STATE OF MINNESOTA
                               IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                     A23-1199

               In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: K. O. and D. W.,
                    Commissioner of Human Services, Legal Custodian.

                                Filed February 26, 2024
                                Reversed; motion denied
                                    Schmidt, Judge

                              Ramsey County District Court
                                 File No. 62-JV-18-118

Richard D. Snyder, W. Thomas Wheeler, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and

Katie Mathurin, Children’s Law Center of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Chad Snyder, Rubric Legal, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant S.D.W.-O.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, L. Michelle Thompson, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County Social Services
Department)

Patty Taylor, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

       Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and

Ross, Judge.

SYLLABUS

       Under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.181 (2022), a child who is taken into

custody pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 260C.175 (2022) and has not been alleged

to be delinquent, may be held in a secure detention facility for no more than 24 hours.

OPINION

SCHMIDT, Judge

       The Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services took legal

custody of, and guardianship over, appellant-child S.W.-O. after a district court terminated

parental rights and adjudicated him to be a child in need of protection (CHIPS). After

running from another placement, respondent Ramsey County Social Services Department

(the county) placed S.W.-O. in the Ramsey County Juvenile Detention Center (JDC).

S.W.-O. argues that the district court lacked authority to hold him at the JDC beyond the

initial 24-hour period while the county tried to secure an appropriate placement. Because

Minnesota Statutes section 260C.181, subdivision 2 required the district court to place

S.W.-O. with his relative or in a shelter care facility, we reverse.

                                           FACTS

       Following a CHIPS adjudication and a termination of parental rights, the

Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services took legal custody of, and

guardianship over, S.W.-O. S.W.-O. has a “chronic history” of running from placements,

having been in eighteen placements total.

       On June 17, 2023, S.W.-O. left his placement without permission. At the county’s

request, the district court issued a warrant for immediate custody. After locating S.W.-O.,

the county held him at the JDC starting on July 21, 2023.

       On July 24, 2023, the district court held a hearing to review placement options for

S.W.-O. At the hearing, the county stated that it had been working diligently, but

“placement seems to be few and far between these days” because S.W.-O. required a


                                              2
specialized placement with “chemical dependency treatment as well as psychiatric care.”

The county had secured a placement in Missouri on July 17, but S.W.-O. had run from his

placement and his whereabouts were unknown at that time. The county hoped to have a

new admission date for the Missouri facility “within the next week.” Until the county

could obtain a new admission date, it argued that the JDC was the least restrictive

placement available given S.W.-O.’s history, which included running from multiple

placements and a history of drug use.

       S.W.-O.’s attorney opposed the placement in Missouri, explaining that S.W.-O.

wished to be close to his family and support system in Minnesota. In the alternative,

S.W.-O. requested placement with his biological mother, whose parental rights had been

previously terminated, with out-patient treatment for chemical dependency and mental

health. S.W.-O.’s attorney objected to S.W.-O.’s continued confinement at the JDC.

       The district court approved placement in Missouri and granted the county’s request

to continue to confine S.W.-O. at the JDC until a space became available at the Missouri

treatment center. The district court rejected placing S.W.-O. with his biological mother,

finding it was not a viable option because it had failed in the past.

       On July 25, 2023, S.W.-O.’s attorney filed a motion requesting S.W.-O.’s

immediate release from the JDC. S.W.-O.’s attorney argued that Minnesota Statutes

section 260C.181, subdivision 2 allowed holding S.W.-O. at the JDC for only 24 hours.

       At a July 27, 2023 hearing, the county explained that after S.W.-O. was taken to the

JDC on July 21, staff took him to the hospital because they believed he was under the

influence of methamphetamine. The county also explained that placing S.W.-O. at the


                                              3
Missouri facility had been delayed and that the county was actively searching for other

options. But the county candidly conceded, “I don’t think we have any good answers here

today, to be really honest and frank about it.”

       S.W.-O.’s attorney reiterated the argument that section 260C.181 did not authorize

holding a nondelinquent child at a detention facility for more than 24 hours.            The

guardian ad litem expressed concern for S.W.-O.’s safety and requested that the county

consider a treatment center closer to home or placement with his biological mother.

       In response to the arguments, the district court acknowledged that “unfortunately,

this isn’t the first time we’ve been in this situation” when a nondelinquent child had to wait

in the JDC until a placement option could be secured. The district court stated:

              [I]f I’m making that determination, I am still guided by what I
              believe, as the Court, to be in the best interest of the child. And
              while that child is . . . under the jurisdiction of this Court, then
              I’m going to make decisions that I think are in the best interest
              of the child. If I have a kid that continually runs and may
              involve him or herself in conduct that is injurious to either him
              or herself or potentially the public, you know, I just have a hard
              time ignoring that. I appreciate your position. He’s not in
              custody as a result of delinquency, at least not for committing
              an offense for which he’s been charged. However, the agency
              is charged with temporary custody of the child. That
              responsibility comes with doing what is in the best interests of
              that child. To suggest that the Court should simply allow the
              child out to the street, knowing full well the end result of that,
              that’s kind of a tall order.

The district court continued to hold S.W.-O. at the JDC and scheduled another hearing.

       On August 3, 2023, the district court held a hearing on S.W.-O.’s motion for release

from the JDC. S.W.-O.’s attorney again argued that the statute did not authorize holding

S.W.-O. at the JDC beyond the initial 24-hour period.            The county responded that


                                               4
subdivision 2 of section 260C.181 empowered the court to hold S.W.-O. at the JDC but

acknowledged that the JDC was not “the ideal placement.”

       The district court told S.W.-O. that “the reality of this situation . . . is that we want

to get you the help that you need while you are still the responsibility of the State.” The

court then ruled that it had the statutory authority to hold S.W.-O. at the JDC. The district

court noted it must act in S.W.-O.’s best interests and that the JDC constituted “the least

restrictive way to ensure [S.W.-O.’s] well-being” given his history of running and “given

the fact that there will be a placement for him at a facility that is well equipped to provide

him with the services that he does need.”

       On August 4, 2023, the district court issued an order denying S.W.-O.’s motion for

immediate release from the JDC. The court concluded it had authority to continue to hold

S.W.-O. at the JDC as it was in his best interests and constituted the “least restrictive

setting” consistent with S.W.-O.’s health and welfare.

       On August 14, 2023, S.W.-O.’s attorney filed a notice of appeal from the August 4,

2023 order. Six days later, the county transported S.W.-O. to an out-of-state residential

treatment facility, by which time S.W.-O. had spent 31 days—from July 21 to August 20—

at the JDC before being transferred.




                                               5
                                         ISSUES

I.    Does an exception to the mootness doctrine apply when the child is no longer
      being held at the JDC?

II.   Does Minnesota Statutes section 260C.181, subdivision 2, permit the state to
      hold a nondelinquent child for longer than 24 hours at a secure detention
      facility?

                                       ANALYSIS

I.    The issue is moot, but is capable of repetition yet evades review.

      The county moved to dismiss this appeal as moot because S.W.-O. was moved from

the JDC to a shelter care facility in Missouri. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 30 (2022)

(defining shelter care facility). S.W.-O. opposes the motion to dismiss.

       “The existence of a justiciable controversy is a prerequisite to adjudication.” Izaak

Walton League of Am. Endowment, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 

(Minn. 1977).     In general, “Minnesota courts may only hear actual cases and

controversies.” Winkowski v. Winkowski, 

, 308 n.7 (Minn. 2023) (citation

omitted). A moot case is generally nonjusticiable. Snell v. Walz, 

, 283

(Minn. 2023). We must dismiss an issue on appeal as moot “when a decision on the merits

is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible.” Dean v. City

of Winona, 

 (Minn. 2015). We generally “decline to hear moot cases

because courts do not issue advisory opinions or decide cases merely to make precedents.”

Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d at 308 n.7 (quotation omitted). Appellate courts decide de novo

both whether a question is justiciable and whether a question is moot. Dean, 

 (justiciability); In re McCaskill, 

 (Minn. 1999) (mootness).



                                             6
       The issue presented in this appeal is whether Minnesota Statutes section 260C.181,

subdivision 2 authorizes a child to be held in a secure detention facility. The parties agree

that after S.W.-O. appealed, the county transferred him out of the JDC to a facility in

Missouri. 1 Since we cannot grant relief from the district court’s order that S.W.-O. be held

at the JDC, the issue is moot.

       We generally will not address a moot issue. Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d at 308. But

the mootness doctrine is not “a mechanical rule that is automatically invoked whenever the

underlying dispute between the parties is settled or otherwise resolved. It is instead a

flexible discretionary doctrine that is subject to some limited exceptions.” Id. (quotations

omitted). We cannot consider the merits of a moot issue unless one of the recognized

exceptions to the mootness doctrine applies. Snell, 985 N.W.2d at 284.

       The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized certain circumstances in which

courts may consider an otherwise moot issue, including that the harm is capable of


1
  An appellate court is generally limited to the record that was before the district court when
it made the decision being appealed. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (defining the record
on appeal); Thiele v. Stich, 

 (Minn. 1988). If, however, an event
occurs while an appeal is pending that (allegedly) renders a decision on the merits by this
court unnecessary or effective relief impossible, that event is—by definition—outside the
record on appeal as defined by rule 110.01. See In re Application of Minnegasco,

 (Minn. 1997) (noting “the general rule is that when, pending appeal,
an event occurs that makes a decision on the merits unnecessary or an award of effective
relief impossible, the appeal should be dismissed as moot”). The mootness question in this
case arises because S.W.-O. was transferred out of the JDC after the notice of appeal had
been filed. Thus, limiting our review to the record before the district court would preclude
us from considering the event prompting the assertion of mootness. For purposes of
addressing the question of mootness at issue here, we must look beyond the record
presented to the district court. See Plowman v. Copeland, Buhl & Co., Ltd., 

, 584 n.3 (Minn. 1977) (stating “courts have used the power to look beyond the record
for purposes of determining mootness” (citations omitted)).

                                              7
repetition yet evades review. Id. at 284, 288. The capable-of-repetition yet-evades-review

exception has two prongs: “[1] there is a reasonable expectation that a complaining party

would be subjected to the same action again and [2] the duration of the challenged action

is too short to be fully litigated before it ceases or expires.” Dean, 

(emphasis in original). If the exception applies, we have discretion as to whether to apply

the exception and whether to address the question. See 

; Limmer v. Swanson,

 (Minn. 2011).

       The county argues this exception does not apply because S.W.-O. is no longer at the

JDC and there is no reasonable expectation that he will be subjected to a temporary hold at

the JDC in the future. S.W.-O. counters that he and other children who are not alleged to

be delinquent could be held at the JDC and that such conduct would evade review because

the hold is generally temporary. S.W.-O. has the better argument.

       Relying heavily on State ex rel. Young v. Schnell, 

 (Minn. 2021),

S.W.-O. argues that both prongs of the capable-of-repetition yet-evading-review exception

to the mootness doctrine are met. In Young, the Minnesota Department of Corrections

(DOC) revoked probation for Young, a Level III predatory offender, seven times and

returned him to prison each time. Young, 956 N.W.2d at 658-59, 663. While Young was

in prison, a district court denied his petition for habeas corpus. Id. at 661. After Young

filed his appeal from the denial of his habeas petition, the DOC conditionally released him

and then argued the appeal was moot. Id. at 661-62. The Minnesota Supreme Court held

that the first prong of the exception was met because Young’s conditional release had been

revoked seven times and his placement options were limited, which “create[d] a reasonable


                                            8
expectation that Young’s conditional release will be revoked again for his inability to

complete residential programming.” Id. at 663. For the second prong, the supreme court

determined that “[a]ny future challenge by Young . . . could easily be mooted by the

Department’s decision to release him from confinement, rendering the challenged action

too short to be fully litigated.” Id. The supreme court concluded that the issue, even though

moot, merited consideration as it was capable of repetition yet evaded review. Id.

       We agree that State ex rel. Young v. Schnell guides our analysis. First, there is a

reasonable expectation that S.W.-O. may be held at the JDC for more than 24 hours again

in the future. S.W.-O. has already been held at the JDC beyond 24-hours on two occasions

despite no allegation that he is delinquent; S.W.-O. is a chronic flight risk, having been in

18 placements; and suitable placements for him are difficult to find given his particular

therapy and treatment needs. Second, the issue is capable of evading review due to the

relatively short periods of time that S.W.-O. has been held at the JDC, the typical duration

of an appeal, and the delays repeatedly encountered in obtaining appropriate placements

for S.W.-O. As a result, we conclude that the issue is capable of repetition yet evades

review, and we elect to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this appeal under

this exception. Young, 956 N.W.2d at 663; see also State ex rel. L.E.A. v. Hammergren,

 (Minn. 1980) (holding issue regarding propriety of juveniles being

held in a secure facility was rendered moot because juveniles were released from the secure

facility, but deciding the issue because it was “capable of repetition but evading review”).

The county’s motion to dismiss this appeal as moot is denied.

       We now turn to the merits of the appeal.


                                             9
II.    Minnesota Statutes section 260C.181, subdivision 2, does not authorize holding
       a nondelinquent child for longer than 24 hours at a secure detention facility.

       S.W.-O. argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for release

because Minnesota Statutes section 260C.181, subdivision 2, does not authorize holding a

nondelinquent child in a secure detention facility for more than 24 hours. The county

responds that subdivision 2 does not prohibit holding a child at the JDC if that environment

is the least restrictive setting that meets the child’s health and welfare needs.

       The competing statutory interpretation arguments raise a question of law, which we

review de novo. In re Welfare of J.J.P., 

 (Minn. 2013). The goal of

interpreting a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. 

 (2022). First, we examine the text of the statute to determine whether the

language is ambiguous. State v. Thonesavanh, 

 (Minn. 2017). If the

statutory language is clear and free of ambiguity, we enforce the plain language of the

statute and do not explore its spirit. 

; see In re Welfare of Child of

S.B.G., 

, 884 (Minn. 2023).

       In interpreting statutory language, we give words and phrases their plain and

ordinary meaning. J.J.P., 

. Further, we read a statute as a whole and

give effect to all of its provisions. Save Lake Calhoun v. Strommen, 

, 177

(Minn. 2020). We neither read words in isolation, nor do we “add words or phrases to

unambiguous statutes or rules.” 

 (quotations omitted).




                                              10
      The statute at issue provides:

                     Subdivision 1. Temporary custody. A child taken into
             custody pursuant to section 260C.175 may be detained for up
             to 24 hours in a shelter care facility, secure detention facility,
             or, if there is no secure detention facility available for use by
             the county having jurisdiction over the child, in a jail or other
             facility for the confinement of adults who have been charged
             with or convicted of a crime in quarters separate from any adult
             confined in the facility which has been approved for the
             detention of juveniles by the commissioner of corrections. At
             the end of the 24-hour detention any child requiring further
             detention may be detained only as provided in this section.

                     Subd. 2. Least restrictive setting. Notwithstanding
             the provisions of subdivision 1, if the child had been taken into
             custody pursuant to section 260C.175, subdivision 1, clause (1)
             or (2), item (ii), and is not alleged to be delinquent, the child
             shall be detained in the least restrictive setting consistent with
             the child’s health and welfare and in closest proximity to the
             child’s family as possible. Placement may be with a child’s
             relative or, if no placement is available with a relative, in a
             shelter care facility. The placing officer shall comply with this
             section and shall document why a less restrictive setting will
             or will not be in the best interests of the child for placement
             purposes.

                     Subd. 3. Placement. If the child had been taken into
             custody and detained as one who is alleged to be in need of
             protection or services under section 260C.007, subdivision 6,
             clause (13) or (14), by reason of having been adjudicated, in
             need of protection or services under section 260C.007,
             subdivision 6, clause (13) or (14), or conditionally released by
             the juvenile court without adjudication, has violated probation,
             parole, or other field supervision under which the child had
             been placed as a result of behavior described in this
             subdivision, the child may be placed only in a shelter care
             facility.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.181 (emphasis in italics added).




                                            11
       We agree with the parties that subdivision 1 is unambiguous. Subdivision 1 allows

the state to detain a nondelinquent child, who was taken into custody pursuant to section

260C.175, 2 for “up to 24 hours in a shelter care facility, secure detention facility,” or certain

adult facilities. Id. at subd. 1. The JDC—as a physically restrictive facility—qualifies as

a “secure detention facility.” See Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 29 (“‘Secure detention

facility’ means a physically restricting facility, including but not limited to a jail, a hospital,

a state institution, a residential treatment center, or a detention home used for the temporary

care of a child pending court action.”). The final sentence of subdivision 1 provides that

after the 24-hour detention period ends, a child “may be detained only as provided in this

section.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.181, subd. 1.

       The parties do not dispute that subdivision 2 provides for placement options for

nondelinquent youth who need to be detained beyond 24 hours. Minn. Stat. § 260C.181,

subd. 2. 3 The parties further agree that the subdivision indicates that a child must be

“detained in the least restrictive setting consistent with the child’s health and welfare and

in closest proximity to the child’s family as possible.” Id. The parties part ways on their

interpretation of the sentence: “Placement may be with a child’s relative or, if no placement

is available with a relative, in a shelter care facility.” Id.




2
  The parties do not dispute that S.W.-O. was taken into custody pursuant to section
260C.175.
3
 The parties agree that subdivision 2 applies to S.W.-O.’s 31 days at the JDC that were the
genesis of this dispute.

                                                12
       S.W.-O. argues that subdivision 2 allows for one of two options: (1) placement with

a relative or (2) placement in a shelter care facility. S.W.-O. contends that subdivision 2

does not “authorize a nondelinquent child to be held in a secured facility of any type,” such

as the JDC. We agree.

       The plain language of subdivision 2 states that a child must be placed in the least

restrictive setting that is either with a relative or in a shelter care facility. 4 Id. The

legislature did not include “secure detention facility” as a location option after the initial

24-hour period, as provided in subdivision 1, has expired. Id. To include “secure detention

facility” among the settings provided in subdivision 2 would add words to the statute,

which we may not do. See Save Lake Calhoun, 943 N.W.2d at 177 (“[W]e do not add

words or phrases to unambiguous statutes or rules.” (quotations omitted)).

       The county contends that the use of “may” and “or” in subdivision 2 affords the

district court discretion to choose any placement, including at a secure detention facility,

so long as the placement is “the least restrictive” alternative. But the county’s proposed

interpretation of the statute would render superfluous the sentence that states, “Placement

may be with a child’s relative or . . . in a shelter care facility.” See Amaral v. St. Cloud

Hosp., 

 (Minn. 1999) (“Whenever it is possible, no word, phrase, or

sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.”). That sentence would be

unnecessary if, as the county argues, a district court had unlimited discretion in choosing



4
  A “‘[s]helter care facility’ means a physically unrestricting facility, such as but not limited
to, a hospital, a group home, or a licensed facility for foster care, used for the temporary
care of a child pending court action.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 30.

                                               13
the location where the child will stay. The legislature’s use of “may” and “or” affords the

district court discretion in selecting between the options expressly listed: a relative or a

shelter care facility. The discretionary language does not authorize the district court to

choose a third option—a secure detention facility—as it is not expressly included in

subdivision 2.     Since the county’s reading would render the two stated alternatives

superfluous, it is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute.

       The legislature’s use of the words “detained” and “placement” within subdivision 2

does not change our analysis. The legislature has not defined either term, and the parties

offer competing interpretations of their meanings. 5 We note that the statute appears to use

“detained” and “placement” interchangeably. But any difference in the words is immaterial

because the plain language of the statute—when read as a whole—demonstrates that the

legislature designated specific locations where a nondelinquent child may be physically

located. In subdivision 1, for example, the legislature authorized a CHIPS child to be

physically located in a: “shelter care facility, secure detention facility, or . . . a jail or other

facility for the confinement of adults[.]” Minn. Stat. § 260C.181, subd. 1. Similarly, in

subdivision 3, the legislature provided only one option for certain CHIPS children: “a

shelter care facility.” Id. at subd. 3. Like subdivisions 1 and 3, the legislature expressly

designated locations in subdivision 2 where a nondelinquent child may be located: “with

a . . . relative” or “in a shelter care facility.” Id. at subd. 2. In selecting the location within



5
  After oral argument, we requested—and the parties filed—supplemental briefs on the
significance, if any, of the legislature’s use in subdivision 2 of the words “detained,”
“placement,” and “placing.”

                                                14
subdivision 2, a county and a district court must account for “the least restrictive setting”

available that is “in the closest proximity to the child’s family as possible.” Id. What a

county and a district court cannot do is physically place a nondelinquent child in a secure

detention facility for longer than 24 hours.

       Subdivision 3 provides further support for our conclusion. The record in this case

reflects that the county and the district court raised valid concerns that S.W.-O. had run

from numerous placements and posed a danger to himself while on the run.                      In

subdivision 3, the legislature addressed the situation of a child who is alleged to be, or has

been adjudicated CHIPS as, “a runaway.” See Minn. Stat. § 260C.181, subd. 3 (referencing

Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (13) (runaway)). In such circumstances, the legislature

provided that a runaway CHIPS child “may be placed only in a shelter care facility.” Id.

If the legislature requires a CHIPS child who has been adjudicated a “runaway” to be

placed only in “a shelter care facility” and not in a “secure detention facility,” then logically

a CHIPS child who has not been adjudicated a “runaway”—even if the facts would support

such an adjudication—cannot be placed in a “secure detention facility.” See, e.g., In re

Welfare of L.J.C., 

 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding status offender cited

for being a “runaway” may not be placed in a secure juvenile detention facility, even

temporarily, while awaiting a post-adjudication placement).

       We recognize that Minnesota counties have limited financial resources and limited

options to place children—especially children with specific needs like S.W.-O.—in

facilities with appropriate treatment plans. The district court and the county both took great

care in this case to protect the best interests of this child. Indeed, based on this record,


                                               15
S.W.-O. has experienced significant trauma in his young life and has demonstrated that he

could be a danger to himself and others if he were to be released to a nonsecure placement

while awaiting admission to an appropriate facility that can treat his specific needs.

       Nonetheless, existing law does not allow the district court or the county to detain

S.W.-O., or any other nondelinquent CHIPS child, in a secure detention facility beyond 24

hours. While our decision in this case may require substantial changes in practice for some

Minnesota counties, we must follow the unambiguous statutory language. And “our task

here is limited to interpreting the statutory [language] as enacted by the Legislature.” In re

Welfare of J.B., 

 (Minn. 2010); see also Amaral, 

(“When interpreting a statute, we may not disregard the letter of the law under the pretext

of pursuing the spirit of the law.”). Although the district court provided well-intentioned

reasoning that temporarily holding S.W.-O. in a secure detention facility was in the best

interests of this child, the statute does not authorize such a hold. Any amendment to the

statute must come from the legislature, not the judiciary. Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub.

Safety, 

 (Minn. 2014) (“[T]he Legislature, not the judiciary, must be

the reviser [of a statute].”).

                                        DECISION

       Because Minnesota Statutes section 260C.181, subdivision 2, does not authorize the

district court to hold S.W.-O., a nondelinquent CHIPS child, in a “secure detention facility”

for any length of time beyond the initial 24-hour period provided in subdivision 1, we must

reverse the district court’s order denying S.W.-O.’s motion for release.

       Reversed; motion denied.


                                             16