State of Minnesota v. Daniel Roy Luckhardt

Minnesota Court of Appeals

State of Minnesota v. Daniel Roy Luckhardt

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0606 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Daniel Roy Luckhardt, Appellant. Filed January 16, 2024 Affirmed Kirk, Judge * Lyon County District Court File No. 42-CR-19-1432 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Abby Wikelius, Lyon County Attorney, Julianna F. Passe, Assistant County Attorney, Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Kirk, Judge. * Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION KIRK, Judge The district court did not abuse its discretion by vacating Luckhardt’s stay of adjudication and sentencing him to the presumptive prison sentence and as such, we affirm. FACTS As part of a plea agreement, appellant Daniel Luckhardt received a stay of adjudication on a presumptive prison sentence for violating a harassment restraining order on December 30, 2019, as part of a plea agreement. Luckhardt was later charged with a probation violation, and his probation was reinstated with additional conditions on January 26, 2022. The district court told Luckhardt that as condition of his reinstated probation he was to complete a chemical-use assessment and follow the recommendations. Luckhardt completed the assessment and the recommendations included abstaining from the use of mood-altering substances and submitting to random drug testing. Luckhardt tested positive for methamphetamine in October and November 2022 and failed to maintain contact with his probation officer throughout late 2022. At a contested probation-revocation hearing in January 2023, Luckhardt conceded he was required to follow the recommendations but argued he was not informed they were a condition of his probation. The district court revoked his probation. Luckhardt appeals. DECISION We review a district court’s decision to revoke probation for an abuse of discretion. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). Luckhardt sets out five arguments 2 as to why his probation should not have been revoked. None persuade this court that the district court abused its discretion, and we address each in turn below. First, the district court set Luckhardt’s probation conditions and properly ordered Luckhardt to comply with the chemical-use assessment recommendations as a condition of his probation. See State v. Bradley, 756 N.W.2d 129, 132 (Minn. App. 2008) (holding that district courts may permit chemical-health assessors to determine whether treatment is necessary, and the type of treatment required). Second, the probation violation report specifically detailed which recommendations Luckhardt allegedly violated; therefore, Luckhardt had adequate notice of his alleged probation violations. Third, the district court found Luckhardt’s excuses for not contacting his probation officer to be “not credible.” We defer to the district court on witness credibility determinations. See Griffin v. State, 941 N.W.2d 404, 408-09 (Minn. 2020). The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Luckhardt had violated his probation, as shown by clear and convincing evidence in the record that he failed to maintain contact with his probation officer and had tested positive for methamphetamine. Fourth, the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Luckhardt’s probation because it appropriately considered the third Modtland subfactor when it found that allowing Luckhardt to continue on probation when he had a similar, prior probation violation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense which contemplated a presumptive prison sentence, even without the prior violation. See State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 2005); see also Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249-50. 3 Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Luckhardt’s motion for a downward departure as it sentenced Luckhardt to the presumptive sentence for his offense. See State v. Williams, 337 N.W.2d 387, 390-91 (Minn. 1983) (holding that reviewing courts will generally not disturb a district court’s exercise of discretion when the imposed sentence is within the presumptive range). Affirmed. 4

Opinion

                   This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                         Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                                STATE OF MINNESOTA
                                IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                      A23-0606

                                    State of Minnesota,
                                       Respondent,

                                            vs.

                                  Daniel Roy Luckhardt,
                                        Appellant.

                                  Filed January 16, 2024
                                         Affirmed
                                       Kirk, Judge *

                                Lyon County District Court
                                 File No. 42-CR-19-1432

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Abby Wikelius, Lyon County Attorney, Julianna F. Passe, Assistant County Attorney,
Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

         Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Kirk,

Judge.




* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
                           NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

KIRK, Judge

       The district court did not abuse its discretion by vacating Luckhardt’s stay of

adjudication and sentencing him to the presumptive prison sentence and as such, we affirm.

                                         FACTS

       As part of a plea agreement, appellant Daniel Luckhardt received a stay of

adjudication on a presumptive prison sentence for violating a harassment restraining order

on December 30, 2019, as part of a plea agreement. Luckhardt was later charged with a

probation violation, and his probation was reinstated with additional conditions on January

26, 2022. The district court told Luckhardt that as condition of his reinstated probation he

was to complete a chemical-use assessment and follow the recommendations. Luckhardt

completed the assessment and the recommendations included abstaining from the use of

mood-altering substances and submitting to random drug testing. Luckhardt tested positive

for methamphetamine in October and November 2022 and failed to maintain contact with

his probation officer throughout late 2022. At a contested probation-revocation hearing in

January 2023, Luckhardt conceded he was required to follow the recommendations but

argued he was not informed they were a condition of his probation. The district court

revoked his probation. Luckhardt appeals.

                                       DECISION

       We review a district court’s decision to revoke probation for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Austin, 
295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50
 (Minn. 1980). Luckhardt sets out five arguments




                                             2
as to why his probation should not have been revoked. None persuade this court that the

district court abused its discretion, and we address each in turn below.

       First, the district court set Luckhardt’s probation conditions and properly ordered

Luckhardt to comply with the chemical-use assessment recommendations as a condition of

his probation. See State v. Bradley, 
756 N.W.2d 129, 132
 (Minn. App. 2008) (holding that

district courts may permit chemical-health assessors to determine whether treatment is

necessary, and the type of treatment required). Second, the probation violation report

specifically detailed which recommendations Luckhardt allegedly violated; therefore,

Luckhardt had adequate notice of his alleged probation violations. Third, the district court

found Luckhardt’s excuses for not contacting his probation officer to be “not credible.” We

defer to the district court on witness credibility determinations. See Griffin v. State, 
941 N.W.2d 404
, 408-09 (Minn. 2020). The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding

that Luckhardt had violated his probation, as shown by clear and convincing evidence in

the record that he failed to maintain contact with his probation officer and had tested

positive for methamphetamine. Fourth, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

revoking Luckhardt’s probation because it appropriately considered the third Modtland

subfactor when it found that allowing Luckhardt to continue on probation when he had a

similar, prior probation violation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense

which contemplated a presumptive prison sentence, even without the prior violation. See

State v. Modtland, 
695 N.W.2d 602, 607
 (Minn. 2005); see also Austin, 
295 N.W.2d at 249-50
.




                                             3
       Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Luckhardt’s motion

for a downward departure as it sentenced Luckhardt to the presumptive sentence for his

offense. See State v. Williams, 
337 N.W.2d 387, 390-91
 (Minn. 1983) (holding that

reviewing courts will generally not disturb a district court’s exercise of discretion when the

imposed sentence is within the presumptive range).

       Affirmed.




                                              4


Reference

Status
Unpublished
Syllabus
The district court did not abuse its discretion by vacating Luckhardt's stay of adjudication and sentencing him to the presumptive prison sentence and as such, we affirm.