Shannon Hollie v. Lucinda E. Jesson, Commissioner of Department of Human Services
Minnesota Court of Appeals
Shannon Hollie v. Lucinda E. Jesson, Commissioner of Department of Human Services
Opinion
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0314
Shannon Hollie, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Lucinda E. Jesson,
Commissioner of Department of Human Services, et al.,
Respondents.
Filed September 15, 2014
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge
Carlton County District Court
File No. 90-CV-13-2210
Shannon D. Hollie, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Anthony R. Noss, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Raising issues concerning conditional release and predatory-offender registration,
appellant challenges the district court’s summary denial of his habeas-corpus petition. We
affirm.
FACTS
In November 1989, appellant Shannon Hollie pleaded guilty to second- and third-
degree criminal sexual conduct, and he received two concurrent sentences of 30 months’
imprisonment. In September 1993, a jury found Hollie guilty of first-degree attempted
murder and first-degree burglary, and he received a sentence of 240 months’
imprisonment. Hollie challenged his 1993 conviction, arguing that his burglary
conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and that the district court erred by
admitting prior-conviction evidence. This court affirmed in an order opinion. State v.
Hollie, No. C5-93-2584 (Minn. App. Sept. 22, 1994). Hollie filed postconviction-relief
petitions in January 2002, January 2006, and August 2007, and the district court denied
each petition.
In February 2009, the district court indeterminately committed Hollie to the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) as a Sexual Psychopathic Personality (SPP)
and Sexually Dangerous Person (SDP). This court affirmed Hollie’s commitment. In re
Civil Commitment of Hollie, No. A09-0579, 2009 WL 2596071, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 25, 2009), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009), cert. denied,560 U.S. 916
(2010).
In January 2010, Hollie filed a fourth postconviction-relief petition, arguing that
his 1989 conviction was impermissibly considered as a factor in (1) “enhanc[ing]” his
ten-year conditional-release period and (2) subjecting him to predatory-offender
registration. The district court denied the petition, and this court affirmed in an order
opinion. Hollie v. State, No. A10-1369 (Minn. App. Apr. 1, 2011), review denied (Minn.
June 14, 2011).
2
In October 2011, Hollie petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court. The federal court construed the petition as challenging Hollie’s 1989 and 1993
convictions and sentences, including a ten-year conditional-release term that “was part of
[his] 1993 sentence.” Hollie v. Jesson, CIV. 11-3147 PJS/JJG, 2011 WL 6122315, at *1– 2 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, CIV. 11-3147 PJS/JJG,2011 WL 6122306
(D. Minn. Dec. 8, 2011). Concerning Hollie’s 1989
conviction and sentence and conditional-release challenge, the court denied Hollie relief
on the basis that any “collateral consequence[]” that he might have been experiencing
from that conviction and sentence “[did] not cause him to . . . be ‘in custody’ for his 1989
case for purposes of § 2254(a).” Id. at *3. Concerning Hollie’s ten-year conditional-
release term imposed in connection with his 1993 conviction and sentence, the court
concluded that, if he had not yet completed the conditional-release term, for federal
habeas purposes, he was still considered to be in custody for that case. Id. But the court
summarily dismissed Hollie’s petition without prejudice because it was his second
federal habeas-corpus petition and he failed to seek pre-authorization from the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals before filing it. Id. at *3–4.
In October 2013, Hollie petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in Minnesota state
court and filed a supporting affidavit. Respondent Minnesota Commissioner of Human
Services opposed the petition, and Hollie filed a reply. The district court summarily
denied Hollie’s petition.
This appeal follows.
3
DECISION
The district court denied Hollie’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, reasoning in
part that Hollie failed to show that he was being detained illegally; his challenges to his
conditional-release term and registration requirement are not constitutional attacks on his
civil commitment; he may not use the habeas-corpus process to collaterally attack his
sentence; and the prohibition against ex-post-facto laws does not apply to Hollie’s
registration requirement because the requirement is not punitive. Hollie argues that the
district court erred by summarily denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Appellate courts may affirm a petition’s denial when, “on its face, [it fails to] present[] a
case for issuing a writ of habeas corpus.” State ex rel. Nelson v. Rigg, 259 Minn. 375,
375,107 N.W.2d 378, 379
(1961).
A writ of habeas corpus is a statutory civil remedy available “to obtain relief from
[unlawful] imprisonment or restraint.” Minn. Stat. § 589.01(2012). It is an “extraordinary remedy.” State ex rel. Rajala v. Rigg,257 Minn. 372, 381
,101 N.W.2d 608, 614
(1960) (quotation omitted). “Committed persons may challenge the legality of their commitment through habeas corpus.” Joelson v. O’Keefe,594 N.W.2d 905, 908
(Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. July 28, 1999); see Minn. Stat. § 253B.23, subd. 5 (2012) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to abridge the right of any person to the writ of habeas corpus.”). “But the only issues the district court will consider are constitutional and jurisdictional challenges.” Joelson,594 N.W.2d at 908
; see also Beaulieu v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs.,798 N.W.2d 542
, 547−48 (Minn. App. 2011)
(stating that “the supreme court regards habeas as a remedy only for a jurisdictional
4
defect or a constitutional violation” and that “[t]he supreme court has refrained from
expanding the scope of the writ of habeas corpus to encompass statutory violations that
give rise to unlawful restraint”), aff’d, 825 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2013).
The petitioner “bears the burden of proof of showing the illegality of his
detention.” Breeding v. Swenson, 240 Minn. 93, 97,60 N.W.2d 4, 7
(1953). The district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing unless the “petition alleges any facts which, if proved, would entitle the petitioner to relief.” State ex rel. Roy v. Tahash,277 Minn. 238, 245
,152 N.W.2d 301, 306
(1967). “[H]abeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for a writ of error or appeal or as a cover for a collateral attack upon a judgment of a competent tribunal which had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of the defendant.” State ex rel. Thomas v. Rigg,255 Minn. 227, 234
,96 N.W.2d 252, 257
(1959). “[A]ppellants are not entitled to obtain review of an issue previously raised.” Joelson,594 N.W.2d at 908
.
Construing Hollie’s petition in light of his affidavit and reply, Hollie argues that
his conditional-release term and predatory-offender-registration requirement violate his
due-process rights because they violate his constitutional rights to be free from ex-post-
facto laws. Gleaning what we can from the scant record before us, the district court’s
2010 order and our 2010 order opinion suggest that Hollie is presently subject to a ten-
year conditional-release term and a predatory-offender-registration requirement due to his
1989 criminal-sexual-conduct convictions and his 1993 first-degree attempted-murder
and first-degree-burglary convictions.
5
We conclude that Hollie’s claims are procedurally barred because he could have
raised them through other legal means, specifically his prior postconviction-relief
petitions. In fact, in affirming the district court’s denial of Hollie’s fourth postconviction-
relief petition in our April 2011 order opinion, we concluded that Hollie’s failure to raise
his claims in his third petition was “inexcusable.” Hollie, No. A10-1369; see State ex rel.
Butler v. Swenson, 243 Minn. 24, 29,66 N.W.2d 1, 4
(1954) (“Questions which should be . . . reviewed through some other regular legal procedure have no place in a habeas corpus proceeding.”); see also Kelsey v. State,283 N.W.2d 892
, 893–94 (Minn. 1979)
(disapproving of “attempt . . . to use habeas corpus as a means of obtaining review of trial
errors,” reasoning that “[d]irect appeal and the postconviction remedy . . . are available
for that purpose” and, therefore, “the need for another means of raising the claim of trial
error is . . . not apparent”).
Hollie argues that we should not affirm the district court on the ground that his
claims are procedurally barred because the district court did not rely on it. We reject
Hollie’s argument. “We may affirm the district court on any ground, including one not
relied on by the district court.” State v. Fellegy, 819 N.W.2d 700, 707(Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2012); see Kafka v. O’Malley,221 Minn. 490, 499
,22 N.W.2d 845, 849
(1946) (noting that a “decision in [respondent’s] favor may be
predicated upon any ground appearing as a matter of law in the record”). Hollie asks us to
review his arguments in the interest of justice. We “may review any . . . matter as the
interest of justice may require.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04. But Hollie raised identical
claims in his fourth postconviction-relief petition, and, when we affirmed the district
6
court’s summary denial of it, we reasoned that he “failed to ‘assert any sufficient reason
why [it] is in the interests of justice to hear his highly untimely petition.’” Hollie, No.
A10-1369. Likewise, we now observe no sufficient reason to review the summary denial
of Hollie’s procedurally barred habeas-corpus petition.
Affirmed.
7
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished