This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                         Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                               STATE OF MINNESOTA
                               IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                     A23-0238
                                     A23-0239

                                   State of Minnesota,
                                      Respondent,

                                            vs.

                               Ronald Eugene Brusacoram,
                                       Appellant.

                                Filed February 12, 2024
                                Reversed and remanded
                                    Wheelock, Judge

                              St. Louis County District Court
                       File Nos. 69HI-CR-21-648, 69HI-CR-21-658

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Stacey M. Scholz, Assistant County
Attorney, Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

      Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and

Wheelock, Judge.

                           NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

WHEELOCK, Judge

      Appellant challenges his convictions for assault of a peace officer in the fourth

degree, felony domestic assault, and unlawful possession of ammunition, arguing that the
circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for unlawful possession

of ammunition and that his attorney committed structural error by conceding his guilt with

respect to the assault offenses. We reverse the convictions for unlawful possession of

ammunition, assault of a peace officer in the fourth degree, and felony domestic assault

and remand for a new trial on the assault charges.

                                          FACTS

       Shortly after 8:00 p.m. on an evening in August 2021, the Hibbing Police

Department received a report of a domestic assault. The 911 caller reported that a man,

later identified as appellant Ronald Eugene Brusacoram, was beating a woman and

damaging her car. When an officer arrived on scene to respond to the call, Brusacoram

yelled at the officer to leave. The officer continued to approach, and Brusacoram grabbed

the officer’s wrist with one hand while swinging a closed fist at the officer’s face with the

other hand, giving the officer a bruised and bloodied lip. Brusacoram then ran to a stack

of logs and threw logs at the officer before fleeing the scene.

       Shortly after this encounter, a second 911 call came in, and the caller reported that

she saw Brusacoram running through her yard and explained that she knew him. She

reported that Brusacoram, as he ran through the yard, exclaimed that he had hit an officer.

When other officers followed up on the 911 call, the caller’s partner, S.N., told them that

Brusacoram had briefly fought with S.N. as he ran through the yard. S.N. also told officers

that his 9mm pistol had gone missing. Brusacoram and his son, D.B., had been working

for S.N. outside S.N.’s residence the day before, and S.N. suspected that D.B. stole the

pistol when D.B. went inside S.N.’s residence. In an unrelated series of events, Hibbing


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police officers had arrested D.B. for a different offense prior to speaking with S.N. and had

found S.N.’s missing pistol during a search of D.B.

       Around 11:30 p.m., officers went to a residence in the area of the domestic assault

to investigate. The officers found Brusacoram’s truck in the driveway, the doors to the

residence locked, personal belongings scattered outside, and a fire burning in the yard. A

fire was also burning inside the residence, and officers called the fire department and

evacuated the surrounding homes. Officers forced one of the doors open but did not go

inside the residence because the smoke was too thick.

       Eventually, officers searched the residence and found a gun case and ammunition

for a 9mm firearm in the drawer of a dresser. The record does not contain information

about the search or Brusacoram’s arrest.

       The state filed two complaints against Brusacoram. The first complaint charged

him with assault of a peace officer in the fourth degree, and the second charged him with

unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition, assault in the second degree, and felony

domestic assault. In June 2022, Brusacoram waived his right to a jury and agreed to a

simultaneous trial on both complaints based on stipulated exhibits and counsel’s closing

arguments submitted to the district court in writing. The district court found Brusacoram

guilty of assault of a peace officer in the fourth degree, unlawful possession of ammunition,

and felony domestic assault and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 19 months, 60

months, and 30 months, respectively.

       Brusacoram appealed from the convictions in both cases, and we consolidated the

appeals.


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                                         DECISION

       Brusacoram raises two issues on appeal. First, he asserts that his conviction for

unlawful possession of ammunition under 

, subd. 1b (2020), must be

reversed because the state provided insufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, he asserts that he is entitled to a new trial on

the charges of felony domestic assault under 

, subd. 4 (2020), and

assault of a peace officer in the fourth degree under 

, subd. 1(c)(1)

(2020), because his attorney committed structural error by conceding his guilt without his

consent. We address each argument in turn.

I.     The district court erred when it convicted Brusacoram of unlawful possession
       of ammunition because there is a reasonable inference from the circumstances
       proved that is inconsistent with guilt.

       Brusacoram asserts that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

constructively possessed the ammunition found in his home because a reasonable

alternative inference exists that is inconsistent with his guilt. He argues that the evidence

of possession—which was entirely circumstantial—was equally consistent with the theory

that his son, D.B., exclusively possessed the ammunition. The state asserts that, to affirm

the conviction for unlawful possession of ammunition, this court needs to conclude only

that Brusacoram could have possessed the ammunition because the district court made that

inference when it found him guilty. 1 The state also points out that Brusacoram did not


1
  In its brief, the state asks this court to strike parts of Brusacoram’s brief that raise issues
not decided by the district court. However, we decline to consider this request because the
state did not comply with rules of appellate procedure when making it. For this court to


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provide evidence that D.B. lived at the residence to support his alternative theory and that,

even if D.B. possessed the ammunition, the district court did not err because it was possible

for Brusacoram to possess the ammunition jointly with D.B.

       We apply the same standard to a district court’s findings as to a jury’s when

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction. State v. Holliday,

 (Minn. 2008). We review the district court’s determination of guilt

de novo based on its findings of fact, State v. Sam, 

 (Minn. App.

2015), and we review its findings of fact for clear error, State v. Andersen, 

 (Minn. 2010). “If, on the entire evidence, we are left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake occurred, then the district court clearly erred” in its finding of

fact. 

 But a finding of fact must be a true finding of fact to receive this level of

deference; if a legal conclusion is labeled as a finding of fact, it will not be reviewed

through the lens of clear error. Graphic Arts Educ. Found., Inc. v. State, 

 (Minn. 1953).

       A district court cannot find a defendant guilty unless the state proves every element

of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 

(1970). To find a defendant guilty of unlawful possession of ammunition, the state must

prove, among other elements, that the person both knowingly possessed the ammunition




grant the requested relief, a party must make a motion pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil
Appellate Procedure 127 and Special Rule of Practice for the Minnesota Court of Appeals
8.

                                             5
and that the possession was either constructive or actual. State v. Harris, 

 (Minn. 2017); State v. Salyers, 

 (Minn. 2015).

       To prove constructive possession, the state must show either that the object was

found “in a place under defendant’s exclusive control to which other people did not

normally have access” or that it was found “in a place to which others had access” and

“there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that defendant was at the time

consciously exercising dominion and control over it.” Salyers, 

 (quoting

State v. Florine, 

 (Minn. 1975)).           The constructive-possession

doctrine requires a strong inference “that the defendant at one time physically possessed

the [ammunition] and did not abandon his possessory interest in the [ammunition] but

rather continued to exercise dominion and control over it up to the time of the arrest.” 

(quoting Florine, 

).

       With respect to the second type of constructive possession, the state cannot show

only that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the location in which the

contraband was found; rather, the state must show that the defendant exercised dominion

and control over the contraband itself. Sam, 

. However, if the state

shows that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the location and knew that

the contraband was there, that may be enough to prove constructive possession. See State

v. Lee, 

 (Minn. 2004) (holding that because defendant gave his cousin

permission to store contraband in defendant’s garage and allowed gang members into the

garage, defendant had constructive possession of the contraband).




                                             6
         A person may constructively possess an item jointly with another person; in other

words, a person may be convicted of possession even though another person

simultaneously possessed the contraband. See State v. Lorenz, 

(Minn. 1985) (holding that simply occupying a dwelling in which contraband is found does

not constitute possession of contraband, that possession of contraband is not always limited

to a single person, and that two or more people can jointly possess contraband). That

occupants share a home does not, on its own, prove that the occupants each constructively

possessed contraband found in the home. 

; see Sam, 

 (stating

that when there is not exclusive possession of the location, one cannot automatically infer

possession of the contraband); State v. Dickey, 

 (Minn. 2013) (stating

that more facts, such as a suspect’s personal items near the contraband or contraband within

a suspect’s bedroom, must be found in order to support a conviction for possession). But

see State v. Denison, 

 (Minn. App. 2000) (concluding that

circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show spouses’ joint constructive possession of

contraband when it was discovered in common areas of home), rev. denied (Minn. June 13,

2000).

         The state relied on circumstantial evidence to prove that Brusacoram constructively

possessed the ammunition. Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder

can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Harris, 

(quotation omitted). A conviction based on circumstantial evidence receives heightened

scrutiny. State v. Al-Naseer, 

 (Minn. 2010). When reviewing

circumstantial evidence, this court conducts a two-step inquiry in which we first identify


                                              7
the circumstances proved and second “independently consider the reasonable inferences

that can be drawn from those circumstances.” Harris, 

. The reasonable

inferences must be “inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” 

(quotation omitted). If any “reasonable or rational inferences exist which are inconsistent

with guilt, the state has not presented sufficient evidence as a matter of law.” Sam,

. And we do not defer to the fact-finder’s choice between reasonable

inferences. 

. “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, as a

whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable

doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Hanson, 

(Minn. 2011). Each piece of circumstantial evidence is not viewed in isolation, but rather

as a whole. Andersen, 

.

      With this framework in mind, we turn to Brusacoram’s case. The district court

determined that Brusacoram constructively possessed the ammunition based on its findings

that the doors to the residence were locked, Brusacoram’s truck was in the driveway, and

the ammunition was found in the residence—a place to which others normally did not have

access. The district court inferred from these circumstances that the residence was

Brusacoram’s, that no other people were present in the residence prior to the officers

finding the ammunition, and thus, that the ammunition must have been in Brusacoram’s

possession. The district court further found that Brusacoram knew of the gun and further

reasoned—based on its findings that the ammunition was compatible with S.N.’s stolen

firearm, that S.N.’s firearm was found in D.B.’s possession, and that Brusacoram was with




                                            8
D.B. when S.N. believed the firearm was stolen—that Brusacoram must also have known

about the ammunition.

       We apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of review to the district court’s

findings. First, we identify the circumstances proved, which are as follows:

       •      Brusacoram and D.B. worked together outside of S.N.’s home;

       •      S.N. realized that his 9mm handgun was missing from his
              home;

       •      S.N. thought D.B. stole the 9mm handgun during the time that
              he was working with Brusacoram at S.N.’s home because D.B.
              went inside of S.N.’s home;

       •      Officers engaged in an investigation unrelated to the facts of
              this case found a 9mm handgun in D.B.’s bag;

       •      Officers investigating Brusacoram in this case found 9mm
              ammunition in a dresser drawer in a residence;

       •      The ammunition found was compatible with a 9mm handgun;
              and

       •      At the time the officers found the ammunition in the residence,
              the doors to the residence were locked and Brusacoram’s truck
              was parked in the driveway.

       Next, we “independently consider the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from

those circumstances” while viewing the circumstances proved as a whole and without

deferring to the fact-finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.             On these

circumstances proved, at least two reasonable or rational inferences inconsistent with guilt

exist: (1) the place in which the ammunition was found was not under Brusacoram’s

exclusive control or (2) Brusacoram did not exercise dominion and control over the

ammunition. Furthermore, the circumstances proved do not show that Brusacoram knew


                                             9
that the ammunition was in his residence. We must therefore conclude that the state has

not presented sufficient evidence as a matter of law.

       The state did not provide evidence that connected Brusacoram to the location in the

residence or the dresser in which officers found the ammunition. This case is unlike State

v. Colsch, in which the supreme court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support

the jury’s finding that the male defendant constructively possessed controlled substances

found by officers in a bedroom that contained men’s clothing as well as papers and a

checkbook with the defendant’s name on them. 

 (Minn. 1979). This

case is also unlike Lee, in which the supreme court affirmed that the defendant

constructively possessed contraband because he permitted gang members to spend time in

his garage and knew that they stored contraband there. 

. The

circumstances proved at trial here are unlike those in Colsch and Lee because the state

provided no evidence (1) connecting Brusacoram to either the location in the residence or

the dresser in which officers found the ammunition or (2) showing that Brusacoram knew

about the ammunition.

       The circumstances proved here are akin to those in State v. Krueger, a

nonprecedential but persuasive opinion. No. A19-0459, 

, at *2 (Minn.

App. Jan. 27, 2020); see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“[N]onprecedential

opinions may be cited as persuasive authority.”). In Krueger, we determined that the

defendant did not constructively possess a firearm found under a bed in his roommate’s

bedroom when the defendant slept in the living room and the record contained no testimony

or evidence linking the defendant to the firearm. 

, at *2. Here, there is


                                            10
no evidence in the record to show that Brusacoram occupied the room in which the

ammunition was found, and thus, the evidence is insufficient to support a determination

that Brusacoram constructively possessed ammunition found in that room. Without more,

the circumstances proved cannot support a determination that Brusacoram constructively

possessed the ammunition beyond a reasonable doubt.

       Because the circumstances proved do not lead so directly to Brusacoram’s guilt as

to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt an inference other than guilt, the evidence is

insufficient, and we reverse Brusacoram’s conviction for unlawful possession of

ammunition.

II.    Brusacoram’s trial counsel committed structural error by admitting
       Brusacoram’s guilt of felony domestic assault and assault of a peace officer in
       the fourth degree.

       Brusacoram asserts that his trial counsel committed structural error in his written

argument to the district court when he conceded Brusacoram’s guilt of assault of a peace

officer in the fourth degree and felony domestic assault without Brusacoram’s consent. He

also asserts that, because this is a structural error, prejudice is presumed, the convictions

for these two offenses must be reversed, and his case must be remanded for a new trial.

The state concedes that the record does not support a finding that Brusacoram waived his

presumption of innocence on these charges or otherwise acquiesced to his counsel’s

concessions of guilt.

       We recall that Brusacoram waived his right to a jury and that the parties agreed to a

stipulated-evidence trial with written closing arguments.         In Brusacoram’s written

argument, his counsel conceded guilt in two places, stating: “Brusacoram comes now


                                             11
requesting the Court find him guilty of 69HI-CR-21-648 and Count III on

69HI-CR-21-658,” and, “Mr. Brusacoram’s admissions to [S.N.] provide evidence for a

conviction on 69HI-CR-21-648. The 911 call provides evidence for a conviction on Count

III on 69HI-CR-21-658. Mr. Brusacoram’s prior convictions in 2015 and 2016 provide the

necessary prior qualified domestic related convictions.”      Because Brusacoram’s trial

counsel conceded these points, the state did not argue them in its written submission to the

district court. The district court found Brusacoram guilty of both counts. 2

       Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right to maintain their innocence

throughout trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; McCoy v. Louisiana, 

(2018). Whether to concede guilt is a decision that only the defendant can make. State v.

Luby, 

 (Minn. 2017). If the defendant’s counsel usurps this right by

conceding the defendant’s guilt without their consent, prejudice is presumed and “the

defendant is entitled to a new trial, regardless of whether he would have been convicted

without the admission.” 

 (quotation omitted). In McCoy, the Supreme Court stated that

an unauthorized concession of guilt is a structural error because a structural error is one

that attacks “the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his

own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty,” and its effects create a

“fundamental unfairness.” 

 (quotation omitted).


2
  We note that Brusacoram did not object or raise ineffective assistance of counsel or
violation of his right to maintain his innocence to the district court based on the
unauthorized admissions before the district court entered judgment, and we further note
that Brusacoram could not be present or object as he would have been able to during an
in-person trial because the admissions of guilt occurred via written submissions in a
stipulated-evidence trial.

                                            12
          To determine whether counsel conceded a defendant’s guilt without consent, we

conduct a two-step review. Luby, 

. We first review “the record de novo

to determine whether defense counsel made a concession of guilt.” 

 If defense counsel

conceded guilt, then we must determine whether the defendant acquiesced to the

concession. 

 This court may infer that the defendant acquiesced if the concession

strategy was apparent throughout the trial and the defendant failed to object or if “the

concession was an understandable strategy and the defendant was present [and] understood

a concession was being made, but failed to object.” 

 (quotation omitted). If the

defendant did not acquiesce to the concession, then the remedy is to award a new trial. 

.

          Brusacoram’s trial counsel conceded Brusacoram’s guilt twice in the written closing

argument. Counsel requested that the district court find Brusacoram guilty of two of the

charges against him—assault of a peace officer in the fourth degree and felony domestic

assault.      Then, counsel conceded that the statement from S.N., the 911 call, and

Brusacoram’s criminal record provide sufficient evidence to find him guilty of those two

charges. It is clear that Brusacoram’s counsel made a concession of guilt, satisfying the

first step.

          As to the second step of our analysis, the record contains no evidence that

Brusacoram acquiesced to the concessions of guilt on either assault charge. At each stage

of the stipulated-evidence trial up to the written closing argument, Brusacoram asserted his

innocence. He did not enter any plea other than not guilty, the case never settled, and all

four charges proceeded to trial. We see no basis on which to conclude that conceding guilt


                                              13
was a trial strategy that appeared throughout the trial. And, because the admissions took

place via written submissions, Brusacoram was not present and could not object. We

cannot say that Brusacoram acquiesced to the concessions of guilt, and we conclude that

Brusacoram’s counsel committed structural error and that the two assault convictions must

be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

       In sum, as to Brusacoram’s conviction for unlawful possession of ammunition,

because the circumstances proved do not lead so directly to his guilt as to exclude beyond

a reasonable doubt an inference other than guilt, we reverse the district court’s conviction

on that charge for insufficiency of the evidence.        As to Brusacoram’s two assault

convictions, because the Sixth Amendment protects the defendant’s freedom, especially

from incarceration, and there is no evidence that Brusacoram waived his right to maintain

his innocence, we conclude that his counsel committed structural error when conceding

Brusacoram’s guilt. Therefore, we reverse Brusacoram’s convictions for assault of a peace

officer in the fourth degree and felony domestic assault and remand to the district court for

a new trial.

       Reversed and remanded.




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