This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                       Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                              STATE OF MINNESOTA
                              IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                    A23-1465

                           Daniel Wayne Siegfried, petitioner,
                                     Respondent,

                                           vs.

                             Commissioner of Public Safety,
                                     Appellant.

                                  Filed June 17, 2024
                                       Reversed
                                     Frisch, Judge


                              Dakota County District Court
                               File No. 19HA-CV-23-541

Joseph G. Vaccaro, The Law Office of Joseph G. Vaccaro, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Matthew A. McGuire, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

      Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge;

and Frisch, Judge.

                          NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

FRISCH, Judge

      Appellant-commissioner challenges the district court’s order rescinding the

revocation of respondent’s driver’s license on the basis that law enforcement lacked a

reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. We reverse because the
district court credited the officer’s observation that respondent committed a traffic

violation, and the officer therefore had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct an

investigatory stop.

                                           FACTS

       At about 10:00 p.m. on December 9, 2022, an officer observed a car exiting the

parking lot of a bar and decided to follow the car to determine if the driver was impaired.

The car, which was driven by respondent Daniel Wayne Siegfried, turned onto the same

road as the officer, driving in the opposite direction. The officer made an immediate mid-

road U-turn to follow Siegfried.

       The officer observed Siegfried travel through a four-way intersection controlled by

a stop light. There was a fog line on the road on both sides of the intersection but no fog

line in the intersection itself. 1   The officer testified that, when Siegfried exited the

intersection, “[a]pproximately half” of his car was over the fog line.                Siegfried

“correct[ed]” his vehicle shortly thereafter. The officer followed Siegfried a while longer

and later stopped Siegfried.

       Appellant Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety revoked Siegfried’s driver’s

license. Siegfried petitioned for rescission of his license revocation, and the district court

held an evidentiary hearing on the sole issue of whether law enforcement had a reasonable,

articulable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. At the hearing, Siegfried testified that



1
  We follow the parties in referring to the white line on the far-right side of the roadway as
the “fog line.”


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he was distracted by his observation of a car making a U-turn behind him and was looking

in his side mirror when he “touched” the fog line. He did not know at the time that the car

making the U-turn was a police car. Siegfried did not dispute that he crossed the fog line.

       At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the district court stated on the record

that it was going to rescind the revocation of Siegfried’s license. The district court

acknowledged that “there’s case law that the Commissioner cited that I could easily fall

upon . . . and say you went over the fog line once, and that’s enough for an officer to stop

you.” The district court nevertheless reasoned that there was no violation of the law

because the road swerved slightly on the other side of the intersection, and because

Siegfried corrected his lane position “immediately.”        The district court stated that

something like that “could happen to anyone who is not driving and drinking,” was “so

de minimis” that the court did not believe there was a basis for the stop, and that the stop

was “premature.” The district court concluded by stating that it thought that it was “doing

the appropriate thing reminding police officers that you have to be a little more patient

before you make these stops and put people through testing and things of that nature.”

       Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court filed a written order rescinding

Siegfried’s license revocation. The district court found that Siegfried was driving over the

fog line when he exited the intersection “but immediately corrected and traveled within his

lane,” and did not commit any additional traffic violations while the officer followed him

for several more blocks. The district court credited the officer’s testimony that they were

investigating Siegfried because they saw him leave a bar parking lot and that Siegfried

“crossed the fog line.” The district court then concluded that the officer lacked reasonable,


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articulable specification to stop Siegfried because Siegfried “was distracted by the abrupt

U-Turn made by [the officer] which contributed to his momentary lack of lane discipline”

and “immediately corrected into his proper lane after passing through the intersection.”

       The commissioner appeals.

                                        DECISION

       The commissioner argues that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to

make an investigatory stop because a single lane violation is a sufficient basis to stop a

motor vehicle. We agree.

       The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit “unreasonable searches and

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “But an officer does not violate

the prohibition if [the officer] stops a vehicle to conduct an investigation based on the

officer’s reasonable suspicion that the driver is engaging in criminal activity.” Soucie v.

Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 

, 463-64 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn.

June 29, 2021). “[T]o justify . . . an investigatory stop, the police must only show that the

stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon

specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those

facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Anderson, 

 (Minn.

2004) (quotations omitted). “Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law,

no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite

particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” 

 We review “a district

court’s determination of reasonable suspicion de novo, but accept[] the district court’s




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factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Kruse v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 

, 557 (Minn. App. 2018).

       Minnesota Statutes section 169.18, subdivision 7(1) (2022), provides that when a

road is “divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic,” “a vehicle shall be

driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from

the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.”

A violation of this law can occur simply by driving on a marking that divides lanes. Soucie,

957 N.W.2d at 465 (concluding that an officer had reasonable suspicion that a driver moved

their car from the lane in violation of 

, subd. 7(1) (2020), “when the

outside edge of his tires touched the inside edge of the painted fog line”); Kruse, 906

N.W.2d at 560 (concluding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to support an

investigatory stop under 

, subd. 7(a) (2016), when the driver drove on

the fog line). The district court found, and it is undisputed, that Siegfried drove over the

fog line. Therefore, based on the undisputed facts, the district court erred by concluding

that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that Siegfried had committed

a traffic violation.

       Siegfried argues that the statute only requires a driver to remain in a lane “as nearly

as practicable” and that the district court concluded that he remained within his lane as “as

nearly as practicable” by finding that the road was not straight and Siegfried corrected his

position immediately. Siegfried contrasts his case to State v. Dean, where we declined to

conclude that a driver stayed in their lane as nearly as practicable because there was

“nothing in the record to suggest that it was impracticable to remain fully within [the


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driver’s] lane” and the driver failed to explain why his conduct was “evidence of staying

in the lane as nearly as practicable.” No. A17-1113, 

, at *2 (Minn. App.

Mar. 26, 2018). It is true that the district court made findings of fact, which are supported

by record evidence, that the road was not entirely straight and that Siegfried corrected his

position relatively quickly. But the district court made no finding that Siegfried drove his

vehicle within the lane “as nearly as practicable.” And there is no evidence in the record

suggesting that it was objectively impracticable for Siegfried to continue driving within the

lane markings after driving through the intersection, such that it would have been

unreasonable for the officer to suspect that Siegfried violated a traffic law. Cf. Anderson,

 (concluding that the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion

for a stop because his interpretation of the law was erroneous, and he therefore lacked a

particularized and objective basis for stopping the driver); State v. Richardson, 

 (Minn. 2001) (citing State v. Pike, 

 (Minn. 1996))

(explaining that “it is not necessary that the police detect an actual violation of the law” to

conduct an investigatory stop). And none of the findings by the district court negate the

undisputed fact that Siegfried drove over the fog line, which formed the basis for the

officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigatory stop.

       Because the officer observed Siegfried drive over the fog line, they had reasonable,

articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. We therefore reverse the district

court’s ruling rescinding the revocation of Siegfried’s license.

       Reversed.




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