This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                       Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                              STATE OF MINNESOTA
                              IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                    A22-1528

                                  State of Minnesota,
                                     Respondent,

                                           vs.

                                  Dahir Abdow Noor,
                                      Appellant.

                                Filed January 16, 2024
                                       Affirmed
                                    Larson, Judge

                            Hennepin County District Court
                               File No. 27-CR-21-8215

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Barry S. Edwards, Max A. Keller, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

       Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Klaphake,

Judge. *




*
 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
                            NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARSON, Judge

          Appellant Dahir Abdow Noor appeals his conviction for two counts of criminal

sexual conduct. Noor argues the district court (1) improperly admitted expert testimony;

(2) permitted prosecutorial misconduct during opening statement and closing argument;

and (3) excluded evidence that was necessary for Noor to present a complete defense. We

affirm.

                                         FACTS

          Respondent State of Minnesota charged Noor with two counts of criminal sexual

conduct after his stepdaughter, A.W., accused him of sexual abuse. See 

, subd. 1(a), 1(h)(iii) (2020). A.W. alleged the abuse occurred when she was

eight years old while she resided in an apartment with her mother, siblings, and Noor. The

family contacted law enforcement after A.W. disclosed the alleged abuse to her sister. Law

enforcement referred A.W.’s case to CornerHouse for a forensic interview. At trial, A.W.

provided detailed testimony about her allegations, which largely tracked the substance of

her interview with CornerHouse. After a five-day trial, a jury found Noor guilty of both

counts. The district court sentenced Noor to 90 months in prison, the presumptive middle-

of-the-box sentence.

          Noor appeals.




                                            2
                                      DECISION

      In this direct appeal, Noor challenges his convictions on three grounds. First, Noor

argues the district court erred when it admitted unobjected-to expert testimony from the

CornerHouse interviewer because the interviewer’s testimony exceeded the limits of her

expertise, lacked foundational reliability, and vouched for A.W.’s credibility. Second,

Noor asserts the prosecutor committed unobjected-to misconduct during his opening

statement and closing argument.      Last, Noor argues the district court violated his

constitutional right to present a complete defense when it did not allow him to offer

evidence that he claims showed A.W.’s mother coached A.W. to lie about the abuse. We

address each argument in turn.

                                           I.

      Noor first argues the district court improperly admitted the interviewer’s expert

testimony. Specifically, Noor challenges the interviewer’s testimony about “episodic” and

“script” memory. During her testimony, the interviewer described how children might

recall episodes of sexual abuse and explained that “episodic” memory is memory of

specific individual events, compared to “script” memory that generalizes a repeated

occurrence. Noor also challenges the interviewer’s testimony that children often delay

reporting sexual abuse due to embarrassment or fear about the consequences of disclosure.

      Admission of expert testimony is within the district court’s “broad discretion,” and

we typically review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Peterson, 

 (Minn. 2009). However, because Noor did not object to

the interviewer’s testimony, we review for plain error. See State v. Sontoya, 

 (Minn. 2010) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02). To show plain error, Noor must

demonstrate “(1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights.”

State v. Mosley, 

 (Minn. 2014). If these three prongs are met, we

correct the error if it seriously impacts “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.” 

 (quotation omitted). If the appellant fails to meet one prong of

the plain-error test, we do not consider the remaining prongs. See id at 798.

       First, Noor argues the district court improperly determined the interviewer was

qualified to testify that children may describe sexual abuse in the form of an “episodic” or

“script” memory. Noor contends that “episodic” and “script” memory are scientific

concepts and the interviewer lacked the qualifications to testify about these concepts

because she is not a psychologist, psychiatrist, or licensed counselor.

       Whether an expert is qualified is within the district court’s sound discretion. State

v. Sandberg, 

 (Minn. 1987).             “[K]nowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education” may qualify an expert to testify. Minn. R. Evid. 702. The record

reflects the interviewer had the following qualifications. She earned a bachelor’s degree

and a master’s degree in social work. Before CornerHouse, she was a therapist at a child-

treatment facility. The interviewer also taught and attended numerous trainings on the

CornerHouse-interview method and forensic interviews more generally. She testified that

she had conducted over 1,309 interviews with CornerHouse. Because the interviewer had

extensive qualifications to testify on the topic of child sex abuse, the district court did not

plainly err when it allowed her to testify as an expert. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 

 (Minn. App. 1988) (permitting the testimony on the “common characteristics


                                               4
of sexually abused adolescents” from an expert with an undergraduate degree in elementary

education and course work towards a doctorate in school psychology).

       Second, Noor argues the interviewer’s testimony about “episodic” and “script”

memory lacked foundational reliability. Noor claims such testimony is “pseudo-science.”

Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 “does not define, generally, what ‘foundational

reliability’ means.” Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 

 (Minn. 2012).

Nevertheless, to establish foundational reliability under rule 702, the district court must:

(1) “analyze the proffered testimony in light of the purpose for which it is being offered”

and (2) “consider the underlying reliability, consistency, and accuracy of the subject about

which the expert is testifying.” 

. Also, “the proponent of evidence . . . must

show that it is reliable in that particular case.” 

.

       We do not discern any plain error in the foundational reliability for the interviewer’s

testimony about “episodic” and “script” memory. 1 The state established the interviewer’s

qualifications to testify regarding the emotional and psychological characteristics of

children who experience sexual abuse. And contrary to the appellant’s assertions, the

interviewer testified using defined terms in her field to describe how children may

remember events.




1
  Our recent nonprecedential opinions have also concluded that expert testimony about
child sex abuse from experts with CornerHouse training was foundationally reliable.
Contreras v. State, No. A22-0329, 

, at *2, *5-6 (Minn. App. Jan. 3, 2023),
rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2023); State v. Shafer, No. A20-0541, 

, at
*3, *5-6 (Minn. App. Mar. 22, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. June 15, 2021).

                                                5
       Finally, Noor argues the interviewer violated the rule against an expert vouching for

another witness’s credibility. See State v. Wembley, 

 (Minn. App.

2006), aff’d on other grounds, 

 (Minn. 2007).            Noor points to the

interviewer’s testimony about “episodic” and “script” memory, and her testimony about

delays in children reporting abuse.

       Typically, a jury’s “common experience affords sufficient basis” to assess witness

credibility. State v. Myers, 

 (Minn. 1984). The risk that expert

opinion might unduly influence a jury “mitigates against admission” even if it is helpful

for deliberation. 

. However, leniency towards expert testimony that might inform

a jury’s credibility assessment is warranted when a witness’s behavior and the nuances of

how they might describe certain allegations fall outside a jury’s common experience. See

. Although “[a]n expert witness may not testify as to the credibility of a

specific witness, [they] may be able to testify generally as to certain psychological or

physiological conditions that may affect credibility, if such testimony is beyond the

knowledge and experience of an average jury.” State v. Reese, 

(Minn. 2005).

       In Myers, a psychologist testified about the “general characteristics [of] sexually

abused children.” Id. at 607-09. To determine whether the district court erred in admitting

the expert’s testimony, the supreme court emphasized that, in the specific context of child

sex abuse, a victim’s behavior may fall outside juror’s common experience because

children tend to describe conduct as occurring over a vague time frame and may appear

“uncertain or ambivalent.” Id. at 610. The expert testimony was admissible because it


                                             6
provided “relevant insight into the puzzling aspects of the child’s conduct and demeanor.”

Id. In contrast, in Wembley, a CornerHouse interviewer vouched for a witness’s credibility

when she defined four criteria for evaluating child credibility and then described that the

child-witness met those criteria. See 

.

       Here, the interviewer’s testimony falls into the type of permissible testimony Myers

described: “[b]ackground data providing a relevant insight into the puzzling aspects of [a]

child’s conduct and demeanor.” See 

 By providing general information about how

children might describe sexual abuse, and why they might wait to report it, the interviewer

provided context transcending the jury’s common experience about A.W.’s allegations.

And unlike Wembley, the interviewer did not testify about criteria for assessing child-

witness credibility and then explain that A.W. met those criteria. See 

-

92. Thus, the interviewer did not violate the rule against an expert impermissibly testifying

about witness credibility.

       For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not plainly err when it allowed

the interviewer’s expert testimony.

                                             II.

       Noor next argues the state committed prosecutorial misconduct during opening

statement and closing argument. Noor asserts “[t]he misconduct included vouching for

[A.W.], stating personal opinion as to the ultimate question of guilt, appealing to emotion,

disparaging the defense, and misstating the testimony.” Because Noor did not object, we

apply the modified plain-error test specific to prosecutorial misconduct allegations. See

State v. Ramey, 

 (Minn. 2006). First, the defendant must demonstrate


                                             7
“that the prosecutor’s conduct constitutes an error that is plain.” 

 If the defendant

identifies a plain error, the state must demonstrate that there is “no reasonable likelihood

that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the

verdict.” 

 (quotations omitted). Whether the state met its burden depends on “the

strength of the evidence against the defendant, the pervasiveness of the improper

suggestions, and whether the defendant had an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the

improper suggestions.” State v. Davis, 

 (Minn. 2007).

       Noor points to the following remarks from opening statement and closing argument

to assert that the state committed prosecutorial misconduct. First, Noor contends the

prosecutor made conclusory assertions during opening statement that did not simply

describe the facts to be proved, thereby undermining the role of the jury to evaluate

credibility and discern the facts for itself. Specifically:

                     [A.W.] was eight years old when her stepfather, [Noor],
              the Defendant, sexually abused her. It started in December of
              2020 in their apartment, and it happened numerous times over
              the course of the next several months.

Second, Noor argues that the state inflamed the passions and prejudices of the jury when

the prosecutor commented:

              Even when a victim is a child, they still have to take the stand.
              They still have to testify.

                      Now, [A.W.] may be scared. She may be nervous. But
              she will be here, and she’ll testify and tell you what happened
              to her.

Third, Noor argues the state invited the jury to place itself in the alleged victim’s shoes and

invented facts when the prosecutor said:


                                               8
                     [A.W.] is old enough to know to a certain extent that
             what happened was wrong or inappropriate. But [A.W.]
             doesn’t know how to deal with that, doesn’t know how to deal
             with it like an adult would. But can you imagine for a moment
             what is going on inside the 8-year-old [A.W.’s] mind when this
             is happening.

                   She may not have the confidence or persistence to tell
             her mother about what was happening like she does now. . . .

                   It is likely that [A.W.] saw her mother – how hard she
             was working, how stressed she was, how overburdened she
             was cooking or doing something else. . . .

                    . . . Maybe [A.W.] doesn’t have the words to
             communicate fully what is going on to her, the fear of not being
             believed, wanting to forget what happened because it was
             uncomfortable.

      Lastly, Noor argues that the state denigrated the defense when the prosecutor

explained that Noor’s closing argument would likely focus on “minor inconsistencies” in

A.W.’s testimony and then stated:

             [I]magine for a moment what the defense’s argument would be
             if [A.W.] was perfectly consistent. What would their argument
             be? That she memorized or rehearsed this story. That she must
             have seen it before and is remembering the details because of
             that.

      Assuming, without deciding, that these statements amounted to plain error, we

conclude the state met its burden to show there was “no reasonable likelihood that the

absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict.”

See Ramey, 

 (quotations omitted).

      Here, the state presented a robust case against Noor, including A.W.’s testimony in

which she detailed the abuse and the interviewer’s expert testimony in which the expert



                                            9
provided further context for the jury to evaluate A.W.’s testimony. The district court also

ameliorated any impact the above statements had on the verdict when it instructed the jury

before opening statements that “what the attorneys say is not evidence.” And the district

court again instructed the jury prior to closing arguments that “the arguments or other

remarks of an attorney are not evidence.” Furthermore, the portions of the state’s opening

statement and closing argument that Noor contests represented relatively small portions of

those remarks as a whole. Therefore, the state satisfied its burden to show that any alleged

plain errors during opening statement and closing argument did not have a significant effect

on the jury’s verdict.

                                            III.

       Noor finally argues the district court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence

that A.W.’s mother had previously threatened or removed men from her home. Appellate

courts review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Larson, 

 (Minn. 2010). Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 402, “[e]vidence which is not

relevant is not admissible.” And even relevant evidence can “be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,

or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.

       At trial, one of Noor’s defenses was that A.W.’s mother had coached A.W. to lie

about the allegations. To support this defense, Noor’s counsel proposed using a transcript

from a YouTube video in which A.W.’s mother allegedly described the fathers of her

children as “losers.” Noor’s counsel also stated that Noor would testify that he heard a


                                             10
rumor that A.W.’s mother had driven a past partner out of the country with threats that she

would accuse him of sexual assault.

       Before A.W.’s mother testified, the state moved for the district court to preclude this

evidence on the grounds that it was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The district court

granted the state’s motion, determining that Noor’s counsel could not inquire into A.W.’s

mother removing partners or threating to remove them. But the district court clearly

indicated “[t]o the extent that the defense wishes to inquire of the victim’s mother that she

told her daughter not to smile or laugh during the interview in support of [his] theory that

she coached her, I will permit that on cross-examination.”

       Noor contends that by excluding the evidence, the district court deprived him of his

due-process right to have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Noor is

correct that defendants have a “constitutional right to present a complete defense.” State

v. Atkinson, 

 (Minn. 2009). But the evidence the defense presents

must still satisfy the rules of evidence. See Minn. R. Evid. 1101(a) (stating that the

Minnesota Rules of Evidence, subject to certain exceptions, “apply to all actions and

proceedings in the courts of this state”).

       Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the evidence.

First, it is not entirely clear how the YouTube video transcript regarding A.W.’s mother

not trusting past partners was relevant to Noor’s theory that A.W. was coached. See Minn.

R. Evid. 402. And the probative value of Noor’s second- or third-hand knowledge that

A.W.’s mother may have driven a past partner out of the country with threats that she would




                                             11
accuse him of sexual assault did not outweigh any unfair prejudice likely to result from

such an unsubstantiated allegation. 2 See Minn. R. Evid. 403.

       For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded

evidence that A.W.’s mother had threatened or removed men from her home.

       Affirmed.




2
  The state did not raise a hearsay objection. See Minn. R. Evid. 801 (defining hearsay as
“a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”); Minn. R. Evid. 802
(explaining that hearsay is inadmissible “except as provided by these rules or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court or by the Legislature”).

                                             12