This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                         Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                               STATE OF MINNESOTA
                               IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                     A23-1525

                                   State of Minnesota,
                                       Respondent,

                                            vs.

                                   Jill Marie Zetterwall,
                                         Appellant.

                                   Filed June 10, 2024
                                        Affirmed
                                      Frisch, Judge

                             Hennepin County District Court
                               File No. 27-CR-22-15379

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Bruce Rivers, Rivers Law Firm, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

      Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and

Bratvold, Judge.

                           NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

FRISCH, Judge

      Following her conviction of criminal vehicular homicide, appellant argues that the

district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a downward dispositional
sentencing departure. Because we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in

imposing the presumptive sentence, we affirm.

                                           FACTS

       In July 2022, appellant Jill Marie Zetterwall caused a collision between her SUV

and a smaller vehicle while she was driving with an alcohol concentration of at least 0.225.

As a result, the driver of the smaller car died at the collision site from blunt-force injuries.

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Zetterwall with criminal vehicular homicide—

operating a vehicle with negligence while under the influence of alcohol—pursuant to

, subd. 1(a)(2)(i) (2020). Zetterwall pleaded guilty to the charge

and moved for a downward dispositional sentencing departure.

       Zetterwall emphasized in her departure motion that she had been sober since the

collision—420 days—and that she had been consistently engaged in treatment efforts to

address both mental-health and substance-abuse issues throughout that time. Zetterwall

noted her substantial family and social support, lack of criminal history, compliance with

the terms of her supervised release, cooperation and truthfulness throughout the

proceedings, and remorse for causing the victim’s death.           Zetterwall also submitted

evidence of her health conditions, arguing that these circumstances weighed against her

incarceration.

       The district court denied Zetterwall’s motion and sentenced her to 57 months’

imprisonment, followed by a conditional-release period of five years. Zetterwall appeals.




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                                        DECISION

       The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines “prescrib[e] a sentence or range of sentences

that is presumed to be appropriate.” State v. Soto, 

 (Minn. 2014)

(quotation omitted).    A district court has great discretion when making sentencing

decisions, and we will reverse those decisions only when the district court abuses that

discretion. 

. A sentence imposed in accordance with the guidelines is

presumed to be appropriate. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2021). “We will affirm

the imposition of a presumptive guidelines sentence when the record shows that the

sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before

making a determination.” State v. Johnson, 

 (Minn. App. 2013)

(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).

       If presented with “identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances,” a

district court may depart from the presumptive guidelines sentence. Id.; see also Minn.

Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (stating that a court may depart from the guidelines sentence if

“there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a

departure”). But a district court may choose not to depart without abusing its sentencing

discretion even if it determines that factors exist that might support a sentencing departure.

See State v. Walker, 

 (Minn. App. 2018) (concluding that a district

court did not abuse its discretion by denying a defendant’s motion for a dispositional

departure despite “evidence of factors that could have supported a departure if they had

been substantial or compelling”). We reverse a sentencing court’s refusal to depart only in

“rare” cases. 

 at 468 (quoting State v. Kindem, 

 (Minn. 1981)).


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       In evaluating a motion for a downward dispositional departure from the presumptive

guidelines sentence, a district court considers whether the defendant is “particularly

amenable to individualized treatment in a probationary setting.” State v. Wright, 

 (Minn. 1981). In evaluating a defendant’s particular amenability to

probation, a district court may consider factors including the defendant’s age, prior record,

remorse, cooperation, attitude while in court, and support of friends and family. State v.

Trog, 

 (Minn. 1982). These are known as the Trog factors. See State v.

Pegel, 

 (Minn. App. 2011).

       Zetterwall argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by (1) not

properly considering the evidence in support of her departure motion, (2) not considering

or making findings as to each of the Trog factors, and (3) improperly and unfairly cross-

examining Zetterwall during her sentencing hearing. Our review of the record shows that

the district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion.

       First, at the sentencing hearing, the district court evaluated the evidence presented

by Zetterwall in support of her departure motion and considered that evidence in light of

the entire record. The district court stated that it reviewed memoranda, exhibits, character

reference letters, and the presentence investigation report (PSI).       The district court

specifically recognized and commended Zetterwall on her recent success in treatment and

acknowledged the support of her family and friends. But the district court also noted

concerns about Zetterwall’s long-term conduct related to treatment and sobriety and

determined that this history weighed against a finding of particular amenability to treatment




                                              4
in a probationary setting. We therefore reject Zetterwall’s contention that the district court

failed to consider the evidence in favor of a dispositional departure.

         Zetterwall next argues that the district court abused its discretion because it did not

expressly make findings on each of the Trog factors. It is true that the district court did not

reference Zetterwall’s age, prior criminal record, remorse, cooperation, attitude toward the

court, or vulnerability due to health concerns, despite evidence in the record regarding each

of these factors. But a district court need not expressly acknowledge or make findings on

each Trog factor in considering a departure motion. Pegel, 

; see also

Johnson, 

 (noting that a district court is not required to state for the

record its reasons for denying a motion for dispositional departure). And a district court

does not abuse its discretion even where the record contains some record evidence showing

particular amenability to probation. See State v. Bertsch, 

 (Minn.

2006).

         Finally, Zetterwall argues that the district court abused its discretion by questioning

her during the sentencing hearing about certain of the Twelve Steps recited at Alcoholics

Anonymous (A.A.) meetings. In support of her departure motion, Zetterwall emphasized

that she was committed to her sobriety and had attended A.A. meetings at least five days

per week for over one year. During the sentencing hearing, the district court judge asked

Zetterwall to state the first two of the A.A. Twelve Steps. 1 In her responses, Zetterwall did


1
  At oral argument, counsel for Zetterwall asserted that the district court judge used an
intimidating tone or volume in asking these questions, which caused Zetterwall to provide
flustered responses. On appeal, we cannot discern the district court’s tone, because our
review is limited to the transcript of hearings held in district court and other record

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not recite the first two steps but instead offered a different description of the first two steps.

The district court judge noted that the A.A. Twelve Steps should be “almost a mantra” for

someone who had been attending meetings five days a week. The district court ultimately

concluded that Zetterwall was not “truly engaged” in treatment and was therefore not

particularly amenable to probation.

       We discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in its conduct during the

sentencing hearing. A district court is not limited to the Trog factors in evaluating whether

a defendant is particularly amenable to treatment in a probationary setting. See Soto, 

 (stating that the Trog factors provide a “useful framework” but “are not the

only factors that can bear on a defendant’s amenability to probation”). The questions posed

by the district court enabled it to assess Zetterwall’s amenability to treatment in a

probationary setting. And given that Zetterwall did not contest the evidence in the record

showing her history of disengagement with and otherwise unsuccessful treatment, the

district court had a reasoned basis for its inquiry. We therefore conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion by questioning Zetterwall about the Twelve Steps during

the sentencing hearing.

       We recognize Zetterwall’s efforts in the year between the offense and sentencing

and commend her commitment to sobriety. But on this record, we conclude that the district

court evaluated all available evidence and did not abuse its broad discretion by imposing a

presumptively appropriate sentence under the sentencing guidelines. This case does not


evidence. We also note that the sentencing transcript does not reflect any objection to the
district court’s questions.

                                                6
present the rare circumstances that would justify overturning a district court’s denial of a

motion for dispositional sentencing departure.

       Affirmed.




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