This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                       Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                              STATE OF MINNESOTA
                              IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                    A22-1808

                                  State of Minnesota,
                                     Respondent,

                                           vs.

                                   Robert Earl Boyce,
                                      Appellant.

                                Filed January 22, 2024
                                       Affirmed
                                    Cochran, Judge

                            Hennepin County District Court
                               File No. 27-CR-22-3465

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

      Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and

Larson, Judge.

                          NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

      In this direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction for first-degree aggravated

robbery, simple robbery, and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, appellant

challenges his conviction on two grounds. Appellant first argues that the district court
erred by denying his motion to strike the jury venire because it did not represent a fair

cross-section of the community. Appellant next contends that the district court clearly

erred by denying his Batson challenge because the prosecution’s peremptory removal of

the only Black prospective juror violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States

Constitution. Appellant therefore asserts that he is entitled to a new trial and that his

convictions must be reversed. We affirm.

                                          FACTS

       In February 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Robert Earl

Boyce with one count of simple robbery and one count of fifth-degree possession of a

controlled substance based on allegations that, while in Hennepin County, Boyce hit a

victim with a baseball bat, stole money from the victim, and was found in possession of

several prescription pills. The state later amended the complaint to add one count of

first-degree aggravated robbery. Boyce pleaded not guilty, and the matter was scheduled

for a jury trial in Hennepin County.

       Before the jury was sworn, Boyce, who is Black, challenged the composition of the

prospective jury panel, which he refers to as the “jury venire.” 1 Boyce argued that the jury


1
  Jury “venire” is defined as “[a] panel of persons selected for jury duty and from among
whom the jurors are to be chosen.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1869 (11th ed. 2019). Our
caselaw sometimes uses the terms “jury pool,” “jury venire,” and “jury panel”
interchangeably. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 

 (Minn. App. 2014)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2014). Additionally, the rules of criminal
procedure appear to use “jury list” in place of “jury pool” and use “jury panel” in place of
“jury venire.” See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subds. 1-2. Based on our review of recent
caselaw, we conclude that “jury pool” describes the group of jurors summoned for jury
service during a given week, “jury venire” describes the group of prospective jurors drawn
from the jury pool for voir dire in a particular case, and “jury panel” describes the jurors

                                             2
venire violated Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.02, subdivision 1, because only

two prospective jurors identified as people of color and only one of those jurors identified

as Black. Boyce asserted that, as of 2010, the population of Hennepin County residents

who identify as Black “is at least 12 percent, possibly more” but only three percent of the

“prospective jury panel” or jury venire identified as Black. Boyce argued that this

discrepancy impeded his right to a fair trial.

       In response to Boyce’s challenge, the state argued that Hennepin County’s

jury-selection procedures do comply with Minnesota law and described these procedures

in detail. The state explained that the county compiles a “master jury list” that consists of

voter registration records, driver’s-license records, and state identification card records,

and uses a “random selection process” to select prospective jurors from this list. The state

described the random selection process as “blind” to demographic characteristics like race

and therefore “totally immune” to purposeful or inadvertent discrimination. Lastly, the

state noted that the county’s jury-selection procedures were “mandated” by Minnesota law

and far “exceed[ed] the National Center for State Courts’ inclusivity goal of 85 percent.”

       Defense counsel characterized the state’s argument as implying that, “because this

is how Hennepin County and the [c]ourts have always done it, it’s okay.” Defense counsel

then noted that a district court in another county rejected a similar argument and “ordered

a change to the jury selection process in response to concerns that the racial makeup of

juries [did not] reflect Minnesota’s diversity.” Defense counsel also explained that she had


seated in that case. See, e.g., State v. Lockhart, No. A22-0094, 

, at *1
(Minn. App. Jan. 30, 2023).

                                                 3
tried three cases in the past four weeks and that, in her experience, the underrepresentation

of people of color in jury panels was a “systematic problem.”

       The district court denied Boyce’s motion to strike the jury venire. The district court

noted that, to succeed in his motion, Boyce had to show that (1) “the group allegedly

excluded is a distinctive group within the community,” (2) “the group in question was not

fairly represented in the venire,” and (3) “the underrepresentation was the result of a

systemic exclusion of that group.” The district court found that Boyce satisfied the first

element because Black people “are a distinctive group within the community.” The district

court found that Boyce satisfied the second element because it was a “problem” that none

of the prospective jurors in the jury venire except “maybe one” identified as Black. But

the district court found that Boyce had not satisfied the third element because he had not

demonstrated that the composition of the jury venire resulted from the “systemic

exclusion” of Black people.

       The parties proceeded with jury selection. During voir dire, the district court asked

the prospective jurors if any of their family members or friends had been accused or

convicted of a crime. 2 Prospective juror 15 indicated that his brother had been arrested,

incarcerated, and prosecuted for a serious crime but that the charges against him were

dropped after video evidence revealed that he was not the perpetrator of the crime. When

the district court asked if his brother’s experience would affect prospective juror 15’s



2
 “Voir dire” is defined as “[a] preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge
or lawyer to decide whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1886 (11th ed. 2019).

                                             4
ability to be a fair juror, prospective juror 15 stated: “I don’t know until I actually listen to

what’s going on and if I can see what happened. You know, some laws do—you know,

some [of] the laws are just—it’s 50/50. I’ll put it to you that way.” (Emphasis added.)

The district court again asked prospective juror 15 if he thought he could be a fair and

impartial juror, and the following exchange occurred:

              PROSPECTIVE JUROR: For me, it’s fair enough, you know,
              if I just listen to hear what’s going on. Because like I said,
              some of the laws that—it’s just not right, I’ll put it to you that
              way. And then it’s just some of the things that—I’m just
              amazed how things can be written and can be broken at the
              same time.

              COURT: So for laws—this case involves charges of simple
              robbery, drug possession, aggravated robbery. Are those some
              of the laws that you think you have problems with how the law
              is written?

              PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Well, I would say, like I said, it just
              depends on the crime and the evidence that’s been proven, you
              know, stuff like that. That’s what I see, if I can see it and listen
              to it, I can give a good analys[is] to figure out what’s
              happening.

              COURT: And so you’ll definitely have witnesses to listen to.
              I have no idea other evidence or not. So are you saying you’ll
              keep an open mind to listen to the witnesses? Or would you
              have to see something on video?

              PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Well, it’s an open mind.

During defense counsel’s questioning, prospective juror 15 again stated that he could not

“make a judgment off something [he could not] hear or see.”




                                               5
         The prosecutor exercised a peremptory strike of prospective juror 15. Boyce raised

a Batson challenge because prospective juror 15 was “the sole Black juror on [the] panel.” 3

The prosecutor explained that she struck prospective juror 15 because of his “potential bias

against the [s]tate and in favor of the defendant based on his experience with his brother.”

The prosecutor also expressed concerns about the prospective juror’s need to “see” the

evidence because there was no video evidence in the case. Lastly, the prosecutor noted

that the prospective juror “mentioned that he didn’t know whether or not he could be fair

and impartial until he heard and saw the evidence,” which “raise[d] all sorts of concerns

for the [s]tate about [prospective juror 15’s] ability to . . . be a fair and impartial juror.”

Boyce argued that the prospective juror’s experience with his brother was similar to that of

another prospective juror, and emphasized that the other prospective juror was not “chosen

to be the first strike by the [s]tate.” The prosecutor responded that the state “share[d] the

same concerns” about that other prospective juror and was considering striking her as well. 4

         The district court denied Boyce’s Batson challenge. After expressing doubt as to

whether Boyce had made a prima facie showing that the peremptory strike was based on

race, the district court concluded that the prosecutor’s reasons for exercising the

peremptory strike were race neutral and “sufficient to overcome a Batson challenge.”




3
  See Batson v. Kentucky, 

 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution prevents parties from striking prospective jurors based
solely on their race); see also State v. Carridine, 

 (Minn. 2012)
(applying Batson).
4
    This prospective juror was not ultimately seated on the jury panel.

                                               6
       The jury found Boyce guilty on all counts. The district court convicted Boyce of

first-degree aggravated robbery and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance and

imposed a 67-month executed prison sentence for first-degree aggravated robbery and a

19-month stayed prison sentence for fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, to

be served concurrently.

       Boyce appeals.

                                         DECISION

       Boyce argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred by

denying his motion to strike the jury venire and clearly erred by denying his Batson

challenge. We consider these issues in turn.

I.     The district court did not err by denying Boyce’s motion to strike the jury
       venire.

       Boyce first argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to strike the

jury venire because the jury venire “did not represent a fair cross-section of the

community.” We review de novo fair-cross-section challenges. Griffin, 

.

       The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the

right to a “jury venire” that “reflect[s] a fair cross-section of the community.” Griffin,

 (quotation omitted); see also U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . an impartial jury of the . . . district

wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”); Minn. Const., art. I, § 6 (same); Minn.

R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 1 (“The jury list must be composed of persons randomly selected

from a fair cross-section of qualified county residents.”). But neither federal nor state



                                               7
constitutional law “guarantee[s] a criminal defendant a jury of a particular composition or

one that mirrors the community.” State v. Williams, 

 (Minn. 1994).

       To make a prima facie showing that a jury venire did not reflect a fair cross-section

of the community, a defendant must show that (1) “the group allegedly excluded is a

‘distinctive’ group in the community,” (2) “the group in question was not fairly represented

in the venire,” and (3) “the underrepresentation was the result of a ‘systematic’ exclusion

of the group in question from the jury selection process.” 

 (quoting Duren v. Missouri,

 (1979)). 5

       Boyce contends that he made a prima facie showing that the jury venire did not

reflect a fair cross-section of the community because he demonstrated all three elements of

a prima facie case. The state asserts that Boyce did not make the required prima facie

showing because he failed to establish the second and third elements of a prima facie case.

Assuming without deciding that Boyce met his burden on the first two elements of a prima

facie case, we conclude that Boyce did not satisfy the third element. In other words, Boyce

did not show that the exclusion of Black people from the jury venire was the result of their

systematic exclusion from the jury-selection process.

       To satisfy the third element, the defendant must establish “that over a significant

period of time—panel after panel, month after month—the group of eligible jurors in

question has been significantly underrepresented on the panels” due to their “systematic



5
  If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a fair-cross-section violation, the state
may rebut this showing by establishing that the jury selection process advanced a
significant state interest. Hennepin County v. Perry, 

 (Minn. 1997).

                                             8
exclusion” from those panels. Griffin, 

 (quoting Williams, 

). “Systematic exclusion” refers to “unfair or inadequate selection procedures used

by the state rather than, e.g., a higher percentage of ‘no shows’ on the part of people

belonging to the group in question.” Id. at 102 (quotation omitted). In other words,

systematic exclusion requires the defendant to show that the distinctive group at issue has

been consistently underrepresented in jury venires as a result of the procedures used to

identify and summon individuals for jury duty, see Williams, 

, and that

the underrepresentation could not be explained by “reasonable and plausible alternative

possibilities shown by the statistical data.” Griffin, 

. Without evidence

of systematic exclusion, we cannot conclude that the defendant was denied a right to a jury

trial by a fair cross-section of the community. See Andersen v. State, 

, 182

(Minn. 2020).

       To determine what evidence is required to show systematic exclusion, we turn to

relevant caselaw. In State v. Roan, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Roan was not

denied his right to a jury trial by a fair cross-section of the community because he did not

show that the underrepresentation of “eligible jurors of color” was the result of their

“systematic exclusion” from the jury-selection process.           

(Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). The supreme court noted that “[t]he Hennepin County

jury selection system uses registered voters, driver’s licenses, and registered Minnesota

identification card holders” to identify prospective jurors and “reaches over 98 percent of

[Hennepin County] citizens.” 

 The supreme court therefore concluded that Roan had

“not demonstrated that Hennepin County’s selection procedures in any way constitute


                                             9
systematic exclusion.” 

 Similarly, in Andersen, the supreme court held that a member

of the White Earth Band, a federally recognized tribe, was not denied his right to a fair trial

because he did not demonstrate that the jury-selection process systematically excluded

Native Americans. 940 N.W.2d at 181-82. The supreme court first observed that the

jury-selection procedures at issue were the same as those used in Hennepin County and

upheld in Roan. Id. at 182. The supreme court then emphasized that Andersen had

“adduced no historical or contemporaneous evidence or statistical analysis to factually

support his argument that” Native Americans were systematically excluded from the

jury-selection process because of these procedures. Id. Accordingly, the supreme court

concluded that Andersen’s fair-cross-section challenge failed. Id.

       Applying the relevant legal standard and applicable caselaw, we conclude that the

district court correctly determined that Boyce failed to satisfy the third element of a

fair-cross-section challenge. The record before the district court reflects that Boyce did

not submit any evidence to support his assertion that Black people were underrepresented

in the jury venire as a result of Hennepin County’s jury-selection procedures. Boyce did

not call any witnesses or submit any historical, contemporaneous, or statistical evidence to

show that Black people were underrepresented in the jury venire as a result of Hennepin

County’s jury-selection procedures. Instead, Boyce relied solely on defense counsel’s

assertions about the number of Black people in Hennepin County relative to the percentage

of Black people in the jury venire, as well as her account of another district court’s response

to a jury-venire challenge and her anecdotal experience with jury trials. Assertions and

arguments by counsel are not evidence. See State v. Bobo, 

, 142-43


                                              10
(Minn. 2009) (stating that attorneys “may not make arguments that are not supported

by evidence”). Because Boyce did not introduce any evidence to support his assertion that

Black people were systematically excluded from the jury venire because of Hennepin

County’s jury-selection procedures, the district court did not err by denying Boyce’s

fair-cross-section challenge. See 

       On appeal, Boyce seeks to introduce new factual information to support his

argument that the district court erred in its analysis of his fair-cross-section challenge. For

example, Boyce cites to two news articles discussing racial disparities in jury pools and

driver’s-license records and one study addressing racial disparities in photo ID records.

Because this information was not presented to the district court, it is not part of the record

on appeal. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 8 (“The record on appeal consists of the

documents filed in the district court, the offered exhibits, and the transcript of the

proceedings, if any.”). Therefore, we decline to consider this extra-record information as

well as Boyce’s arguments based on the information. See Plowman v. Copeland, Buhl &

Co., 

 (Minn. 1977) (“It is well settled that an appellate court may not

base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal, and that matters not produced

and received in evidence below may not be considered.”); see also State v. Little,

 (Minn. 2014) (citing this aspect of Plowman).

       In sum, Boyce did not meet his burden before the district court to show that Black

people in Hennepin County have been “significantly underrepresented” in jury venires

“over a significant period of time” as a result of their “systematic exclusion” from the

county’s jury-selection process. See Griffin, 

 (quoting Williams,


                                              11


). Therefore, Boyce has not made a prima facie showing that the jury

venire did not reflect a fair cross-section of the community, and we discern no error in the

district court’s denial of Boyce’s motion to strike the jury venire. See 

II.    The district court did not clearly err by denying Boyce’s Batson challenge.

       Boyce next contends that the district court clearly erred by denying his Batson

challenge because the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of the only Black person on the jury

panel was based on racial discrimination. In general, we will not reverse a district

court’s ruling on a Batson challenge unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Harvey,

 (Minn. 2019); State v. Pendleton, 

(Minn. 2007). A ruling is clearly erroneous when it is “manifestly contrary to the weight

of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Commitment

of Kenney, 

, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).

       A party may use a peremptory challenge “to strike a prospective juror that the party

believes will be less fair than some others” in an effort “to select as final jurors the persons

they believe will be most fair.” State v. Martin, 

 (Minn. 2009)

(quotation omitted). But a party may not use a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective

juror based on race because it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Batson,

; see also Carridine, 

 (applying Batson).




                                              12
       Minnesota courts use the three-step framework set forth in Batson to determine

whether a peremptory challenge was motivated by racial discrimination.             Martin,

; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7(3). Under this framework,

              (1) the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the
              prosecutor executed a peremptory challenge on the basis of
              race; (2) the burden then shifts to the prosecution to articulate
              a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question; and
              (3) the district court must determine whether the defendant has
              carried the burden of proving purposeful discrimination.

Martin, 

. We consider each step of the Batson analysis in turn.

       A.     Step One: Prima Facie Case of Discrimination

       Step one of the Batson analysis requires the defendant to “make a prima facie

showing that the prosecutor executed a peremptory challenge on the basis of race.” 

       When deciding Boyce’s Batson challenge, the district court expressed “some

concern” about whether Boyce had satisfied step one of the Batson analysis but did not

resolve the question before proceeding to step two. When the district court proceeds to

step two of the Batson analysis, “the question as to step one is moot on appeal.”

State v. Lufkins, 

, 210 (Minn. 2021). Here, the district court proceeded to

step two of the Batson analysis. Accordingly, the issue of whether Boyce made a prima

facie case of racial discrimination is moot. 

       B.     Step Two: Race-Neutral Explanation

       At step two of the Batson analysis, the state must “offer a reasonably specific

explanation that the court can use to determine whether that reason is related to the case

being tried.” Id. at 211 (emphasis omitted). This explanation does not need to be



                                             13
“persuasive or even plausible.” Martin, 

. And this explanation “will be

deemed race-neutral unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the . . . explanation.”

Pendleton, 

 (quotation omitted). “A family member’s involvement with

a criminal investigation is a race-neutral reason for striking a juror.” State v. Martin,

 (Minn. 2000).

       The prosecutor offered three reasons for striking prospective juror 15: (1) the

prosecutor was concerned about the prospective juror’s “potential bias . . . in favor of the

defendant based on his experience with his brother;” (2) the prosecutor was concerned

about the prospective juror’s need to “see” the evidence because there was no video

evidence in the case; and (3) the prospective juror “mentioned that he didn’t know whether

or not he could be fair and impartial until he heard and saw the evidence,” which raised

questions about his ability to be a fair and impartial juror. The district court concluded that

these reasons were sufficiently race-neutral to overcome a Batson challenge.

       Boyce argues that the district court’s reasoning at step two of the Batson analysis

was insufficient because the district court accepted the prosecutor’s reasons “at face value,”

without testing their validity.      Boyce relies on the supreme court’s decision in

State v. McRae, 

 (Minn. 1992), to support his argument. In McRae, the

supreme court concluded that the prosecutor had violated Batson by striking a prospective

juror based on her responses to questions about “the system” and the fact that both she and

the defendant were Black. 

. In rejecting these explanations,

the supreme court expressed concerns about “the exaggeration employed by the

prosecutor” in describing the prospective juror’s responses and noted that consideration of


                                              14
her race was “expressly forbid[den]” by Batson. 

. The supreme court also

questioned the district court’s understanding of Batson and explained that the second and

third steps of the Batson analysis require the district court “first to determine whether the

prosecutor has articulated a facially race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in

question and then to test the validity of the explanation—that is, to determine whether the

proffered race-neutral reason” was pretextual, which the district court failed to do. 

Boyce relies on this articulation of the Batson analysis to argue that the district court in this

case was required “to test the validity of the prosecutor’s stated reasons for the strike” at

the second step of the Batson analysis but “failed” to do so.

       Boyce’s reliance on this language from McRae is misguided. In stating that district

courts must “test the validity of the [prosecutor’s] explanation” to determine “whether the

proffered race-neutral reason” was pretextual, the supreme court is merely describing the

third step of the Batson analysis that occurs after the second step; it is not adding to the

second step some sort of testing requirement. See 

 As stated above and recognized in

McRae, the second step of the Batson analysis requires courts to consider only whether the

prosecutor’s explanation for excluding the prospective juror in question is “reasonably

specific,” not whether it is pretextual. Lufkins, 963 N.W.2d at 211; see also McRae,

.

       Based on our review of the record and relevant caselaw, we conclude that the district

court did not clearly err at step two of the Batson analysis. The prosecutor explained that

the state was concerned about potential bias against the state in favor of the defendant due

to the prospective juror’s brother’s involvement with a criminal investigation—namely, the


                                               15
brother’s arrest and prosecution for a crime he did not commit. This reason alone is

sufficient to satisfy step two of the Batson analysis. See Martin, 

. We

therefore conclude that the district court did not clearly err by determining that the state’s

reasons for excluding prospective juror 15 were sufficiently race neutral.

       C.     Step Three: Purposeful Discrimination

       Finally, step three of the Batson analysis requires the party challenging the

peremptory strike to prove that the “strike was motivated by racial discrimination and that

the proffered reasons were merely a pretext for the discriminatory motive.” Pendleton,

 (quotation omitted).

       The district court determined that Boyce had not shown that the prosecutor’s reasons

for striking prospective juror 15 were pretextual, in light of the prospective juror’s

responses to questioning during voir dire.

       Boyce contends that the district court clearly erred by determining that the

prosecutor’s reasons for striking prospective juror 15 were not pretextual because (1) the

prosecutor exaggerated the prospective juror’s responses to the district court’s questions

about fairness and impartiality; (2) the prosecutor did not question the prospective juror

about the reasons she provided for striking him; and (3) “[s]tatistical disparities in the jury

composition show the strike was a pretext.” For the reasons below, we are not persuaded.

       “Exaggeration” of Responses

       Boyce first argues that the prosecutor unfairly exaggerated the prospective juror’s

responses to the district court’s questions about fairness and impartiality. This argument

is not supported by the record.


                                              16
      Boyce is correct that exaggerating a prospective juror’s responses to voir dire

questions may support an inference that the prosecutor’s explanation for striking the

prospective juror was pretextual.     See McRae, 

 (describing the

prosecutor’s “exaggeration” of a prospective juror’s responses as “very troubling” and

concluding that the prosecutor’s explanation for striking the juror was “not the sort of

racially-neutral explanation that the [Supreme] Court contemplated in Batson”). But the

prosecutor did not exaggerate prospective juror 15’s responses to questioning in this case.

In striking prospective juror 15, the prosecutor expressed concern about the prospective

juror’s need to “see” evidence, in light of his experience with his brother, who was

exonerated by video evidence. The prosecutor also expressed concern about prospective

juror 15’s statement that, before he could decide whether he would be a fair and impartial

juror, he needed to “see” the evidence. The record reflects that prospective juror 15

repeatedly stated that he needed to “see” the evidence before he could decide whether

Boyce was guilty and whether he could be fair and impartial. Thus, Boyce’s contention

that the district court clearly erred at step three of the Batson analysis because the

prosecutor unfairly exaggerated prospective juror 15’s responses to voir dire questions is

not persuasive.

       Failure to Question

       Boyce next argues that “[t]he prosecutor’s failure to question [prospective juror 15]

during voir dire about [the prosecutor’s] alleged concerns shows that her race-neutral

reasons for the strike were a pretext.” We are not persuaded.




                                            17
       Failure to meaningfully examine a prospective juror on a topic of concern during

voir dire may be evidence of a pretext for discrimination. See Miller-El v. Dretke,

 (2005) (explaining that the state’s failure to ask a prospective juror

questions about his brother suggested that its explanation for striking the prospective juror

based on his brother’s past was pretextual). But the district court extensively questioned

prospective juror 15 about his experience with his brother, his need to “see” evidence, and

his ability to be fair and impartial. And Boyce does not argue that a prosecutor’s failure to

ask a prospective juror additional questions about a topic of concern is evidence of pretext

after the juror has been extensively questioned on the matter by the district court.

Accordingly, Boyce’s failure-to-question argument is unavailing.

       Statistical Disparities

       Lastly, Boyce contends that “[s]tatistical disparities in the jury composition further

support the inference that the race-neutral explanations were pretextual.” To support his

argument, Boyce relies on Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

 (2003). In that case, the

state used its peremptory strikes to exclude 10 out of 11, or 91%, of Black prospective

jurors, which the Supreme Court concluded was “unlikely” to occur by “[h]appenstance.”

Cockrell, 

.




                                             18
       This case is readily distinguishable from Cockrell. Here, the state struck only one

Black prospective juror who just happened to be the only Black prospective juror. 6 The

Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the exclusion of the only juror of

color by itself is insufficient to establish a Batson violation.     See State v. Moore,

 (Minn. 1989); State v. Everett, 

 (Minn.

1991); State v. Bowers, 

 (Minn. 1992). Because, unlike Cockrell,

the state struck only one Black prospective juror, we conclude that Boyce’s reliance on

Cockrell is misguided.

       In sum, Boyce has not demonstrated any record support for his contention that the

prosecutor’s reasons for striking prospective juror 15 were a pretext for discrimination.

We therefore conclude that the district court did not clearly err by determining that Boyce

did not meet his burden of proof under step three of the Batson analysis or by denying

Boyce’s Batson challenge. See Pendleton, 

.

       Affirmed.




6
  The state disputes that there was only one Black juror in the jury venire, noting that one
juror who was excused for cause spoke Amharic, which is “the official language of
Ethiopia.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 59 (5th ed. 2011).
For purposes of this appeal, we accept Boyce’s contention that the jury venire included
only one Black prospective juror.

                                            19