STATE OF MINNESOTA
                             IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                   A23-0359

                                   Charles Aldean,
                                    Respondent,

                                          vs.

                                  City of Woodbury,
                                      Appellant.

                               Filed February 5, 2024
                                      Affirmed
                                   Cochran, Judge

                          Washington County District Court
                             File No. 82-CV-22-1266

Samantha E. Steward, Meuser, Yackley & Rowland, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Paola K. Maldonado, Christina C. Petsoulis, Brandon M. Fitzsimmons, Flaherty & Hood,
P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Zachary J. Cronen, Calen E. King, Squires, Waldspurger & Mace, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and

Timothy Jung, Lind, Jensen, Sullivan & Peterson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amicus
curiae Association of Minnesota Counties)

Paul A. Merwin, Patricia Y. Beety, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
amici curiae League of Minnesota Cities and Coalition of Greater Minnesota Cities)

      Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and

Larson, Judge.

SYLLABUS

      A public employer’s obligation, under Minnesota Statutes section 299A.465,

subdivision 1(c) (2022), to “continue to provide health coverage for” a qualifying
duty-disabled peace officer or firefighter requires that the public employer make

health-insurance coverage available for the officer or firefighter until the officer or

firefighter reaches the age of 65. The public employer’s obligation to make coverage

available continues even if the officer or firefighter elects not to participate in the

employer’s health-insurance plan for a period of time and later seeks to reinstate coverage.

OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

       In this appeal following a grant of summary judgment, appellant-city challenges the

district court’s order requiring the city to reinstate respondent’s access to the city’s

health-care plan pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 299A.465, subdivision 1(c) (2022),

for respondent and his dependents. 1 Because we conclude that the statute unambiguously

requires appellant to make coverage available for respondent, even though respondent’s

coverage had temporarily lapsed, we affirm.

                                         FACTS

       This case arises from respondent Charles Aldean’s efforts to obtain health-insurance

coverage from appellant City of Woodbury (the city) under Minnesota Statutes

section 299A.465 (2022). The following facts are undisputed.

       Aldean was employed as a Washington County deputy sheriff for approximately ten

years. In March 2017, he joined the Woodbury Police Department as a police officer. He



1
  We note that there were significant amendments made to the statutes governing
duty-disability benefits and continued health-insurance coverage in 2023. See 2023 Minn.
Laws ch. 48. The statutory provision at issue in this appeal was not amended.

                                              2
was employed by the city until he resigned in April 2020. While employed with the city,

Aldean was enrolled in the city’s group health plan with his wife and two children listed

as dependents.

       Prior to resigning, Aldean experienced health problems arising from his work. As

a result, he applied for duty-disability benefits while still employed with the city. On

April 13, 2020, the Public Employees Retirement Association (PERA) determined that

Aldean was entitled to duty-disability benefits under state law and continued

health-insurance coverage from the city until the age of 65 under section 299A.465. The

city did not petition for review of PERA’s determination. Aldean resigned effective

April 30, 2020, but continued to be enrolled in the city’s health plan.

       In summer 2020, Aldean found employment with the Minnesota Department of

Employment and Economic Development. Around that same time, Aldean stopped paying

his portion of the city’s health-insurance premium and was dropped off the city’s health

plan. Then, on October 6, 2021, Aldean requested to be placed back on the city’s health

plan and to receive health insurance through the city. The city denied his request.

       Aldean sued the city, seeking benefits owed under section 299A.465. The city

moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the district court denied the

motion. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Aldean sought an

order requiring the city to continue to offer him and his dependents health coverage until

age 65, while the city sought a determination that the city was no longer obligated to

provide health coverage because Aldean voluntarily ended his coverage.




                                              3
       The district court granted Aldean’s motion for summary judgment and denied the

city’s motion. In its order, the district court determined that the unambiguous language of

section 299A.465 “requires [the city] to continue to provide health coverage for [Aldean]

and his dependents until [Aldean] is age 65 and, in the case of his dependents, until they

are no longer dependents if that happens before [Aldean] turns 65.” As a result, the district

court ordered the city to “allow [Aldean] and [Aldean’s] dependents access to its group

health-care plan in accordance with Minnesota Statutes [section] 299A.465.”

       The city appeals.

                                           ISSUE

       Did the district court err by determining that Minnesota Statutes section 299A.465,

subdivision 1(c), requires the city to continue to provide health-insurance coverage for

Aldean?

                                        ANALYSIS

       The city argues that the district court erred by determining that the city must provide

Aldean health-insurance coverage under section 299A.465 and granting summary

judgment in Aldean’s favor. 2




2
  On appeal, the city does not challenge the district court’s determination that, if the city
must provide Aldean health-insurance coverage, the city must also provide coverage for
Aldean’s dependents. See Minn. Stat. § 299A.465, subd. 1(c) (stating that an employer
“shall continue to provide health coverage for . . . the officer’s or firefighter’s dependents
if the officer or firefighter was receiving dependent coverage at the time of the injury under
the employer’s group health plan”). Accordingly, if Aldean is entitled to health-insurance
coverage, his dependents are also entitled to health-insurance coverage as specified in
section 299A.465, subdivision 1(c)-(d).

                                              4
       Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ.

P. 56.01; see also Under the Rainbow Early Educ. Ctr. v. County of Goodhue,

, 902 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01). We review a district

court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.                 Hanson v. Dep’t of Nat. Res.,

, 371 (Minn. 2022). “We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if no

genuine issues of material fact exist and if the court accurately applied the law.” Id.

at 371-72.

       Since 1997, the legislature has required public employers to continue to provide

health-insurance coverage for those peace officers and firefighters who are determined to

be eligible for duty-disability benefits. Minn. Stat. § 299A.465, subd. 1(a), (c); 1997 Minn.

Laws ch. 239, art. 8, § 6, at 2852-53. 3           More specifically, section 299A.465,

subdivision 1(c), provides that, for duty-disabled peace officers and firefighters:

                    The officer’s or firefighter’s employer shall continue to
              provide health coverage for:
                            (1) the officer or firefighter; and
                            (2) the officer’s or firefighter’s dependents if the
                    officer or firefighter was receiving dependent coverage
                    at the time of the injury under the employer’s group
                    health plan.



3
  A “duty disability” is a physical or mental condition expected to prevent an officer or
firefighter, “for a period of not less than 12 months, from performing the normal duties” of
their position and “that is a direct result of an injury incurred during . . . the performance
of inherently dangerous duties that are specific to the positions covered by the public
employees police and fire retirement plan.” 

, subd. 41 (2022); see also
Minn. Stat. § 352B.011, subd. 7 (2022) (adopting the same definition for the State Patrol
retirement fund).

                                              5
Minn. Stat. § 299A.465, subd. 1(c). Section 299A.465, subdivision 1(d), states that “[t]he

employer is responsible for the continued payment of the employer’s contribution for

coverage” and that “[c]overage must continue for the officer or firefighter and, if

applicable, the officer’s or firefighter’s dependents until the officer or firefighter reaches

or, if deceased, would have reached the age of 65.” Id., subd. 1(d).

       Here, it is undisputed that PERA determined Aldean to be eligible for duty-disability

benefits, as is required under subdivision 1(a)(1) to qualify for continued health-insurance

coverage, and that the city did not challenge that determination. It is also undisputed that

Aldean was a peace officer at the time of the determination. Accordingly, the sole question

before us is whether the city still has an obligation under section 299A.465,

subdivision 1(c)—to “continue to provide health coverage for” Aldean as a duty-disabled

peace officer—even though Aldean stopped paying his contribution and is not currently

receiving health-insurance coverage from the city. This question presents an issue of

statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. State by Smart Growth Minneapolis v.

City of Minneapolis, 

, 590 (Minn. 2021).

       “The goal of all statutory interpretation ‘is to ascertain and effectuate the intention

of the legislature.’” 

 (quoting 

 (2020)). “The first step of statutory

interpretation is to determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.”

Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 

, 169 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).

“A statute is only ambiguous if its language is subject to more than one reasonable

interpretation.” 

 (quotation omitted). When interpreting a statute to determine whether

it is ambiguous, “we construe the statute’s words and phrases according to their plain and


                                              6
ordinary meaning.” 

 (quotation omitted). We also read the statute “as a whole to

harmonize all its parts, and, whenever possible, no word, phrase or sentence should be

deemed superfluous, void or insignificant.” Kremer v. Kremer, 

(Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). We will go beyond the statute’s plain language to

determine the legislature’s intent only if the language is ambiguous. Hagen, 963 N.W.2d

at 169. But “[w]hen a statute is unambiguous, our role is to enforce the language of the

statute and not explore the spirit or purpose of the law.” Id. (quotation omitted). In other

words, “[i]f a statute is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, then we must

apply the statute’s plain meaning.” In re Application of Moratzka, 

, 47

(Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted).

       Aldean and the city dispute whether the legislative intent of section 299A.465,

subdivision 1(c), is clear or ambiguous under the circumstances of this case. Aldean argues

that the statute unambiguously requires the city to continue to offer health-insurance

coverage to Aldean until Aldean turns age 65. The city argues that the statute’s language

is ambiguous and that the legislative history and public policy support its interpretation

that the city’s obligation to Aldean ended when Aldean voluntarily dropped off the city’s

health plan. We conclude that the statute is unambiguous and requires the city to continue

to provide health-insurance coverage to Aldean.

       We begin our analysis by considering the language of subdivision 1(c) that is at the

center of the parties’ dispute. The relevant portion of subdivision 1(c) states that the public

employer of a qualifying duty-disabled peace officer or firefighter “shall continue to

provide health coverage for . . . the officer or firefighter.”     Minn. Stat. § 299A.465,


                                              7
subd. 1(c) (emphasis added). Neither the word “continue” nor “provide” is defined within

the statute. Accordingly, we turn to dictionary definitions to determine the plain and

ordinary meaning of these terms.         See Lagasse v. Horton, 

, 198

(Minn. 2022) (“When a term is not defined by statute, we may use dictionary definitions.”).

       The word “continue” is defined in Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary,

consistent with the city’s proposed definitions, as “to maintain without interruption a

condition, course, or action” and “to remain in existence.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate

Dictionary 270 (11th ed. 2014); see also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English

Language 398 (5th ed. 2018) (defining “continue” as “[t]o go on with a particular action

or in a particular condition; persist” and “[t]o exist over a period; last”). And Merriam-

Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “provide,” consistent with Aldean’s proposed

definition, as “to supply or make available (something wanted or needed)” and “to make

something available to.” Merriam-Webster’s, supra, at 1001; see also American Heritage,

supra, at 1418 (defining “provide” as “[t]o make available (something needed or desired);

furnish” and “[t]o supply something needed or desired to”). Reading the definitions of

“continue” and “provide” together, we conclude that the plain language of the phrase “shall

continue to provide health coverage for . . . the officer or firefighter” means that the

employer must maintain, without interruption, the availability of health-insurance coverage

for a qualifying duty-disabled officer or firefighter. As a result, the plain language of

subdivision 1(c) creates an obligation that the public employer make health-insurance

coverage available without interruption, regardless of whether the duty-disabled officer or

firefighter elects to accept that coverage.


                                              8
       The city concedes that the above interpretation of the phrase “shall continue to

provide health coverage” is reasonable, but it argues that the language of subdivision 1(c)

also supports another reasonable interpretation. The city contends that the phrase “shall

continue to provide health coverage” in subdivision 1(c) can be interpreted as an obligation

of the public employer to continue existing health coverage for an officer or firefighter

once the employee is determined to be duty-disabled but that this obligation ends if the

duty-disabled employee “voluntarily discontinue[s] their health coverage.” To support its

interpretation, the city focuses on the word “continue.” Thus, the city asserts that, if a duty-

disabled employee “voluntarily discontinue[s]” participation in the former employer’s

health plan for any reason, the employer’s obligation to “continue to provide health

coverage” under subdivision 1(c) ceases because there is no health coverage to “continue.”

       Based on the plain language of the statute, we conclude that the city’s proffered

interpretation of subdivision 1(c) is not reasonable.         First, the city’s interpretation

overlooks that the public employer’s obligation under subdivision 1(c) is to “continue to

provide health coverage,” not to “continue health coverage.” Minn. Stat. § 299A.465,

subd. 1(c) (emphasis added). As discussed above, “provide” means to “make available.”

Merriam-Webster’s, supra, at 1001. The legislature’s inclusion of the word “provide” in

subdivision 1(c) therefore requires the employer to continue to make available health

coverage for a qualifying duty-disabled officer or firefighter.           The city’s contrary

interpretation—that it need only continue existing coverage—fails to give meaning to the

phrase “to provide.” When interpreting a statute’s plain language, “no word, phrase or

sentence should be deemed superfluous, void or insignificant.” Kremer, 

. Because the city’s proposed interpretation would render “to provide” superfluous,

the city’s interpretation of subdivision 1(c) is not reasonable. 4 See 

       The city’s proffered interpretation also is not reasonable because it requires us to

read a limitation into subdivision 1(c) that does not exist in the plain language. Under the

city’s proffered interpretation, a public employer’s obligation “to continue to provide

health coverage” under subdivision 1(c) is conditioned upon the employee maintaining

uninterrupted coverage with the public employer after becoming duty-disabled. According

to the city, if the employee elects not to maintain coverage for any period of time, the public

employer’s obligation under subdivision 1(c) ends. Subdivision 1(c), however, does not

include language setting forth such a limitation. Minn. Stat. § 299A.465, subd. 1(c)(1).

The public employer’s obligation under subdivision 1(c) “to continue to provide health

coverage for [the duty-disabled] officer or firefighter” is unconditional.         Id.   If the

legislature intended to limit a public employer’s obligation “to continue to provide health

coverage for” a duty-disabled officer or firefighter in the manner urged by the city, the




4
  The city also cites a nonprecedential opinion of this court and an administrative-law-judge
decision to assert that the word “continue” supports multiple reasonable interpretations of
section 299A.465, subdivision 1(c). See Davison v. City of Minneapolis, No. A08-0535,

 (Minn. App. Feb. 3, 2009); In re City of Austin and City of Minneapolis,
OAH No. 65-3600-33288 (Dec. 16, 2016). Neither decision is binding on this court. See
State v. M.L.A., 

 (Minn. App. 2010) (explaining that “[t]he district
court, like this court, is bound by supreme court precedent and the published opinions of
the court of appeals”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010). Moreover, neither decision
concluded that the phrase “continue to provide” is ambiguous when read in the context of
the statute as a whole. Accordingly, we discern no basis to reach a different result based
on prior nonbinding decisions interpreting section 299A.465, subdivision 1.

                                              10
legislature would have included such language. 5 The legislature did not. Because we

cannot add language to a statute, the city’s interpretation—limiting its obligation under

subdivision 1(c) to officers and firefighters who maintain uninterrupted coverage—is not

reasonable. See Firefighters Union Loc. 4725 v. City of Brainerd, 

, 109

(Minn. 2019) (“[W]e cannot add language to a statute; rather, we must apply the plain

language of the statute as written.” (quotation omitted)); see also KSTP-TV v. Ramsey

County, 

, 790 n.9 (Minn. 2011) (declining to “abandon the plain language

of” the relevant statute “for an interpretation that inserts a temporal limitation”).

       Our conclusion is reinforced by reading subdivision 1(c) in conjunction with

subdivision 1(d).    See Walgreens Specialty Pharmacy, LLC v. Comm’r of Revenue,

 (Minn. 2018) (“When interpreting statutes, we do not read the

sentences of a subdivision in isolation but rather as a harmonious whole.”).

Subdivision 1(d) includes the only limitation found in section 299A.465 on the employer’s

obligation to “continue to provide health coverage for” a qualifying duty-disabled officer

or firefighter, and the limitation is not the one that the city argues should be read into

subdivision 1(c). See Minn. Stat. § 299A.465, subd. 1. Subdivision 1(d) states:

                     The employer is responsible for the continued payment
              of the employer’s contribution for coverage of the officer or

5
  In fact, unlike a public employer’s unconditional obligation to duty-disabled officers and
firefighters, the legislature did condition an employer’s obligation to provide continuing
dependent coverage under subdivision 1(c). The legislature specified that an employer
“shall continue to provide health coverage for . . . the officer’s or firefighter’s dependents
if the officer or firefighter was receiving dependent coverage at the time of the injury under
the employer’s group health plan.” Minn. Stat. § 299A.465, subd. 1(c)(2) (emphasis
added). The legislature’s conditioning of dependent coverage demonstrates that the
legislature knew how to include such limiting language.

                                              11
              firefighter and, if applicable, the officer’s or firefighter’s
              dependents. Coverage must continue for the officer or
              firefighter and, if applicable, the officer’s or firefighter’s
              dependents until the officer or firefighter reaches or, if
              deceased, would have reached the age of 65. However,
              coverage for dependents does not have to be continued after
              the person is no longer a dependent.

Id., subd. 1(d) (emphasis added). “Must” is mandatory. 

, subd. 15a

(2022). Therefore, read as a whole, subdivision 1 of section 299A.465 specifies that an

employer’s obligation to continue to make health-insurance coverage available for a

qualifying duty-disabled officer or firefighter ends only when the officer or firefighter

reaches age 65. See Schmidt v. City of Columbia Heights, 

 (Minn.

App. 2005) (“[P]ursuant to [section 299A.465, subdivision 1(d) (2004)], an employer’s

obligation to pay for benefits [for dependents] ends only when the officer reaches age 65

or the beneficiary loses dependency status.”).

       In sum, section 299A.465, subdivision 1(c), unambiguously requires a public

employer to continue to provide—that is, make available—health-insurance coverage for

a qualifying duty-disabled peace officer or firefighter until age 65. We therefore do not

consider the legislative history cited by the city.     See Juntunen v. Carlton County,

, 740 n.6 (Minn. 2022) (declining to consider legislative history because

“such considerations are not appropriate when” the statute’s language is unambiguous).

Similarly, because the language of subdivision 1(c) is unambiguous, we decline to consider

the city’s policy arguments. We “may not usurp the legislature’s role and decide that, as a

matter of policy, a certain class of disabled officers should be disqualified from benefits

that the legislature intended all officers to receive for the risks they incur while guarding


                                             12
the peace and safety of the citizens of this state.” See In re Claim for Benefits by Meuleners,

 (Minn. App. 2006). Accordingly, based on the plain, unambiguous

language of section 299A.465, subdivision 1(c), we hold that a public employer’s

obligation to continue to provide health-insurance coverage for a qualifying duty-disabled

officer or firefighter until age 65 does not terminate if the officer or firefighter allows

coverage to lapse and later seeks to reinstate coverage.

       Applying the plain language of section 299A.465, subdivision 1(c), to the

undisputed facts of this case, we conclude that the city has an ongoing obligation to make

health-insurance coverage available for Aldean.            Because Aldean is a qualifying

duty-disabled officer, Aldean’s decision to allow his coverage through the city to lapse is

immaterial to the city’s obligation to make coverage available to him. The district court

therefore did not err by granting summary judgment in Aldean’s favor and requiring the

city to allow Aldean to access the city’s health plan. 6



6
  The city similarly challenges the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss on the
basis that Aldean failed to state a claim under section 299A.465, subdivision 1(c), because
there was no coverage for the city to “continue.” For the reasons above, that argument is
unavailing. And the city’s other arguments related to deficiencies in the complaint—that
it was mistakenly labeled a “Contract” case and sought monetary relief not authorized by
section 299A.465—are, at most, harmless error. Aldean amended the complaint to specify
it was a “Civil/Miscellaneous” case. Likewise, Aldean clarified prior to summary
judgment that he was seeking only declaratory judgment, and the city concedes that Aldean
could have sought mandamus relief to gain access to the city’s health plan. Cf. Scherger
v. N. Nat. Gas Co., 

, 579 n.1 (Minn. 1998) (noting that “[t]he essence of
this action was [a] request for a judicial declaration as to the scope and validity of [an]
agreement, and therefore was not appropriate for a writ of mandamus,” but that “we need
not correct the procedure”). As a result, the city’s arguments related to the complaint do
not present a basis for reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Aldean’s
favor. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored); see also

                                              13
                                         DECISION

       Under Minnesota Statutes section 299A.465, subdivision 1(c), a public employer’s

obligation to “continue to provide health coverage” to a qualifying duty-disabled peace

officer or firefighter requires that the employer make health-insurance coverage available

for the officer or firefighter until the officer or firefighter reaches age 65. The employer’s

obligation to make coverage available continues even if that coverage lapses and the officer

or firefighter later seeks to reinstate coverage. As a result, the district court did not err by

granting summary judgment in Aldean’s favor because, under the plain language of the

statute, the city’s obligation to continue to provide coverage to Aldean did not terminate

even though he allowed his coverage to lapse.

       Affirmed.




Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 

 (Minn. 1944) (“[E]rror without prejudice is not
ground for reversal.”).

                                              14