This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                         Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                                STATE OF MINNESOTA
                                IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                      A23-0180

                                    State of Minnesota,
                                        Respondent,

                                             vs.

                                    Jeffrey Scott Baker,
                                         Appellant.

                                  Filed February 5, 2024
                                         Affirmed
                                    Segal, Chief Judge

                              Hennepin County District Court
                                File No. 27-CR-21-16751

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

       Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and

Connolly, Judge.

                           NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SEGAL, Chief Judge

       In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for second-degree criminal

sexual conduct, appellant challenges the district court’s decision to allow the state to offer

expert testimony concerning the typical behaviors of children in reporting that they have
been sexually assaulted. Because we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in

its determination that the testimony would be helpful and not unfairly prejudicial, we

affirm.

                                            FACTS

          Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jeffrey Scott Baker in 2021 with

sexually assaulting his daughter (the child) on three different occasions. 1 The complaint

alleged that the offenses occurred between July 13, 2015, and July 12, 2017, when the child

was seven to nine years old. The child first disclosed the assaults four to five years after

they occurred, and only incrementally provided additional details.

          The child first disclosed the sexual assaults to a friend from school when the child

was around 12 years old. A few months later, she told an aunt. In both initial disclosures,

the child offered only a general description of being assaulted; it was not until she testified

at trial that she affirmatively acknowledged that Baker touched the skin on the outside and

inside of her vagina.

          After the child’s disclosure, the aunt reported the assaults to law enforcement, and

the child was then referred to CornerHouse for a forensic interview. The       child    shared

more detail with the forensic interviewer at CornerHouse but, even then, the child did not

tell the forensic interviewer that Baker had touched her vagina “inside, outside, skin”—


1
  The initial complaint contained one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in
violation of 

, subd. l(a) (2016) (sexual contact with complainant
under 13 and actor more than 36 months older). Before the start of the trial, the state
amended its complaint to add a count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation
of 

, subd. l(h)(iii) (2016) (significant relationship, complainant under
16 at time of sexual contact, multiple acts over extended period of time).

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just that he had touched her vagina generally. She told the interviewer that Baker had

touched her “inappropriately” and indicated on a body diagram where she was touched.

The child also told the interviewer that she had “asked [Baker] to stop and he said, okay,

don’t tell anybody.” When asked why she did not tell anyone about the assaults earlier,

the child stated she was “scared,” but eventually allowed her aunt to report it because she

“didn’t want that to happen” to any other girls. The child expressed her concern for the

safety of the young daughters of Baker’s girlfriend, who were living with him at the time.

       At trial in 2022, the child provided more detail about the scope of Baker’s assaults.

Echoing her previous disclosures, the child testified that two of the assaults occurred at her

grandparent’s house in Richfield, and the third occurred at a cabin the family rented near

Alexandria. She also added that, during each assault, Baker touched her vagina with his

fingers and hands both inside and outside of the pajamas she was wearing and that he

touched her inside her vagina. She also stated that, after the first assault, Baker told her

not to tell anyone.    She explained, similar to the statements she made during the

CornerHouse interview, that she did not come forward earlier because she was “afraid”

and “didn’t know what the consequences would be or if I would be believed or not.” She

testified that she ultimately disclosed the assaults because she was “scared for what would

happen” to the daughters of Baker’s current girlfriend, with whom he was living.

       Because of the child’s delayed and incremental disclosure of her sexual assaults, the

state filed a motion to admit expert testimony by the forensic interviewer about the

counterintuitive patterns of disclosure displayed by sexually abused children. Baker




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objected, arguing that the forensic interviewer’s testimony would amount to improper

vouching and be unfairly prejudicial. The district court granted the state’s motion.

       The forensic interviewer then testified at trial that “[i]t is very common for a young

person to delay reporting what they have experienced.” The interviewer noted that it is

uncommon for children to tell all the details of their assault in “one fell swoop.” She

explained that “[t]hey give [information] in small increments” and, because children have

concerns people will not believe them, “they often first tell a peer—someone their own age

or someone they can test.”

       In addition to the child and forensic interviewer, the witnesses at trial included the

friend the child first confided in, the child’s aunt and grandfather, the police officer who

investigated the case, and Baker. A video of the CornerHouse interview was also played

for the jury. The jury found Baker guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 90 months

in prison.

                                        DECISION

       The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion when it

allowed expert testimony about delayed reporting pursuant to rule 702. Baker argues that

the testimony was not helpful because it was well within the common knowledge of a jury

and it was highly prejudicial because it allowed the forensic interviewer to vouch for the

veracity of the child’s testimony. 2


2
 At the district court, Baker argued that the forensic interviewer is not an expert because
she is not a psychiatrist or child psychologist, and thus her testimony would be speculative.
The district court concluded that the forensic interviewer was qualified, and Baker does
not challenge the expertise of the witness on appeal.

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       Appellate courts review the admissibility of expert testimony under rule 702 for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Thao, 

 (Minn. 2016). “A district court

abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against

logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Garland, 

, 742 (Minn. 2020)

(quoting State v. Guzman, 

 (Minn. 2017)). On appeal, the appellant

has the burden of showing (1) the district court abused its discretion by admitting the

challenged expert testimony, and (2) that the error prejudiced the defendant. State v.

Sanders, 

 (Minn. 2009).

       Expert testimony is admissible under rule 702 if it meets four criteria: “(1) the

witness is qualified as an expert; (2) the expert’s opinion has foundational reliability;

(3) the expert testimony is helpful to the jury; and (4) if the testimony involves a novel

scientific theory, it must satisfy the Frye-Mack standard.” State v. Obeta, 

 (Minn. 2011). Expert testimony is helpful when it is “outside the common knowledge

of the jury” and unhelpful if it will not aid the jury in reaching a conclusion. 

.

       The district court determined that the proposed testimony satisfied the requirements

of rule 702, reasoning that the expert testimony would be helpful to the jury based on

established caselaw that “the behavior of allegedly sexually abused children, . . . —for

example, delayed disclosures—[is] not a common understanding for adults.” The district

court cited to cases such as State v. Myers, 

 (Minn. 1984), which

held that expert testimony about the behavior and characteristics typical of sexually abused

adolescents can be admissible because it is outside the common experience of a jury; and


                                              5
State v. Reyes, 

 (Minn. App. 2017), which affirmed the admission

of expert testimony about common characteristics of sexually abused adolescents because

it “helped the jury t[o] understand delayed reporting and circumstances of . . . abuse.” See

also Obeta, 

 (noting that expert testimony “on the typicality of

delayed reporting . . . may be helpful to the jury”).

       Baker argues, nevertheless, that this case should be treated differently because the

child was able to explain at trial the reasons for the delay in her reporting and the jury also

heard the explanation she gave during her CornerHouse interview. Baker argues that the

jury could understand this testimony and did not need to hear from an expert. But, even

with the child’s explanations, understanding how sexually abused children typically

behave with regard to disclosing such abuse remained outside the common knowledge of

the adult jurors. The testimony was thus helpful to the jury as in assessing the child’s

credibility.   Expert testimony in cases involving abuse is not “duplicative of prior

testimony; rather, it [is] necessary to explain the complexity of [the victim’s] behavior.”

State v. Grecinger, 

 (Minn. 1997). The district court’s determination

that the testimony would be helpful is therefore consistent with case precedent and was not

an abuse of discretion.

       We also discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that

Baker would not be unfairly prejudiced by the testimony. As stated in its ruling, the district

court specifically limited the expert testimony to prevent prejudice based on the state’s

“own agreement and acknowledgement that they would not be seeking any testimony

specific to this victim with respect to some sort of vouching or believability.” The expert


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testimony provided by the forensic interviewer related only to the typical reaction of

children to sexual assault. She did not testify about the credibility of the child’s reactions

in this case. As such, the testimony did not amount to impermissible vouching. See State

v. Vick, 

 (Minn. 2001) (concluding expert testimony about the

common behaviors of adolescent victims of sexual abuse is not impermissible vouching);

see also State v. Ferguson, 

 (Minn. 1998) (concluding an officer did

not impermissibly vouch for other witness’ credibility as the officer did not state he

believed one witness over another). Moreover, to the extent that Baker argues that the

expert testimony “substantially influenced” the jury, that is not itself unfair prejudice. See

State v. Brovold, 

 (Minn. App. 1991) (affirming admission of expert

testimony in a child sexual-abuse case because the district court “allowed the jury to weigh

the evidence and determine each witness’s credibility,” and “because the testimony

involved a psychological characteristic rather than the truthfulness of a witness”), rev.

denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 1992).

       The admission of the forensic interviewer’s expert testimony concerning the

counterintuitive behaviors of children in reporting sexual abuse was not an abuse of

discretion.

       Affirmed.




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