State of Minnesota v. Ali Mehralian
Minnesota Court of Appeals
State of Minnesota v. Ali Mehralian
Opinion
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-2201
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Ali Mehralian,
Appellant.
Filed September 8, 2014
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19WS-CR-13-10734
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
William L. Bernard, Grannis & Hauge, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, F. Richard Gallo, Jr., Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
KIRK, Judge
On appeal from his conviction of unlawful ouster, fifth-degree assault, and
emergency escape and rescue, appellant argues that he was deprived of the effective
assistance of his trial counsel. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 1, 2013, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Ali
Mehralian with unlawful ouster, fifth-degree assault, theft by swindle, emergency escape
and rescue, and disorderly conduct. The charges stemmed from a confrontation between
appellant and F.C., who claimed to be renting the basement of appellant’s home in Eagan,
on May 27, 2013. F.C. alleged that appellant attempted to strike him in the face and
locked him out of appellant’s townhouse.
During the jury trial, F.C. testified that in February 2013 he entered into an
agreement with appellant to rent out the basement of appellant’s townhouse for $450 per
month on a month-to-month basis, and he paid appellant the first and last month of rent.
Appellant denied that F.C. was living in the basement of his townhouse, gave him money
for rent, or possessed a key to his home. Instead, appellant testified that he allowed F.C.
to park his car in the guest parking lot outside his townhouse and store some of his
possessions in his basement. The jury found appellant guilty of unlawful ouster, fifth-
2
degree assault, and emergency escape and rescue, but not guilty of theft by swindle.1
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Minnesota appellate courts examine ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under
the two-prong approach set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984). State v. Rhodes,657 N.W.2d 823, 842
(Minn. 2003). “To prevail on such a claim, an appellant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.”Id.
(quotations omitted). The appellant has the burden of proof on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. State v. Miller,666 N.W.2d 703, 716
(Minn. 2003). We need not examine both prongs of the Strickland test if one prong is determinative. Rhodes,657 N.W.2d at 842
.
An objective standard of reasonableness “is defined as representation by an
attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent
attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414,
420-21(Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). “There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.” Miller,666 N.W.2d at 716
(quotation omitted). Appellate courts generally will not review ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claims that are based on trial strategy. State v. Vang,847 N.W.2d 248, 267
(Minn. 2014). Trial strategy “includes the extent of counsel’s investigation and the selection of evidence presented to the jury.”Id.
1
The district court dismissed the disorderly conduct count during the trial.
3
Appellant argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel
because his counsel did not try to acquire an alleged exculpatory document or elicit
testimony about the document. He contends that a reasonably competent attorney would
have attempted to obtain the evidence.
Here, the district court discussed the alleged document with the parties during the
trial after a short recess where appellant’s counsel spoke with appellant about his right to
testify. Appellant’s counsel reported to the district court that she attempted to discuss
appellant’s right to testify with him, but he refused to have that conversation. Instead,
she reported that appellant insisted that she obtain the document. Appellant’s counsel
stated that she told appellant that she made a timely discovery request, and the state
properly provided her with discovery. Appellant, however, remained “emphatic [and]
persistent with respect to this document.”
The district court asked appellant to describe the contents of the document he was
requesting, and appellant explained that in a separate eviction case against F.C., the
district court referred in its order to a document that contained “exculpatory statements
individually made by [F.C.] admitting that he was leasing this place for storage only and
he will be moving out by the end of April.” Appellant argued that the prosecutor had not
provided the document through discovery. Appellant provided the district court with a
copy of the district court’s order in the eviction case, and the district court reviewed the
order. The district court stated on the record that the district court judge in the eviction
case handwrote the following statement in the order: “[T]he [c]ourt has significant
questions about the credibility of the parties in this case. The only, quote, proof, close
4
quote, the [c]ourt has was a written agreement by [F.C.] to vacate the property at the end
of April. He did not.”
Appellant’s counsel explained to the district court that appellant asked her before
the trial to go to the courthouse to obtain certain documents, and she did as he requested.
She picked up several documents, including the district court order in question, but when
she met with appellant, he refused to read the file or discuss the documents with her.
Based on her training and the defense she was asserting, she determined that the
document was not relevant to the case. The district court told appellant that the document
was only relevant if he chose to testify, and the only way the information in the document
could be admitted was through testimony.
We conclude that appellant has not demonstrated that his trial counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Appellant’s counsel
timely requested discovery from the state and attempted to review that discovery with
appellant. When appellant requested that his counsel obtain additional documents, she
attempted to obtain all of the requested documents. The exact location and contents of
the document that appellant sought are unclear from the record. Appellant’s counsel’s
decision not to investigate the existence of the document any further or to introduce the
district court’s eviction order into evidence are matters of trial strategy, which we
generally do not review. See Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 267.
Moreover, the jury heard evidence of appellant’s version of the events, and its
verdict indicates that it found F.C.’s version of events to be more credible. The district
court also admitted the eviction complaint into evidence, which included several of
5
appellant’s references to F.C. as a squatter. F.C. testified extensively about the incident
and his lease agreement with appellant, and his testimony was supported by the testimony
of appellant’s ex-wife and the police officer who responded to the May 27 incident, and
the photographs of F.C.’s belongings in appellant’s basement. Appellant has not shown
that if the document he sought had been admitted at trial it would have changed the
outcome of the case. See Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d at 842.
Therefore, appellant has not established that he was deprived of the effective
assistance of trial counsel.
Affirmed.
6
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished