This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                        Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                               STATE OF MINNESOTA
                               IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                     A23-1347

        In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: D. L. P. and J. A. P., Parents.

                                 Filed February 14, 2024
                                        Affirmed
                                       Reyes, Judge

                             Chippewa County District Court
                                 File No. 12-JV-22-341

John E. Mack, New London Law, P.A., New London, Minnesota (for appellants D.L.P.
and J.A.P.)

Matthew Haugen, Chippewa County Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent
Chippewa County Family Services)

Kristi Barber, Willmar, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

       Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Ede, Judge.

                           NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

REYES, Judge

       Appellant-parents argue that the record is insufficient to support the district court’s

termination of their parental rights and that the respondent-county should have provided

them with reunification services before their parental rights were terminated. We affirm.

                                          FACTS

       This case concerns one of the children of appellant mother D.L.P. and appellant

father J.A.P (the parents). The parents had their first children, twin girls, in 2018. After

both daughters suffered injuries, Kandiyohi County filed a petition to terminate the parental
rights (TPR) of the parents. The district court terminated their parental rights to the twins,

and this court affirmed. In re Welfare of Child. of D.L.T., Nos. A19-0954, A19-0991, 

, at *4 (Minn. App. Dec. 23, 2019).

       D.L.P. became pregnant with B.P., the child in this appeal, in 2021. Respondent

Chippewa County Family Services (the county) reached out to D.L.P. after receiving a

report that she was using recreational cannabis during her pregnancy. B.P. was born in

June 2022, and the child’s meconium tested positive for THC.1 The day B.P. was born,

the county filed a TPR petition, alleging that the parents were palpably unfit under Minn.

Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2022). Although the county provided the parents with

drug-testing services while the TPR petition was pending, the parents failed to show up for

several tests; for some of the tests the parents did attend, one or both parents tested positive

for THC or alcohol.

       The district court held a court trial in August and September 2022. At the trial, the

county presented evidence that the parents were presumed to be palpably unfit to parent

B.P. under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), because their parental rights to the twins

had been involuntarily terminated. After the burden to demonstrate parental fitness shifted

to the parents, D.L.P., J.A.P., and their then-roommate provided testimony on the steps

they had taken to be fit to parent B.P. D.L.P. denied that the injuries to her twin girls were

child abuse and stated that the injuries were instead caused by a genetic condition. The



1
  THC is “[a] compound . . . obtained from cannabis or made synthetically, that is the
primary intoxicant in marijuana.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 1803 (5th ed. 2018).

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guardian ad litem (GAL) for B.P. testified that, in her opinion, granting the TPR petition

was in the best interests of B.P. The district court determined that the parents had not

successfully rebutted the presumption of palpable unfitness and terminated their parental

rights to B.P. The parents appealed, and we reversed, concluding that the district court had

applied an incorrect standard for determining whether the parents had rebutted the

presumption, and remanded for the district court to use the correct standard to address

whether the parents had rebutted the presumption. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.P., No.

A22-1594, 

, at *4-5 (Minn. App. Apr. 10, 2023).

       On remand, the district court held another evidentiary hearing, at which it heard

testimony from D.L.P., J.A.P., J.A.P.’s mother and father, the social worker assigned to

the case, and the GAL. The district court determined that the parents had produced

sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness but determined that the

county had produced clear and convincing evidence that the parents were palpably unfit to

parent B.P. and terminated their parental rights to B.P. The parents moved for a new trial,

and the district court denied their request.

       The parents now appeal.




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                                        DECISION

I.     The district court did not abuse its discretion by terminating D.L.P. and
       J.A.P.’s parental rights to B.P.2

       The parents argue that the district court abused its discretion by terminating the

parental rights of the parents to B.P. for two reasons. First, they challenge the sufficiency

of the district court’s factual findings. Second, they argue that the district court should

have believed the testimony of the parents. We address each argument in turn.

       We review the factual findings from a TPR order for clear error and whether a

statutory basis exists to terminate parental rights for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare

of Child of J.K.T., 

 (Minn. App. 2012).

       A.     The district court made sufficient factual findings to support the
              termination of D.L.P. and J.A.P.’s parental rights.

       The parents argue that the district court clearly erred by relying on its factual

findings from the first trial to support its TPR decision following remand. We are not

persuaded.

       In our previous opinion remanding this case, we directed the district court to reopen

the record on remand. D.L.P., 

, at *4. We quoted In re Welfare of Child

of J.A.K., 

, 248 (Minn. App. 2018):

              Because any termination of parental rights must relate to
              conditions that exist at the time of termination and it must
              appear that the conditions giving rise to the termination will

2
  In their principal brief, the parents argued that they had presented sufficient evidence to
the district court to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). All parties agree, as do we, that the district court determined
that the parents had presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, so we do not
address that portion of the parents’ argument.

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              continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period, it will be
              necessary for the district court to reopen the record to allow the
              parties to introduce supplemental evidence.

D.L.P., 

, at *4 (emphasis omitted; emphasis added).

       We did not prohibit the district court from relying on evidence from the first trial;

rather we directed the district court to obtain supplemental evidence of the parents’

circumstances at the time of the second trial. After determining that the parents had

rebutted the presumption of palpable unfitness, the district court reviewed the evidence

from the first trial, including that the child tested positive for THC at birth, and received

new evidence of the circumstances of the parents at the time of the second trial. The district

court expressly “incorporated . . . by reference” the order from the first trial. We conclude

that the district court did not clearly err by relying on evidence from the first trial in its

order from the second trial.

       B.     We defer to the district court’s credibility determinations.

       The parents argue that, after remand, the district court “did not believe the parents’

testimony,” and “[h]ad it credited their testimony, the finding of palpable unfitness could

not have stood.” We are not persuaded.

       The parents cite to caselaw that states that “the [district] court . . . cannot disregard

the positive testimony of an unimpeached witness unless and until its probability or

inconsistency furnishes a reasonable ground for so doing.” O’Leary v. Wangensteen, 

 (Minn. 1928). A district court, however, “is not required to believe even

uncontradicted testimony if there are reasonable grounds to doubt its credibility.” Gellert

v. Eginton, 

 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 2009).


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And appellate courts defer to the district court’s credibility determination. In re Welfare

of R.T.B., 

 (Minn. App. 1992). Based on the entire record before the

district court, as well as the district court’s credibility determinations, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that sufficient evidence supported

palpable unfitness as a ground to terminate the parents’ parental rights, particularly given

the parents’ continued denial that their first children had suffered physical abuse.

II.    The district court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering the county to
       make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents and reunite them with B.P.

       The parents argue that the district court abused its discretion by not ordering the

county to make efforts to reunite them with B.P. They contend that, because we reversed

the district court’s first decision in which it had determined the parents had not rebutted

the presumption of palpable unfitness, the county had no basis to discontinue providing

rehabilitative and reunification services to the parents. We disagree.

       When a county files a TPR petition, Minnesota law generally requires the district

court to order the social-services organization to engage in reasonable efforts for family

rehabilitation and reunification. 

(a) (2022). The statute provides that

these efforts are “always required except upon a determination by the [district] court that a

petition has been filed stating a prima facie case that . . . the parental rights of the parent to

another child have been terminated involuntarily.” 

 (emphasis added).

       First, the statute permits the county not to provide services upon a showing that “the

parental rights of the parent to another child have been terminated involuntarily,” 

 at

(a)(2), not upon a finding of “palpable unfitness” as the parents suggest. Because the



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county provided evidence that the parental rights of the parents to the twins had been

involuntarily terminated, the county did not need to provide rehabilitative or reunification

services.

       Moreover, after our reversal and remand, the presumption of palpable unfitness still

applied. Our reversal and remand did not alter the factual determination that the parents

had previously had their parental rights involuntarily terminated. Even though we required

the district court to reevaluate the presumption of palpable unfitness, D.L.P., 

, at *4, it remained true then, as it does today, that the prior termination occurred.

Thus, even with the intervening reversal and remand, the county did not need to provide

rehabilitative or reunification services to the parents.

       Finally, the parents argue that the mere fact that the county did not have to provide

services did not prohibit the district court from ordering rehabilitative or reunification

services. Although it is true that the district court was not prohibited from ordering

services, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to require

services that are not required by statute, particularly given that the parents did not

consistently avail themselves of the drug-testing services the county provided them while

the TPR petition was pending. And we note that the record does not contain evidence that

the parents requested any services from the county. We conclude that the district court did

not abuse its discretion by not ordering services that were not statutorily required.

       Affirmed.




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