In re the Marriage of: Anita Joan Rakow v. Gary Arnold Rakow, Jr.
Minnesota Court of Appeals
In re the Marriage of: Anita Joan Rakow v. Gary Arnold Rakow, Jr.
Opinion
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0281
In re the Marriage of:
Anita Joan Rakow, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Gary Arnold Rakow, Jr.,
Respondent.
Filed December 8, 2014
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge
Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-FA-12-161
Steven A. Sicheneder, Johnson/Turner, P.A., Forest Lake, Minnesota (for appellant)
Mary A. Pfeifer, Appelhof, Pfeifer & Hart, P.A., Oakdale, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Smith,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
In this marital-dissolution dispute, appellant argues that the district court abused
its discretion by reserving spousal maintenance without a current award. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Anita Joan Rakow (wife) and respondent Gary Arnold Rakow Jr.
(husband) married on August 8, 2001, and separated on November 28, 2011. Wife
petitioned for marriage dissolution in the spring of 2012, seeking an award of permanent
spousal maintenance.
Both parties were employed outside of the home during the marriage. In June
2007, wife suffered a work-related back injury for which she received a workers’
compensation lump-sum settlement of $34,000 after attorney fees and taxes in late 2009.
Wife was last employed in August 2012 and began receiving social security disability
benefits in November 2012, based on a finding that she had “severe impairments” of
“Multi-level Degenerative Disk Disease and Depression,” as of May 1, 2012. Wife’s
disability determination “must be reviewed at least once every 3 years.” After a trial, the
district court dissolved the parties’ marriage, divided their property, and reserved
husband’s spousal-maintenance obligation to wife, finding that “a reservation of spousal
maintenance is appropriate at this time . . . due to [the court’s] disproportionate award of
personal property and motor vehicle value to [wife], as well as its award of [husband’s]
Thrift Savings Plan to [wife].”
The court denied wife’s posttrial motion for amended findings of fact and
conclusions of law, finding, among other things, “no basis to amend the reservation of
spousal maintenance to [wife].”
This appeal follows.
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DECISION
“The standard of review on appeal from a district court’s determination of a
maintenance award is whether the district court abused its discretion.” Gales v. Gales,
553 N.W.2d 416, 418(Minn. 1996). “[District courts have] broad discretion in deciding whether to award maintenance and before an appellate court determines that there has been a clear abuse of that discretion, it must determine that there must be a clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record.” Dobrin v. Dobrin,569 N.W.2d 199, 202
(Minn. 1997). And “[d]istrict courts are vested with broad discretion to determine whether to reserve maintenance.” Haefele v. Haefele,621 N.W.2d 758, 766
(Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001).
Spousal maintenance is defined as “an award made in a dissolution . . . proceeding
of payments from the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support and
maintenance of the other.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2012). A district court
may grant a maintenance order for either spouse if it finds
that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) lacks sufficient property, including marital
property apportioned to the spouse, to provide for reasonable
needs of the spouse considering the standard of living
established during the marriage, especially, but not limited to,
a period of training or education, or
(b) is unable to provide adequate self-support, after
considering the standard of living established during the
marriage and all relevant circumstances, through appropriate
employment . . . .
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2012). “The [maintenance] statute lists eight non- exclusive factors for courts to consider when crafting maintenance orders . . . .” Lee v. Lee,775 N.W.2d 631, 636
(Minn. 2009); seeMinn. Stat. § 518.552
, subd. 2 (2012).
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“[N]o single statutory factor for determining the type or amount of maintenance is
dispositive.” Broms v. Broms, 353 N.W.2d 135, 138(Minn. 1984). “[E]ach marital dissolution proceeding is unique and centers upon the individualized facts and circumstances of the parties . . . .” Dobrin,569 N.W.2d at 201
. A district court must balance the financial needs of the spouse seeking maintenance and his or her ability to meet those needs against the financial condition of the spouse from whom the maintenance is sought. See Erlandson v. Erlandson,318 N.W.2d 36
, 39–40 (Minn. 1982)
(“[T]he issue is basically the financial needs of [the spouse seeking maintenance] and [his
or] her ability to meet those needs balanced against the financial condition of [the spouse
from whom maintenance is sought.]”).
Here, the district court heard testimony from wife, her father, husband, his mother,
and his friend during the parties’ dissolution trial. The court also received 93 exhibits
spanning more than 1,000 pages. At the time of trial, wife was being treated for her back
condition and planned to move forward with back surgery “in the next couple months.”
Wife testified that she could supplement her social security income but had not been
released by her doctor to work and would have work restrictions—she could work no
more than ten hours per week with “no lifting, squatting, bending, twisting” and could
not sit or stand for prolonged periods. Wife testified that she had not worked at all since
August 2012. The court found that wife “was not a homemaker during the marriage” and
further found:
There was no evidence that any loss of earnings, seniority,
retirement benefits, or other employment opportunities were
forgone by either party. While the SSA has determined that
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[wife] is currently disabled (a determination that is to be
reviewed at least once every three years), this disability is the
result of a work injury and not a result of [wife] choosing to
forego earnings, seniority, retirement benefits, or other
employment opportunities. Both parties worked throughout
the marriage.
As to the parties’ standard of living during their marriage, the district court found
that
[t]he parties had a reasonable and modest standard of living
during the marriage. They acquired a home, motor vehicles,
recreational vehicles, and household furnishings as needed.
However, to obtain these items of property they did incur
mortgage debt, loans, and credit card debt. It appears that they
may have lived beyond their means at times during the
marriage.
The district court found that wife’s monthly income is $1,373 and her reasonable
monthly expenses total $3,108. The court recognized that wife “does not have sufficient
income to meet her expenses, although the evidence is clear that she can supplement her
social security [disability] income with employment.” And the court noted that wife’s
planned “back surgery within a couple months . . . may alleviate some of her pain and her
work restrictions may be lessened,” and that her employment history includes working
with children with disabilities and working as a Store Manager for Dollar General. The
district court found that “[f]ollowing the dissolution [husband]’s net monthly income will
be $5,108.55 and his reasonable monthly expenses will total $5,146.68. He therefore will
not have the ability to meet his needs while also meeting those of [wife].” The court
recognized that “[husband]’s future monthly expenses may decrease in some fashion.”
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The district court’s findings reveal that the parties’ homestead has a negative net
equity of $68,087.14. The court ordered husband to be solely liable for that debt because
of his better ability to pay it. The court awarded wife approximately 85% of the personal
property and husband 15%, concluding that the division is equitable based on the parties’
respective incomes, wife’s disability status and work restrictions, and the reservation of
spousal maintenance. The court awarded wife $14,575 in motor-vehicle value and
awarded no value in motor vehicles to husband. The court awarded wife one-half of the
marital portion of husband’s pension and husband’s entire employment-based Thrift
Savings Plan in the amount of $23,375.11. The court specifically awarded the Thrift
Savings Plan to wife as a property settlement, not as spousal maintenance, finding that
the disproportionate award of the marital asset to wife is equitable due to her current
disability status, work restrictions, and income.
Although wife makes conclusory assertions that the district court’s “factual
findings are not supported by the evidence,” she fails to identify a single finding that is
unsupported by record evidence. Indeed, wife appears to accept the court’s findings but
insists that they support a current award of permanent maintenance. Similarly, wife
asserts that the court “did not complete an analysis on how the various [statutory] factors
provided for a reservation of spousal maintenance” and that the court’s “decision is
contrary to law.” Yet wife acknowledges that “the district court made findings as
required” by the maintenance statute; recounts the court’s factor-by-factor findings
without specific critique; and, by complaining that the court “allowed [husband’s
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inability to meet his own reasonable needs] to be the deciding factor,” recognizes that the
court weighed its findings against one another in reaching its ultimate conclusion.
In considering wife’s arguments, we note that the district court’s factual findings
are thorough and amply supported by testimony and exhibits in the record. The district
court properly and painstakingly applied the statutory factors set forth in Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 1, to the unique facts in this case before concluding that, on balance, a
reservation of spousal maintenance—coupled with a property division that
overwhelmingly favors wife—is fair and equitable. The court’s conclusion is not against
logic or the facts on record and therefore is not clearly erroneous.
That a spouse who cannot meet his or her own reasonable needs should not be
ordered to pay maintenance is supported by caselaw. See Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d
353, 358(Minn. App. 2004) (“A finding of a maintenance obligor’s ability to pay maintenance is required to support an award of maintenance.” (citing Stich v. Stich,435 N.W.2d 52, 53
(Minn. 1989))); Larson v. Larson,383 N.W.2d 18, 20
(Minn. App. 1986) (stating that “it is not feasible to burden [the husband] with a maintenance obligation at the present time” since “[his] monthly expenses exceed his income by more than $400”); but see Ganyo v. Engen,446 N.W.2d 683, 687
(Minn. App. 1989) (“recogniz[ing] that the evidence indicates [the husband] would need $3174, $201 more than he actually earns, to cover $1745 in personal expenses, maintenance of $900, and debt of $529” but concluding that “trial court’s determination that this level of maintenance is appropriate, given all the circumstances of the case, is not an abuse of discretion”); Justis v. Justis,384 N.W.2d 885, 886
, 891–92 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that “[i]t is evident, under the
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circumstances, that [the husband]’s income is insufficient to meet the total needs of [the
wife], the [five marital] children and himself” but concluding that “trial court did not
abuse its discretion in setting maintenance”), review denied (Minn. May 29, 1986).
A “[r]eservation [of maintenance] allows the court to later assess and address
future changes in one party’s situation as those changes arise, without prematurely
burdening the other party.” Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 703(Minn. App. 2001). Reservation may be particularly appropriate where the circumstances of the spouse seeking maintenance, the spouse from whom maintenance is sought, or both, are likely to change in the foreseeable future. See, e.g., Fastner v. Fastner,427 N.W.2d 691, 700
(Minn. App. 1988) (concluding that “the health problems of both parties compel at least
the reservation of maintenance for both parties” so that “the trial court will be in a better
position to later assess and address the impact of future changes in the parties’ health
which affect their ability to support themselves”).
In Larson, as in this case, the wife appealed the district court’s reservation of
maintenance without a current award. 383 N.W.2d at 19. The wife was an unemployed mother of two and a full-time student whose only source of income was $524 per month in AFDC benefits, while the husband was employed part time as a letter carrier and also earned some money playing in a band.Id.
Nevertheless, this court affirmed the district
court’s reservation of maintenance without a current award, reasoning in part as follows:
[T]he record shows that [the husband]’s monthly expenses
exceed his income by more than $400. Given [the husband]’s
present financial situation, it is not feasible to burden him
with a maintenance obligation at the present time. Yet, by
retaining jurisdiction over the matter, the court will be able to
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provide [the wife] with some maintenance if and when [the
husband]’s income increases or his expenses decrease. The
trial court’s determination does not involve any clearly
erroneous conclusions that are against logic and the facts on
record.
Id. at 20–21.
In this case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
reserving the issue of husband’s spousal-maintenance obligation.
Affirmed.
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Reference
- Status
- Unpublished