This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                        Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                                 STATE OF MINNESOTA
                                 IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                       A23-0830

                                     State of Minnesota,
                                        Respondent,

                                             vs.

                                    Bjorn Bolton Iverson,
                                         Appellant.

                                    Filed June 17, 2024
                      Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
                                        Slieter, Judge

                               Hennepin County District Court
                                 File No. 27-CR-21-20374

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

       Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge;

and Slieter, Judge.

                             NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SLIETER, Judge

       In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction for possession of pornographic

works, appellant argues that the district court erred by allowing the state to introduce

evidence discovered during an additional search of appellant’s computer hard drive nearly
two years after it was first seized and searched by police.         Alternatively, appellant

challenges his sentences, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by imposing

upward durational departures. Because the district court acted within its discretion by

allowing the state to introduce evidence found on appellant’s hard drive, we affirm in part.

But, because the district court failed to explain why creating the pornographic works

provided a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the presumptive sentence for

their possession, we reverse in part and remand for resentencing.

                                         FACTS

       In 2019, law enforcement seized a computer hard drive belonging to appellant Bjorn

Bolton Iverson pursuant to a search warrant. The hard drive contained child pornography.

Iverson subsequently pleaded guilty to several counts of possessing child pornography. 1

Law enforcement retained possession of the hard drive.

       In 2021, M.K. contacted the Plymouth Police Department and reported that Iverson

had sex with her in 2017, when she was 15 years old. M.K. also reported that Iverson

recorded having sex with her after she turned 16 years old. After taking M.K.’s statement,

law enforcement searched Iverson’s hard drive again and found at least six videos of

Iverson engaging in various sex acts with M.K. Respondent State of Minnesota charged

Iverson with criminal sexual conduct in violation of 

, subd. 1(b)

(2016), and two counts of possessing child pornography in violation of 

, subd. 4(a) (Supp. 2019). The state also noticed their intent to seek aggravated


1
 This court affirmed Iverson’s sentences in 2022. State v. Iverson, No. A21-1341, 

 (Minn. App. Sept. 6, 2022) (Iverson I), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 23, 2022).

                                             2
sentences on the possession of child pornography counts based on the fact that Iverson had

created the pornographic works he was charged with possessing. The case proceeded to a

jury trial in 2022.

       At the start of trial, Iverson moved in limine to prevent the state from introducing

evidence from the hard drive because law enforcement did not obtain a new warrant to

search it a second time. Iverson did not, on the record or in writing, support the motion

with any legal authority. The district court denied the motion, stating that it was unaware

of any authority supporting Iverson’s request particularly because the hard drive remained

in law enforcement custody following an earlier warranted search of its contents.

       Iverson waived his right to have a jury decide whether the state proved the

aggravating factor it claimed supports departure and to, instead, have the court make that

determination. The jury found Iverson guilty as charged. On the count of criminal sexual

conduct, the district court sentenced Iverson to 144 months’ imprisonment. For the two

counts of possessing child pornography, the district court sentenced Iverson to consecutive

30-month prison terms, which reflects an upward durational departure from the

presumptive guidelines sentence of 15-month prison terms.

       Iverson appeals.

                                       DECISION

I.     The district court acted within its discretion by allowing the state to introduce
       evidence found on the hard drive.

       Iverson argues that the district court erred by allowing the state to introduce

evidence found on the hard drive, claiming that law enforcement needed a new warrant to



                                            3
search it a second time. As an initial matter, Iverson frames this issue as if this court were

reviewing a pretrial motion to suppress. But Iverson made no motion to suppress the

evidence found on the hard drive; rather, the issue was raised on the first day of trial

in limine as an evidentiary issue.

       “Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and we

will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Ali, 

 (Minn. 2014). We, therefore, consider whether the district court abused

its discretion by allowing the state to present the evidence obtained from the hard drive.

       Iverson’s in limine motion asked “[f]or an order precluding the State from

introducing the videos, displaying the alleged copulation before the jury,” and argued that

“[t]he police officer view[ed] this video in contravention of a search warrant and Mr.

Iverson’s constitutional right to privacy.” The district court denied the request, reasoning:

              [O]nce you have some type of property, like it’s a car, you can
              search the car, for instance. If you’re looking for a gun because
              that’s the basis for the search warrant and you find drugs, that’s
              legitimately recovered evidence that can be used. I see this as
              relatively similar to that.

The district court also noted that it was not aware of any law requiring law enforcement to

obtain a second warrant before searching items lawfully in its custody. Iverson did not

provide the district court with any legal authority supporting his request. Because Iverson

failed to support the motion with any legal authority, the district court acted within its

discretion by allowing the state to introduce the evidence obtained from the hard drive.

       On appeal, Iverson argues that the second search of the hard drive violated his

Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches. This court reviewed a substantially


                                              4
similar claim in State v. Johnson. 

 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied

(Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).      As in this case, Johnson involved a subsequent forensic

examination of a hard drive that had been previously seized and searched pursuant to a

valid warrant. 

 And, as with this case, both forensic examinations in Johnson sought

evidence of child pornography. 

 In Johnson, this court considered “whether appellant

retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a hard drive after the drive

and data were seized pursuant to a search warrant authorizing a seizure of that drive and

search of its contents.” 

. This court explained that a person’s expectation of

privacy in property is terminated when that property is seized pursuant to a warrant. 

. Because a person does not have an expectation of privacy in seized property,

subsequent forensic analysis of the seized property does “not amount to a second ‘search’

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” 

 (citation omitted). Law enforcement’s

subsequent analysis of the hard drive, therefore, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

       Iverson asks this court to overrule Johnson. The U.S. Supreme Court case in which

Iverson relies on involved an individual who retained a Fourth Amendment privacy interest

in the searched device, whereas Iverson no longer had a privacy interest in a device which

had been seized pursuant to a warrant and was in police custody. Riley v. California, 

, 392-93 (2014). We, therefore, decline the request.

II.    The district court erred by imposing an upward durational departure without
       providing an adequate reason to depart.

       “[A] sentencing court can exercise its discretion to depart from the guidelines only

if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present and those circumstances provide a



                                             5
substantial and compelling reason not to impose a guidelines sentence.” State v. Soto, 

 (Minn. 2014) (quotations and citations omitted). We review de novo

“whether a particular reason for an upward departure is permissible. . . .          Once we

determine as a matter of law that the district court has identified proper grounds justifying

a challenged departure, we review its decision whether to depart for an abuse of discretion.”

Dillon v. State, 

 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted), rev. denied

(Minn. July 20, 2010).

       Iverson challenges his aggravated sentences on two grounds. First, he claims that

the district court erred by imposing aggravated sentences without first finding that the state

had proved beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factor supporting departure.

Second, Iverson challenges the reason for departure, claiming that the district court failed

to provide a permissible justification for aggravating his sentences. We begin, and end,

our analysis with Iverson’s second claim.

       A district court may exceed the maximum sentence authorized by the facts

established by a guilty verdict if “there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling

circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2019). Thus, there

are two requirements for imposing an upward durational departure: “(1) a factual finding

that there exist one or more circumstances not reflected in the guilty verdict or guilty plea,

and (2) an explanation by the district court as to why those circumstances create a

substantial and compelling reason to impose a sentence outside the range on the grid.”

State v. Rourke, 

 (Minn. 2009).




                                              6
       The state sought aggravated sentences for the possession of child pornography

convictions, claiming that the offenses were more serious than the typical case because

Iverson created the child pornography. While the district court did not explicitly find that

Iverson had created the child pornography, it appears that it agreed that Iverson had done

so, and Iverson does not contest that fact. The issue before us, rather, is whether the district

court failed to explain why that fact justifies an aggravated departure.

       The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provides a nonexclusive list of factors that

may justify an upward departure. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.b.1, 2 (2019) (providing

that a departure may be appropriate if, for example, the victim was “particularly

vulnerable” or if the offender “treated [the victim] with particular cruelty”).

       When explaining its decision to depart, the district court stated:

              The argument that was made in the last case that was affirmed
              by the court of appeals is that even though you’re not charged
              with creating it, the fact that you created it should be a factor
              that can aggravate the sentence on both Counts 2 and 3, and I
              accept that argument, not necessarily for the exact reasons that
              [the previous district court] did.

In his first case, the district court, in granting an aggravated departure explained:

              Defendant’s creation of the videos—his treating the victim as
              his sexual slave, unworthy of respect, calling her names,
              dehumanizing her—caused obvious physical pain and untold
              psychological harm to the child. These facts make his carrying
              around of the finished product even more abhorrent . . .
              Someone actually caused the harm—the pain and shame—
              visible in the videos defendant possessed, and that person was
              defendant himself.

Iverson I, 

, at *5. The district court determined that Iverson’s conduct

was equivalent to “gross and vile physical abuse” and “extraordinarily brutal conduct,”


                                               7
which are proper grounds for departure. Id.; see also Dillon, 

(outlining proper grounds for departure). In affirming the departures in Iverson I, this court

explained:

              Reasonable minds could perhaps disagree as to whether the
              acts described in the district court’s above-quoted reasoning
              rose to the level of “gross and vile physical abuse” or
              “extraordinarily brutal” conduct. However, insofar as this
              court’s de novo review is concerned, where this court must
              determine whether “the district court has identified proper
              grounds” as a matter of law, the district court’s focus on the
              perceived violence and brutality of Iverson’s actions identifies
              a proper legal ground for departure.

       Here, the district court agreed with Iverson I that the fact that Iverson created the

videos justified departing but “not necessarily for the exact reasons.” The district court

characterized the conduct portrayed as no “better or worse than most” child pornography.

Explaining its reason to depart, the district court explained:

              But what is – what makes me believe that there’s solid basis
              for finding aggravating factors is that when you look at it from
              [M.K.’s] perspective, you know, it is a nightmare that is a
              reality every day to know that the worst moment of her life is
              captured on a video that can exist forever. 20, 30, 40 years
              from now, that is something that can haunt her. And I would
              tell that to the person that owns it on their phone or possesses
              it on their phone, but it’s worse is the person that originated
              that, which was you. And I know you didn’t mean to have
              something that could haunt [M.K.] for the rest of your life, but
              that’s what you did. And it will, and for that I believe an
              aggravated sentence is justified on both counts.

       “A durational departure must be based on factors that reflect the seriousness of the

offense.” State v. Solberg, 

 (Minn. 2016) (emphasis omitted). Instead



                                              8
of linking Iverson’s conduct to the charged offense, the district court focused on the impact

to M.K. In contrast to Iverson I, here the district court did not identify why Iverson’s

creation of the child pornography made his possession of it more serious than the typical

child-pornography-possession offense. Therefore, the district court erred by imposing an

upward durational departure without providing an adequate reason to depart. Rourke, 

.

       “If reasons supporting the departure are stated, [appellate] court[s] will examine the

record to determine if the reasons given justify the departure.” State v. Williams, 

 (Minn. 1985). M.K. testified that, despite being uncomfortable with

being recorded, she knew Iverson recorded their sexual encounters. M.K. also testified

that after Iverson recorded the interactions, she asked Iverson if he still had the videos,

suggesting that she did not know whether the videos continued to exist. The record here

does not show that Iverson’s creation of child pornography made his possession of it more

serious than the typical offense. We, therefore, reverse Iverson’s child pornography

sentences and remand for resentencing and imposition of the presumptive guidelines

sentence. 

 (“If the reasons given are improper or inadequate and there is insufficient

evidence of record to justify the departure, the departure will be reversed.”). 2

       Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.




2
  Because we reverse Iverson’s sentences, we decline to address Iverson’s claim that the
district court failed to find that he created the pornographic works.

                                              9