This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                       Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                             STATE OF MINNESOTA
                             IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                   A23-0553

                In re the Marriage of: Michelle Beth Kremer, Petitioner,
                                       Appellant,

                                          vs.

                               Robbie Michael Kremer,
                                    Respondent.

                                Filed January 2, 2024
                                      Affirmed
                                    Larkin, Judge

                             Nobles County District Court
                               File No. 53-FA-10-425

William J. Wetering, Hedeen, Hughes & Wetering, Worthington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Daniel M. Eaton, Waypoint Law PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

      Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Florey,

Judge.

                         NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARKIN, Judge

      In this dispute following the dissolution of the parties’ marriage, appellant-wife

challenges the district court’s declaratory judgment, which established that she is not





 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
entitled to interest on her marital lien and attorney-fee award, or reimbursement for a

payment she made on a debt in respondent-husband’s bankruptcy proceeding. We affirm.

                                          FACTS

       This is the third appeal to this court stemming from the underlying dissolution

proceeding. On May 28, 2015, the district court issued a judgment and decree addressing

the issues of marital property, spousal maintenance, and attorney fees. The decree awarded

appellant Michelle Beth Kremer (wife) $750,000, which was secured by a marital lien on

real estate held by respondent Robbie Michael Kremer (husband). The decree did not

provide a date by which husband was required to pay the award or satisfy the lien. And

the decree did not order interest on the award or lien. The decree also awarded wife

attorney fees in the amount of $168,000. The decree did not provide a date by which

husband was required to pay that award, and it did not order interest on the award.

       Because husband filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in December 2019, the amounts

ordered for the lien and attorney-fee awards were never reduced to a money judgment. One

of the debts in the bankruptcy proceeding was a judgment owed to an attorney. Wife agreed

to pay that attorney $70,000 out of the proceeds that she was to receive from the sale of

husband’s real estate.

       Husband paid the $168,000 attorney-fee award in December 2020. Husband paid

wife $750,000 in satisfaction of the marital lien in October 2022. During the course of the

underlying matter, wife’s attorney repeatedly claimed that wife was entitled to interest on

her marital lien, that wife’s attorney was entitled to interest on the attorney-fee award, and

that wife was entitled to repayment of the $70,000 she paid on the attorney debt in the


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bankruptcy proceeding. Husband moved the district court for a declaratory judgment to

resolve those issues. See 

 (2022) (“Courts of record within their

respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations

whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.”). The district court granted husband’s

request for declaratory judgment, declaring that wife was not entitled to interest on her

marital lien, that wife’s attorney was not entitled to interest on the attorney-fee award, and

that wife did not have a basis in law to seek reimbursement from husband for the $70,000

payment she made on the attorney debt in husband’s bankruptcy proceeding.

         Wife appeals.

                                          DECISION

         Wife contends that the district court erred by granting husband’s request for

declaratory judgment. Wife has the burden to establish that the district court erred. See

Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 

 (Minn. 1975) (stating that

on appeal, a party seeking relief must establish both an error and prejudice). We review

de novo a district court’s decision regarding whether to grant interest under 

 (2014).1 See Redleaf v. Redleaf, 

 (Minn. App. 2011) (stating

that we review application of section 549.09 de novo); Hogenson v. Hogenson, 

 (Minn. App. 2014) (concerning prejudgment interest).

         As to interest on the marital lien, the district court declared that “[b]ecause [wife]

was not awarded interest on her lien in the [f]inal [d]ecree and no later order modified the



1
    We rely on the 2014 statute, which was in effect at the time of the judgment and decree.

                                               3
[f]inal [d]ecree to permit such an award, the marital lien has been paid in full.” The district

court reasoned that under the plain language of the decree, wife was not entitled to interest

and that an award of interest would therefore constitute an improper modification of the

decree. The district court relied on Erickson v. Erickson, which held that a district court

erred in awarding interest on a marital lien because the original decree did not provide for

an interest-bearing lien and the imposition of interest therefore constituted an

impermissible modification of the decree. 

 (Minn. App. 1990).

       In assigning error to the district court’s determination, wife relies on 

.09—providing for awards of interest on verdicts, awards, and judgments—as applied

by this court in Riley v. Riley, 

 (Minn. App. 1986) (Riley II). In Riley

II, this court held that “[a] dissolution judgment awarding money to a party accrues interest

on the unpaid balance from the time the judgment says payment is due until it is paid.” 

 (emphasis added). This court cited 

 (1984) and stated,

“Minnesota law provides that interest shall accrue on unpaid balances of judgments from

the time the judgment is entered until it is paid.” 

. We reasoned that there was

“no reason to distinguish an award of money in a dissolution action from judgments for the

recovery of money in other types of cases.” 

 We therefore remanded to the district court

for entry of a judgment for interest from September 10, 1984—the date on which the

judgment stated payment was due—until the date that the payment was made. 

       Riley II is distinguishable from this case in two important ways. First, the decree in

Riley II directed husband to pay wife $30,000 as part of the property settlement in the

dissolution and “to make this payment within thirty days of the entry of the judgment and


                                              4
decree on August 10, 1984.” 

 In this case, the decree does not include a deadline for

husband to satisfy wife’s $750,000 marital lien or to pay wife’s attorney-fee award.

       Second, there is no indication in either of this court’s Riley opinions that the $30,000

payment, on which interest was awarded, was connected to a marital lien. 

;

Riley v. Riley, 

 (Minn. App. 1985) (Riley I), rev. denied (Minn. Aug.

29, 1985). In fact, neither opinion mentioned a marital lien, much less discussed the

accumulation of interest on a marital lien under section 549.09. Riley II, 

; Riley I, 

. This court has said that “marital liens . . . are not

judgment liens; they are a method of distributing property in a dissolution proceeding.”

Bakken v. Helgeson, 

 (Minn. App. 2010). Thus, the requirement, in

Riley II, that husband pay wife $30,000 by a date certain is not the same as the “marital

lien” in this case.

       Wife argues that the absence of express payment deadlines in the decree means that

the $750,000 and $168,000 payments were due on the date that the judgment and decree

was issued. According to wife, if a dissolution judgment and decree awards a monetary

sum to a party and the decree does not provide an express deadline for payment of that

sum, then “that sum must be considered to be due as of” the date of the decree, and the

district court “has no jurisdiction to deviate from the statute that requires . . . interest on




                                              5
dissolution awards.” We reject wife’s position because in this case, the record shows that

the district court did not intend husband to satisfy the $750,000 marital lien immediately.2

       Wife also relies on Thomas v. Thomas, in which this court suggested that a district

court should either award interest on a property distribution that is not immediately payable

or address the failure to award interest in its findings. 

 (Minn.

App. 1987). However, in this case, wife did not challenge the district court’s failure to

address interest in the final decree, and the time for raising that challenge has passed. See

Dieseth v. Calder Mfg. Co., 

 (Minn. 1966) (stating that “[e]ven though

the decision of the [district] court in the first order may have been wrong, if it is an

appealable order it is still final after the time for appeal has expired.”); see also 

, subd. 2 (2022) (setting forth limited grounds for reopening a judgment and

decree); Shirk v. Shirk, 

 (Minn. 1997) (“The sole relief from the

judgment and decree lies in meeting the requirements of 

, subd. 2.”).

       As to interest on the attorney-fee award, the district court reasoned that interest was

inappropriate because there was no language in the decree providing for such interest, no

later order modified the decree to permit interest, and wife’s attorney never reduced the

attorney-fee award to a judgment.

       Wife once again relies on Riley II to establish error, arguing that the analysis in Riley

II “suggests the statutory mandate on interest on awards would apply to attorney’s fees,



2
 On remand after the first appeal in this case, the district court indicated that it ordered
permanent spousal maintenance without regard to the interest that wife could earn on the
$750,000 because it did not expect that payment to be made for some time.

                                               6
post judgment.” But we have determined that Riley II is inapplicable here. Moreover,

Riley II does not address the issue of interest on an attorney-fee award in a dissolution

action. See 

 (stating that husband “deprived [wife] of the $30,000

awarded to her by the [district] court in the judgment”). Thus, Riley II does not establish

that the district court erred in declaring that wife’s attorney was not entitled to interest on

the attorney-fee award.

       Wife raises an additional question in the issue-statement section of her brief,

specifically, whether the district court erred by denying “[wife] deduction on partial

satisfaction of judgment for costs incurred in collecting from [husband] and refusal to

allocate sums collected first to accrued interest pursuant to [section] 549.09.” The first part

of that question, regarding costs incurred, is waived for inadequate briefing. See Schoepke

v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 

 (Minn. 1971) (stating that

mere assertions of error unsupported by legal argument or authority are waived unless

prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection); see also State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v.

Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 

 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an

inadequately briefed issue); Brodsky v. Brodsky, 

 (Minn. App. 2007)

(applying Wintz in a family-law appeal). The second part of that question is resolved by

our conclusion that wife was not entitled to interest.

       In conclusion, wife has not met her burden to show that the district court erred by

declaring that (1) wife was not entitled to interest on her marital lien, (2) wife’s attorney

was not entitled to interest on the attorney-fee award, and (3) wife did not have a basis in




                                              7
law to seek reimbursement from husband for the $70,000 payment she made on a debt in

husband’s bankruptcy proceeding.

      Affirmed.




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