Minnesota Court of Appeals, 1998 Minnesota appellate court holds that whether subcellular chromosome breakage from Captan exposure constitutes a compensable present injury is a question for the trier of fact, while unquantified increased-risk-of-cancer damages remain too speculative to support recovery.

Minnesota appellate court holds that whether subcellular chromosome breakage from Captan exposure constitutes a compensable present injury is a question for the trier of fact, while unquantified increased-risk-of-cancer damages remain too speculative to support recovery.

Bryson v. Pillsbury Co.
Minnesota Court of Appeals · Decided February 3, 1998 · No. C4-97-1564 · Short, Kalitowski, Peterson
573 N.W.2d 718; 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 117; 1998 WL 37460 (North Western Reporter, Second Series)

Outcome: Affirmed in part.

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Counsel

Alf E. Sivertson, Michelle M. Barrette, Sivertson and Barrette, P.A, St. Paul, for appellant., Robert J. Tansey, Jr., Frederick R. Juck-niess, Thomas C. Mahlum, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, L.L.P., Minneapolis, for respondents.

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Bryson v. Pillsbury Co.

What happened

The facts of the case, in plain language.

While rescuing her horse from a 20-by-20-foot, 17-foot-deep water-filled pit allegedly used by Green Giant to dispose of waste, Bryson observed what she believed to be Captan-treated seeds floating in the water.

Later that day Bryson broke out in a rash covering her body and has since developed additional rashes; her expert presented evidence of extensive chromosome breakage from Captan exposure and a resulting increased risk of developing cancer.

Bryson's expert characterized her chromosome breakage as a "real and present physical and biologic injury," while the company's expert testified that elevated chromosome aberrations are not an injury per se because they cause no physical impairment.

Bryson's expert admitted that her increased risk of cancer could not be measured or quantified, so the evidence could not support a determination that she was more likely than not to develop cancer.

Like the Werlein plaintiffs, Bryson seeks emotional-distress damages and medical-monitoring expenses arising from her alleged chromosome damage.

What the court decided

Nora Bryson boarded her horse at the farm of a fellow employee of Green Giant, a Pillsbury subsidiary. On July 23, 1990, the horse fell into a water-filled pit allegedly used by the company for waste disposal, and Bryson entered the pit to rescue it, seeing what she believed were Captan-treated seeds. She broke out in a rash that day and later developed more rashes; expert evidence showed chromosome breakage and an increased risk of cancer. The district court granted the company summary judgment, finding no present injury and calling future damages speculative. Following Werlein, the court held that whether Bryson's subcellular chromosome damage is a real, present injury, and related emotional-distress and medical-monitoring damages, raises genuine fact questions for the jury, so it reversed and remanded that claim. Because her expert admitted the cancer risk could not be quantified, it affirmed summary judgment on the increased-risk claim.

  1. Whether asymptomatic, subcellular injuries such as chemically induced chromosome breakage constitute a present injury is a question for the trier of fact aided by expert testimony; courts may not rule as a matter of law that such injuries are not "real" merely because they are subcellular. (*721)
  2. When a plaintiff presents evidence of a present injury, the existence and extent of related emotional-distress damages and medical-monitoring expenses present fact questions for the jury, and summary judgment on those damages is inappropriate. (*721)
  3. To establish a claim for future damages, a plaintiff must show both that the future harm is more likely than not to occur and that the future damages are not too speculative. (*721)
  4. The term "fair comment" characterizes expert medical testimony for purposes of determining the admissibility of evidence; it does not provide the standard for proving future injury. (*721)
  5. Damages premised on an increased risk of developing cancer that cannot be measured or quantified are too speculative to support recovery; absent evidence permitting a factfinder to determine that the plaintiff is more likely than not to develop cancer, summary judgment on the future-damages claim is proper. (*722)

How the court reached its decision

The court's reasoning, step by step.

Whether Bryson's asymptomatic Captan-induced chromosome breakage constitutes a present physical injury sufficient to survive summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment stating there were no present injuries without reference to Bryson's present-damages allegations. Bryson's expert testified that her chromosome breakage was a "real and present physical and biologic injury," while the company's expert countered that elevated chromosome aberrations are not an injury per se because they cause no physical impairment. Following Werlein, the trier of fact should resolve the dispute; because a genuine issue of disputed material fact exists regarding whether there was a present injury, the district court erred in granting summary judgment, and that claim is reversed and remanded.

Whether Bryson's claimed emotional-distress damages and medical-monitoring expenses arising from the alleged chromosome damage present jury questions rather than matters resolvable by summary judgment. Like the Werlein plaintiffs, Bryson seeks emotional-distress damages and medical-monitoring expenses because of her alleged chromosome damage, and genuine fact issues exist concerning the existence of her present injuries and damages. Summary judgment on these collateral damages is inappropriate, and they proceed with the remanded present-injury claim for further proceedings.

Whether Bryson presented sufficient evidence to support damages based on her alleged increased risk of developing cancer. Bryson's expert admitted that her increased risk of cancer could not be measured or quantified, and her contention that "fair comment" testimony sufficed misconstrued a term used for evidentiary-admissibility purposes as the standard for proving future injury. Because Bryson presented no evidence permitting a factfinder to determine that she is more likely than not to develop cancer, her claimed future damages are too speculative as a matter of law, and the district court properly granted summary judgment on the increased-risk claim.

Key quotes from the opinion

Notable passages from the opinion, in the court's own words.

“For Bryson to establish her claim for future damages, she must show: (1) that the future harm is more likely than not to occur; and (2) that her future damages are not too speculative.”
Two-part requirement for proving future damages — *721
“rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are not “real” simply because they are subeellular. The effect of volatile organic compounds on the human body is a subtle, complex matter. It is for the trier of fact, aided by expert testimony, to determine whether plaintiffs have suffered present harm.”
Werlein holding the court follows: subcellular harm is for the trier of fact to assess — *721
“an elevated number of chromosome aberrations are not considered an “injury” per se because they do not in and of themselves result in any physical impairment.”
Company expert's counter-testimony on chromosome aberrations — *721
“We conclude, however, Bryson has presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact concerning the existence of a present injury and damages as a result of the alleged injury.”
Basis for reversing summary judgment on the present-injury claim — *722

Cases the court relied on

Earlier decisions the court cited as authority for its ruling.

  • Werlein v. United States (746 F.Supp. 887 (D.Minn. 1990)) — The court expressly follows Werlein's determination that subcellular injuries from toxic exposure, along with associated emotional-distress and medical-monitoring damages, are fact questions for the trier of fact, structuring its reversal of the present-injury summary judgment around that precedent.
  • Pietrzak v. Eggen (295 N.W.2d 504 (Minn. 1980)) — Supplies the two-part requirement that future harm be more likely than not to occur and that future damages not be too speculative, against which Bryson's increased-risk claim fails.
  • Fabio v. Bellomo (504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993)) — Provides the appellate standard of viewing summary-judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the non-prevailing party, and is invoked in dissent for the parallel point that probability, not mere possibility, must ground recovery.
  • Dunshee v. Douglas (255 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1977)) — Establishes that "fair comment" pertains to the admissibility of expert medical testimony, undercutting Bryson's attempt to use it as the proof standard for future injury.
  • Jackson v. Reiling (311 Minn. 562, 249 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1977)) — Confirms that judgments about whether damages are too speculative or remote should usually be left to the trial court, supporting affirmance of the summary judgment on the future-damages claim.

Separate opinions from other justices

Views from justices who wrote separately from the majority.

Short, Judge: Judge Short concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that summary judgment was proper on the increased-risk-of-cancer claim but dissenting from the remand of the chromosome-breakage claim on the ground that there is no evidence supporting damages for a present physical injury; invoking Reliance Ins. Co. v. Arneson and Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05, he argued that mere allegations of emotional distress and possible medical-monitoring expenses cannot create a genuine fact issue and would have affirmed summary judgment in full.

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Full opinion

The complete text of the court's opinion as published.

Concurring in Part

SHORT, Judge

(concurring in part, dissenting in part).

I concur insofar as the majority concludes the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Pillsbury Company on Bryson’s “risk of cancer” claim. I respectfully dissent on the narrow remand concerning Bryson’s “chromosome breakage” claim because there is no evidence supporting an award of damages for present physical injury. Compare Werlein v. United States, 746 F.Supp. 887, 901 (D.Minn. 1990) (holding summary judgment inappropriate where increased risk of harm damages are supported by evidence of present physical injury), vacated in part on other grounds, 793 F.Supp. 898 (D.Minn. 1992) with Reliance Ins. Co. v. Arneson, 322 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn. 1982) (concluding threat of future harm, not yet realized, will not satisfy damage requirement in negligence action). Mere allegations of emotional distress and possible medical monitoring expenses are insufficient to create a fact issue on whether Bryson now suffers from a present physical injury. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05 (stating nonmoving party may not rest on pleading averments or denials, but must present specific facts showing genuine issue for trial); Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 533 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn. 1995) (holding speculation and general assertions are not sufficient to create genuine issue of material fact for trial).

Even if an asymptomatic chromosome condition constitutes evidence of a present physical injury, Bryson also failed to offer any evidence that her alleged damages are capable of proof to a reasonable certainty. See Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 762-63 (Minn. 1993) (concluding, even if court were to adopt “loss of chance” theory in medical malpractice actions, summary judgment was appropriate on “loss of chance” theory because patient failed to present evidence that it was more probable than not that her cancer would recur or that she had diminished life expectancy); see also Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding plaintiff who seeks damages for increased risk of future illness or injury can recover only where toxic exposure more probably than not will lead to malady); Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 269 (8th Cir. 1982) (concluding lawsuit for personal injuries cannot be based only upon mere possibility of some future harm); Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846 F.Supp. 1400, 1408 (W.D.Mo. 1994) (concluding claim for increased risk of cancer is not compensable unless reasonably certain to occur); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287, 308 (1987) (declining to recognize plaintiffs’ cause of action for unquantified enhanced risk of disease because of speculative nature of an unquantified enhanced risk claim and difficulties inherent in adjudicating such claims). Under these circumstances, Bryson has no compensable injury and Pillsbury Company is entitled to judgment as a *723matter of law. I would affirm the trial eourt’s grant of summary judgment.

Opinion of the Court

OPINION

KALITOWSKI, Judge.

Appellant Nora Bryson challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents Pillsbury Company, et al., arguing the district court erred because: (1) Bryson submitted evidence that raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered a present injury; and (2) Bry-son presented sufficient evidence to establish her claim for damages based on her alleged increased risk of developing cancer.

FACTS

Appellant Nora Bryson boarded her horse at the farm of an individual who, like Bryson, was an employee of respondent Finsbury’s subsidiary, Green Giant (company). On July 23, 1990, Bryson discovered that her horse had fallen into a pit filled with water from a storm. The pit, which was 20 feet by 20 feet with a 17-foot depth, had allegedly been used by the company to dispose of waste. Bryson entered the pit in an attempt to rescue the horse and, while ,in the pit, observed what she believed to be Captan-treated seeds floating in the water. Captan is a chemical treatment for seed that protects it from insects in the soil until germination.

Bryson and others succeeded in getting the horse out of the water. Later that day, Bryson broke out in a rash that covered her body. She presented evidence that she has subsequently developed additional rashes. Bryson, through her expert from the University of Minnesota, presented evidence that she suffered extensive chromosome breakage as a result of exposure to Captan and that, because of the chromosome breakage, she has an increased risk of developing cancer. The company made a motion for summary judgment arguing: (1) Bryson assumed the risk of harm by not leaving the pit when she saw the Captan-treated seeds; and (2) Bry-son’s alleged damages were too speculative. The district court denied the company’s summary judgment motion on assumption of risk, but granted summary judgment in favor of the company stating that Bryson suffered no present injury and concluding ■ that her claimed damages for future harm were too speculative as a matter of law.

ISSUES

1. Did Bryson present sufficient evidence to support her claim of a present injury?

2. Did Bryson present sufficient evidence to support her claim for damages based on her alleged increased risk of developing cancer?

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, the company moved to strike Bryson’s reply brief arguing the brief raised new issues and theories on appeal. After a review of the parties’ arguments, we conclude that Bryson’s reply brief is proper and deny the company’s motion.

On appeal from a district court’s grant of summary judgment, this court determines: (1) whether any genuine issues of material fact exist; and (2) whether the district court erred in applying the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). In making this determination, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted.” Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).

I.

Bryson contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment, claiming she presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine fact issue as to whether her chromosome damage constituted a present injury. The company asserts that because Bryson’s claimed chromosome damage is asymptomatic, it does not constitute a legally compensa-ble present injury. In .a memorandum supporting its order for summary judgment, the district court, without reference to Bryson’s allegations regarding present damages, stated: “In this matter there are no present injuries * * We conclude the district court erred by granting summary judgment *721where there is a genuine issue of disputed material fact regarding whether there was a present injury.

In Werlein v. United States, 746 F.Supp. 887, 901 (D.Minn. 1990), vacated in part on other grounds, 793 F.Supp. 898 (D.Minn. 1992), the United States District Court addressed a ease in which the plaintiffs claimed that exposure to contaminated air and drinking water resulted in chromosome damage. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs did not suffer a present injury. Id. In denying the defendants’ summary judgment motion, the court in Werlein stated that it could not

rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are not “real” simply because they are subeellular. The effect of volatile organic compounds on the human body is a subtle, complex matter. It is for the trier of fact, aided by expert testimony, to determine whether plaintiffs have suffered present harm.

Id.

The asymptomatic, subeellular damages claimed in Werlein are similar to the injury claimed by Bryson. Here, Bryson’s expert witness presented evidence that Bryson’s exposure to Captan resulted in chromosome breakage, and that such breakage is a “real and present physical and biologic injury.” This testimony was disputed by the company, whose expert testified that

an elevated number of chromosome aberrations are not considered an “injury” per se because they do not in and of themselves result in any physical impairment.

Following the reasoning of Werlein, we conclude the trier of fact should resolve this fact dispute.

Further, like the plaintiffs in Werlein, Bryson claims emotional distress damages and medical monitoring expenses because of her alleged chromosome damage. Id. at 901, 905. The court in Werlein determined that the existence and extent of these alleged damages also presented fact questions for the jury. Id. at 905-06. Again, following Werlein, we conclude that because there are genuine fact issues concerning the existence of Bryson’s present injuries and damages, summary judgment on this claim is inappropriate.

II.

Bryson next argues that because she has offered expert evidence that she has a present injury, she need only present evidence that is “fair comment” on the medical implications of chromosome breakage to establish future damages resulting from her increased risk of cancer. Alternatively, Bry-son argues that she has presented sufficient evidence to a reasonable medical certainty that entitles her to compensation for future damages as a result of her increased risk of cancer. The district court concluded that because Bryson can neither prove that her increased risk of future harm is more likely than not to occur, nor quantify her increased risk of developing cancer, her claimed damages for increased risk of future harm are too speculative as a matter of law. We agree.

A plaintiff must prove every element of a claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Carpenter v. Nelson, 257 Minn. 424, 427, 101 N.W.2d 918, 921 (1960). For Bryson to establish her claim for future damages, she must show: (1) that the future harm is more likely than not to occur; and (2) that her future damages are not too speculative. Pietrzak v. Eggen, 295 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Minn. 1980). Bryson failed to present evidence on both issues.

We disagree with Bryson’s contention that she need only present evidence that is “fair comment” on the medical implications of chromosome breakage. The term “fair comment” has been used to characterize expert medical testimony for purposes of determining the admissibility of evidence, not to provide the standard for proving future injury. Dunshee v. Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42, 47 (Minn. 1977). Here, Bryson’s expert admitted that Bryson’s increased risk of cancer could not be measured or quantified. Thus, the evidence presented by Bryson does not, as a matter of law, permit a factfinder to determine that Bryson is more likely than not to develop cancer.

*722Further, in Faimon v. Winona State Univ., 540 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Minn.App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Feb. 9,1996), this court affirmed the principle that plaintiffs may not recover damages that are too speculative. The determination of whether damages are too speculative or remote “should usually be left to the judgment of the trial court.” Jackson v. Reiling, 311 Minn. 562, 563, 249 N.W.2d 896, 897 (1977). Because Bryson has presented no evidence to quantify her risk of developing cancer, we conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the company on Bryson’s claim for future damages.

DECISION

The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the company on Bryson’s claim for damages based on an alleged increased risk of future harm because: (1) Bryson has not presented evidence that it is more likely than not that she will develop cancer; and (2) Bryson’s claimed damages for the increased risk of cancer are too speculative as a matter of law. We conclude, however, Bryson has presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact concerning the existence of a present injury and damages as a result of the alleged injury. We, therefore, reverse and remand this claim for further proceedings.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion to strike denied.

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