with the estate of a third party who was previously largely responsible for MMC’s finances is indicative of inducement. His attempt to utilize this ongoing line of credit in 1986 evidences his reliance on the promise.

The trial court also concluded that even if a promise were made, Platzer’s reliance on the loan as an extension of the credit ad infinitum is unreasonable. The reasonableness of a party’s reliance is a fact question for the jury and not generally amenable to summary judgment. Brenner v. Nordby, 306 N.W.2d 126, 127 (Minn. 1981). We believe this is the case here. A jury may find the promise was of indefinite duration, or that some event, such as default, would reasonably trigger the expiration of the line of credit. Perhaps not, but the issue should be argued to and decided by a jury, not the trial court.

Finally, appellants have alleged millions of dollars in damages arising from lost business opportunities. Which of these losses, if any, are attributable to the denial of credit presents a material issue of fact. The judgment of the trial court on this count is therefore reversed, and the action *881 remanded for trial on the issue of promissory estoppel.

4. Appellants claim the Bank breached a portion of the security agreement providing for release of collateral and personal guarantee if MMC met specified conditions for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1987. Appellants contend an oral agreement between the parties modified the actual terms of the agreement by allowing it to meet the conditions until the end of fiscal year 1989. The goals were met after June 30, 1987, but before the end of fiscal year 1989.

Appellants’ contention is contrary to the parol evidence rule. The general rule is that where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, parol evidence will not be allowed to alter the terms of that contract. Mrozik Constr., Inc. v. Lovering Assocs., Inc., 461 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Minn.App. 1990). Where a written agreement is integrated, no prior oral agreement relating to that agreement may vary its terms. Lehman v. Stout, 261 Minn. 384, 390-91, 112 N.W.2d 640, 644-45 (1961). Likewise, contemporaneous oral agreements are not admissible to vary a contract unambiguous on its face. Fidelity State Bank v. Bradley, 227 Minn. 541, 544, 35 N.W.2d 748, 750 (1949). Parol evidence of subsequent conversations which alter the terms of a contract may be considered. Nord v. Herreid, 305 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Minn. 1981). However, such evidence “must be clear and convincing to justify setting aside a written contract and holding it as abandoned or substituted by a subsequent parol contract at variance with its terms.” Duffy v. Park Terrace Supper Club, Inc., 295 Minn. 493, 498-99, 206 N.W.2d 24, 28 (1973).

In his affidavit, Platzer claims par-ol evidence of a mistake in the integrated security agreement regarding the deadline for meeting the conditions for release of collateral. This involves prior and contemporaneous conversations with Bank officials. He also indicates these parol agreements were ratified, again by parol, after the contract was signed.

This understanding [as to release of collateral] was memorialized in a letter to me from Mr. Kroskin dated November 26,1986. The letter mistakenly suggests that these conditions had to be met by June 30, 1987. On many occasions, including occasions after November 26, 1986, Mr. Kroskin told me that the additional security would be released whenever the three conditions were met. The three conditions were met as of fiscal year ending June 1989.

Platzer signed a security agreement which is integrated and unambiguous. Consideration of this parol evidence is contrary to the law as it exists in this state. The claim of subsequent assurances are not subsequent agreements, but reaffirmations of the original alleged parol agreement altering the written terms of the contract. Even if the alleged subsequent conversations were separate agreements, the evidence before the trial court fell far short of the clear and convincing standard necessary to alter the terms of this contract. The trial court is affirmed as to the issue of the security agreements.

DECISION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to dismissal of appellants’ ECOA claim based upon the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court erred in dismissing appellants’ breach of contract claim, since there remain material issues of fact as to whether promissory estoppel may properly be applied against the Bank. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the clear and unambiguous terms of the security agreement were not altered by contemporaneous or subsequent parol agreements.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for trial.

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