State of Minnesota v. Daniel John Mechtel
Minnesota Court of Appeals
State of Minnesota v. Daniel John Mechtel
Opinion
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0989
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Daniel John Mechtel,
Appellant.
Filed December 27, 2016
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge
Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-15-869
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Annie Claesson-Huseby, Beltrami County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his sentence and the amended warrant of commitment
committing him to 60 months in prison on the ground that the district court lacked authority
to amend appellant’s sentence. Because the amended warrant of commitment was merely
a correction of a clerical error on the original warrant of commitment, and because the
district court did not change appellant’s sentence, we affirm.1
FACTS
In March 2015, appellant Daniel Mechtel was charged with being an ineligible
person in possession of a firearm after ammunition was found in his home, a shotgun was
found in his garage, and a rifle was found in his vehicle. A jury found him guilty as
charged.
Appellant’s presentence investigation (PSI) stated that:
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES REVIEW:
According to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, on Possess
Pistol/Assault Weapon-Conviction or Adjudicated Delinquent
for Crimes of Violence is a severity level 6 offense, and with a
criminal history score of 1, recommends an executed sentence
of 60 months.
RECOMMENDATION:
It is respectfully recommended that the defendant be
committed to the Commissioner of Corrections for a period of
60 months with 40 months served in prison and 20 months
served on supervised release . . . .
1
Because respondent State of Minnesota did not file a brief, this matter proceeded under
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03 (providing that, if respondent does not file a brief, the case
shall be determined on the merits.)
2
At the sentencing hearing, the district court, counsel for both appellant and the state,
and appellant agreed that the mandatory sentence for his offense was 60 months, as
recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines and on the PSI. Appellant’s counsel said he
and appellant had gone over the PSI; when asked if he had any corrections to it, he said,
“There are a few dates that are incorrect, but nothing significant.” Counsel for the state,
when asked for any recommendations, said the 60-months recommendation on the PSI was
“a recommendation that the legislature has . . . created for [the state] and, unfortunately, I
think for the Court” and added that the state had “no alternate recommendations from the
60 month mandatory commit set forth in [the PSI].” No one at the sentencing hearing
challenged the 60-month sentence or recommended a lesser sentence, although the state’s
counsel expressed hope that appellant “can get through some programming that will allow
him to secure an early release and we’ll welcome him back into the community.”
Appellant said, “[T]here should be some changes in the law . . . because of the fact that I’m
not a hardened criminal,” but he did not dispute that 60 months was the legal sentence and
said “you’re just doing what it says by the guidelines.”
The district court then imposed the sentence, saying, “[I]t is a 60 month sentence
with 40 months in prison with good time and 20 months on conditional release provided
that there are no disciplinary infractions in prison” and added, “[The s]tatutory minimum
fine and surcharge and law library fee would be sent to collections.” Appellant then asked
about the amount in question: “How much is it going to be?” The district court, thinking
appellant was asking how much time he would have to spend in prison, answered, “Forty
months.” The misunderstanding was soon clarified: appellant asked, “Forty?”; the district
3
court answered, “Yeah”; appellant again asked, “Forty bucks?”; the district court repeated,
“Forty months,” then realized what appellant really wanted to know and said, “Oh, a 50
dollar fine plus the fees.” Appellant repeated, “Oh, a $50 dollar fine” and explained,
“That’s what I was asking.” The district court said there was nothing to be done about the
fine, and appellant replied, “I just don’t want it sitting there. I don’t owe [the c]ounty a
dime on my—when I was in jail here . . . .”
Although it was undisputed that appellant had been sentenced to 60 months, the
warrant of commitment issued the same day committed him to the commissioner of
corrections for 40 months. This disparity came to the attention of the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission (MSGC) six months later: it noticed that appellant’s
presumptive guideline sentence was 60 months, he had been committed for 40 months, and
no report had been filed on this departure from the guidelines. MSGC therefore requested
a report, asking the district court to indicate on a printed form whether there had been a
departure, to give the reason if there had been, and to explain how the discrepancy occurred
if there had not been a departure.
On the form, the district court checked the box that preceded “Sentencing
information listed above is incorrect” and, after the words, “The correct pronounced
sentence is:” wrote “60 mos. Corrected today in amended commitment order.” An
Amended Warrant of Commitment was issued committing appellant to the commissioner
of corrections for 60 months.
Appellant challenges the amended commitment order, arguing that the district court
lacked authority to amend his sentence.
4
DECISION
This court reviews de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to correct clerical
errors. See Brazinsky v. Brazinsky, 610 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Minn. App. 2000).
If there is a discrepancy between the oral and written sentences that is attributable
to clerical error, the district court may correct it at any time. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd.
10. A clerical error
ordinarily is apparent upon the face of the record and capable
of being corrected by reference to the record only. It is usually
a mistake in the clerical work of transcribing the particular
record. It is usually one of form. It may be made by a clerk,
by counsel, or by the court. A clerical error in reference to an
order for judgment or judgment, as regards correction, includes
one made by the court which cannot reasonably be attributed
to the exercise of judicial consideration or discretion.
Wilson v. City of Fergus Falls, 181 Minn. 329, 332,232 N.W. 322, 323
(1930). Here, the
clerical error occurred when “40” instead of “60” was written at the bottom of the first page
and the top of the second page on the warrant of commitment, which the district court then
signed. But the “40 months” written in error could not have been “attributed to the exercise
of judicial consideration or discretion”; the district court orally imposed the mandatory 60-
month sentence.
“‘[A]n orally pronounced sentence controls over a [written] judgment and
commitment order when the two conflict.’” State v. Staloch, 643 N.W.2d 329, 331(Minn. App. 2002) (quoting United States v. Villano,816 F.2d 1448, 1450
(10th Cir. 1987)). Thus,
appellant’s oral 60-month sentence prevails over the 40-month sentence on the
commitment order.
5
Staloch also holds that a district court “cannot later impose a more severe sentence
under the guise of making a clerical correction.” Id. at 332 (emphasis added). Appellant
takes the italicized language out of context to argue that the district court here could not
impose a more severe sentence after the original warrant committed him for 40 months.
But Staloch is distinguishable. It concerned the conflict between an oral pronouncement
that 75 days of a 105-day sentence were stayed and a written order imposing on the stay
the condition that the defendant obey all laws for one year. Id. at 330. Based on the written
order, the defendant was charged with probation violation. Id. He appealed on the ground
that he was not on probation because no conditions had been imposed in the oral sentence,
and this court agreed, noting that “the oral pronouncement controls.” Id. at 332. But here,
there was a clerical error: the written commitment order had to be amended to conform to
the oral sentence.
Appellant also relies on Pageau v. State, 820 N.W.2d 271, 277(Minn. App. 2012), but that case is also distinguishable. It concerned whether a defendant’s probationary periods were concurrent or consecutive.Id. at 273
. The district court said it had intended to impose “probation for two consecutive three year terms.”Id. at 274
. This court wrote, “Although we conclude that the sentence is ambiguous, we are not persuaded that it is appropriate to rely on judicial intent to resolve the ambiguity in this case.”Id. at 277
.
Appellant argues that the district court’s intent when it pronounced a 60-month sentence
should be similarly irrelevant in resolving the ambiguity here. But the sentence in Pageau
was inherently ambiguous: nothing in the district court’s oral pronouncement indicated
6
whether the probation terms were or were not consecutive. Here, the oral pronouncement
was clear: appellant was sentenced to 60 months in prison.
Affirmed.
7
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished