This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                          Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                                 STATE OF MINNESOTA
                                 IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                       A23-1355

                             Bradford Cain Dopkins, petitioner,
                                        Appellant,

                                              vs.

                                     State of Minnesota,
                                        Respondent.

                                   Filed June 3, 2024
                    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
                                      Larkin, Judge

                                Anoka County District Court
                                 File No. 02-CR-18-3927

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

         Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Frisch,

Judge.

                            NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARKIN, Judge

         Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his request for relief, in

which he claimed that his guilty pleas to first-degree assault and making threats of violence

were invalid. Because appellant’s guilty plea to first-degree assault lacked an adequate
factual basis and was therefore inaccurate, we reverse in part and remand for further

proceedings. However, because appellant has not met his burden to establish that his guilty

pleas were unintelligent, we reject his request for relief on that ground. We also reject

appellant’s additional pro se arguments for relief.

                                          FACTS

       In 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Bradford Cain Dopkins

with several offenses, including making threats of violence and first-degree assault. During

the ensuing criminal proceeding, Dopkins’s competency to stand trial was questioned, and

at one point, he was found incompetent to stand trial. Ultimately, the district court found

Dopkins competent.

       Dopkins resolved the charges against him pursuant to a plea agreement with the

state. He pleaded guilty to one count of making threats of violence and one count of

first-degree assault resulting in great bodily harm. In exchange for those guilty pleas, the

state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts, to an executed sentence of 117 months for

first-degree assault, and to not seek an aggravated sentence. The district court entered

judgment of conviction and sentenced Dopkins to serve 366 days for making threats of

violence and a concurrent sentence of 117 months for first-degree assault.

       Nearly two years after Dopkins pleaded guilty, he petitioned for postconviction

relief, asserting that his guilty pleas were invalid. The postconviction court denied relief

without holding an evidentiary hearing.

       Dopkins appeals.




                                             2
                                         DECISION

       Under Minnesota’s postconviction statutes, a person convicted of a crime may seek

relief by filing a petition claiming that the conviction “violated the person’s rights under

the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state.” 

,

subd. 1(1) (2022).     “The person seeking postconviction relief bears the burden of

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that his claims merit relief.” Crow v. State,

 (Minn. 2019).

       We review the denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion. Colbert

v. State, 

 (Minn. 2015). In doing so, we review legal issues de novo

and factual findings for clear error. 

 The postconviction court “abuses its discretion

when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts

in the record.” State v. Nicks, 

 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

       “A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing upon a timely motion and

proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a

manifest injustice.” State v. Ecker, 

 (Minn. 1994) (quotation

omitted) (applying Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1, in the context of a postconviction

challenge to the validity of a guilty plea). A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not

valid. State v. Theis, 

 (Minn. 2007). To be valid, a guilty plea must

be “accurate, voluntary and intelligent.” Ecker, 

. “A defendant bears

the burden of showing his plea was invalid.” State v. Raleigh, 

 (Minn.

2010). The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.

                                               3
                                             I.

       Dopkins contends that his guilty plea to first-degree assault was invalid because it

was inaccurate. “The main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to protect a defendant

from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to

insist on his right to trial.” State v. Trott, 

 (Minn. 1983). “A proper

factual basis must be established for a guilty plea to be accurate.” Ecker, 

. To determine whether a guilty plea has an adequate factual basis, “we examine

whether there are sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s

conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” Lussier v. State,

 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

       Dopkins argues that the record does not establish a necessary element of

first-degree assault, specifically, great bodily harm. First-degree assault occurs when a

person “assaults another and inflicts great bodily harm.” 

, subd. 1

(2016). An assault includes “the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm

upon another.” 

, subd. 10 (2016). “‘Great bodily harm’ means bodily

injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent

disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the

function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm.” 

 subd. 8 (2016).

       Dopkins provided sworn admissions as support for his guilty plea. He admitted that

on May 31, 2018, he threatened to harm JS with the intent to make her “very, very afraid.”

He also admitted that from May 31, 2018, to June 10, 2018, he repeatedly choked JS with

his hands until she lost consciousness and physically harmed her by hitting her with a coat


                                             4
hanger. Finally, Dopkins admitted that JS sought treatment for her resulting injuries at a

hospital and that the injuries included bruising on her chest, arms, legs, and back, as well

as petechia in her eye.

       In denying relief, the postconviction court reasoned that Dopkins’s guilty plea was

accurate because his factual basis established “other serious bodily harm” under section

609.02, subdivision 8:

              The injuries [Dopkins] inflicted on [JS,] including petechiae of
              the eye, a known sign of occlusion to the airways; repeatedly
              choking until [JS] lost consciousness over a period of 11 days;
              and hitting [JS] with a [coat] hanger resulting in substantial
              bruising over multiple areas of her body all contributed to the
              [district] court’s finding that “other serious bodily harm” had
              been inflicted on [JS].

       Dopkins argues that the record does not show that he inflicted bodily injury that

created a high probability of death or other serious bodily harm. We address each form of

great bodily harm in turn.1

       High Probability of Death

       When determining whether a victim suffered great bodily harm, we must “focus on

the injury to the victim rather than the actions of the assailant.”         State v. Gerald,

 (Minn. App. 1992). For a bodily injury to create a high probability

of death, “the injury itself must be life-threatening.” 

 “The fact that a lesser injury is




1
 The record does not suggest, and the state does not argue that the record established, either
of the other two types of great bodily harm: “serious permanent disfigurement” or
“permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ.” 

, subd. 8.

                                              5
located near a major organ or vessel and therefore could have been more serious is not

sufficient . . . .” 

        The factual basis for Dopkins’s guilty plea includes the following exchange:

                PROSECUTOR: [Dopkins], when you say that you threatened
                to hurt her, the types of threats that you were making were to
                hurt her very badly; true?

                DEFENDANT: True.

                          ....

                PROSECUTOR: As the days went by with [JS], is it true that
                you physically hurt her in a number of different ways?

                DEFENDANT: Yes.

                PROSECUTOR: From May 31st through June 10th, [JS]
                reported that you had choked her on several occasions to the
                point that she lost consciousness. Is that true?

                DEFENDANT: Yes.

                          ....

                PROSECUTOR: [Dopkins], are you telling the [c]ourt that
                every time that you choked [JS] until she became unconscious,
                you only did it with your hands?

                DEFENDANT: Yes.

                          ....

                PROSECUTOR: [Dopkins], you don’t have to plead guilty
                today, but what [JS] reported that you did to her is very
                different from what you’re saying today. What is it that you
                did to her that makes you guilty of first-degree assault?

                DEFENDANT: I’m not sure what first[-]degree assault means.

                COURT: Well, I can help you with that, [Dopkins].


                                              6
                     First[-]degree assault means that you assaulted her[,]
              and she suffered great bodily harm. And great bodily harm
              doesn’t really have a technical definition so much as it’s
              serious bodily harm.
                     So the [c]omplaint that I’m reading indicates that [JS]
              did have to go to the hospital, that her eyes had petechiae . . . ,
              which means, like, a lot of blood visible in her eyes; she had
              bruises on her body, including on her chest, arms, legs, and
              back.
                     So I’m going to ask you, is that the results of your
              assaulting her?

              DEFENDANT: Yes.

              COURT: So did you also hit her at some point with a coat
              hanger?

              DEFENDANT: Yes.

              COURT: And you agree that you beat her and caused those
              bruises on her body?

              DEFENDANT: Yes.

              COURT: The [c]ourt’s satisfied that that is great bodily
              harm . . . .

       We turn to caselaw to determine whether Dopkins’s factual basis established an

injury with a high probability of death.

       In Gerald, the victim sustained half-inch lacerations on the ear and neck. 

.

The state argued that because one of the lacerations was close to a major vein and artery,

the victim “could have bled to death.” 

. The state further argued that the injury

therefore “created a high probability of death” and constituted great bodily harm. 

 We

rejected the state’s argument, reasoning that “[t]he fact that a lesser injury is located near




                                              7
a major organ or vessel and therefore could have been more serious is not sufficient to

satisfy the statut[ory]” requirement of a high probability of death. 

       We reached a similar conclusion in State v. Dye, reasoning that a gun-shot injury

was not life threatening. 

 (Minn. App. 2015). In Dye, testimony

established that despite the gun-shot injury, the victim could walk, talk, and breathe, and

that she walked down a set of stairs to an ambulance. 

. We rejected the state’s

argument that “a bullet that enters the torso where it did on [the victim] can hit critical body

parts, such as the lungs, heart, kidneys, aorta, or spine, and that other patients have died

from gunshot wounds in the same area as [the victim’s].” 

. We reasoned that

although medical staff treated the injury as if it were life-threatening, a CT scan revealed

that the bullet traveled in a straight line without hitting any critical body parts. 

 In sum,

the injury in Dye could have been life-threatening for purposes of establishing great bodily

harm, but in fact it was not.

       In contrast, in State v. Anderson, we held that the evidence of the victim’s injuries

showed a high probability of death and was sufficient to sustain a first-degree assault

conviction. 

 (Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 19, 1985).

The Anderson victim suffered a laceration to her liver, and a physician testified at trial that

the laceration was ‘“life-threatening’” and that it was ‘“a serious injury because if the

bleeding does not stop or is not stopped, a person can bleed and die.’” 

 Unlike Anderson,

the record here does not contain medical evidence indicating that the particular injuries in

this case were life-threatening or created a high probability of death.




                                               8
       Given the caselaw above, we conclude that the record does not establish that

Dopkins inflicted injuries that created a high probability of death. Like the circumstances

in Gerald and Dye, although JS’s injuries may have had the potential to be life-threatening,

Dopkins did not admit that he inflicted life-threatening injuries and the record does not

establish that JS’s injuries did in fact create a high probability of death. The record does

not contain any information regarding the number of times that Dopkins rendered JS

unconsciousness or for how long. Nor does the record contain any medical evidence

indicating that JS’s injuries created a high probability of death. To be clear, we do not

suggest that choking leading to unconsciousness could never create a high probability of

death. But caselaw indicates that such a determination must be based on the particular

facts of a case. And in this case, the factual record is very weak on that issue. More facts

were necessary to show that the injuries that Dopkins inflicted did in fact create a high

probability of death.

       The state’s arguments do not persuade us otherwise. The state argues that JS’s loss

of consciousness “was because her brain, a major organ was deprived of oxygen, which is

known to lead to death.” (Emphasis added.) That argument is unavailing because, as

explained above, the possibility of death is not sufficient to establish great bodily harm.

See Gerald, 

 (explaining that “the injury itself must be life-threatening”).

The evidence must show that the particular injury did in fact create a high probability of

death. See 

 Thus, the state’s general assertion that loss of oxygen is known to cause

death is not adequate to establish that the particular loss of oxygen in this case created a

high probability of death.


                                             9
       Moreover, the caselaw on which the state relies is distinguishable. In those cases,

courts considered whether a temporary loss of consciousness constitutes “substantial

bodily harm” for the purpose of third-degree assault; the courts did not decide that a

temporary loss of consciousness constitutes “great bodily harm” for the purpose of first-

degree assault. State v. Stafford, 

 (Minn. 1983) (declining to decide

whether great bodily harm is inflicted if one knocks someone out briefly); State v. Larkin,

 (Minn. App. 2001) (“An individual who assaults another, causing

temporary loss of consciousness, has inflicted substantial bodily harm and is guilty of third-

degree assault . . . .”). The state does not cite, and we are not aware of, any precedential

authority holding that a temporary loss of consciousness constitutes great bodily harm for

the purpose of first-degree assault.2

       Other Serious Bodily Harm

       “Other serious bodily harm” is not defined by statute, and it “should be taken in the

context of the other three alternative definitions.” State v. Moore, 

(Minn. 2005). “To determine whether a victim’s injuries constitute ‘other serious bodily

harm,’ courts must consider the totality of the victim’s injuries.” Dye, 

.

       In State v. Barner, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the following

injuries constituted “other serious bodily harm”: a swollen head that caused the victim to

have difficulty eating for several days, multiple stab wounds that left scars, and a


2
  State v. Lindsey, which the postconviction court cited, is also not on point. 

 (Minn. App. 2002) (reviewing jury instruction regarding the requisite mental state
for the crime of first-degree assault of a correctional employee, which has different
elements than the offense here).

                                             10
debilitating injury to the victim’s hand. 

 (Minn. 1993). “Other

serious bodily harm” was also established in Anderson, based on injuries that included a

lacerated liver, a head laceration that required stitches, bruises, other head injuries that

caused periods of unconsciousness, and a long scar running the length of the victim’s upper

body. 

.

       In State v. Jones, the victim was found unconscious and nearly in shock:

              She had to be put in a “shock suit” for transfer to the hospital.
              She did not regain consciousness until the following day. She
              remained hospitalized for a week. She testified that [two]
              weeks after the attack she almost suffered a miscarriage and
              was prescribed bed rest. While there was no medical evidence
              tying this to the attack, it certainly was evidence which the jury
              could consider in determining whether she had suffered great
              bodily harm. She testified that her left leg was numb for
              several weeks, she had dizziness and headaches until just
              before trial, and she still had a numbness in her teeth at the time
              of trial.

 (Minn. 1978). The Jones court concluded that, “[a]t the very least,

[the victim’s] injuries would seem to fit within the phrase ‘“other serious bodily harm.’”

       Once again, the record does not contain any information regarding the number of

times that Dopkins rendered JS unconscious or for how long. And the record does not

contain any medical evidence indicating that JS’s injuries compared with those in Barner,

Anderson, or Jones. Nor does the record indicate that Dopkins’s assault left JS with

permanent scars. In sum, the injuries here simply do not compare to the injuries that have

supported a finding of “other serious bodily harm.”




                                              11
       In arguing that the record shows “other serious bodily harm,” the state once again

relies on Stafford and Larkin. Again, those cases are not on point because they involved

allegations of “substantial,” and not “great,” bodily harm. See 

; 

. And the state does not cite any caselaw suggesting that temporary,

unmeasured periods of unconsciousness coupled with significant bruising constitutes

“other serious bodily harm.”

       In Gerald, we explained that, because the focus of Minnesota’s first-degree assault

statute is the severity of the victim’s injury, there may be situations in which a person who

commits a “grievous assault on another may escape a first[-]degree assault conviction

because the victim is fortunate enough to escape serious injury.” 

.

Those seem to be the circumstances here. The record simply does not establish either an

“injury which creates a high probability of death” or “other serious bodily harm” as

required to sustain a conviction of first-degree assault.

       We do not minimize the harm that Dopkins inflicted. And we recognize that

domestic violence is a significant problem that must be treated seriously. But we are bound

to follow the law, and caselaw indicates that a determination of great bodily harm must be

based on the particular facts of a case. We are also bound by the facts in the record, and in

this case, the factual record is weak. More facts are necessary to show that the injuries that

Dopkins inflicted did in fact create a high probability of death or constitute other serious

bodily harm. Thus, Dopkins’s plea to first-degree assault is inaccurate and invalid, and he

must be allowed to withdraw his plea to avoid a manifest injustice. See Theis, 

 (noting that “a manifest injustice exists [when] a guilty plea is invalid,” and

“withdrawal of the plea [must] be allowed”).

                                             II.

       Dopkins also contends that his guilty pleas to first-degree assault and making threats

of violence were unintelligent. A guilty plea is intelligent if the defendant understands

(1) the charges against him, (2) the rights he is giving up by pleading guilty, and (3) the

direct consequences of pleading guilty. Raleigh, 

. A district court must

ensure that a defendant has such an understanding before accepting his guilty plea. See

Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1 (stating that before a judge accepts a guilty plea, the

defendant must be sworn and questioned on whether he or she understands the crime

charged and the rights being waived).

       Dopkins argues that his guilty pleas were unintelligent because the district court did

not verify that he understood his rights or the guilty-plea process. He notes that he

repeatedly indicated that he did not understand the charges against him and his most basic

trial rights. He argues that the district court “did not ensure that [he] understood the

charges, his trial rights [that] he was waiving, and the plea consequences.”

       The district court’s extensive effort to ensure that Dopkins understood the charges,

his rights, and the consequences of pleading guilty were accurately summarized by the

postconviction court as follows:

                      Dopkins’[s] [p]etition focuses on whether [he]
              adequately understood the rights he waived by pleading guilty.
              First, Dopkins acknowledged signing a [p]etition to [e]nter [a]
              [g]uilty [p]lea which enumerated all of his various trial rights.
              Counsel noted on the record that they had “sat through the glass


                                             13
and talked about everything [in the plea petition], and then
[Dopkins] was given a copy.” When Dopkins was first
questioned about whether he wanted to proceed, he stated
“no[,]” and the court immediately recessed and allowed him
and his attorneys more time to speak. Upon returning, an
amended offer was placed on the record, the court inquired of
Dopkins if [he] wished to proceed with the plea[,] and he stated
“yes.”
        When asked if he had any specific questions concerning
his rights, Dopkins said “no.” The plea hearing transcript
spans thirty-eight pages[,] and the last page reflects that court
did not conclude until 5:15 p.m., indicating ample time was
spent ensuring that he understood everything.              While
[Dopkins] equivocated during various point[s] during the
proceeding about whether he understood specific rights and
whether he had read the [r]ule 15 [p]etition, these instances
should be viewed in the context of his agreement, upon
questioning by counsel, that “we watched you review each
page and ultimately sign the last page of the document.”
Counsel specifically asked Dopkins, “do you recall that?”; to
which his response was “yes.”
        Throughout the hearing, both the court and counsel
questioned [Dopkins] repeatedly on whether he wanted to
continue with the plea agreement or take the case to trial. The
court inquired of [Dopkins] three times whether he wanted to
plead guilty and continue through with the plea agreement.
Defense counsel asked [Dopkins] twice whether he wished to
plead guilty and continue with the plea. Each time, [Dopkins]
stated he did not want a trial and confirmed his intentions to
plead guilty.
        Even though defense counsel went through the [r]ule 15
[p]etition with [Dopkins], and [Dopkins] signed it, inquiry
occurred on the record where [Dopkins] acknowledged several
specific rights, including the right to challenge how the police
did their job and the right to have a jury or court trial. When
defense counsel referenced the fact that the [s]tate would have
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, [Dopkins] said “no”
when asked if he understood. Defense counsel went on to
explain that this was the standard of proof for a jury to
unanimously find him guilty. When asked if he had questions
about that, Dopkins replied[,] “I don’t know.” The court then
explained further that “beyond a reasonable doubt” was the
“highest burden of proof” and reiterated that the burden would


                               14
be on the [s]tate to prove [him] guilty by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The court went on to ask[,] “do you
understand that’s what would happen if we had a trial?” to
which Dopkins failed to respond. When he claimed not to
understand this explanation, the court responded[,] “Okay. So
tell me where your question is. You have to help me out here
[so] I can help you, okay?” Dopkins responded[,] “I’m not
sure.” Later, when Dopkins claimed not to understand what it
meant to testify, the court told him[,] “testify simply means you
tell what happened under oath, after you’ve taken an oath to
tell the truth. That’s what you’re doing right now, because I
gave you an oath to tell the truth, and you promised me to tell
the truth to the best of your ability.”
         After a long pause, the court noted that Dopkins had
signed a [p]etition to [e]nter a [p]lea of [g]uilty, and the court
needed to determine what he wanted to do. If he did not want
to proceed, the court made it clear that the trial would
commence in January.
         Defense counsel then picked up questioning Dopkins
once again, explaining that testifying was witnesses coming
into court and telling the jury “what they know and what they
saw[,]” which Dopkins acknowledged with “okay.” Counsel
then explained that “we as your defense team can present
witnesses on your behalf, people who have things to say about
you. Do you understand?” He replied[,] “yes.” Counsel
further explained that he could give up his right to remain silent
and testify. But if he pled guilty, there would be no trial.
         Dopkins then claimed that he did not want to either
plead guilty or have a trial. The court interjected and advised
him as follows: “So, [Dopkins], I completely understand that
it is difficult to make a decision. But if you decide that you’re
not going to accept the [s]tate’s offer, that is fine, but then you
are choosing to have the trial. Do you understand what I am
saying?” Dopkins replied, “maybe.” The court continued, “do
you wish to go forward with the jury trial in January and have
all the witnesses testify and have a trial, or do you wish to enter
into this agreement that you’ve signed off on the petition with
the [s]tate?” He replied, “the agreement.” The court clarified,
“so you want to go forward with the agreement. That means
you’re pleading guilty to these two charges, right?” He
replied[,] “right.” The court then noted that five other charges
in the complaint would be dismissed, which the prosecutor
confirmed. In addition, the prosecutor affirmatively stated that


                                15
              the [s]tate would not seek an aggravated sentence and would
              withdraw its motion for a higher maximum sentence.
                      The thirty-eight page transcript of the plea hearing
              demonstrates that [Dopkins] made a knowing, voluntary, and
              intelligent choice to plead guilty in order to limit his prison
              time to 117 months and avoid a sentence of up to 20 years. As
              noted by the court towards the conclusion of the proceedings,
              counsel “bent over backwards to make sure” Dopkins
              understood what he was doing. Throughout the lengthy
              hearing, Dopkins not only reviewed a [r]ule 15 [p]etition
              thoroughly with his counsel, but he asked many questions in
              order to have legal concepts and the consequences of his guilty
              plea explained. As a result, at the conclusion of the
              proceedings, Dopkins confirmed that he had no other
              questions. Therefore, the record as a whole demonstrates that
              Dopkins’[s] guilty plea was accurate, knowing[,] and
              intelligent. His request to withdraw it must be denied as he has
              not met his burden to demonstrate that a manifest injustice has
              occurred.

(Footnotes omitted.)

       Although we review the validity of a guilty plea de novo, if a defendant makes

inconsistent statements regarding the validity of his guilty plea, “credibility determinations

are crucial, [and] a reviewing court will give deference to the primary observations and

trustworthiness assessments made by the district court.” State v. Aviles-Alvarez, 

 (Minn. App. 1997), rev. denied (Minn. June 11, 1997).

       The district court’s obligation to ensure that Dopkins’s guilty pleas were intelligent

was complicated by Dopkins’s inconsistent statements regarding his understanding of the

charges, his rights, and the consequences of his guilty pleas. The district court’s ultimate

acceptance of Dopkins’s guilty pleas, as well as the same judge’s subsequent rejection of

his postconviction claim that his guilty pleas were unintelligent, inevitably depended on

the district court’s resolution of his inconsistent statements and an assessment of his


                                             16
credibility.   We defer to the court’s implicit determination that despite Dopkins’s

inconsistent and equivocal statements, Dopkins understood the charges against him, the

rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, and the direct consequences of pleading guilty.

We therefore conclude that his guilty pleas were intelligent.

       In conclusion, because the factual basis for Dopkins’s guilty plea to first-degree

assault was inaccurate, we reverse and remand in part for Dopkins to withdraw his guilty

plea to that offense. However, because Dopkins has not met his burden to establish that

his guilty pleas were unintelligent, and we are not persuaded that his remaining pro se

arguments provide a basis for relief, we affirm in all other respects. See Ture v. State, 

 (Minn. 2004) (rejecting pro se arguments after thorough review of the record

and without detailed discussion).

       Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.




                                             17