This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                         Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                               STATE OF MINNESOTA
                               IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                     A23-0840

                                   State of Minnesota,
                                      Respondent,

                                            vs.

                                    April Jean Worrall,
                                        Appellant.

                               Filed February 14, 2024
                   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
                                  Klaphake, Judge *

                              Hubbard County District Court
                                 File No. 29-CR-23-311

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jonathan Frieden, Hubbard County Attorney, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

         Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Klaphake,

Judge.




*
 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
                            NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

KLAPHAKE, Judge

       Appellant April Jean Worrall pleaded guilty to violating a domestic-abuse no-

contact order (DANCO) after admitting to contacting the protected person, J.H. Worrall

appeals her guilty plea, arguing it was not accurate because it was not supported by an

adequate factual basis. Because our review of the record demonstrates that the plea was

supported by a proper factual basis, we affirm the acceptance of her guilty plea. However,

Worrall’s sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, so we therefore reverse and remand

to the district court for resentencing.

                                          DECISION

       Worrall asserts that she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea because it

was not supported by an adequate factual basis. “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea

must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” State v. Boecker, 

(Minn. 2017). A guilty plea is inaccurate when it is not established with a proper factual

basis. 

 We review the validity of a guilty plea de novo. State v. Raleigh, 

 (Minn. 2010). Worrall argues that her plea did not have a proper factual basis, because

she did not admit that she knew contacting J.H. would violate the DANCO. Specifically,

Worrall contends that she was not asked if she knew that contacting J.H. would subject her

to criminal liability and that such an admission was required for her guilty plea to be

accurate. We are not persuaded.

       Under Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 2(b) (2022), a person

commits a misdemeanor DANCO violation when she “knows of the existence of a


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domestic abuse no contact order issued against the person and violates the order.” Worrall

admitted that she knew the DANCO prohibited her from contacting J.H. and that she

telephoned J.H. after being personally served the DANCO. Under the elements of the

statute, Worrall admitted to violating the DANCO.

       Worrall argues that knowing she was “not supposed to” contact J.H. was not

sufficient to show she knew the facts that placed her in violation of the DANCO. Worrall

cites State v. Andersen, 

, 637 (Minn. App. 2020), to support her argument

that the state was required to show that she “knew the facts that placed her in violation of

the order.” The record establishes that Worrall knew the facts that placed her in violation

of the DANCO. Worrall admitted that she was aware of the DANCO, that she knew the

DANCO prohibited contact with J.H., and that she contacted J.H. in violation of the

DANCO while knowing that she was “not supposed” to have any contact with the party.

Accordingly, her guilty plea had an adequate factual basis and was constitutionally

accurate.

       The district court, however, abused its discretion by placing Worrall on supervised

probation for two years, exceeding the statutory maximum. We review a district court’s

imposition of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto, 

(Minn. 2014). A district court abuses its discretion when a sentence is “based on an

erroneous view of the law.” State v. Hallmark, 

 (Minn. 2019). Under

Minnesota Statutes section 609.135, subdivision 2(e) (2022), a conviction for a

misdemeanor that is not otherwise specified in the subdivision may have a stay of execution

for a maximum of one year of probation. Probation is allowed for up to two years only for


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specified misdemeanors, including domestic assault, fifth-degree assault, and violations of

orders for protection. 

, subd. 2(d) (2022). A misdemeanor DANCO

violation is not included in subdivision 2(d), so the maximum length of probation for a

misdemeanor DANCO violation is one year. Because Worrall’s conviction was for a

misdemeanor not specified by statute to allow two years of probation, the maximum length

of probation permissible by statute was one year.

       We affirm the district court’s acceptance of Worrall’s guilty plea. We reverse

Worrall’s sentence of two years of probation and remand to the district court with

instructions to direct an entry of one year of probation, consistent with the statutory

maximum.

       Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.




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