State of Minnesota v. Damien Kent Hallmon
Minnesota Court of Appeals
State of Minnesota v. Damien Kent Hallmon
Opinion
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0015
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Damien Kent Hallmon,
Appellant.
Filed December 27, 2016
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reyes, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-23354
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of first-degree aggravated robbery, felon-in-
possession of a firearm, and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. He argues
that (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress physical evidence;
(2) the district court committed reversible error in admitting Spreigl evidence of his prior
bad acts; (3) there was insufficient evidence to convict him; and (4) he was sentenced
improperly. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
The challenged convictions stem from a series of events incident to a June 2014
drug sale between appellant Damien Kent Hallmon, the seller, and Z.G., the buyer.
Appellant and Z.G. were acquainted prior to the sale, as appellant had sold drugs to Z.G.
on a number of occasions. On this particular day, Z.G. received a ride from a friend,
D.B., to a park in south Minneapolis. Z.G. had been drinking heavily before arriving at
the park and was inebriated.
Z.G. testified that, upon meeting appellant in the park, appellant pulled a Walther
9mm handgun from his pocket, and two unidentified men accompanying appellant
punched Z.G. and robbed him while appellant held Z.G. at gunpoint. Conversely,
appellant testified that Z.G. was the aggressor, stating that after appellant told Z.G. he did
not have any marijuana to sell, Z.G. pulled the gun on appellant, and demanded he hand
over everything in his possession. Both men testified that they attempted to take the gun
from the other man. In the ensuing struggle, the gun went off three times. Z.G. testified
that the two unidentified men fled when the gun went off. Appellant was hit twice in the
arm, and Z.G. was grazed behind his ear. Appellant also suffered a broken arm in the
struggle.
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At the conclusion of the struggle, Z.G. possessed the gun. At this point, Z.G.
either offered or agreed to take appellant to a nearby hospital, and D.B. drove them both.
Z.G. testified that, on the way to the hospital, he removed the magazine from the gun and
gave the entire magazine and the unfired bullet from the chamber to appellant as a
pacifying gesture. Appellant, on the other hand, testified that Z.G. dumped all of the
bullets on the ground outside the hospital, and appellant picked up one of the bullets and
put it in his pocket hoping that fingerprints on the bullet would help the police to identify
Z.G. if appellant did not survive. After dropping appellant off at the emergency room for
treatment, D.B. and Z.G. drove away.
At the hospital, medical personnel removed appellant’s bloody clothing to treat his
wounds. In response to the hospital’s notification that a patient with a gunshot wound
was seeking treatment, a Minneapolis police officer entered appellant’s room. As
medical personnel continued to treat appellant, hospital staff collected his clothing and
placed it into paper bags. While a staff member was handling appellant’s pants, an
unfired 9mm bullet and two bags of marijuana fell from appellant’s pants onto the floor.
After all of appellant’s clothes were bagged, the officer took possession of the bags and
transported them to the Minneapolis Police Department property room. A subsequent
search by the property-room clerk revealed several bags of cocaine.
Neither Z.G. nor D.B. notified the police of the incident. Instead, shortly after
dropping appellant off at the hospital, Z.G. asked D.B. for a ride to St. Paul. In St. Paul,
Z.G. used the gun as collateral in lieu of money to acquire methamphetamine. Between
one day and one week later, after describing the events to his girlfriend, Z.G. bought the
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gun back. Z.G.’s girlfriend shared the story with a friend, who contacted the police. Two
weeks after the incident, Z.G. met with the police and turned over the gun. When the
police tested the gun for DNA, both the trigger and grip returned results from at least four
individuals, and appellant and Z.G. could not be excluded from contributors.
A jury found appellant guilty of one count each of first-degree aggravated robbery,
felon-in-possession of a firearm, and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance.
The district court sentenced appellant to 129 months in prison for the aggravated-robbery
conviction, with concurrent sentences of 60 months and 36 months for the felon-in-
possession and controlled-substance convictions, respectively. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by denying appellant’s motion to suppress
evidence of the cocaine.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the
cocaine found in his pants based on an inventory search. We disagree.
When reviewing a district court’s order on a motion to suppress evidence, we
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d
496, 502(Minn. 2008). However, we review whether the facts support the district court’s decision to suppress evidence de novo.Id.
The district court found that the cocaine was not discovered until after the police
seized appellant’s bloody pants and performed a subsequent search in the police property
room. This factual finding is adequately supported by testimony in the record and is not
4
clearly erroneous. Based on this factual finding, the district court determined that the
property clerk’s search was valid under the inventory-search exception.
It is uncontested that the police at no point obtained a warrant to search appellant’s
pants. Generally, under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable.” Id.However, inventory searches are a “well-defined exception to the warrant requirement” that “serve to protect an owner[’]s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.”Id.
(quotations omitted). The state bears the burden of demonstrating that the inventory-search exception applies to a warrantless search.Id.
As a threshold matter, appellant argues that this exception only applies to vehicles.
We disagree. Examples of the application of the inventory-search exception include
police inventories of impounded vehicles as well as administrative inventory searches
incident to booking or jailing. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647,103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610
(1983) (drawing parallel between inventory search of impounded vehicle and inventory search incident to booking based on legitimate governmental interests served); State v. Rodewald,376 N.W.2d 416
, 420–21 (Minn. 1985) (applying Lafayette to search
of wallet incident to booking). Therefore, we analyze the validity of the search of
appellant’s clothing under the inventory-search exception framework.
Two requirements must be met for a warrantless inventory search to be valid.
First, the police must have seized the item in a lawful manner. State v. Rohde, 852
N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 2014). Second, the scope of the subsequent inventory search
5
must be such that the intrusion does not exceed the caretaking function. State v. Holmes,
569 N.W.2d 181, 187 (Minn. 1997). Appellant challenges only the seizure of the pants,
arguing that police could not lawfully seize the pants without seeing the cocaine in plain
view first.
An item in plain view may be seized if police are lawfully present when the item is
discovered and the police have probable cause to believe the item is incriminating in
nature. State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 631(Minn. 1995). An item is incriminating in nature if “the facts available to the officer would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that [the] item[] may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of crime.”Id. at 632
(emphasis added) (alteration omitted) (quoting Texas v. Brown,460 U.S. 730, 742
,103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543
(1983)).
At the suppression hearing, by conceding that police could seize the bullet that fell
from his pants under the plain-view exception, appellant effectively conceded that the
police officer’s presence in his hospital room was lawful.1 The responding officer
testified that he seized appellant’s clothing because he believed the blood on them would
have value as evidence of the shooting of which appellant was the apparent victim.
Because the officer was lawfully present and had reasonable suspicion that the pants
1
Appellant argues for the first time on appeal that the officer had no lawful reason to be
in appellant’s hospital room. Appellant forfeited this argument by not raising it below.
See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357(Minn. 1996). In any case, it is without merit. Hospitals are required by statute to notify law enforcement when treating a patient with a gunshot wound. SeeMinn. Stat. § 626.52
subd. 2 (2012). We agree with the district
court that a police officer in the hospital room of a gunshot victim as a response to a
statutorily mandated notification is lawfully present for purposes of Fourth Amendment
analysis.
6
would be valuable as “evidence of crime,” the initial warrantless seizure of appellant’s
pants was proper.
Because the district court did not err by determining that the warrantless search of
appellant’s pants was valid within the inventory-search exception and denying appellant’s
motion to suppress the cocaine, we affirm his conviction for criminal possession of a
controlled substance.
II. Allowing the state to present Spreigl evidence of appellant’s prior bad acts
was an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.
A. Admitting Spreigl evidence of an act that was not proved by clear and
convincing evidence was an abuse of discretion.
Appellant next argues that the district court committed reversible error by
allowing the state to present evidence that appellant had intimated that he always carries a
gun when selling drugs and had shown Z.G. a gun during a previous drug sale. We
agree.
Generally, evidence of prior bad acts by a criminal defendant is inadmissible for
the purpose of showing action in conformity therewith. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); see also
State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488,139 N.W.2d 167
(1965). However, this evidence, often referred to as Spreigl evidence, may be admitted for limited other purposes provided certain requirements are met. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). One requirement is that the prior act “and the participation in it by a relevant person are proven by clear and convincing evidence.”Id.
We review a district court’s decision to admit Spreigl evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ness,707 N.W.2d 676, 685
(Minn. 2006).
7
Z.G. testified that “[o]ne other time when I met [appellant] he kind of made it
clear that he always carried a gun and he had an old .22 revolver with him.” The state
argued to the district court that this past-acts evidence was relevant because “[i]f [Z.G.]
knows that [appellant] is always armed and has actually seen him with a gun in the past,
why wouldn’t [Z.G.] choose some random other person to rob?” The district court
concluded that this evidence would not be admissible under rule 404(b) because there
wasn’t clear and convincing evidence that the incident occurred. However, the district
court did allow the evidence to be admitted as relevant to Z.G.’s state of mind, given that
appellant was claiming self-defense.
An exception to the rule excluding Spreigl evidence exists where prior bad acts of
the victim are admissible to demonstrate the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the
altercation. See State v. Taylor, 258 N.W.2d 615, 620–21 (Minn. 1977) (concluding that
evidence of relevant criminal convictions of victim may be admissible to bolster
defendant’s self-defense claim). Here, we encounter the reverse situation. The state
sought to introduce evidence of prior bad acts of the defendant to demonstrate the state of
mind of the victim. Therefore, evidence of appellant’s past acts does not fall within this
exception.
The state relies on dicta from State v. Rossberg to argue that appellant’s past-acts
evidence is admissible to defeat his claim of self-defense: “[I]f the defendant claims to
have acted in self-defense, the fact that the victim was afraid of the defendant might bear
on whether the defendant’s account is believable.” 851 N.W.2d 609, 619 (Minn. 2014).
But a closer examination of the facts in Rossberg illuminates several key distinctions.
8
First, this situation differs factually from Rossberg. There, the admitted
statements being challenged were statements of a homicide victim that were admitted as
an exception to the general inadmissibility of hearsay evidence. Id. Here, Z.G. is not a
homicide victim. Even if he were, the evidence at issue here is not a statement by Z.G.
that he was afraid of appellant.
Second, the legal issue in Rossberg was whether an exception to the hearsay rule
applied. Id.2 The statements in that case were not analyzed under the Spreigl rule. Here,
on the other hand, the evidence was not hearsay, but rather first-hand testimony about the
circumstances surrounding a previous drug deal between the two men. In other words,
this was evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts, not of the victim’s state of mind, a
crucial distinction.
The testimony by Z.G. was evidence of prior bad acts offered to demonstrate
conformity therewith: during a previous deal, appellant implied he carries a gun when he
is selling drugs and that he was carrying a gun; therefore, he was carrying a gun at the
time of this incident. This was Spreigl evidence of an act that the state failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence, and no other valid exception exists to the general rule
2
Rossberg is a case that follows from State v. Blanchard. 315 N.W.2d 427, 432(Minn. 1982). In Blanchard, the evidence at issue was a statement made by a homicide victim that she was afraid of the defendant.315 N.W.2d at 432
. See also State v. Ulvinen,313 N.W.2d 425, 427-28
(Minn. 1981) (finding hearsay statements by homicide victim that she feared her mother-in-law would poison her deemed not admissible). The Spreigl evidence in this case was not the type addressed by Rossberg and Blanchard. Moreover, for such evidence to be admissible under Blanchard, a proper limiting instruction must be given to the jury.315 N.W.2d at 432-33
. No limiting instruction was given here.
9
against its admissibility. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence of appellant’s prior bad acts.
B. The admission of the Spreigl evidence was reversible error.
We must now determine if the admission was reversible error. State v. Fardan,
773 N.W.2d 303, 320(Minn. 2009). Erroneous admission of prior-acts evidence constitutes reversible error if it was not harmless. State v. Thao,875 N.W.2d 834, 839
(Minn. 2016). “An error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.”Id.
(quotation omitted). Relevant factors to consider in making this determination include the strength of evidence of guilt, the presence of a limiting instruction to the jury, and the prosecutor’s reliance on the evidence in closing.Id.
Here, the state’s evidence is far from overwhelming. The state offered no
cumulative evidence that appellant had shown Z.G. a gun on a prior occasion, nor any
evidence that appellant was known by reputation to carry a gun. The state offered no
evidence linking appellant to the gun at any time before this incident. No witnesses other
than Z.G. testified to seeing appellant holding the gun during the incident. Multiple
witnesses corroborate that Z.G. possessed the gun after the incident. There is no physical
evidence that supports the state’s version of the events that does not also support
appellant’s version of the events. While not necessarily indicative of him being the non-
aggressor, appellant received the gravest wounds from the altercation, and Z.G. possessed
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the gun after the struggle. The state’s case relied primarily on the testimony of Z.G., a
witness who was, in his own words, “inebriated” at the time of the event.3
On the second factor, no limiting instruction was given to the jury.
Finally, in addressing the jury during closing argument, while the prosecutor did
not specifically reference Z.G.’s prior bad-acts testimony, the prosecutor made it clear the
issue of who brought the gun to the park was the central and pivotal point in the case:
The self-defense charge is what I want to get to because
this—we’re kind of moving into what this really—this case is
really all about.
. . . The defense of self-defense is not available to [appellant]
. . . if you find the [s]tate proves [appellant] is the one that
brought the gun to the park and pulled it on [Z.G.]. . .
So the—let me be very clear to make this decision easy
for you. If you’re going back in that jury room and you’re
talking about all this and you’re thinking, you know, “I really
have a reasonable doubt as to, you know, whether [Z.G.]
brought it or [appellant] brought it” . . . you can basically get
rid of the first two counts, aggravated robbery and prohibited
person in possession of a firearm because self-defense would
have excused [appellant]’s contact . . . .
The prosecutor’s framing of the issue of which party brought the gun to the park as the
central question of the aggravated-robbery and felon-in-possession charges would
inevitably lead the jury to seek out evidence to help answer that central question—and as
the district court noted, this improper Spreigl evidence could have enabled the jury “to
3
It is also noteworthy that the state acknowledged Z.G.’s lack of credibility. During
closing arguments, the prosecutor stated to the jury: “I do not have to prove to you that
[Z.G.] is not a liar. If I had to prove that, I would lose this case . . . because he lied about
a lot of things.”
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draw the conclusion that [if appellant] brought a gun last time or at some time in the past,
he brought a gun this time.”
Weighing these factors, we conclude that it is reasonably possible that the
improper admission of appellant’s past acts significantly affected the verdict regarding
the aggravated-robbery and felon-in-possession charges. Therefore, the district court’s
improper admission of Spreigl evidence was reversible error.
III. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts for the
aggravated-robbery and felon-in-possession charges.
Appellant argues that a judgment of acquittal is the appropriate remedy because
the evidence presented was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts for the
aggravated-robbery and felon-in-possession charges. We disagree.
Despite having already found reversible error, because appellant’s challenge
affects the new trial, we will consider his sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument. See
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18,98 S. Ct. 2141, 2150-51
(1978). If the evidence presented against appellant was legally insufficient, “the only ‘just’ remedy is the direction of a judgment of acquittal.” State v. Clark,755 N.W.2d 241, 256
(Minn. 2008) (alteration omitted) (quotation omitted). Conversely, remanding for a new trial is appropriate where an appellate court concludes there was sufficient evidence to convict, but determines reversible error occurred during trial. See State v. Hersi,763 N.W.2d 339, 345
(Minn. App. 2009) (remanding for new trial after concluding jury was improperly
instructed, but state presented sufficient evidence to convict).
12
Appellant argues that the evidence did not preclude a reasonable possibility that he
acted in self-defense. Appellant misstates the standard of review for sufficiency of the
evidence. Unlike the “reasonable possibility” standard for improperly admitted Spreigl
evidence, sufficiency of the evidence review is more stringent. When considering a
claim of insufficient evidence, we must analyze the record and determine if the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the state, was sufficient to convict. State v. Webb,
440 N.W.2d 426, 430(Minn. 1989). A verdict will be upheld where the evidence shows the jury, acting with due regard for the defendant’s presumption of innocence and the necessity of the state providing proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably find the defendant guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State,684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77
(Minn. 2004). We assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved evidence to the contrary. State v. Moore,438 N.W.2d 101, 108
(Minn.
1989).
The burden is on the state to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
did not act in self-defense, once the defense is raised.” State v. Spaulding, 296 N.W.2d
870, 875(Minn. 1980). To meet this burden, the state must negate one of the three elements of self-defense: (1) the absence of aggression on the part of the defendant; (2) that the defendant actually and honestly believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and the action he took was necessary to prevent that harm; and (3) the actual and honest belief was reasonable.Id.
In support of this argument, in both his brief and pro se supplemental brief,
appellant identifies all of the inconsistencies in Z.G.’s account of the incident, the lack of
13
corroboration of Z.G.’s testimony, and the lack of physical evidence in support of the
state’s theory of the incident. However, these factors were also identified for the jury,
and assessing the credibility of witness testimony is the function of the jury. Moore, 438
N.W.2d at 108.
Z.G. testified that appellant drew a gun and robbed him at gunpoint. This
testimony demonstrates that appellant was the aggressor, and thereby negates the first
element of self-defense: the absence of aggression. We must assume that the jury
believed Z.G. and disbelieved all evidence that contradicted his testimony. See id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the state
presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find appellant guilty of both first-degree
aggravated-robbery and felon-in-possession. Therefore, the appropriate remedy is to
reverse appellant’s convictions for aggravated-robbery and felon-in-possession and to
remand to the district court for a new trial on those charges.
Because we affirm appellant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance
but reverse appellant’s conviction for aggravated robbery, we do not address his
argument that he was sentenced improperly.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
14
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished