STATE OF MINNESOTA
                               IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                     A23-1806
                                     A23-1807

       In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: R. V. M. and J. R. M., Parents.

                                   Filed June 10, 2024
                                        Affirmed
                                      Harris, Judge

                            Blue Earth County District Court
                                File No. 07-JV-23-2807

Kenneth R. White, Law Office of Kenneth R. White, P.C., Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant R.V.M.)

Steven D. Winkler, Brandt & Winkler, P.A., St. Peter, Minnesota (for appellant J.R.M.)

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeVos, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent Blue Earth County Human Services)

Kaylee Polzin, St. Peter, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

       Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Reilly,

Judge. ∗

SYLLABUS

       I.     The pendency of an appeal from a district court order involuntarily

terminating a parent’s parental rights to one or more children does not preclude that order

from giving rise to a presumption of palpable unfitness under Minnesota Statutes section

260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4) (2022).




∗
 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
       II.    To meet the burden of production necessary to rebut the presumption of

palpable unfitness arising from an involuntary termination of parental rights under

Minnesota Statute section 260C.301, subdivision (1)(b)(4) (2022), a parent must produce

evidence related to the statutory reasons identified by the district court as a basis for the

involuntary termination to support a finding that the parent is suitable to be entrusted with

the care of the children.

OPINION

HARRIS, Judge

       In these consolidated appeals, appellants challenge the termination of their parental

rights to one of their children. Appellants argue the district court erred when it relied on

the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness under Minnesota Statutes section

260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4) (2022), to terminate their parental rights to this child, when

their appeal from the prior involuntary termination relating to two older children that gave

rise to the statutory presumption was still pending. Additionally, appellants argue that the

district court erred in its determinations that they did not rebut the presumption of palpable

unfitness, that reasonable efforts were made to reunite the family, and that termination of

parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

                                          FACTS

       Appellants R.V.M. (mother) and J.R.M. (father) are married and have three

biological children. On July 14, 2023, the district court terminated appellants’ parental

rights to their first two children, A.M. and C.M. Among other findings and conclusions,

the district court concluded that C.M. suffered egregious harm while in appellants’ care


                                              2
and terminated appellants’ parental rights under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301,

subdivision 1(b)(6). In a four-month period, C.M.’s injuries included a fractured femur,

two fractured ribs, three skull fractures, a brain bruise, brain bleeds, and bruises to the head

and back. The district court found that appellants were among six possible abusers and

appellants knew or should have known of C.M.’s injuries. Mother appealed on July 28,

2023. Father appealed on August 1, 2023. The appeals were consolidated on August 1,

2023.

        Approximately three days after mother appealed, she gave birth to a third child,

H.M., (the child) who is the subject of this appeal. Police placed the child on a 72-hour-

hold immediately after birth.

        On August 1, 2023, respondent Blue Earth County Human Services (the county)

petitioned the district court to terminate appellants’ parental rights to the third child. The

termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) petition alleged that, based on the statutory

presumption in section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4), appellants were palpably unfit to be

parties to the parent-child relationship because their parental rights to their first two

children were involuntarily terminated.

        On August 2, 2023, the child was discharged from the hospital and placed in foster

care. The same day, the parties appeared for an emergency protective care (EPC) hearing.

The county moved to be relieved of reunification efforts. The district court noted the

pending appeal and ordered the county to make reasonable efforts towards reunification.

In the order following the EPC hearing, the district court ordered the county to file a case

plan.


                                               3
         On August 15, 2023, the parties appeared for an admit-deny hearing. Appellants

denied the allegations in the petition and the parties discussed scheduling the matter for

trial. The court and parties discussed the pending appeal of the prior termination and noted

that oral argument would be scheduled. The county attorney stated, “I don’t know if there

is an ability to stay this TPR to hold off on it pending until the appeal is settled because

should something happen on that appeal that disrupts that termination that would obviously

impact the presumption that exists.” Appellants’ counsel informed the district court that

appellants would waive any timelines and requested “that the trial be set out as long as it

can be.” The district court requested appellants file something with the court indicating

that they agree to waiving any timelines. Appellants later filed correspondence stating they

agreed to waive the timelines for a trial based on good cause and the best interests of the

child.

         On September 8, 2023, the parties appeared for a pretrial hearing. The district court

noted that trial must be scheduled within 60 days of the admit-deny hearing and asked the

parties for any legal authority that would allow appellants to waive this timeline. 1

         Neither party provided any authority to waive the timelines and the district court

moved forward with scheduling trial. The parties never applied to stay the prior order




1
  See Minn. Stat. § 260C.509 (2022) (providing that a trial required under Minnesota
Statutes section 260C.163 (2022) shall be commenced within 60 days of the admit-deny
hearing); see also Minn. R. Juv. Pro. P. 58.01, subd. 1 (“A trial regarding a permanency or
termination of parental rights matter shall commence within 60 days of the first admit/deny
hearing.”).

                                               4
terminating appellants’ parental rights to their first two children. Minn. Stat. § 260C.415,

subd. 1 (2022); Minn. R. Juv. Pro. P. 23.03.

       On September 25, 2023, the parties appeared for an additional pretrial hearing. The

county social worker reported that the child was attending visits three times a week with

appellants, that appellants had physicals scheduled to address any health concerns, and that

she met with appellants to develop goals for their case plans. The social worker reported

she had the case plans drafted, provided a copy to mother, and was going to provide copies

to appellants’ counsel. The district court directed the county to provide the case plans to

appellants’ counsel by the end of the business day. The case plans were not filed with the

district court and are not included in the record on appeal.

       On October 10, 2023, the parties appeared for a court trial. The county updated the

district court, informing it that oral argument had not been scheduled for the appeal on the

prior termination.    The district court received two exhibits: Exhibit 1—the order

terminating the parental rights to A.M. and C.M.—and Exhibit 2—a medical record from

the child’s birth. Based on the prior TPR order, the district court found that the presumption

of palpable unfitness applied under Minnesota Statute section 260C.301, subdivision

1(b)(4), and it was appellants’ burden to produce evidence to rebut the presumption.

       Appellants testified to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness. Appellants

described their relationship and interaction with the child, including details about the

child’s birth, and attending medical appointments and supervised visits. Appellants also

testified about items on their case plans, including their housing, employment,

transportation, and health. Appellants described their home as clean and free of hazards


                                               5
and testified that they had all the necessary items to care for the child. Appellants discussed

completing a parenting capacity assessment and starting a parenting class.

       Mother testified about her mental health, including therapy, medication

management, and coping skills. She stated she would like to attend trauma therapy, get

her GED, and work on stress management.             Father testified that he had a therapy

appointment scheduled, was willing to complete a medication evaluation, and had a

physical examination scheduled to address his physical-health symptoms.

       The county called the guardian ad litem (GAL) and social worker as witnesses. The

social worker testified about her contact with appellants and the supervised visits, and she

described the child’s relationship with her siblings. The social worker testified that

appellants have not sufficiently addressed the concerns raised in the prior TPR and that the

current TPR was in the child’s best interest. The GAL testified that she was not aware of

any significant changes the appellants made following the previous TPR to allow them to

safely parent the child, and that TPR was in the child’s best interest.

       The district court did not make credibility findings about any of the testimony.

Following the court trial, the district court terminated appellants’ parental rights based on

the presumption of palpable unfitness and found that the child’s best interests in

maintaining a relationship with her siblings and growing up in a safe environment

outweighed her interests in maintaining a parent-child relationship with appellants. The

district court concluded that appellants did not rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness

in part because they “failed to show they are currently suitable to be entrusted with the care

of [the child] without acknowledgment of the egregious harm to [C.M.] and how they


                                              6
would work together and with various services to ensure egregious harm would never come

to [the child].”

       Mother and father appeal. 2

                                          ISSUES

I.     Did the district court err by applying the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness
       pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 260C.301 subdivision 1(b)(4), while the
       appeal of the prior TPR order was pending?

II.    Did the district court violate appellants’ right to due process by applying the
       statutory presumption of palpable unfitness pursuant to Minnesota Statute section
       260C.301 subdivision 1(b)(4), before the completion of the appeal process in the
       prior TPR?

III.   Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion for a
       continuance pending the completion of the appeal process in the prior TPR?

IV.    Did the district court erroneously consider the underlying grounds for the previous
       termination when addressing whether appellants rebutted the statutory presumption
       of palpable unfitness?

V.     Did the district court err by finding that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite
       the family and correct the conditions that led to out-of-home placement?

VI.    Did the district court abuse its discretion by finding that termination of parental
       rights was in the child’s best interest?




2
 While these appeals were pending, this court affirmed the termination of mother’s and
father’s parental rights to the first two children. In re Welfare of Children of R.V.M.,
No. A23-1103, 

 (Minn. App. Feb. 5, 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 12,
2024).




                                              7
                                        ANALYSIS

       Parental rights may be terminated only for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re

Welfare of M.D.O., 

 (Minn. 1990). We affirm the district court’s

termination of parental rights if: (1) one of the statutory bases for terminating parental

rights exists; (2) reasonable efforts toward reunification were made or were not required;

and (3) termination is in the child’s best interests. Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.301, subds. 1(b),

7, 8, .317, subd. 1 (2022); In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 

(Minn. 2008). In reviewing the district court’s order terminating parental rights, we review

the underlying factual findings for clear error. S.E.P., 

. We review

the district court’s ultimate decision whether to terminate parental rights for an abuse of

discretion. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 

 (Minn. App. 2012).

I.     The district court did not err by applying the statutory presumption of
       palpable unfitness pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 260C.301,
       subdivision 1(b)(4), while the appeal of the prior TPR order was pending.

       First, we address appellants’ argument that there was no statutory basis to terminate

appellants’ parental rights. Appellants argue that this court should read section 260C.301,

subdivision 1(b)(4), to require that an appeal of a prior order terminating parental rights be

complete before that order can trigger the statutory presumption. Based on this reading of

the statute, appellants then assert that this court should rule that, because the appeal of the

prior TPR order was not complete here, no prior termination of parental rights existed to

trigger the presumption of palpable unfitness.

       “Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” In re

Welfare of Child of S.B.G., 

, 884 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). “Under


                                              8
the de novo standard, we do not defer to the analysis of the courts below, but instead we

exercise independent review.” 

 (quotation omitted). When engaging in statutory

interpretation, we first determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.

 A statute is ambiguous when its language is subject to more than one reasonable

interpretation. Id.; In re Welfare of Child of J.D.T, 

, 327 (Minn. 2020).

         In interpreting statutory language, we give words and phrases their plain and

ordinary meaning. In re Fin. Resp. for Out-of-Home Placement of S.M., 

 (Minn. 2012); see also Rodriguez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 

 (Minn. 2019) (“We construe words and phrases ‘according to rules of grammar and

according to their common and approved usage.’”) (quoting State v. Riggs, 

 (Minn. 2015))). We will not disregard a statute’s clear language to pursue the

spirit of the law. J.D.T., 946 N.W.2d at 327. If a statute is unambiguous, we apply the

statutory language. Id. If the statute is ambiguous, “then we may apply the canons of

construction to resolve the ambiguity.” State v. Thonesavanh, 

 (Minn.

2017).

         The relevant part of the statute states: “It is presumed that a parent is palpably unfit

to be a party to the parent and child relationship upon a showing that the parent’s parental

rights to one or more other children were involuntarily terminated . . . .” Minn. Stat.

§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (emphasis added).            Appellants argue that the statute is

ambiguous because “showing” is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.

Appellants argue that the statute could mean that a prior termination under appeal is final




                                                9
for the purposes of the statutory presumption, or it could mean that the entire appellate

process must first be completed for the statutory presumption to apply. We disagree.

       The plain meaning of “showing” is inconsistent with appellants’ argument that the

appellate process must be complete.        The word “showing,” as used in the statute,

establishes that there is a condition needed to trigger statutory presumption of palpable

unfitness. That is, the statute authorizes the district court to presume that a parent is

palpably unfit upon a determination that their parental rights to one or more children were

involuntarily terminated.

       Although the legislature has not defined “showing,” we conclude that the statutory

language is sufficiently clear on its face and unambiguous for us to conclude that a prior

district court order involuntarily terminating a parent’s parental rights can constitute a

“showing that the parent’s parental rights to one or more other children were involuntarily

terminated” under Minnesota Statute section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4). Appellants’

request that we read the statute in a way that would require us to add words and meaning

to the statute.   See E.M.B., 987 N.W.2d at 601.         But we cannot add words to an

unambiguous statute under the guise of statutory interpretation. County of Dakota v.

Cameron, 

 (Minn. 2013); see also Great River Energy, 860 N.W.2d

at 364 (stating that we cannot add words to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently

omitted). “[W]hen a question of statutory construction involves a failure of expression

rather than an ambiguity of expression, courts are not free to substitute amendment for

construction and thereby supply the omissions of the legislature.” E.M.B., 987 N.W.2d

at 601 (quotation omitted); Reiter v. Kiffmeyer, 

 (Minn. 2006) (“And


                                             10
we will not read into a statute a provision that the legislature has omitted, either purposely

or inadvertently.”).

       In essence, appellants’ position is that their parental rights are not terminated until

the appellate process is complete. By contrast, the county argues that an order terminating

parental rights is effective immediately, unless that order is stayed. We agree with the

county.

       Minnesota Statutes section 260C.415 (2022), regarding stays of orders pending

appeal, states, in relevant part:

               An appeal may be taken by the aggrieved person from a final
               order of the juvenile court affecting a substantial right of the
               aggrieved person, including but not limited to an order
               adjudging a child to be in need of protection or services,
               neglected and in foster care . . . . The order of the juvenile
               court shall stand, pending the determination of the appeal, but
               the reviewing court may in its discretion and upon application
               stay the order.

Minn. Stat § 260C.415, subd. 1 (emphasis added); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 23.03

(“The service and filing of a notice of appeal does not stay the order of the juvenile court.”).

Appellants argue that this statute does not address when a termination is effective and

absent language addressing the effectiveness of a termination this court should hold that a

termination is effective upon the completion of the appellate process and the presumption

of palpable unfitness should not apply. We disagree.

       Minnesota Statutes section 260C.415, subdivision 1, states that an appeal may be

taken from “a final order” and the order of the juvenile court shall stand pending a request

for a stay. Appellants have not identified any authority that an order terminating parental



                                              11
rights does not generate a presumption of palpable unfitness to be a party to the parent-

child relationship until the conclusion of the appeal process. To the contrary, section

260C.415, subdivision 1, notes that a final order of the district court remains in effect unless

a party applies for a stay and the court grants that relief. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.415,

subd. l (stating order stands pending appellate determination absent court staying order);

see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 23.03 (explaining filing appeal does not stay order appealed

and describing process for obtaining stay); cf. Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co,

 (Minn. 2007) (“Accordingly, we reaffirm our prior decisions that,

for res judicata purposes, a judgment becomes final when it is entered in the district court

and it remains final, despite a pending appeal, until it is reversed, vacated or otherwise

modified.”). Therefore, absent a stay pending the prior appeal, that order was effective

during pendency of that appeal.

       We conclude “showing” is unambiguous because the statute states that the “order

of the juvenile court shall stand.” Minn. Stat § 260C.415, subd. 1. There is no indication

that the legislature contemplated that an appeal of a prior TPR must be complete before the

rebuttable presumption of palpable unfitness applies. Therefore, the prior termination

order, even when appealed, is a “showing” under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4),

and the presumption of palpable unfitness applies.

       The district court’s July 14, 2023 order terminating appellants’ parental rights was

a final, appealable order. See In re Welfare of L.M.M., 

 (Minn. App.

1985) (holding that order terminating parental rights is final and appealable), rev. denied

(Minn. Oct. 18, 1985). During the pendency of the appeal of the prior order, appellants’


                                              12
parental rights were involuntarily terminated, and they did not apply for and there was no

stay of the prior order. The district court found that, because there was no stay of the prior

TPR order, the TPR order was in effect and the presumption of palpable unfitness applied.

Therefore, the district court did not err by applying the rebuttable presumption of palpable

unfitness as a statutory basis for termination of their parental rights in this case when the

prior TPR was pending appeal.

II.    The district court did not violate appellants’ right to due process by applying
       the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness before the completion of the
       appeals process in the prior TPR.

       Appellants assert that the district court violated their right to due process by

applying the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness before the completion of the

appeals process in the prior TPR.

       Appellants’ attorneys did not argue before the district court that applying the

statutory presumption of palpable unfitness prior to the completion of the appeals process

in the prior TPR would violate the parents’ right to due process. 3 Because appellants did


3
  At the EPC hearing mother’s attorney stated that the prior case was under appeal. On
August 15, 2023, at the admit-deny hearing the county attorney admitted that, “should
something happen on that appeal that disrupts that termination that would obviously impact
the presumption that exists.” Father’s attorney, who was appearing for both parents, asked
for visits and to waive the timeline, entered denials, and did not raise the due-process issue.
On September 8, 2023, at the first pretrial hearing the district court discussed the timelines
and requested the parties provide legal authority to waive the timelines. At the second
pretrial on September 25, 2023, father’s counsel requested the county withdraw the TPR
petition so that the parties can work a case plan while the appeal is underway. At trial,
mother testified about the appeal and its effect on her bond with the child. In post-trial
briefing the district court received a proposed order that stated, “it is inappropriate to
terminate their parental rights to the child before a decision in their appeal in the prior case
is made.” Appellants did not specifically argue that due process necessitated a continuance.
The district court declined to continue the hearing, in part because of the strict timelines.

                                              13
not present their due-process argument to the district court, we conclude that appellants

forfeited this argument. See In re Welfare of Child of Coats, 

 (Minn.

2001) (providing that appellate courts “consider only those issues that were presented and

considered by the [district] court”); In re Welfare of C.L.L., 

 (Minn.

1981) (declining to address a constitutional issue raised for the first time on appeal from a

termination of parental rights); see also In re Welfare of Children of D.F., 

 (Minn. App. 2008) (concluding that a due-process argument in a TPR appeal was not

properly before this court when the argument was not made before the district court); In re

Welfare of A.L.F., 

 (Minn. App. 1998) (stating that [e]ven in the

context of termination of parental rights, failure to raise constitutional issues in the district

court precluded the issues from being raised on appeal”).

III.   The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’ motion
       for a continuance of their TPR trial pending completion of the appeal process
       in the prior TPR.

       Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion when it misapplied

Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Protection Procedure 5.01, subdivision 2, and did not grant

their continuance. Appellants argue that the district court did not address whether it was

in the child’s best interest to continue the trial for more than a week. A district court may

continue a TPR trial upon findings made on the record that “a continuance is necessary for

the protection of the child, for accumulation or presentation of evidence or witnesses, to

protect the rights of a party, or for other good cause shown, so long as the permanency time

requirements set forth in these rules are not delayed.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.01, subd. 2.

It is within the district court’s discretion whether to grant a continuance, and absent a


                                               14
showing of a clear abuse of discretion, this court will not reverse it. In re Welfare of J.A.S.,

 (Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992). Here, the

parties appeared at a hearing on September 8, 2023, at which time the parties requested

that the trial be continued until the resolution of the appeal in the prior TPR, and appellants

noted they would waive the timelines outlined in the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile

Protection Procedure. The district court found that neither party provided any legal

authority to delay the court trial or to allow appellants to “waive” the timelines outlined in

the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure, and based on that denied the

continuance request and set the matter for trial. Under the circumstances of this case, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' continuance request based

on the delay of the permanency timeline. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 5.01, subd. 1.

IV.    The district court did not err by considering the underlying grounds for the
       previous termination in determining whether appellants rebutted the statutory
       presumption.

       Appellants challenge the district court’s conclusion that they failed to rebut the

presumption of palpable unfitness. We review de novo whether a parent has rebutted the

presumption that they are palpably unfit to parent. In re Welfare of Child of J.A.K., 

, 246 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2018).

       Under Minnesota Statute section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4), the district court

must presume that a parent is palpably unfit if there is a showing that a parent’s rights to

another child was previously involuntarily terminated. The statutory presumption is

“easily rebuttable.” Id. at 245 (quotation omitted). A parent may rebut the presumption of

palpable unfitness by producing evidence that would be sufficient to justify a finding of


                                              15
fact that the parent is not palpably unfit. Id.; at 246; see also In re Welfare of Child of

R.D.L., 

 (Minn. 2014) (“[T]he parent needs to produce only enough

evidence to support a finding that the parent is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the

children.” (quotation omitted)).

       If a parent introduces evidence in an attempt to rebut the statutory presumption, a

district court must determine whether the evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of

fact as to whether the parent is palpably unfit. J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at 246. “Whether the

evidence satisfies the burden of production is determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id.

(quotation omitted). To analyze whether a parent rebutted the statutory presumption, the

district court should consider the evidence submitted by the parent(s) without weighing it

against any contrary evidence. See In re Welfare of Child of J.W., 

(Minn. App. 2011) (concluding that the parent’s evidence, “if believed,” would support a

finding that the parent was not palpably unfit and that the evidence was therefore sufficient

to rebut the statutory presumption), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).

       Because the presumption of palpable unfitness is based on a prior involuntary

termination of parental rights, it was necessary for the district court to consider whether

appellants produced evidence related to the findings from the previous termination. See

J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at 246-48 (examining the grounds supporting prior termination of




                                             16
mother’s parental rights in determining whether mother rebutted the presumption of

palpable unfitness). 4

       We conclude that the district court did not err in determining that appellants did not

rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness because appellants did not produce sufficient

evidence to support a finding that they were suitable to be entrusted with the care of the

child, when considering the finding of egregious harm in the prior termination proceeding.

       In the TPR order, the district court discussed the presumption and appellants’

attempt to rebut the presumption. The district court noted that appellants’ parental rights

to two older children were previously involuntarily terminated because: (1) one of the

children, C.M., experienced egregious harm, including fractures and bruises to various

parts of his body while in appellants’ care, and appellants knew or should have known that

C.M. experienced egregious harm while in their care; (2) appellants substantially,

continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with duties imposed upon the

parent by the parent-child relationship because they did not provide for the children’s

medical, educational, and other needs; and (3) appellants were palpably unfit to be a party

to the parent-child relationship because of a consistent pattern of a failure to protect the




4
  We addressed this issue in a nonprecedential opinion, In re Welfare of Child of J.B.-M.,
No. A19-0902, 

, at *3-4 (Minn. App. Dec. 24, 2007), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 18, 2008), and held that in order to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness,
evidence of the previous termination is relevant and necessary to determine whether the
parent is fit to be entrusted with the care of the child because he or she has addressed the
condition or conditions that led to the previous termination. Although not precedential, we
find the reasoning in J.B.-M. to be persuasive. See State v. Roy, 

(Minn. App. 2009) (adopting reasoning from unpublished case).

                                             17
children from harmful or injurious situations. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2),

(4), (6).

        Here, appellants attempted to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness by

producing the following evidence. Appellants testified that they have made changes in

their lives since the prior involuntary termination. Since the child that is the subject of this

appeal was removed from their care, appellants attended regular supervised visits. Mother

attended the supervised visits three times per week and missed one visit due to illness.

Father missed additional visits due to his work schedule and physical health. Appellants

discussed using a communication log to communicate with the foster parents about any

concerns. Appellants attended the child’s first well-child checkup and mother attended the

second well-child checkup. Appellants completed a parenting capacity assessment and

signed up for a parenting education course. Mother attended one session and father had

not attended a session.

        Appellants moved to a three-bedroom home and signed a year-long lease.

Appellants testified the home had no safety hazards and they had items to baby-proof the

home and care for an infant. Mother testified she was a licensed driver, and her vehicle

was paid-off and insured. Father testified that he did not have a driver’s license but relied

on mother for transportation and was willing to take the steps to get his license. Appellants

testified they had no interactions with law enforcement since the prior termination.

        At the time of trial, mother was recently employed on the night shift. Mother

testified that she talked to her employer and, if reunited with the child, her schedule would

change to the day shift, so they can receive childcare assistance. Father testified that he


                                              18
was not employed but was expecting a call back from mother’s employer and would be

employed at the same place as mother.

       Appellants testified about working on their health issues. Mother testified she

attended therapy regularly, had a diagnostic assessment, and was working on addressing

life stressors and coping strategies with her therapist. Mother also testified that she was

working with her providers to find the right medication and that medication assisted her

with her parenting because it helped with focus, anxiety, and tiredness. Father agreed with

his mental-health diagnoses and was willing to attend a stress- or anger-management

program and complete a medication evaluation.            Father had a therapy appointment

scheduled for a few days after trial.

       The district court determined that appellants did not meet their burden of production

and failed to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness. Appellants did not introduce any

evidence as to how they would prevent the child from suffering the same egregious harm

found in the previous TPR action; further, appellants failed to raise or mention the previous

egregious harm in their testimony.

       The district court’s detailed findings show that the district court made the essential

determinations to support termination of appellants’ parental rights. The district court

specifically stated that appellants failed to meet their burden of production at trial regarding

the egregious harm suffered by C.M. because they, “failed to introduce any evidence as to

how [appellants] would prevent the child from suffering the same egregious harm that

[C.M.] suffered; further, [appellants] failed to raise or mention the harm C.M. faced at all.”

As it relates to egregious harm the district court also determined:(1) neither mother nor


                                              19
father acknowledged the injuries to C.M. that formed the basis for the egregious harm

finding or stated how they intended to prevent injury to a baby in their care; (2) mother did

not address the previous findings of egregious harm in the prior TPR and did not testify as

to how she would protect the child from physical harm, how she would manage stress while

raising a newborn, or who she would allow to watch and/or care for her newborn in her

absence; (3) father had not completed a comprehensive chemical-use assessment and had

not begun any courses for stress or anger management; (4) appellants provided conflicting

testimony regarding how they intended to provide care for the child if both of them were

at work; (5) appellants’ testimony did not address how potentially placing their newborn in

daycare would prevent her from experiencing the same egregious physical harm

experienced by C.M.; (6) appellants’ testimony did not address how the child would be

protected from family members, particularly in light of specific findings that the perpetrator

of the egregious harm was unknown but was likely one of six individuals: appellants,

mother’s parents, mother’s minor brother, or father’s mother; and (7) appellants did not

provide any testimony about any support system they had to assist them in providing care,

whether family members would be allowed to see the child, and how appellants would

protect the child from experiencing egregious harm.

       Appellants introduced evidence that in the short time between the two TPR actions

(less than three months), they made progress. But based on the evidence in the record, and

in particular their failure to address the underlying facts regarding the egregious harm

underlying the first TPR, the record supports the district court’s determination that the

evidence appellants produced at trial was insufficient to rebut the presumption of palpable


                                             20
unfitness. Although appellants produced evidence about their mental health and home

environment, appellants did not introduce evidence to address the finding of egregious

harm in the prior termination, elaborate on how they would prevent the child from

experiencing egregious harm in their care, or explain who they would protect the child

from. Even when we take everything the appellants say as true, it is not sufficient to

overcome the presumption of palpable unfitness because they have not addressed the

underlying reasons for the original termination.

       In making the determination that the parents failed to rebut their burden, the district

court accurately articulated the statutory presumption, and discussed the “easily rebuttable”

nature of the statutory presumption. The district court accurately applied the correct

standard when analyzing whether the parents produced sufficient evidence to rebut the

palpable-unfitness presumption. See J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at 248. When considering the

underlying facts of egregious harm in the previous termination, we conclude appellants did

not produce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness. Thus, the

district court did not err by concluding that appellants failed to rebut the presumption that

they are palpably unfit to parent.

V.     The district court did not err by finding that the county made reasonable
       efforts to reunite the family and correct the conditions that led to out-of-home
       placement.

       Appellants argue that the district court erred by finding that the county made

reasonable efforts because the county did not file case plans with the district court and thus

the efforts were neither timely nor reasonable.




                                             21
       In granting a TPR petition, a district court must “make findings and conclusions as

to the provision of reasonable efforts” by the county. 

(h) (2022).

Reasonable efforts “for rehabilitation and reunification are always required” until the

district court determines that the county has filed a petition stating a prima facie case that

one of five situations exists justifying cessation of such efforts. 

 “The district court

must also consider how long the county was involved and the quality of its efforts.” In re

Welfare of Child of J.H., 

, 601 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec.

6, 2021). “[W]hat constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ depends on the facts of each case.” 

We review factual findings for clear error. S.E.P., 

.

       If a county determines that a child must be removed from a parent, the county “shall

. . . prepare an out-of-home placement plan addressing the conditions that each parent must

meet before the child can be in that parent’s day-to-day care.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.219,

subd. 1(c)(1) (2022). “An out-of-home placement plan means a written document . . .

prepared . . . jointly with the child’s parent . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 1(b)

(2022). The plan shall be signed by the parent, submitted to the court for approval, and

explained to all persons involved in its implementation. Id. It is important for the case

plan to be filed with the court to allow the county and the parents to engage with the court

about what aspects of the case plan are reasonable under the circumstances. See S.E.P.,

 (“[O]nce a case plan has been approved by the court, the appropriate

action for a parent who believes some aspect of the case plan to be unreasonable is to ask

the court to change it . . . .”).




                                             22
         When reasonable efforts are required, the county cannot arrogate to itself the

authority to not provide a statutorily required plan. See In re Welfare of Child of T.R., 

 (Minn. 2008) (“The [c]ounty may not unilaterally determine that

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate a parent and reunify a parent and child would be futile;

the [c]ounty must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate a parent and reunify a parent and

child until such time as the district court determines that reasonable efforts are not

required.”).

         Yet, a lack of a filed case plan is not dispositive. “[F]ailure to provide [a written

case plan] does not automatically warrant reversal if the circumstances render the lack of

a case plan excusable.” In re Welfare of Children of A.R.B., 

, 898 (Minn.

App. 2018). A failure to provide a timely written plan is reversible error however, if

parents have not been informed of, or do not understand, the conditions they must satisfy

to achieve reunification. See In re Welfare of Copus, 

 (Minn. App.

1984).

         Here, the district court found that in a short period of time, the county set up

supervised parenting time, engaged in case planning, provided referrals to services, and

maintained regular contact with appellants. The district court found the county was making

reasonable reunification efforts despite the prior termination based upon egregious harm.

These findings are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.

         Regarding the case plans, the district court determined that mother participated in

developing a case plan, did not sign the case plan, and several items on the case plan were

not completed at the time of trial. The district court determined that father had input in


                                              23
creating his case plan and discussed the recommendations outlined in his case plan. The

record demonstrates that the county engaged in case planning with appellants, appellants

participated in a case-planning meeting, and appellants contributed to the development of

their case-plan goals. Mother testified that she participated in developing the case plan and

testified she had a copy at her house. Father also testified about items in his case plan.

There is nothing in the record suggesting that appellants did not have case plans or did not

understand the conditions of their case plans.

       Furthermore, appellants did not raise this issue with the district court. See Thiele v.

Stich, 

 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts generally address

only those questions previously presented to and considered by the district court). Thus,

based on these circumstances and our review of the record, the district court’s finding that

the county made reasonable efforts is not clearly erroneous and the county’s failure to file

the case plans does not require reversal.

VI.    The district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that there was clear
       and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the child’s
       best interest.

       Appellants argue that the district court erred by ruling that termination of parental

rights was in the child’s best interest. If a district court determines that a statutory ground

for termination exists, it must also determine that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In re Welfare the Child of J.R.B., 

 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied

(Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). We review a district court’s conclusion that termination of parental

rights is in a child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion. 

 We give “considerable




                                              24
deference to the district court’s findings” because the analysis requires credibility

determinations. J.K.T., 

.

       To evaluate the best interests of a child in a proceeding to terminate parental rights,

a district court must consider “(1) the child’s interests in preserving the parent-child

relationship; (2) the parent’s interests in preserving the parent-child relationship; and

(3) any competing interests of the child.” In re Welfare Child of A.M.C., 

 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotation omitted); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii)

(enumerating these factors). “Competing interests include health considerations, a stable

environment, and the child’s preference.” J.K.T., 

. The interests of the

children, not the parents, predominate in termination matters. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,

subd. 7 (2022) (providing that when a statutory basis to terminate parental rights is present,

“the best interests of the child must be the paramount consideration).” “[A] parent’s love

and desire to care for her children does not outweigh her children’s needs for basic care

and adequate nutrition.” In re Welfare of Children of K.S.F., 

 (Minn.

App. 2012).

       The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the competing

interest of the child, specifically the child’s safety, outweighed the interests in preserving

the parent-child relationship. The district court considered that appellants and the child

had an interest in preserving the parent-child relationship. The district court found that

appellants “testified that they are successful in comforting [the child], that [the child]

smiles at them, and is able to sleep in their presence.” The district court considered the




                                             25
testimony of the GAL that the parent-child relationship and the child’s connection to

appellants would be permanently severed.

       The district court also considered the child’s competing interests. The district court

weighed the testimony of the GAL and social worker that appellants have not addressed

the cause of the egregious harm that led to the prior termination of parental rights, and that

the child is vulnerable and needs a caregiver who is safe, stable, chemical free, and aware

of their parenting strengths and weaknesses. The district court did not ignore appellants’

positive testimony, but thoroughly explained how, when considering all the evidence,

appellants’ testimony was insufficient to address the previous finding of egregious harm

and the district court’s concerns for the child’s safety.

       Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion because the district court

carefully considered the evidence and determined that the child’s need for a safe, stable

environment outweighed the child’s and appellants’ interest in preserving the parent-child

relationship.

                                         DECISION

       The district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating appellants’ parental

rights. The prior order terminating appellants’ parental rights to C.M. and A.M was a

showing that appellants’ rights to one or more children had been involuntarily terminated

under Minnesota Statute section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4). Therefore, there was a

statutory basis for termination and appellants were presumed to be palpably unfit parents.

Upon our review of the record, parents did not meet their burden of production to produce

sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness. The appellants forfeited


                                              26
its argument that the district court violated their right to due process by applying the

statutory presumption of palpable unfitness before the completion of the appeals process

in the prior TPR because appellants did not present their due-process argument to the

district court. Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants

request for a continuance based on the delay to the permanency timeline. Additionally, we

conclude the county’s failure to file the case plans is not reversible error under the

circumstances and the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that termination

of parental rights was in the child’s best interests.

       Affirmed.




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