State of Minnesota v. Christopher Eric Vines

Minnesota Court of Appeals January 16, 2024

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0186

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Eric Vines,
Appellant.

Filed January 16, 2024
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-CR-21-353

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Stacey Scholz, Assistant County Attorney,
Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and

Wheelock, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for second-degree controlled-

substance possession, appellant Christopher Eric Vines argues that the district court abused

its discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure because Vines
demonstrated that he met the criteria for such a departure pursuant to Minnesota Statutes

section 152.152 (2020). We affirm.

FACTS

In April 2021, after police stopped Vines’s vehicle for a traffic violation, Vines was

arrested for an outstanding warrant. A search of his person and the vehicle he was driving

uncovered a methamphetamine pipe and a lockbox containing 25.197 grams of

methamphetamine. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Vines with one count of first-

degree sale of a controlled substance, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 152.021,

subdivision 1(1) (2020), and one count of second-degree possession of a controlled

substance, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 152.022, subdivision 2(a)(1) (2020).

A jury found Vines guilty of second-degree possession of a controlled substance for

possessing over 25 grams of methamphetamine and not guilty of the first-degree sale

charge.

At sentencing, Vines requested a downward dispositional departure or, in the

alternative, a downward durational departure. In his argument for a dispositional departure,

Vines requested that the district court find him “particularly amenable to probation” in

accordance with Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 2.D.3.a(8) (2020) 1 and Minnesota

Statutes section 152.152.

1
In the district court, the defense attorney referenced Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
2.D.3.a(7), but he quoted the language of 2.D.3.a(8), which accords with his argument on
appeal.

2
Section 2.D.3.a(8) of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines identifies the following

as a mitigating factor that “may be used” as a reason for departure:

In the case of a controlled substance offense conviction, the
offender is found by the district court to be particularly
amenable to probation based on adequate evidence that the
offender is chemically dependent and has been accepted by,
and can respond to, a treatment program in accordance with

Minn. Stat. § 152.152

.

Section 152.152, in turn, provides that, if a person is convicted under Minnesota Statutes

sections 152.021, 152.022, 152.023, or 152.0262 (2020) and the guidelines call for a

presumptive prison sentence, “[t]he sentence may be stayed based on amenability to

probation only if the offender presents adequate evidence to the court that the offender has

been accepted by, and can respond to, a treatment program that has been approved by the

commissioner of human services.”

Minn. Stat. § 152.152

Vines argued that he established the mitigating factor under these provisions

because there was “no dispute that [he] is ‘chemically dependent,’” had “long ago applied

for acceptance into the Teen Challenge treatment program,” and “ha[d] been provisionally

accepted contingent on the requirements set forth in the acceptance letter” and so was

entitled to a departure. The state argued that Vines’s record did not demonstrate a particular

amenability to probation and that a substantial and compelling reason for departure was

not present.

The district court declined to grant a dispositional departure, stating:

Well, as to the dispositional departure . . . I might empathize
with Mr. Vines and everything that the defense has set out here.
The—the reality is, is I do not believe that there are substantial
and compelling circumstances that would justify a

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dispositional departure—that he’s shown any kind of really
strong or compelling reason that he has responded to treatment
and, in fact, I think the record shows something different. So,
in regards to that, I am going to deny that.

The district court sentenced Vines to 58 months in prison and credited him with 564 days.

The district court noted that the sentence was at the low end of the presumptive guidelines

range to reflect that the weight of drugs he was found with was “just over the minimum

threshold” of 25 grams.

Vines appeals.

DECISION

Vines argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for

a downward dispositional departure.

An appellate court “afford[s] the trial court great discretion in the imposition of

sentences.” State v. Spain,

590 N.W.2d 85, 88

 (Minn. 1999). The use of permissive

language—the word “may”—in the sentencing guidelines when discussing departures

creates “broad discretion” for the district court in sentencing matters. State v. Kindem,

313 N.W.2d 6, 7

 (Minn. 1981). Generally, an appellate court will “reverse sentencing decisions

only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto,

855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08

 (Minn. 2014).

       The sentencing guidelines assign sentencing ranges that are “presumed to be

appropriate” and allow departure from the applicable range only if “there exist identifiable,

substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g

Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020). A departure is not exclusively controlled by the guidelines but

“is an exercise of judicial discretion constrained by statute or case law.”

Id.

 A district court



                                               4
may depart “only if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present” and those

circumstances present a substantial and compelling reason to depart. Soto,

855 N.W.2d at 308

 (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). “Because the guidelines’ goal is to create

uniformity in sentencing, departures are justified only in exceptional cases.” State v.

Solberg,

882 N.W.2d 618, 625

 (Minn. 2016). And, while a district court may depart based

on the presence of a mitigating factor that presents substantial and compelling

circumstances, it is not obligated to do so. State v. Pegel,

795 N.W.2d 251, 253-54

 (Minn.

App. 2011).

       Vines asserts that the district court “incorrectly determined that there had to be

substantial and compelling circumstances before [it] could grant a departure” and that,

instead, he only had to provide “adequate evidence” of the factors in Minnesota Statutes

section 152.152 to warrant a departure. The state responds that substantial and compelling

circumstances are required to depart and that section 152.152 does not lower that standard

but rather further limits the discretion afforded to district courts when contemplating

departures in controlled-substance cases. The state’s argument is more persuasive.

       As explained above, substantial and compelling circumstances are required to depart

from a guidelines sentence. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1. Certain mitigating factors may

provide a substantial and compelling reason to depart. Soto,

855 N.W.2d at 308

. One

mitigating factor identified by the guidelines that may provide a basis for departure is a

finding of particular amenability to probation in a controlled-substance case. Minn. Sent’g

Guidelines 2.D.3.a(8). For all types of offenses, particular amenability to probation can be

demonstrated by such factors as “the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his


                                             5
cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.” State v.

Trog,

323 N.W.2d 28, 31

 (Minn. 1982). When the case involves a controlled-substance

violation under one of the enumerated sections of Minnesota Statutes chapter 152,

however, the defendant must provide adequate evidence that they are (1) chemically

dependent, (2) have been accepted by a treatment program, and (3) can respond to such

treatment, in accordance with Minnesota Statutes section 152.152. Minn. Sent’g

Guidelines 2.D.3.a(8). Section 152.152 dictates that a district court “may” depart based on

amenability to probation “only if” those three requirements have been satisfied.

Minn. Stat. § 152.152

. In addition, the defendant must establish that the treatment program is approved

by the commissioner of human services.

Id.

 And, although not an issue in the present case,

section 152.152 adds that “[t]he court may impose a sentence that is a mitigated

dispositional departure on any other ground only if the court includes as a condition of

probation incarceration in a local jail or workhouse.”

Id.


       Read together, the sentencing guidelines and section 152.152 provide that a district

court may grant a dispositional departure from a presumptive executed sentence for a

controlled-substance offense only if the district court determines that particular amenability

to probation presents a substantial and compelling circumstance and the defendant has

provided adequate evidence to satisfy the requirements of the statute.

       As a result, the district court here did not abuse its discretion by requiring substantial

and compelling circumstances to depart. Nor did it abuse its discretion by finding such

circumstances lacking. The district court considered Vines’s argument that he had shown

himself to be responsive to treatment in the past and had maintained periods of sobriety.


                                               6
But the district court also considered the state’s argument that Vines, after completing

treatment, was convicted of driving while impaired in 2013 and later committed other

offenses, including the current controlled-substance offense. We discern no abuse of

discretion in the district court’s determination that the record did not reflect substantial and

compelling circumstances justifying a departure from the presumptive sentencing

disposition.

       Affirmed.




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