Minnesota Court of Appeals, 2000 Minnesota Court of Appeals holds that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts a ticket purchaser's breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims challenging an airline's $75 reissue fee as an illegal penalty, but reverses the Rule 11 attorneys' fee award because the claims were not frivolous.

Minnesota Court of Appeals holds that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts a ticket purchaser's breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims challenging an airline's $75 reissue fee as an illegal penalty, but reverses the Rule 11 attorneys' fee award because the claims were not frivolous.

Leonard v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
Minnesota Court of Appeals · Decided February 8, 2000 · Lansing, Willis, Halbrooks
605 N.W.2d 425; 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 148; 2000 WL 136101 (North Western Reporter, Second Series)

Outcome: Affirmed in part.

AI-enhanced analysis. Verify before relying in legal proceedings.

Counsel

Samuel D. Heins, Daniel E. Gustafson, Kristine M. Boylan, Heins Mills & Olson, P.L.C., Minneapolis, MN, Leonard B. Simon, Dennis Stewart, Joseph D. Daley, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP, San Diego, CA, Daniel A. Farber, Minneapolis, MN (of counsel), for appellant)., Thomas Tinkham, Michael J. Wahoske, Andre T.M. Hanson, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, MN (for respondent).

Can I rely on this case?

Citation treatment has not been reviewed for this case. The notes below come from the citation graph and the Minnesota Revisor's amendment records, not from a review of how later courts treated this decision.

(as of 9/30/2026)

Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 2025, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.

Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

See our Terms of Use before relying on these notes. Report an error

Leonard v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.

What happened

The facts of the case, in plain language.

Beth Leonard purchased a nonrefundable ticket from Northwest Airlines to fly from Minneapolis to Las Vegas on October 24 and from Las Vegas back to Minneapolis on October 28, 1998; she did not fly as ticketed but later had the ticket reissued by Northwest and paid a $75 fee for reissuing the ticket.

Under the contract of carriage, a holder of Leonard's type of nonrefundable ticket who does not fly as ticketed may, within one year of issuance, apply the unused fare toward a new contract of carriage but must pay an additional $75 fee; a holder who neither uses nor reissues the ticket forfeits the entire fare.

Leonard alleged not that Northwest failed to abide by the contract's terms, but that the reissue fee is an illegal penalty under Minnesota law because it bears no rational relationship to the actual cost of reissuing the ticket.

The district court dismissed Leonard's complaint on preemption grounds and awarded Northwest $500 in attorneys' fees under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

Leonard's claims rest on the Minnesota common-law rule against contract penalties, an equitable doctrine grounded in public policy and unconscionability that is unrelated to the parties' bargain, so enforcing it would require the court to consider state policy external to the agreement with Northwest.

What the court decided

Beth Leonard bought a nonrefundable Northwest Airlines ticket, did not fly as ticketed, and later had the ticket reissued for travel on different dates, paying a $75 reissue fee. She sued Northwest on behalf of similarly situated purchasers, alleging that the fee was an illegal penalty under Minnesota law because it bore no rational relationship to the actual cost of reissuing the ticket. The district court dismissed her breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims as preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act and awarded Northwest $500 in attorneys' fees under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal: the claims relate to price under both the Morales textual standard and a structure-and-purpose analysis, and they seek to enforce state law—the common-law rule against penalties—external to the parties' contract. But the court reversed the fee award, reasoning that ADA preemption law was unsettled enough that Leonard's claims were not frivolous or unwarranted, and it declined to impose fees for the appeal.

  1. The Airline Deregulation Act preempts state-law breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims alleging that an airline's ticket-reissue fee is an illegal penalty, because such claims both relate to price and seek to enforce state law external to the parties' contract. (*431)
  2. An airline's charge for reissuing a nonrefundable ticket relates to price within the meaning of the ADA's preemption clause, both under the Morales textual standard and under a structure-and-purpose analysis, because the ADA defines "price" as any rate, fare, or charge without limiting language and because enforcing state penalty laws would frustrate Congress's intent to promote efficiency through price deregulation. (*430)
  3. Claims resting on the state common-law rule against contract penalties constitute enforcement of state law rather than enforcement of privately ordered contractual obligations, because the rule against penalties is an equitable public-policy doctrine whose application is independent of, and often frustrates, the parties' bargain. (*431)
  4. A claim is not frivolous or unwarranted under existing law, and therefore not subject to Rule 11 attorneys'-fee sanctions, merely because it fails on preemption grounds where the governing preemption doctrine is unsettled and the claim advances a colorable argument for evolution of precedent. (*433)
  5. An appeal presenting a colorable challenge in an unsettled area of law is not frivolous under Minnesota Statutes section 549.211, and attorneys' fees incurred on such an appeal should not be imposed. (*433)

How the court reached its decision

The court's reasoning, step by step.

Does the ADA's preemption clause bar breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims challenging an airline's ticket-reissue fee as an illegal penalty? The $75 reissue fee is a price the airline charges for reissuing an existing ticket for travel on a different day; the ADA defines "price" as "rate, fare, or charge" without limiting language, so the fee bears a connection with price under the Morales standard, and because Congress sought efficiency specifically through deregulation of prices, routes, and services, applying state penalty laws to the fee would frustrate that intent under the structure-and-purpose analysis. Leonard's claims relate to price under both the Morales textual standard and the Court's narrowed structure-and-purpose analysis, satisfying the first prong of the preemption test.

Do the claims constitute the enactment or enforcement of state law rather than enforcement of the parties' privately ordered bargain? Leonard's claims rest on the Minnesota common-law rule against contract penalties, an equitable doctrine grounded in the public policy against compulsion and unconscionability that is irrelevant to, and often frustrates, the parties' bargain, so adjudicating the claims would require weighing public-policy considerations outside her agreement with Northwest; the availability of a Department of Transportation complaint avenue and the uniformity of the penalty rule among the states do not avoid preemption. Because the claims are unrelated to the contract of carriage but instead seek to enforce state-imposed obligations against contract penalties, they are preempted.

Were Leonard's claims unwarranted under existing law so as to justify Rule 11 sanctions and attorneys' fees for a frivolous appeal? Although the court ruled against Leonard, the Supreme Court has recognized that ADA preemption cannot be settled on the basis of one or two cases, the line separating allowable from preempted claims remains fuzzy, and Leonard's interpretation was no more frivolous than the Wolens plaintiffs' claims were in light of Morales; sanctioning such claims risks deterring colorable arguments for changes in the law and impeding the evolution of precedent. The claims were not frivolous or unwarranted by existing law; the district court's Rule 11 fee award is reversed and no attorneys' fees are imposed for the appeal.

Key quotes from the opinion

Notable passages from the opinion, in the court's own words.

“[A] State * * * may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.”
ADA preemption clause quoted from 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) — *429
“This distinction between what the State dictates and what the airline itself undertakes confines courts, in breach-of-contract actions, to the parties' bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the agreement.”
Wolens distinction between privately ordered contract obligations and state-imposed obligations — *431
“Because the claims are unrelated to the contract of carriage with Northwest, but instead seek to enforce state-imposed obligations against contract penalties, they are preempted.”
Court's holding that illegal-penalty claims enforce state law and are preempted — *432
“In deterring frivolous claims, we must be careful not to deter colorable claims for changes in the law or to impede further evolution of existing precedent.”
Basis for reversing the Rule 11 fee award despite ruling against Leonard — *433

Cases the court relied on

Earlier decisions the court cited as authority for its ruling.

  • American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens (513 U.S. 219) — Supplies the two-part ADA preemption test and the distinction between privately ordered contractual obligations and state-imposed duties on which the dismissal of Leonard's claims rests.
  • Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (504 U.S. 374) — Provides the broad textual reading of "relating to" under which state action connected with or referencing airline fares is preempted, the standard first applied to the reissue fee.
  • New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co. (514 U.S. 645) — Source of the structure-and-purpose method the court applies alongside the Morales text to assess whether the penalty claims would interfere with airline deregulation.
  • Uselman v. Uselman (464 N.W.2d 130) — Minnesota authority establishing Rule 11's deterrence purpose and its narrow construction, grounding the reversal of the attorneys'-fee award.
  • Blackner v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (709 A.2d 258) — New Jersey decision dismissing breach-of-contract claims arising from a lost-ticket replacement surcharge, cited as nonbinding comparative support for preempting illegal-penalty claims.

Minnesota statutes cited

Sections of the Minnesota Statutes this opinion cites.

Cases that cite this one

20 later published cases cite this decision. The 19 that cite it most often are listed here.

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Full opinion

The complete text of the court's opinion as published.

Opinion

OPINION

LANSING, Judge.

The district court dismissed an airline ticket purchaser’s breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims as preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) and awarded the airline attorneys’ fees under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 11. We agree that the ADA preempts the claims. But the ticket purchaser’s argument that the claims are outside the scope of the ADA’s preemption clause has a legal basis, *428 and we therefore reverse the attorneys’ fees award and decline to impose attorneys’ fees on appeal.

FACTS

Beth Leonard purchased a nonrefundable ticket from Northwest Airlines to fly from Minneapolis to Las Vegas on October 24 and from Las Vegas back to Minneapolis on October 28, 1998. Leonard did not travel as ticketed, but rebooked to travel with Northwest at a later date. Northwest charged Leonard a $75 fee for reissuing the ticket.

The contract governing the relations between Northwest and its passengers is known as a “contract of carriage.” Under the contract, a ticket holder with Leonard’s type of nonrefundable ticket who does not fly as ticketed may, within one year of the ticket’s issuance, apply the unused ticket fare toward a new contract of carriage, but must then pay an additional $75 fee. A ticket holder who does not use the original ticket or have it reissued forfeits the entire fare.

Leonard, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated ticket purchasers, sued Northwest for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, and declaratory and in-junctive relief. Leonard alleged not that Northwest failed to abide by the terms of the contract, but that the reissue fee is an illegal penalty under Minnesota law because it bears no rational relationship to the actual cost of reissuing the ticket.

Northwest moved to dismiss Leonard’s complaint on preemption grounds and requested attorneys’ fees and costs under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court dismissed Leonard’s complaint and awarded $500 attorneys’ fees. Leonard appeals the dismissal of her action and the imposition of attorneys’ fees. Northwest moves under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 189.06 and Minnesota Statutes section 549.211 (1998) for attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal.

ISSUES

I. Does the Airline Deregulation Act preempt breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims based on a state law theory of illegal penalty?

II. Are the claims unwarranted under existing law so as to justify sanctions under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and is the appeal frivolous under Minnesota Statutes section 549.211 (1998)?

ANALYSIS

On appeal from the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, we review de novo the claim’s legal sufficiency. Barton v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1997); State ex rel. Graham v. Klumpp, 536 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Minn. 1995). When federal preemption bars relief under any set of facts consistent with the pleadings, the complaint fails to state a claim and must be dismissed. See Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (interpreting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), federal counterpart to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e))).

I

Whether a claim is preempted is a question of congressional intent that is “at bottom” a legal question of statutory construction. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 2036, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992). An analysis of congressional intent therefore “ ‘begin[s] with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). If the text itself does not resolve the preemption question, the analysis moves to the structure and purpose of the Act containing the preemption language. New York State Conference of *429 Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655-56, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1677, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995).

Until 1978, airlines were subject to federal regulation of fares, routes, and services under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958(FAA). American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222, 115 S.Ct. 817, 821, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995). The FAA did not have a preemption clause and in fact contained a saving clause providing that

‘[njothing * * * in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.’

Id. (quoting FAA). In 1978, Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act. The enactment was motivated by congressional belief that “ ‘maximum reliance on competitive market forces’ would best further ‘efficiency, innovation, and low prices’ as well as ‘variety [and] quality * * * of air transportation services.’ ” Morales, 504 U.S. at 378, 112 S.Ct. at 2034 (quoting ADA). To prevent states from undoing deregulation, Congress included a preemption clause:

[A] State * * * may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.

49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994). But Congress retained the FAA’s saving clause, see 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1994), thereby reinforcing the judicial presumption against preemption, particularly on matters commonly reserved to state regulation. See Wellons v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 493, 495 (6th Cir. 1999) (ADA does not vitiate traditional presumption against preemption).

In two successive cases, the U.S. Supreme Court forged a two-part test for resolving whether a state claim is preempted by the ADA. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 226, 115 S.Ct. at 823; Morales, 504 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. at 2037. To be preempted, the claim must (1) relate to prices, routes, or services, and (2) constitute an enactment or enforcement of state law. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 226, 115 S.Ct. at 823. Leonard asserts that her claims are not preempted because they neither relate to price or services nor attempt to enact or enforce state law. We address Leonard’s arguments on each of the prongs of the preemption test in turn.

Relate to

In defining the first prong of the preemption test, the Court has applied a textual “plain-meaning” interpretation to the phrase “relating to.” 1 Morales, 504 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 2037. In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, the Court drew from its previous interpretation of the similarly worded Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and adopted a standard that gave the “relating-to” phrase a broad preemptive purpose. Id. at 384, 112 S.Ct. at 2037. Under this standard, “[sjtate enforcement actions having a connection ivith or reference to airline ‘rates, routes, or services’ are preempted.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

Applying the “connection with” or “reference to” standard, the Morales Court held that the ADA preempted state enforcement of advertising regulations. Id. at 391, 112 S.Ct. at 2041. The Court reasoned that the advertising provisions related to fares within the meaning of the ADA not only because they expressly referred to them, but also because they reduced the *430 incentive to price competitively. Id. at 388, 112 S.Ct. at 2039 (“ ‘[wjhere consumers have the benefit of price advertising, retail prices often are dramatically lower than they would be without advertising.’ ”).

Similarly, in American Airlines v. Wolens, the Court held that the ADA preempted a claim that American Airlines’ retroactive modification of its frequent-flyer program violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228, 115 S.Ct. at 823. The Court concluded with no difficulty that the “claims relate to ‘rates,’ i.e., American’s charges in the form of mileage credits for free tickets and upgrades, and to ‘services,’ i.e., access to flights and class-of-service upgrades.” Id. at 226, 115 S.Ct. at 823.

Since the 1992 Morales decision, however, the Court in its ERISA decisions has retreated from a purely textual interpretation of “relating to” and has shifted to an analysis of ERISA’s structure or purpose to determine the scope of its preemption. In 1995, the Court noted that an “uncritical literalism” in applying the “connection to” language “is no more help than in trying to construe ‘relate to.’ ” Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656, 115 S.Ct. at 1677. Thus, the Court concluded that it must “go beyond the unhelpful text” and “look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive.” Id. In 1997, relying on Travelers, the Court again defined ERISA’s preemptive reach by looking to ERISA’s objectives. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325, 117 S.Ct. 832, 838, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) (analysis of “whether a state law has the forbidden connection” looks to objectives of ERISA and effect of state law on ERISA plan).

Some federal courts have adopted the Court’s narrowed ERISA preemption analysis in resolving controversies arising under the ADA’s preemption clause. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has concluded that Congress intended to preempt “only state laws and lawsuits that would adversely affect the economic deregulation of the airlines and the forces of competition within the airline industry.” Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Similarly, the Second Circuit has observed that “ ‘[rjelated to’ appears to be developing, to some degree, to mean whether state law actually ‘interferes’ with * * * airline deregulation.” Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 128 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1997).

Under either the Morales textual standard or the Court’s narrowed structure- and-purpose analysis of ERISA, Northwest’s reissue fee relates to price. As the district court recognized, the $75 fee is a price the airline charges for reissuing an existing ticket for travel on a different day. Leonard’s argument that the $75 fee does not relate to price because it does not affect what Northwest charges for travel from Point A to Point B is unpersuasive. The ADA’s reach is not so limited. Also unpersuasive is Leonard’s assertion that the reissue fee is unrelated to price because it is not included in the ADA’s definition of price. The Act defines “price” as “rate, fare, or charge” without any further limitation (e.g., rate for what). 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(35) (1994). Leonard would have this court construe the term to mean “rate for transport,” but the Act contains no such limiting language. Thus, applying the Morales textual-interpretation standard, we cannot say that the fee an airline charges for reissuing a ticket does not relate to price.

We reach the same conclusion under the structure-and-purpose standard. We are not persuaded by Leonard’s argument that the application of penalty laws would not frustrate the intent of the ADA. She asserts that Congress must have contemplated state penalty laws because these laws promote efficiency, which is the driving force behind the ADA. See Daniel A. Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U.L.Rev. 303, 333-39 *431 (1983); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law 128-29 (4th ed. 1992). Congress expressed more than a desire to promote efficiency. It expressed a belief that efficiency is best promoted by deregulation of prices, routes, and services. Thus, because Leonard’s claims would frustrate congressional intent to promote efficiency through price deregulation, the claims relate to price under the Court’s more recent structure-and-purpose analysis.

Having concluded that Leonard’s claims relate to and affect price, we do not address whether they relate to services. Instead, we turn to the second part of the preemption test, whether Leonard’s claim requires the enactment or enforcement of a state law, regulation, or other provision.

Enactment or enforcement

In Wolens, the Court held that contract claims relating to frequent-flyer benefits did not involve the enactment or enforcement of state laws, reasoning that the

terms and conditions airlines offer and passengers accept are privately ordered obligations “and thus do not amount to a State’s ‘enact[ment] or enforce[ment] [of] any law, rule, regulation, standard or other provision having the force and effect of law.’ ”

Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228-29, 115 S.Ct. at 824 (citation omitted).

The Court distinguished, however, between contract claims that seek simply to enforce the bargain of the parties and those that require the enforcement of state law or policy outside the contract:

This distinction between what the State dictates and what the airline itself undertakes confines courts, in breach-of-contract actions, to the parties’ bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the agreement.

Id. at 233, 115 S.Ct. at 826. See also Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 257 (4th Cir. 1998) (contract claim preempted when airline’s defenses to breach were based on federal law “which is clearly external to the parties’ agreement”).

Applying Wolens, federal courts have found many contract claims not preempted by the ADA. See In re Air Transp. Excise Tax Litigation, 37 F.Supp.2d 1133, 1140 (D.Minn. 1999) (dispute over whether Federal Express breached contract with customers by continuing to collect amount equal to expired tax); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. UPS of America, 972 F.Supp. 665, 672-73 (N.D.Ga. 1997) (dispute over whether UPS followed contractual provisions for determining packages’ weight); Chrissafis v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 940 F.Supp. 1292, 1298 (N.D.Ill. 1996) (contract dispute over passenger’s right to re-board plane); Seals v. Delta Air Lines, 924 F.Supp. 854, 858 (E.D.Tenn. 1996) (dispute over whether contract required Delta to provide wheelchairs at airports); Chukwu v. Board of Directors Varig Airline, 880 F.Supp. 891, 895 (D.Mass. 1995) (contract dispute alleging failure to transport).

Leonard’s claims rest on a Minnesota common-law contract rule against penalties. The rule against contract penalties is an equitable doctrine arising from a public policy against compulsion and has at its foundation the un-conscionability doctrine. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, § 12.18 (1982); John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts, 564-65 (1977). The parties’ bargain is irrelevant to the rule and often is frustrated by its application. Farnsworth, supra, at § 12.18; Calamari & Perillo, supra, at 564-65. Leonard’s claims would require the district court to take into account public policy considerations outside Leonard’s agreement with Northwest. Because the claims are unrelated to the contract of carriage with Northwest, but instead seek to enforce state-imposed obligations against contract penalties, they are preempted.

Other state courts’ decisions support our conclusion that the ADA preempts illegal-penalty claims. See Blackner v. Continen *432 tal Airlines, 311 N.J.Super. 10, 709 A.2d 258, 260 (App.Div. 1998) (dismissing breach-of-contract claims arising from $60 surcharge to replace lost ticket), certification denied, 156 N.J. 405, 719 A.2d 637 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1142, 119 S.Ct. 1034, 143 L.Ed.2d 42 (1999); Boon Ins. Agency, Inc. v. American Airlines, No. 98-08724 (Travis County, Tex. Feb. 2, 1999) (dismissing breach-of-contract claim arising from reissue fee) (appeal pending). These decisions are, of course, not binding on us, but provide comparative analysis and insight.

Leonard argues that her claims should not be preempted because they cannot be brought in any other forum. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 231-32, 115 S.Ct. at 825. Congress has, however, retained in the federal Department of Transportation (DOT) the authority to regulate trade practices of the airlines. Id. at 228 n. 4, 115 S.Ct. at 823 n. 4. The DOT has used this authority to regulate reissue fees. 14 CFR § 253.7 (1999). Although the DOT has chosen only to require conspicuous notice of the fees, it could also choose to regulate the amounts. Thus, while Leonard does not have another forum in which she can adjudicate her grievance with Northwest directly, she can take her grievance to the DOT and ask it to take action. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228 n. 4, 115 S.Ct. at 823 n. 4 (noting that although consumer fraud claims preempted, plaintiff could seek recourse through the DOT); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1556, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (availability of federal remedy is not a prerequisite to federal preemption).

Leonard also asserts that enforcement of the penalty rule should not be preempted because the rule is uniform in all 50 states. Leonard cites footnote eight in Wolens for the proposition that uniform laws are not preempted. 513 U.S. at 233, 115 S.Ct. at 826 n. 8. Footnote eight addresses the argument that enforcement of the same agreement in different states might lead to differing interpretations of the agreement. Id. But the Court expressed its lack of concern about differing interpretations, noting that contract law is relatively uniform. Id. Thus, the court’s footnote does not support an argument that any law may be imposed on the airlines so long as it is uniform. In fact, the Morales decision defeats that argument, since it involved consumer-protection statutes that were mostly uniform. 504 U.S. at 379, 112 S.Ct. at 2034.

II

Under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the signature of an attorney or party on a pleading certifies that the pleading is “well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 authorizes the court to impose appropriate sanctions, including attorneys’ fees, when a pleading is signed in violation of .the rule. Id. The main purpose of rule 11 is to deter frivolous claims and defenses. Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 142 (Minn. 1990). But the rule should be strictly construed:

[A]s a matter of public policy, * ⅜ ⅜ the rule should be construed somewhat narrowly — while some sanctionable conduct might under these circumstances escape discipline, that is preferable to deterring legitimate or arguably legitimate claims.

Id. Sanctions should not be imposed when “counsel has an objectively reasonable basis for pursuing a factual or legal claim or when a competent attorney could form a reasonable belief a pleading is well-grounded in fact and law.” Id. at 143 (citations omitted).

We review the propriety of rule 11 sanctions generally under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2458, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990); Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 142. But a legal determination that a pleading is not warranted by existing law or a good-faith *433 argument may be set aside by an appellate court if the determination rests on an erroneous view of the relevant law. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 402, 110 S.Ct. at 2459; see also Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 142 (stating that because Minn. R. Civ. P. 11 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 are essentially the same, cases interpreting federal rule offer valuable guidance).

This court may also award attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal if an appeal is frivolous. Minn.Stat. § 549.211 (1998). The decision of whether to award attorneys’ fees for frivolous claims rests within this court’s broad discretion. Van Vickle v. C.W. Scheurer & Sons, Inc., 556 N.W.2d 288, 242 (Minn.App. 1996).

Although we rule against Leonard, we cannot characterize her claims as frivolous or unwarranted by existing law. As the Supreme Court has recognized, ADA preemption is an area of the law that may not be settled “on the basis of one or two cases, but require[s] a closer working out.” Wolens, 513 U.S. at 234-35, 115 S.Ct. at 827. While Wolens articulates the analysis in which courts must engage, the “line separating allowable claims from ADA-preempted ones remains fuzzy.” In re Air Transp. Excise Tax Litigation, 37 F.Supp.2d at 1140. Furthermore, Leonard’s interpretation of the ADA after Wolens is no more frivolous or unwarranted than were the Wolens plaintiffs’ claims in light of Morales. Had the Illinois courts imposed sanctions in that case, the plaintiffs might not have appealed and the Supreme Court might not have decided Wolens, a decision that has become crucial to ADA-preemption analysis. In deterring frivolous claims, we must be careful not to deter colorable claims for changes in the law or to impede further evolution of existing precedent. We therefore reverse the district court’s attorneys’ fee award. For the same reasons, we decline to award fees incurred on appeal.

DECISION

Leonard’s breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims are preempted by the ADA because they relate to price and seek the enforcement of state law. We therefore affirm the dismissal of Leonard’s claims. But Leonard’s claims are not frivolous and do not justify attorneys’ fees under rule 11 or Minnesota Statutes section 549.211 (1998). We therefore reverse the district court’s imposition of attorneys’ fees and decline to impose an award of fees incurred on appeal.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; motion denied.

1

. Prior to a 1994 recodification, the preemption clause provided that

[n]o state * * * shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.

49 U.S.C.A. § 1305(a)(1), cited in Wolens, 513 U.S. at 222-23, 115 S.Ct. at 817. Congress intended the revision to make no substantive change. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 222-23 n. 1, 115 S.Ct. at 821 n. 1.

This page includes AI-generated summaries and analysis based on the full opinion text and citing cases. We believe the summaries are accurate, but you should always verify the holdings, quotes, and treatment data against the original opinion before relying on them in legal proceedings.

Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.