This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                         Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                                STATE OF MINNESOTA
                                IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                      A23-1530

                                Shawn Christopher Brown,
                                       Appellant,

                                            vs.

                                    State of Minnesota,
                                       Respondent.

                                    Filed June 24, 2024
                                         Affirmed
                                       Reyes, Judge

                               Stearns County District Court
                                 File No. 73-CR-22-5729

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Renee N. Courtney, St. Cloud City Attorney, Kyle E. Day, Assistant City Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

         Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reyes,

Judge.

                            NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

REYES, Judge

         In this appeal from an order denying postconviction relief from his conviction of

third-degree driving while impaired (DWI), appellant argues that the postconviction court

abused its discretion by determining that he entered an intelligent guilty plea. We affirm.
                                         FACTS

       In July 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Shawn Christopher

Brown with two counts of DWI and one count of driving after cancellation, inimical to

public safety. The charges arose after appellant drove himself to the St. Cloud Police

Department in January 2022 while he had a canceled driver’s license and had both

amphetamine and methamphetamine in his system.

       In September 2022, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of DWI under Minn. Stat.

§§ 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (Supp. 2021), .26, subd. 2 (2020), in exchange for the state

dismissing the remaining charges. The district court sentenced appellant to 365 days in

jail, with 305 days stayed; ordered him to serve 60 days on work release; and placed him

on probation for six years. 1

       In January 2023, appellant’s corrections agent filed a probation-violation report

alleging, in part, that appellant had been involuntarily discharged from his outpatient-

treatment program. At a contested probation-violation hearing, the district court found

appellant in violation, imposed an intermediate sanction of 45 days in jail, and reinstated

his probation with the additional condition that he attend therapy. In March 2023,

appellant’s corrections agent filed a second probation-violation report alleging that

appellant had failed to: report timely to his probation agent his multiple contacts with law

enforcement and his nightly location while he was homeless; abstain from the use of



1
 The district court later reduced appellant’s sentence to 364 days, which is consistent with

, subd. 1 (Supp. 2023), and reduced his probation length to four
years to comply with 

 (2022 & Supp. 2023).

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alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine; and report for random drug testing on three

occasions.

         In July 2023, before his second probation-violation hearing, appellant filed a

petition for postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. In his petition,

appellant argued that he did not make an intelligent plea “due to the deficient waiver of his

trial rights.” 2 The postconviction court denied appellant’s petition, reasoning that appellant

implicitly and validly waived his trial rights and that he had abused the judicial process by

intentionally delaying his filing of the petition.

         This appeal follows.

                                          DECISION

         Appellant argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by determining

that he entered an intelligent guilty plea because (1) he never expressly or implicitly waived

his trial rights; (2) he was never asked whether he understood that he would need to

relinquish his trial rights to plead guilty; and (3) no one offered a plea petition in support

of his plea. We are not persuaded.

         Appellate courts review a postconviction court’s determination on a defendant’s

request to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Sanchez v. State, 

 (Minn. 2017). A postconviction court abuses its discretion by making a

decision that is “based on an erroneous view of the law” or “against logic and the facts in

the record.” 

 (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review legal issues de novo



2
    Appellant did not request a hearing on the petition.

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and review factual issues to determine “whether there is sufficient evidence in the record

to sustain the postconviction court’s findings.” Pearson v. State, 

(Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).

       Although a “defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea,” State v.

Raleigh, 

 (Minn. 2010), when “withdrawal is necessary to correct a

manifest injustice,” a “court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely

motion” and satisfactory proof. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A “manifest injustice”

exists when a plea is invalid. Raleigh, 

. “To be constitutionally valid, a

guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent,” and the burden is on the defendant

to show that their plea was invalid. 

 The validity of a plea is a question of law that

appellate courts review de novo. 

       The purpose of the intelligent-plea requirement is to ensure that a defendant

understands the charges, the rights they are waiving by pleading guilty, and the

consequences of their plea.       State v. Trott, 

 (Minn. 1983).

“‘Consequences’ refers to a plea’s direct consequences, namely the maximum sentence and

fine.” Raleigh, 

. A district court need not create a perfect record to

establish an intelligent guilty plea. State v. Lawrence, 

, 775 (Minn. App.

2022). Instead, “[i]f the record reveals careful interrogation by the [district] court and the

defendant had full opportunity to consult with his counsel before entering his plea, the court

may safely presume that the defendant was adequately informed of his rights.” 

(quotation omitted).




                                              4
       First, the record reflects that the district court and appellant’s counsel carefully

interrogated appellant regarding the charges and his rights. At his first appearance hearing

in July 2022, appellant acknowledged that he understood the nature of the charges in the

complaint, and appellant’s counsel noted on the record that he had gone over both the

complaint and appellant’s rights with him. At appellant’s plea and sentencing hearing, he

responded “yes” to the district court’s question of whether he wanted to plead guilty to

count II. The district court placed appellant under oath and asked appellant’s counsel to

walk him through the rule-15 petition questions. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.02, subd. 1.

The following exchange between appellant and his counsel then occurred.

              Q: Mr. Brown, as you sit there is your mind clear as to what’s
              going on?
              A: Yes.
              Q: You’ve been in treatment for over a month at Oak Ridge,
              right?
              A: No. I’ve been at Oak Ridge for a month and then I've been
              a month at NuWay.
              Q: During that time you’ve been sober?
              A: Yes.
              Q: Are you under the influence of any mood-altering
              chemicals?
              A: No.
              Q: You understand that the DWI is a gross misdemeanor which
              carries with it a maximum sentence of a year in jail?
              A: I do.
              Q: And also that the fine the State is offering now is a cap of
              $900?
              A: Yes.
              Q: Now, you understand that you have a right to go to a trial
              before this judge -- or a judge or a jury? With it being a gross
              misdemeanor you would have the right to have a jury of six
              members. You understand?
              A: Yes.
              Q: They must return a unanimous verdict after hearing all the
              evidence.


                                             5
              A: Yes.
              Q: You can confront and question the [s]tate’s witnesses, you
              can testify, or if you choose to remain silent, that could not be
              used against you. Do you understand?
              A: Yes.
              Q: You also have a right to a contested omnibus hearing if the
              evidence was obtained in violation of your constitutional
              rights.
              A: Yes.
              Q: And, again, you can call witnesses, use the subpoena power
              of the Court to bring witnesses to testify. You understand all of
              that?
              A: Yes.
              Q: At trial you would be presumed innocent and the burden is
              on the [s]tate to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
              A: Yes.
              Q: Knowing all of that, are you prepared to plead guilty here
              to the charge of gross misdemeanor DWI?
              A: Yes.

Appellant also confirmed that no one had coerced him to plead guilty and that he

understood that his charge was an enhanceable offense. Following this colloquy, the

district court asked appellant if he still wanted to enter a plea of guilty and whether he had

enough time to speak with his attorney, to which appellant answered “yes.” Appellant also

affirmed that he had no questions for his attorney or the district court. After appellant

pleaded guilty, the district court noted that “there is a factual basis to support the plea and

[appellant] freely and voluntarily waived [his] trial rights.” (Emphasis added.) The

district court gave appellant another chance to speak before imposing sentence. Appellant

did not dispute any of these statements.

       Although the plea colloquy was imperfect because the district court never explicitly

asked if appellant understood that he was waiving his rights by pleading guilty, the record

nevertheless demonstrates that appellant understood the charges, the rights he was waiving,


                                              6
and the consequences of the plea. See Raleigh, 

; see also, State v. Blom,

 (Minn. 2004) (explaining that validity of waivers, even of

constitutional rights, depends “upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the

case” and may be implied by defendant’s conduct) (quotation omitted).

       Second, the record supports that appellant “had full opportunity to consult with his

counsel.” Lawrence, 982 N.W.2d at 776 (quotation omitted). At his plea and sentencing

hearing, appellant confirmed that he wanted to plead guilty after his counsel advised him

of his rights. Appellant’s counsel stated the plea agreement’s terms on the record and

appellant acknowledged that he understood the plea’s direct consequences. See Raleigh,

. Appellant affirmed that he had enough time to speak with his attorney,

that he had no further questions for his attorney or the district court, and that he did not

have anything else he wanted to ask or say to the district court after entering his plea and

before sentencing. Because both elements of Lawrence are met here, appellant was

adequately informed of his rights. 982 N.W.2d at 776.

       Furthermore, “[a] court may weigh a defendant’s criminal history in evaluating

whether his guilty plea was knowing and intelligent.” State v. Doughman, 

 (Minn. App. 1983), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 1984). As the postconviction

court observed, appellant has an extensive criminal history and has pleaded guilty

previously to identical or substantially similar charges. Appellant signed a petition to enter

a guilty plea in a felony case as recently as June 2021, and prior to that in October 2019.




                                              7
We are unpersuaded that appellant did not know that he was waiving his trial rights by

entering a guilty plea. 3

       Because the record shows that appellant entered a valid guilty plea, appellant’s

argument that his plea was invalidated by the lack of a plea petition also fails, as filing a

plea petition is an alternative to a defendant personally appearing and pleading guilty

before the district court. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.03, subd. 2; Lawrence, 982 N.W.2d at 775.

Moreover, we need not consider appellant’s final argument that the postconviction court

abused its discretion by determining that appellant petitioned for postconviction relief in

bad faith.

       Affirmed.




3
  Although appellant also relies on State v. Bell, a nonprecedential opinion, to support his
argument, that case is not binding on us and is readily distinguishable. No. A21-1643,

 (Minn. App. Sept. 12, 2022). In Bell, the district court failed to question
the defendant regarding many of the rights outlined under Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1,
and the defendant’s attorney never submitted a plea petition. 

. This court
concluded that the defendant’s plea was “clearly deficient” and that his prior criminal
history alone was not enough to demonstrate that he had intelligently waived his rights. 

. Here, the district court and appellant’s counsel covered, and appellant responded to,
most of the questions under Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.02, subd. 1, even if they were not read
word-for-word from the rule. Furthermore, the postconviction court relied on more than
just appellant’s criminal history to determine that he entered an intelligent plea.

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