Minnesota Court of Appeals, 1995 Minnesota Court of Appeals holds that a multilevel-marketing distributorship agreement permitting both at-will and for-cause termination is unambiguous, and rejects distributor claims under promissory estoppel, the Texas Deceptive Trade Act, and Minnesota consumer-protection statutes.

Minnesota Court of Appeals holds that a multilevel-marketing distributorship agreement permitting both at-will and for-cause termination is unambiguous, and rejects distributor claims under promissory estoppel, the Texas Deceptive Trade Act, and Minnesota consumer-protection statutes.

Banbury v. Omnitrition International, Inc.
Minnesota Court of Appeals · Decided July 3, 1995 · No. C5-95-80 · Davies, Amundson, Foley
533 N.W.2d 876; 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 866; 1995 WL 387811 (North Western Reporter, Second Series)

Outcome: Affirmed for appellee.

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Counsel

Michael A. Stern, Richard D. Snyder, Fre-drikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, for appellants., William L. Killion, Gregory R. Merz, Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.A., Minneapolis, for respondents.

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Banbury v. Omnitrition International, Inc.

What happened

The facts of the case, in plain language.

In February 1992, three Omnitrition distributors accused the Banburys of soliciting them for another network marketing organization, and Omnitrition terminated their distributorship; on internal appeal the Banburys admitted contacting IMAs about another product.

Paragraph 12 of the distributorship agreement provided that either party could terminate the agreement by giving the other party written notice thirty days in advance.

Rule C-7, incorporated by reference into the distributorship agreement, described involuntary termination for violations through suspension, notice of cause, opportunity to remedy, and right of appeal, but contained no language making cause the exclusive basis for termination.

In an affidavit submitted to defeat summary judgment, Terry Banbury attributed false statements promising lifetime earnings to Omnitrition founder Jim Fobair, directly contradicting his earlier deposition testimony that Fobair had made no false statements.

Failure of a distributor and recruits to sell $4,000 of products monthly did not terminate the distributorship agreement but merely precluded payment of overrides, and the initial $4,000 inventory purchase showed no evidence of being anything other than an acquisition of inventory at the ordinary price.

What the court decided

Candace and E. Terry Banbury sued Omnitrition International after the company terminated their distributorship in February 1992, following accusations by other distributors that they had solicited recruits for a competing network marketing organization. The district court granted Omnitrition summary judgment on all claims, and the Banburys appealed while Omnitrition cross-appealed the denial of its improper-venue motion to dismiss. Declining to give preclusive effect to the contract's Texas choice-of-law clause out of deference to Minn.Stat. § 80C.21, the appeals court affirmed because the agreement unambiguously permitted termination either at will on thirty days' written notice or immediately for cause with appeal rights; promissory estoppel failed because a contract existed; a later affidavit contradicting deposition testimony created no factual dispute; the Consumer Fraud Act lacked a merchandise-sale nexus; and the $4,000 inventory purchase was not a franchise fee, with no § 80C.14 damages action available in 1992. The venue cross-appeal went unreached.

  1. A written agreement that provides both for termination at the will of either party upon thirty days' written notice and for immediate termination for cause—with notice, an opportunity to remedy, and a right of appeal—is unambiguous and permits termination in either mode. (*880)
  2. Promissory estoppel applies only where no contract exists and cannot be invoked, through evidence barred by the parol evidence rule, to alter the terms of an existing express contract. (*881)
  3. A party's self-serving affidavit contradicting that party's own earlier deposition testimony does not create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment, although an affidavit may raise an issue where the deposition itself reveals confusion or mistake that the affidavit plausibly explains. (*881)
  4. The Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act reaches only fraud having a nexus to the sale of merchandise; misrepresentations concerning a distributorship or similar business relationship, rather than the sale of merchandise, fall outside the Act. (*882)
  5. A minimum-volume purchase requirement is not a disguised franchise fee where the required purchase is inventory acquired at the ordinary price and failure to meet the volume merely precludes benefits such as overrides rather than terminating the agreement; and, before 1993 Minn.Laws ch. 372 amended Minn.Stat. § 80C.17, that section supported no civil damages action for violations of § 80C.14. (*882)

How the court reached its decision

The court's reasoning, step by step.

Whether the distributorship agreement unambiguously permitted at-will termination notwithstanding Rule C-7's for-cause termination procedure. Rule C-7, incorporated by reference, describes involuntary termination for violations through suspension, notice of cause, opportunity to remedy, and appeal, but contains no language making cause the exclusive basis for termination, so paragraph 12's at-will clause must also be given effect; consistent with Polk and Martin, contracts providing both modes of termination unambiguously reserve the at-will right. Construing the contract as a whole, it permits termination either at the will of a party upon thirty days' written notice or for cause effective immediately with a right to appeal, and the district court did not err in so interpreting it.

Whether promissory estoppel could bar Omnitrition from relying on the contract's at-will termination clause. An express distributorship contract in fact existed between the parties, so the Banburys' reliance on Omnitrition's promissory statements and conduct could not modify the clear at-will termination clause. The Banburys' promissory estoppel claim failed as a matter of law.

Whether Terry Banbury's affidavit attributing false lifetime-earnings promises to Omnitrition's founder created a genuine issue of material fact under the Texas Deceptive Trade Act. Banbury's deposition, taken approximately seven months before his affidavit, exhibited no signs of mistake or confusion—he had testified that Fobair made no false statements, and his counsel had objected that the topic was exhausted—and Cashman, whose statements the Banburys also invoked, was not an agent or employee of Omnitrition, so his statements could not be imputed to the company. The district court did not err in refusing to consider the affidavit as sufficient to create a material issue of fact, and no genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the Texas Deceptive Trade Act claim.

Whether the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act or the Minnesota Franchise Act supplied a basis for the Banburys' statutory claims. The alleged misrepresentations concerned the distributorship relationship rather than the sale of merchandise; the initial $4,000 purchase showed no evidence of being anything other than an acquisition of inventory at the ordinary price; failure to sell $4,000 monthly merely precluded override payments without terminating the agreement; and § 80C.17 authorized no civil damages action for § 80C.14 violations until amended by 1993 Minn.Laws ch. 372. The Consumer Fraud Act was inapplicable for want of a merchandise-sale nexus, and the Franchise Act was inapplicable because no franchise fee was paid and no damages action under § 80C.14 existed when the Banburys were terminated, so summary judgment on both statutory claims was proper.

Key quotes from the opinion

Notable passages from the opinion, in the court's own words.

“Construing the contract as a whole, we hold that the distributorship contract allows for termination either at the will of a party upon 30 days’ written notice or for cause effective immediately, but with a right to appeal.”
Holding that the contract permits both at-will and immediate for-cause termination — *880
“But the doctrine of promissory estoppel only applies where no contract exists.”
Promissory estoppel unavailable where an express contract governs — *881
“If a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own earlier testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact.”
Sham-affidavit rationale adopted from Camfield Tires — *881
“We hold that the Banburys’ initial $4,000 inventory purchase was not a hidden franchise fee.”
Franchise-fee holding rendering the Minnesota Franchise Act inapplicable — *882

Cases the court relied on

Earlier decisions the court cited as authority for its ruling.

  • Polk v. Mutual Service Life Ins. Co. (344 N.W.2d 427) — Minnesota appellate precedent the court followed for the principle that a contract providing both at-will and for-cause termination provisions is unambiguous and permits termination under the at-will clause.
  • Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corporation (719 F.2d 1361) — Eighth Circuit decision supplying the adopted rationale that a self-serving affidavit contradicting the affiant's deposition cannot manufacture a genuine issue of material fact, while recognizing the confusion-or-mistake exception the court also applied.
  • Sacred Heart Farmers Cooperative Elevator v. Johnson (232 N.W.2d 921) — Minnesota Supreme Court decision establishing that promissory estoppel operates only where no contract exists, the rule on which the rejection of the Banburys' estoppel claim rests.
  • Cooperman v. R.G. Barry Corp. (775 F.Supp. 1211) — Federal district court decision whose analysis the appeals court expressly endorsed, holding the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act inapplicable where the alleged fraud concerns an employment or distributorship relationship rather than the sale of merchandise.
  • OT Industries, Inc. v. OT-tehdas Oy Santasalo-Sohlberg AB (346 N.W.2d 162) — Minnesota appellate precedent defining when minimum-volume purchase requirements constitute disguised franchise fees and noting that failure to meet the minimum changes terms rather than terminating the contract—criteria the court applied to reject the hidden-franchise-fee theory.

Minnesota statutes cited

Sections of the Minnesota Statutes this opinion cites.

Cases that cite this one

43 later published cases cite this decision. The 24 that cite it most often are listed here.

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Full opinion

The complete text of the court's opinion as published.

Opinion

OPINION

DAVIES, Judge.

Appellants Candace M. and E. Terry Ban-bury (the Banburys) challenge summary judgment for Omnitrition International, Inc. (Omnitrition), in an action involving termination of the Banburys’ distributorship. Om-nitrition cross-appeals the district court’s order denying its motion to dismiss the action on grounds of improper venue. We affirm.

FACTS

Omnitrition manufactures nutritional and health products, distributing them through a multilevel marketing organization. This organization involves a network of distributors referred to as Independent Marketing Associates (IMAs). IMAs recruit other IMAs, creating a network of IMAs. Omnitrition’s IMAs receive income from their own retail sales and may also earn commissions or “overrides” from sales by IMAs whom they have recruited. An IMA qualifies to earn overrides only when all sales for that month by the IMA and the IMA’s recruits total $4,000.

Ron Cashman, an Omnitrition IMA recruited the Banburys in 1990. The Banburys signed a distributorship agreement and, as Omnitrition representatives recommended, immediately bought $4,000 worth of Omnitrition products to qualify for overrides the first month of the distributorship.

In February of 1992, three of Omnitrition’s IMAs accused the Banburys of violating company rules by soliciting them to take part in another network marketing organization. In response, Omnitrition terminated the Ban-burys’ distributorship. On appeal to Omni-trition, the Banburys admitted that they had contacted IMAs about another product. Om-nitrition then denied the appeal, though it did pay all commissions due to the Banburys for 30 days after the termination.

The Banburys filed suit for damages alleging contractual and statutory violations. The district court granted Omnitrition’s motion for summary judgment from which the Ban-burys appeal.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err in interpreting the distributorship contract as being terminable at will?

II. Are there genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on appellants’ estoppel claim?

III. Are there genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on appellants’ claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade Act?

TV. Did the district court err in its interpretation of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act?

V. Did the district court err in its interpretation of the Minnesota Franchise Act?

ANALYSIS

On appeal from a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, our function is to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).

Before we reach the issues raised by the parties, we must first determine whether to apply Minnesota or Texas law to this distributorship agreement. The district court did not resolve this issue and relied on both Minnesota and Texas cases in interpreting the agreement. The agreement itself states that it is governed by the laws of the State of Texas. Generally, Minnesota courts honor agreements concerning choice of law. Milliken & Co. v. Eagle Packaging Co., 295 N.W.2d 377, 380 n. 1 (Minn. 1980). But in this case, neither party claims that an appli *880 cation of Minnesota law would change the outcome. Moreover, in Minn.Stat. § 80C.21 (1994), the legislature expressed an intent to protect its citizens with its own laws by voiding, to some extent, choice-of-law provisions in agreements like this. To further the legislature’s policy of protecting Minnesotans, we choose not to give preclusive effect to the choice-of-law provision in the contract.

I.

The Banburys argue that the district court erred in holding that the contract unambiguously provided for termination at will. The construction and effect of an unambiguous contract are questions of law and reviewable de novo. Empire State Bank v. Devereaux, 402 N.W.2d 584, 587 (Minn.App. 1987). A contract is ambiguous when the language of the written document by itself is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. Trondson v. Janikula, 458 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Minn. 1990).

Two sections of the distributorship agreement relate to termination. Omnitrition relies on paragraph 12 of the contract, which states:

[The Banburys] understand and agree that either party to this agreement may terminate this agreement by giving notice to the other party in writing thirty days in advance.

The Banburys rely on Omnitrition’s Rule C-7, which is incorporated by reference into the contract. It provides:

Should an Independent Marketing Associate/Distributor materially or repeatedly violate the terms of his or her Application and Agreement of Distributorship * * * or the Omnitrition Code of Professional Ethics, or the Rules & Regulations * * ⅜ such action would be placing their distributor status in jeopardy of being terminated * * *. If involuntary termination is deemed necessary, Omnitrition may place the distributorship ⅝ ⅜ ⅜ in suspension while notice of cause, giving reason(s) of the actual violation(s), is provided along with the opportunity to remedy the violation(s). Should satisfactory remedy not take place * * ⅜ and involuntary termination become necessary, such termination will become effective upon notice being given, with the right of appeal, to the violating distributor.

The Banburys argue that Rule C-7 provides for termination only for cause, and with an opportunity to cure. They claim that Rule C-7 conflicts with the at-will termination provision of paragraph 12, making the contract ambiguous.

The Banburys’ interpretation of Rule C-7 is, however, contrary to the clear language of the contract. Rule C-7 does not state that Omnitrition may fire an IMA only for cause, but rather states that material violations may lead to termination. Rule C-7 contains no language manifesting an intent that it constitute the exclusive basis for termination. Therefore, we must give effect to paragraph 12 as well. See Chergosky v. Crosstown Bell, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Minn. 1990) (courts should “attempt to harmonize all clauses of [a] contract”).

Construing the contract as a whole, we hold that the distributorship contract allows for termination either at the will of a party upon 30 days’ written notice or for cause effective immediately, but with a right to appeal. This is consistent with prior interpretations of similar contracts as unambiguous and as allowing either party to terminate at will. See, e.g., Polk v. Mutual Serv. Life Ins. Co., 344 N.W.2d 427, 429-30 (Minn.App. 1984) (where employment contract provides both for termination at will by either party and for termination for cause by employer, employer may terminate employee under at-will provision); Martin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 553 F.2d 573, 575 (8th Cir. 1977) (contract providing that party may terminate either at will or for cause unambiguously reflects an intent to reserve the right to terminate at will). Thus, the district court did not err in its interpretation of the parties’ distributorship agreement.

II.

The Banburys argue that genuine issues of fact remain regarding their claim of estoppel. They assert that Omnitrition should be estopped from relying on the at-will clause of the contract because Omnitri *881 tion’s promissory statements and conduct led the Banburys to believe they could be terminated only for cause. But the doctrine of promissory estoppel only applies where no contract exists. Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, 305 Minn. 324, 326 n. 2, 232 N.W.2d 921, 923 n. 1 (1975); UFE Inc. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 808 F.Supp. 1407, 1414-15 (D.Minn. 1992) (claims for breach of contract and promissory estop-pel are mutually exclusive as matter of law). A party cannot use the doctrine of promissory estoppel to alter a contract by using evidence that is barred by the parol evidence rule. Jara v. Buckbee-Mears Co., 469 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn.App. 1991), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 2, 1991). In this case, a contract did, in fact, exist. Therefore, the Banburys’ promissory estoppel claim must fail as a matter of law.

III.

The Banburys asserted a claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade Act, which prohibits “[fjalse, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Tex.Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 17.46(a) (West 1992). A false statement that induces a party to sign a contract may be a deceptive act for purposes of the Act. American Commercial Colleges, Inc. v. Davis, 821 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex.Ct.App. 1991).

The Banburys claim that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Omnitrition made false statements that induced the Banburys to become distributors. To support their allegations, the Banburys rely, in part, on Cashman’s statements. But Cashman was not an agent or employee of Omnitrition; thus, his statements cannot be imputed to Omnitrition.

On this issue, the Banburys also rely on Terry Banbury’s affidavit, which he submitted for the purpose of defeating summary judgment. In that affidavit, Banbury states that Jim Fobair, founder of Omnitrition, along with other Omnitrition representatives, falsely told him that if he “worked hard up front for little pay” he could enjoy “earnings for a lifetime.” But these statements directly contradict Banbury’s earlier deposition testimony. At the deposition, Banbury stated that Fobair had not made any false statements and, further, that the statements Fo-bair had made only concerned Terry Ban-bury’s suitability to be an IMA.

A self-serving affidavit that contradicts earlier damaging deposition testimony is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1365 (8th Cir. 1983). In Camfield, the Eighth Circuit offered the following rationale:

If a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own earlier testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact.

Id.; accord Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566, 572 (2d Cir. 1991) (“party may not * * * create a material issue of fact by submitting an affidavit disputing his own prior sworn testimony”); Radobenko v. Automated Equip. Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1975) (inconsistent statements of party did not create genuine issue of fact).

A subsequent affidavit may, however, raise a factual issue where the deposition itself reveals confusion or mistake; such an affidavit is not inherently inconsistent with the deposition, but rather seeks to explain it. Camfield, 719 F.2d at 1364-65; see also Bank Leumi Le-Israel v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 237 (7th Cir. 1991) (“genuine issue of material fact cannot be established by a party contradicting his own earlier statements unless there is a plausible explanation for the incongruity”).

In this case, Terry Banbury’s deposition, taken approximately seven months prior to his affidavit, does not exhibit any signs of mistake or confusion. In fact, when Omnitrition’s counsel pursued further questioning at the deposition about the alleged misrepresentations, Banbury’s counsel objected, arguing in part that the topic had already been exhausted. But now, for purposes of the summary judgment motion, the Banburys rely only on Banbury’s affidavit, *882 not on statements made in the deposition. Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in refusing to consider Banbury’s affidavit as sufficient to create a material issue of fact.

IV.

The Banburys also brought a private action alleging that Omnitrition violated the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act. They argue on appeal that the district court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of the Act. We disagree.

The Consumer Fraud Act provides that it is unlawful to use

any fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, misleading statement or deceptive practice, with the intent that others rely thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise.

Minn.Stat. § 325F.69, subd. 1 (1992).

The Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to all allegations of fraud, but only to those where there is a nexus between the alleged fraud and the sale of merchandise. Cooperman v. R.G. Barry Corp., 775 F.Supp. 1211, 1213 (D.Minn. 1991). In Cooperman, a federal district court held the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act inapplicable because the alleged fraud related to plaintiff’s employment relationship, not to the sale of merchandise. Id. at 1213-14.

We agree with that court’s analysis and find it applicable to this case. The Ban-burys do not allege that Omnitrition made any misrepresentation about the sale of merchandise, but only about their distributorship relationship. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the Consumer Fraud Act claim.

V.

The Mnnesota Franchise Act was adopted in 1973 to protect potential franchisees from unfair contracts and other abuses. Martin Investors, Inc. v. Vander Bie, 269 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Minn. 1978). For there to be a franchise, the act requires, inter alia, a franchise fee to be paid, either directly or indirectly. Minn.Stat. § 80C.01, subd. 4(3) (1992).

The Banburys argue that the district court erred in finding there was no franchise fee. The Banburys claim that the $4,000 minimum purchase necessary to earn overrides was an indirect franchise fee. Minnesota recognizes that minimum volume sales requirements may constitute disguised franchise fees if the franchisee is requested to purchase amounts or items it would otherwise not have purchased. Ot Indus., Inc. v. Ot-tehdas Oy Santasalo-Sohlberg Ab, 346 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Minn.App. 1984). But here, there is no evidence that the initial $4,000 purchase was not an acquisition of inventory at the ordinary price. In Ot, we also noted that the failure to buy the minimum amount did not terminate the contract, but merely changed some of its terms. Id. at 167. Likewise, the failure of an Omnitrition distributor and his recruits to sell $4,000 worth of products monthly does not terminate the distributorship agreement, but merely precludes the payment of overrides. We hold that the Banburys’ initial $4,000 inventory purchase was not a hidden franchise fee. Thus, the Franchise Act is inapplicable.

Yet even if the inventory purchase were a franchise fee, the Banburys would not have a cause of action under the Franchise Act. The Banburys allege a violation of Minn.Stat. § 80C.14 (1992). But when the Banburys were terminated in February 1992, the Act did not yet provide for a civil cause of action for violation of that section. Section 80C.17 did not permit civil damage actions until 1993 Minn.Laws ch. 372, § 1, subd. 1, amended that section. Accordingly, the Banburys’ claim fails.

Because we find that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Om-nitrition on all claims, we need not reach the venue issue raised on Omnitrition’s cross-appeal.

DECISION

The district court properly granted summary judgment for Omnitrition because (1) the parties’ distributorship agreement was unambiguously terminable at will; (2) the Banburys’ claim for promissory estoppel can *883 not alter the clear language of their contract; (3) no genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to the Banburys’ claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade Act; (4) the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act is inapplicable because there is no nexus between the alleged fraud and the sale of merchandise; and (5) the Minnesota Franchise Act is inapplicable because Omnitrition did not require the Ban-burys to pay a franchise fee and, further, the statute provided no damages action for violation of Minn.Stat. § 80C.14 at the time the Banburys were terminated.

Affirmed.

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