The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for a home builder, finding the trial court abused its discretion by letting the builder add a statute-of-limitations defense without notice and leaving estoppel and repair-characterization questions for jury decision.
Outcome: Reversed for appellant.
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What happened
The facts of the case, in plain language.
Appellants Yinsog and Kyung Rhee bought a newly constructed home from respondent Golden Home Builders, Inc., in December 1993, and in the spring of 1994 they discovered water leaking through the walls and floors during heavy rains and notified Golden.
From the spring of 1994 until 1998, Golden made numerous unsuccessful repair attempts and repeatedly assured the Rhees that the leakage problem eventually would be solved.
Golden answered the Rhees' lawsuit without raising a statute-of-limitations defense, then orally moved to amend its answer to assert that defense at the October 11, 1999 hearing without prior notice to the Rhees.
The district court granted Golden's motion to amend and then granted summary judgment in favor of Golden and Henderson on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired before the action commenced.
The Rhees filed suit on December 3, 1998; Golden impleaded its stucco subcontractor, Alan Henderson d/b/a Progressive Stucco, who asserted the statute of limitations as a defense.
What the court decided
Yinsog and Kyung Rhee bought a newly built home from Golden Home Builders in December 1993 and discovered water leakage during heavy rains the following spring. For roughly four years the builder made unsuccessful repairs while repeatedly assuring them the problem would be solved. When the Rhees sued in December 1998, Golden answered without raising the statute of limitations, then orally moved at a hearing—without advance notice—to amend its answer and assert that defense. The district court allowed the amendment and granted summary judgment against the Rhees. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held the trial court abused its discretion because the surprise amendment unfairly prejudiced the homeowners, and it found genuine factual disputes over equitable estoppel—whether reliance on the builder's repeated assurances delayed the suit—and over whether some later work was an "improvement" rather than a "repair," which would start a fresh limitations period. Judgment reversed and remanded.
- A district court abuses its discretion by allowing a party to amend its answer to assert an action-disposing affirmative defense through an oral motion made without the advance notice required by Minn. Gen. R.P. 115.04(a) and without giving the opposing party a reasonable opportunity to respond, because the surprise deprives the opponent of any meaningful chance to prepare against a motion that would dispose of the entire lawsuit. (*621)
- When a builder responsible for a construction defect makes repeated assurances that the defect will be repaired and pursues repair efforts continuously until shortly before the lawsuit is filed, those facts present a genuine issue of material fact whether the builder is equitably estopped from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense, and summary judgment on the estoppel question is inappropriate. (*622)
- Whether a builder's post-discovery remedial work on a construction defect constitutes repairs or improvements—and therefore whether that work triggers a new limitations period under Minn. Stat. § 541.051—is a question of material fact that a court may not resolve by summary judgment, which is proper only where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved. (*622)
How the court reached its decision
The court's reasoning, step by step.
Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing Golden to amend its answer to assert a statute-of-limitations defense via an oral motion made without prior notice and without giving the Rhees an opportunity to respond? Golden orally moved to amend at the October 11, 1999 hearing without prior notice; although the district court may modify the rule-prescribed time limits, it instead simply allowed Golden to ignore the notice and response rules altogether, leaving the Rhees only an impromptu response to a motion that would dispose of the entire lawsuit. The Rhees were unfairly prejudiced by the court's failure to enforce the rules, so the court abused its discretion in allowing the amendment; Golden remains free to move to amend, but the case must be remanded for further proceedings conducted in accordance with the rules.
Did the Rhees' reliance on Golden's repeated assurances and ongoing repair efforts raise a genuine issue of material fact whether Golden is equitably estopped from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense? It is undisputed that Golden made repeated assurances and repair efforts from the spring 1994 discovery of the leakage until a few months before the December 1998 filing, so the facts do not compel a single inference; the district court's contrary reliance on Rivers v. Richard Schwartz/Neil Weber was misplaced because there some parties received no assurances at all and the remaining party saw five years pass with continuing defects but no further assurances or repair efforts. The record presents a genuine issue whether Golden is equitably estopped from asserting the statute-of-limitations defense, and summary judgment on that issue was inappropriate.
Did the district court improperly make a factual finding by ruling that Golden's and Henderson's 1996–1998 remedial work was "repairs" rather than "improvements" triggering a new limitations period? Implicit in the district court's conclusion that the 1996–1998 work did not start a new limitations period was a factual finding that all of the work was repairs rather than improvements, yet the proper characterization of the remedies attempted by Golden and Henderson was not perfectly clear. Genuine issues of material fact exist as to the proper characterization of the attempted remedies, and summary judgment was inappropriate on that issue.
Key quotes from the opinion
Notable passages from the opinion, in the court's own words.
Cases the court relied on
Earlier decisions the court cited as authority for its ruling.
Minnesota statutes cited
Sections of the Minnesota Statutes this opinion cites.
Cases that cite this one
22 later published cases cite this decision. The 20 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Davies v. West Publishing Co. (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)
- Moyer v. Lasher Construction, Inc. (Idaho 2024)
- Randy L. Brandt v. Wayne E. Lee (Minn. Ct. App. 2015)
- Johnny L. Moore v. Park Nicollet Methodist Hospital (Minn. Ct. App. 2015)
- Amaal Mohammed Shire v. Minneapolis Public Housing Authority, Lester L. Hall (Minn. Ct. App. 2014)
- Highway Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp. (8th Cir. 2009)
- Bradley v. First Nat. Bank of Walker, N.A. (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)
- Marjorie Gowan v. The Estate of Robert E. Pape (Minn. Ct. App. 2016)
- Bret Hedrington v. American Standard Insurance Company of Wisconsin (Minn. Ct. App. 2016)
- Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company v. Historic Ivy Tower, LLC (Minn. Ct. App. 2014)
- Stuart Co., d/b/a Century North Apartments v. Ciera Ramsey (Minn. Ct. App. 2014)
- Zirnhelt v. Carter (Minn. Ct. App. 2014)
- SN4, LLC v. Anchor Bank, FSB (Minn. Ct. App. 2014)
- Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Benderson-Wainberg Associates, L.P. (8th Cir. 2012)
- Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp. (D. Minn. 2009)
- Highway Sales v. Blue Bird Corporation (8th Cir. 2009)
- Lake Superior Center Authority v. Hammel, Green & Abrahamson, Inc. (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)
- Andres v. McNeil Co., Inc. (Neb. 2005)
- Dakota County v. BWBR Architects, Inc. (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
- Fedie v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Full opinion
The complete text of the court's opinion as published.
Opinion
OPINION
The owners of a newly constructed home observed leakage from the floors and windows during heavy rains. They complained to the builder, who made repeated assurances that the defect would be repaired and tried unsuccessfully for several years to repair the problem.
When the owners sued the builder, the district court allowed the builder, without prior notice to the owners, to amend the answer so as to assert a statute-of-limitations defense. The court then granted summary judgment, ruling that the statute of limitations had expired before the owners initiated their lawsuit. The court rejected the owners’ arguments that equitable estoppel applied and that some repairs were in fact improvements that triggered new limitations periods. The owners appealed.
FACTS
Appellants Yinsog and Kyung Rhee bought a newly constructed home from respondent Golden Home Builders, Inc., in December 1993. In the spring of 1994, the Rhees discovered water leaking through the walls and floors during heavy rains and they notified Golden.
Golden assured the Rhees that the problem would be fixed. Beginning in the spring of 1994 and continuing until 1998, Golden made numerous unsuccessful repair attempts and repeatedly told the Rhees that eventually the problem would be solved.
Because the leakage continued despite the repair efforts, the Rhees initiated a lawsuit against Golden on December 3, 1998. Golden answered but did not raise the statute of limitations as a defense. Golden impleaded the stucco subcontractor, Alan Henderson d/b/a Progressive Stucco. Henderson asserted the statute of limitations as a defense.
Golden and Henderson moved for summary judgment. At the October 11, 1999, motion hearing, Golden orally moved to amend its answer to assert a statute-of-limitations defense. The Rhees objected, arguing that they had no notice that Golden would make the motion and no opportunity to prepare a response, and that the motion was untimely and prejudicial.
The district court granted Golden’s motion to amend and then granted summary judgment in favor of Golden and Henderson on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired prior to the commencement of the action. The court also ruled that estoppel did not apply, saying
[appellants] here were well aware of the failure of the repair efforts before the statute of limitations period expired. Further, [appellants] were aware after assurances of repair were given that the water leakage continued. Estoppel is not appropriate in this situation.
Finally, the court ruled that the repairs done by Golden and Henderson from 1996 to 1998 did not trigger a new statute of limitations period. The Rhees appeal from summary judgment.
ISSUES
1. Does the district court abuse its discretion by allowing a party to amend its answer so as to assert an affirmative defense that disposes of the action, when the motion to amend is oral and without prior notice, and when the opposing party is not allowed a reasonable opportunity to respond?
*621 2. Homeowners complained of.a defect in their home that caused water leakage. The home builder made many attempts to repair the defect and repeatedly assured the homeowners that it would be remedied. The homeowners contend that they relied on the builder’s assurances and conduct and failed to initiate a lawsuit within the limitations period. Have the homeowners raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the builder is equitably estopped from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense?
3. Does a court make a factual finding by ruling that a builder’s efforts to remedy a construction defect were “repairs” rather than “improvements”?
ANALYSIS
Amendment of Answer
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.03. An affirmative defense must be pleaded specifically and the failure to do so results in a waiver of the defense. Melbo v. Rinn, 280 Minn. 72, 75, 157 N.W.2d 842, 845 (1968). Pleadings may be amended to assert an affirmative defense. Rehberger v. Project Plumbing Co., 295 Minn. 577, 578, 205 N.W.2d 126, 127 (1973); Wagner v. Schwegmann’s S. Town Liquor, Inc., 485 N.W.2d 730 (Minn.App. 1992), revieio denied (July 16, 1992). Ordinarily, amendments to pleadings should be freely granted except when prejudice would result to the other party. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). We will not reverse a decision to allow the amendment of a pleading absent a clear abuse of discretion. Warrick v. Giron, 290 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn. 1980).
Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01 authorizes the court to allow an amendment to the pleadings “when justice so requires.” The rule gives no time limit for bringing or responding to a motion to amend pleadings. But Minn. Gen. R.P. 115.04(a) requires 14 days’ advance notice to the opposing party.
No motion shall be heard until the moving party serves a copy of [the appropriate papers] on the other party * * * at least 14 days prior to-the hearing * * *.
Minn. Gen. R.P. 115.04(b) contemplates a response to the motion and sets time limits for serving and filing responsive papers.
Although the district court has discretion to modify the time limits in rules 115.04(a) and (b), here the court simply allowed Golden to ignore the rules altogether. Without prior notice, the Rhees had only an opportunity to fashion whatever impromptu response 'they could to a motion that would dispose of the entire lawsuit. We 'believe the Rhees were unfairly prejudiced by the court’s failure to enforce the rules under these circumstances and that the court abused its discretion by allowing Golden to amend its answer. Golden is not foreclosed from moving to amend, but the matter must be remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the rules.
Estoppel
Under MinmStat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a), a lawsuit alleging a construction defect must be brought within two years after the claimant discovers, or, .with reasonable diligence, should have discovered an injury sufficient to entitle him to maim tain an action. Greenbrier Village Condominium Two Ass’n v. Keller lnv., Inc., 409 N.W.2d 519, 524, (Minn.App. 1987). There is no dispute that the Rhees discovered substantial leakage in the, spring of 1994. But a builder may be estopped from asserting the bar of-the statute of limitations if his conduct satisfies, the elements of equitable estoppel:
1. There must be conduct — acts, language or silence — amounting to a, representation or a concealment of material facts. 2. These facts must be known to the party, estopped * * ■*. 3. The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the -other party claiming the benefit of estoppel, at ■ the time. when such conduct was done, and at the time *622 when it was acted upon by him. 4. The conduct must be done with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that it will be so acted upon * * ⅜. 5. The conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act upon it. 6. He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his position for the worse * * *.
Lunning v. Land O’Lakes, 303 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Minn. 1980) (emphasis and quotation omitted).
The district court granted summary judgment against the Rhees on the issue of equitable estoppel. On an appeal from summary judgment, we ask two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the district court erred in its application of law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990) (citation omitted).
When a party allegedly responsible for remedying a defect in real property makes assurances or representations that the defect will be repaired, that party may be estopped from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense if the injured party reasonably and detrimentally relied on the assurances or representations. Hydra-Mac, Inc. v. Onan Corp., 450 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Minn. 1990); Mutual Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Galaxy Builders, Inc., 435 N.W.2d 136, 140—41 (Minn.App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 1989). “Estoppel depends on the facts of each case and ordinarily presents a question for the jury.” Brenner v. Nordby, 306 N.W.2d 126, 127 (Minn. 1981). The application of equitable estoppel is a question of fact unless only one inference can be drawn from the facts. Rice St. VFW, Post 3877 v. City of St. Paul, 452 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Minn.App. 1990). We hold that the facts here do not compel only a single inference but rather present a genuine issue of whether or not Golden is equitably estopped from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense. Summary judgment on this issue was inappropriate.
The district court’s relied on The Rivers v. Richard Schwartz/Neil Weber, 459 N.W.2d 166, 170 (Minn.App. 1990), review denied (Oct. 25, 1990), in granting the summary judgment motion. Such reliance is misplaced because in that matter the facts did not support the application of equitable estoppel. As to some of the parties there was no evidence that any assurances had been given. Id. at 170. As to the remaining party, there had been an assurance that repairs would be made but then five years elapsed with continuing defects but without further assurances or repair efforts. Id. Here, it is undisputed that Golden made repeated assurances and repair efforts from the time the Rhees discovered the defect until a few months before they filed the lawsuit.
New Statute of Limitations Period
The Rhees contend that some of Golden’s work after discovery of the leakage amounted to improvements rather than repairs and any improvement would trigger a new statute of limitations period under Minn.Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1 (1996). The district court ruled that the “repairs” done between 1996 and 1998 did not start the running of a new limitations period. Implicit in the court’s conclusion is a factual finding that all of the work was repairs rather than improvements. Summary judgment
should be employed only where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved, and that it is not desirable nor necessary to inquire into facts which might clarify the application of the law.
Donnay v. Boulware, 275 Minn. 37, 45, 144 N.W.2d 711, 716 (1966) (citation omitted). We hold that there exist genuine issues of material fact as to the proper characterization of the remedies attempted by Golden and Henderson. Summary judgment was inappropriate on this issue.
*623 DECISION
The district court abused its discretion by allowing an amendment of an answer without requiring prior notice and an opportunity for the opposing party to prepare to respond.
The district court erred by granting summary judgment when genuine issues of material fact exist as to the applicability of equitable estoppel and the distinction between repairs and improvements.
Reversed and remanded.
Continue your research
- Minnesota cases applying equitable estoppel to defeat statute-of-limitations defenses based on repair assurances
- Cases distinguishing repairs from improvements under Minn. Stat. § 541.051 and their effect on new limitations periods
- Secondary sources on Minnesota motion practice, late amendments to pleadings, and Gen. R.P. 115.04 notice compliance
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.