This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                         Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                                STATE OF MINNESOTA
                                IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                      A23-1357

                     In the Matter of the Welfare of: G. M. D., Child.

                                   Filed March 11, 2024
                                         Affirmed
                                      Bratvold, Judge

                             Blue Earth County District Court
                                 File No. 07-JV-23-2111

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant G.M.D.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeVos, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

       Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and

Bratvold, Judge.

                           NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BRATVOLD, Judge

       In this appeal from the district court’s order certifying appellant for adult

prosecution, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining

that the statutory public-safety factors weighed in favor of adult certification. Because the

record supports the district court’s findings, and because the district court did not abuse its

discretion by weighing the public-safety factors and certifying appellant for adult

prosecution, we affirm.
                                          FACTS

       On June 8, 2023, respondent State of Minnesota filed a juvenile-delinquency

petition charging appellant G.M.D. with (1) possession of a pistol and ammunition while

under 18 years old under 

, subd. 1(1) (2022), (2) possession of a

firearm or ammunition after being adjudicated delinquent for a crime of violence under

, subd. 1(2) (2022), and (3) second-degree assault with a dangerous

weapon under 

, subd. 1 (2022). The state moved to certify G.M.D.

for prosecution as an adult, asserting that a presumption of certification applied.

The Offenses

       The following summarizes the facts alleged in the juvenile-delinquency petition. 1

       On June 5, 2023, G.M.D. had a “verbal altercation” with “victim 1” in a restaurant

parking lot in Mankato. G.M.D. “was the aggressor in the altercation.” Uniformed deputies

from Blue Earth County Sheriff’s Office were at the restaurant. Two plain-clothes agents

from the Minnesota River Valley Drug Task Force were in the parking lot and about to

enter the same restaurant when they saw the altercation. The agents “noted that [G.M.D.]

was holding something heavy in the waistband of shorts that appeared to be heavier than

what his gym shorts could hold.” Victim 1 “attempt[ed] to walk away multiple times.”

G.M.D. “took off chasing victim 1,” but after “observ[ing] victim 1 speak to [the]

uniformed deputies [G.M.D.] then ran across the parking lot in the direction of a green Kia



1
 “For purposes of a certification determination, the charges against the child and the factual
allegations of the petition are presumed true.” In re Welfare of J.H., 

(Minn. 2014).

                                              2
Soul.” The agents saw G.M.D. reach the Kia, open the rear driver’s-side door, pull an object

from his waistband, and place it in the vehicle. The agents noted that as G.M.D. “walked

away from the vehicle he . . . no longer . . . ha[d] a bulge in his waistband and was no

longer holding on to his waistband.” He then “entered a white Ford Escape and fled the

area by himself.”

       A deputy spoke with victim 1, who said he did not know G.M.D. When G.M.D.

approached him and “racked a round” “with a motion that indicated [G.M.D.] was

chambering a bullet in a handgun,” victim 1 said, he became afraid that G.M.D. would

shoot him.

       Agents towed the Kia while waiting for a search warrant. After the agents obtained

a warrant, their search of the Kia found “a 9mm semi-automatic handgun under the driver’s

seat.” The handgun “did not contain serial numbers” but “contained one live 9mm round

in the chamber and 14 live 9mm rounds in the magazine.”

District Court Proceedings

       In its motion for adult certification, the state contended that the district court should

presume that G.M.D. would be certified under Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency

Procedure 18.06, subdivision 2, “[b]ased upon the age of [G.M.D.], the offenses he is

charged with and his juvenile delinquency history.” G.M.D. was 17 years and 11 months

old at the time of the alleged offenses. After a probable-cause hearing later in June 2023,

the district court issued an order finding that probable cause supported all three charges in

the state’s delinquency petition. It also found this was “a presumptive certification matter.”




                                               3
       Blue Earth County Community Corrections conducted a certification study. A

juvenile-probation officer for Blue Earth County Community Corrections prepared the

certification-study report, which recommended that G.M.D. be certified for adult

prosecution. A dispositional advisor for the Minnesota Board of Public Defense submitted

a memorandum opposing adult certification on behalf of G.M.D.

       The district court held an adult-certification hearing on August 1, 2023. The

probation officer and dispositional advisor testified. On August 16, 2023, the district court

issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order granting the state’s certification

motion. The district court noted that, if convicted of the charges as an adult, G.M.D. would

face a presumptive commitment to prison of 60 months. The district court determined that

the statutory public-safety factors favored certifying G.M.D. for adult prosecution and

concluded that G.M.D. had “not rebutted the presumption of adult certification.” The

district court terminated juvenile jurisdiction.

       G.M.D. appeals.

                                         DECISION

       G.M.D. argues that the district court abused its discretion by certifying him for adult

prosecution and challenges its analysis of two of the six public-safety factors. Generally,

the juvenile division of the district court “has original and exclusive jurisdiction in

proceedings concerning” a juvenile under 18 years old who is accused of a crime. Minn.

Stat. § 260B.101, subd. 1 (2022). But when a juvenile is over 14 years old and is alleged

to have committed an “offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult,” the district




                                              4
court may certify the juvenile for prosecution as an adult. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 1

(2022).

       A presumption of adult certification applies if the juvenile “was 16 or 17 years old

at the time of the offense” and the alleged offense “would result in a presumptive

commitment to prison” for an adult. Id., subd. 3 (2022). If the presumption applies, the

juvenile has the burden “to rebut this presumption by demonstrating by clear and

convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court serves public

safety.” Id. If the district court determines that the juvenile fails to rebut the presumption,

“the court shall certify the proceeding.” Id. Here, the parties stipulated, and the district

court concluded, that this was a presumptive-certification case. G.M.D. was 17 years and

11 months old at the time of the alleged offense, and the presumptive sentence for the

alleged offense is a 60-month prison commitment. G.M.D. therefore had the burden to

prove that retaining juvenile jurisdiction over him would serve public safety.

       Minnesota law provides that a district court must consider six factors in determining

whether certifying a juvenile for prosecution as an adult serves public safety:

                     (1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
              community protection, including the existence of any
              aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines,
              the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;
                     (2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged
              offense, including the level of the child’s participation in
              planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of any
              mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines;
                     (3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;
                     (4) the child’s programming history, including the
              child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available
              programming;



                                              5
                     (5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming
              available in the juvenile justice system; and
                     (6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Id., subd. 4 (2022). The district court must “give greater weight” to the first and third

factors. Id. “A district court has considerable latitude in deciding whether to certify a case

for adult prosecution.” In re Welfare of P.C.T., 

 (Minn. App. 2012)

(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013).

       Appellate courts review a certification decision for an abuse of discretion. See In re

Welfare of H.B., 

, 166 (Minn. 2022) (reviewing an order denying

certification). Appellate courts will “not disturb a finding that public safety would be

served by certification unless it is clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of N.J.S., 

 (Minn. 2008). Under the clear-error standard, an appellate court may not reweigh

the evidence, reconcile conflicting evidence, or engage in fact-finding anew. In re Civ.

Commitment of Kenney, 

, 221-22 (Minn. 2021). Rather, an appellate court

undertakes a “review of the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the decision.”

. A finding of fact “is clearly erroneous only if there is no reasonable evidence to

support the finding or when an appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake occurred.” H.B., 986 N.W.2d at 166 (quotation omitted).

       A.     The District Court’s Analysis of Factors 1, 2, 3, and 4

       The district court found that factors 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 weighed in favor of adult

certification. G.M.D. does not challenge the district court’s determinations on factors 1, 2,

3, and 4. Still, we summarize the district court’s findings on these four factors to provide

helpful context for our analysis of factors 5 and 6.


                                              6
       The district court found that factor 1—“the seriousness of the alleged offense”—

favored certification. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4(1). The district court’s order

described the offense and stated that the district court found “no attempted explanation for

[G.M.D.’s] conduct, leaving [it] to assume the most reasonable explanation is simply that

[G.M.D.] acted out in violence because the opportunity to do so presented itself.” The

district court concluded that the “blatant violence in a public parking lot in mid-day, in

conjunction with the use of the firearm and the impact on the victim, all indicate that the

seriousness of this offense weighs heavily in favor of adult certification.”

       On factor 2, the district court analyzed G.M.D.’s “culpability . . . in committing the

alleged offense” and found it favored certification. Id., subd. 4(2). The district court found

that no one else was implicated in “planning [or] carrying out the assault,” which required

“more than mere isolated bad judgment.” G.M.D. first “illegally obtained” possession of a

firearm and loaded it before “cho[osing] to bring that firearm out in public where it could

be used to inflict violence.”

       The district court found that factor 3—G.M.D.’s “prior record of delinquency”—

favored certification. Id., subd. 4(3). The district court determined that G.M.D.’s prior

record shows that “the offense alleged in this certification matter is not an isolated act.

Rather, it is part of a pattern of resorting to violence,” and the “violence is increasing from

physical assault, to the use of replica firearms to commit offenses, and now growing to the

use of actual loaded firearms in order to inflict assault.”

       Factor 4 requires the district court to consider G.M.D.’s “programming history,

including the child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available


                                               7
programming.” Id., subd. 4(4). The district court found that this factor favored certification.

The district court found that G.M.D. “had already been previously detained at no less than

[six] different detention/secure facilities.” Although G.M.D. was “successfully

discharged,” he “demonstrated a lack of cooperation and noncompliance with

programming while on probation” and committed the current offenses while on

extended-juvenile-jurisdiction (EJJ) probation.

       B.     Analysis of Factors 5 and 6

       G.M.D. contends that the district court abused its discretion in analyzing and

weighing the evidence for factors 5 and 6. Appellate courts may consider factors 5 and 6

together. See N.J.S., 

 (analyzing factors 5 and 6 together); In re Welfare

of D.T.H., 

 (Minn. App. 1997) (same), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19,

1998). We consider the district court’s analysis of factors 5 and 6 and also discuss G.M.D.’s

arguments.

       Under public-safety factor 5, a district court considers “the adequacy of the

punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice system.” Minn. Stat.

§ 260B.125, subd. 4(5). In G.M.D.’s case, the district court made these findings about

factor 5:

              EJJ would extend until [G.M.D.’s] 21st birthday, which will
              arrive in about 2 years and 10 months from the issuance of this
              Order. There are punishments and programming available on
              EJJ that are extensive, including Prairie Lakes Youth Program
              Secure Detention, among others. However, given the
              escalation in conduct and the prior failures to comply with
              programming and probation, this Court is not convinced that




                                              8
               the supervision, programming, and/or punishments of less than
               3 years will adequately ensure public safety.

Although the district court did not explicitly state that factor 5 favors adult certification,

we conclude these findings implicitly show that factor 5 favors adult certification.

       Under public-safety factor 6, a district court considers “the dispositional options

available for the child.” Id., subd. 4(6). Here, the district court found that this factor favored

adult certification:

               The dispositional options for this matter include the
               presumptive adult certification, or in the alternative, ordering
               that [G.M.D.] be subject to Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction
               (EJJ) probation. [G.M.D.] is already on EJJ and that was
               insufficient to dissuade [G.M.D.] from engaging in the
               offenses alleged herein. EJJ will not adequately ensure public
               safety. This factor favors adult certification.

       G.M.D. begins by arguing that the district court abused its discretion by failing to

“consider” Minnesota Correctional Facility (MCF)-Red Wing under either factor 5 or 6:

“The district court altogether failed to consider whether the long-term, individualized and

youth-focused treatment program at MCF-[Red Wing] was adequate to ensure public

safety.” G.M.D. points out that the certification-study report stated that MCF-Red Wing

would be an “appropriate juvenile placement” for him. He argues that, so long as EJJ

programming can adequately ensure public safety, it is “not relevant” that he could also

receive services in the adult system. In response, the state argues that the district court was

not required to consider “whether there [were] any possible options available in the juvenile

system”; rather, the district court “was tasked with determining whether any such options

are adequate punishments or programs.”



                                                9
       It is accurate that the district court’s written findings do not discuss MCF-Red Wing

as an option. But the record shows the district court had ample evidence about MCF-Red

Wing as an option for G.M.D. Testimony established that the MCF-Red Wing program—

the most likely placement for G.M.D. if he was on EJJ—typically takes between 18 and 24

months and that, if G.M.D. were placed there, it would be for “about 18 months.” 2

       Ultimately, the district court concluded that continuing EJJ for G.M.D. would be

inadequate to ensure public safety for three reasons, and we consider each of G.M.D.’s

arguments about these reasons.

       First, the district court determined that “the supervision, programming, and/or

punishments of less than 3 years will [not] adequately ensure public safety.” (Emphasis

added.) The district court reasoned that G.M.D. would be released from EJJ on his 21st

birthday, which, at the time of certification order, allowed him to be on EJJ for about two

years and ten months. 3 And the dispositional advisor testified that G.M.D.’s actual

placement time at MCF-Red Wing would be about 18 months. Because the district court

found that G.M.D. needed a three-year placement, its conclusion that any juvenile



2
  More specifically, the probation officer testified that the adequacy of “the services that
[MCF-]Red Wing was able to provide for programming” showed that “neither certification
for EJJ or adult certification” was favored. The dispositional advisor testified that G.M.D.
“would qualify for the services and resources . . . at Red Wing” and that he would probably
be at MCF-Red Wing for about 18 months. The certification study noted “the only
appropriate juvenile placement for continued programming is in [MCF-Red Wing] because
of [G.M.D.’s] age and criminal history” and added that G.M.D. could receive services in
the adult system, as well.
3
 We note that G.M.D.’s available programming time has dwindled since the certification
order.

                                            10
facility—including MCF-Red Wing—would be inadequate is well supported. And

“[i]nsufficient time for rehabilitation under the juvenile system is an appropriate

consideration when deciding whether to refer the juvenile to adult court.” In re Welfare of

U.S., 

 (Minn. App. 2000). 4

       Second, the district court rejected EJJ for G.M.D. as inadequate to protect public

safety because of G.M.D.’s “escalation in conduct.” This conclusion is supported by the

record. G.M.D.’s juvenile record includes a misdemeanor for fifth-degree assault in 2018,

a felony for second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon in 2019, a gross misdemeanor

for harassment in 2021, a misdemeanor for fleeing a peace officer in 2021, a misdemeanor

for disorderly conduct in 2022, and a felony for simple robbery that “involved him

brandishing a BB gun” in 2022.

       The present offenses are three felony charges from June 2023 for possession of a

pistol and ammunition while under 18 years old, possession of a firearm or ammunition

after being adjudicated delinquent for a crime of violence, and second-degree assault with

a dangerous weapon. G.M.D.’s juvenile record, in particular the escalation from primarily




4
  G.M.D. also argues that the district court “not only failed to consider the fact that
MCF-[Red Wing] provided far more comprehensive and longer-term programming than in
adult prison, but it also failed to consider the fact that MCF-[Red Wing] provided
youth-focused programming.” In support, G.M.D. relies on the dissent from H.B., which
states that “EJJ prosecution allows more time . . . for a child to successfully engage with
juvenile treatment and rehabilitation.” H.B., 986 N.W.2d at 186 (Thissen, J., dissenting).
Although this may be accurate as a general proposition, here, G.M.D. has already received
rehabilitative programming while on EJJ. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the district
court abused its discretion by not specifically assessing the programming at Red Wing
versus the programming in adult prison.

                                            11
misdemeanor to felony offenses, and his transition from nonlethal to lethal weapons

support the district court’s conclusion that EJJ is an inadequate disposition.

       Third, the district court rejected an EJJ disposition for G.M.D. because of his “prior

failures to comply with programming and probation.” G.M.D. argues that he “successfully

completed a chemical dependency program, completed the Truthought program, and

participated in mental health therapy.” The district court, however, concluded that G.M.D.

disregarded programming and probation recommendations after his discharge, and this

conclusion is supported by the record. The probation officer testified that G.M.D.’s

direction on discharge was to continue with chemical-dependency treatment and therapy,

but he resisted doing so. Although G.M.D. completed a new diagnostic assessment, he “did

not feel that he needed to participate in [the] programming.” He complied with drug testing

for only a few weeks and failed to attend his weekly meetings with his probation officer.

       G.M.D. also argues that his previous failure on EJJ probation did not predict his

future compliance because he had never been ordered to complete a long-term program—

such as MCF-Red Wing—which “almost certainly would have increased the likelihood of

[his] rehabilitation and success in the community.” He also argues the district court failed

to consider that, with an EJJ disposition for the pending charges, G.M.D. would face a

60-month stayed sentence, which would be “an incentive not to violate probation.”

       We are not convinced. It is counterintuitive that a long-term stayed sentence or

program term “increase[s] the likelihood of [G.M.D.’s] rehabilitation and success in the

community” given that G.M.D. previously failed to meet short-term discharge

recommendations. Because G.M.D. violated short-term conditions, we conclude that the


                                             12
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that G.M.D. is not likely to comply with

probation while facing a long-term stayed sentence. We also reject G.M.D.’s argument that

his past failures were in “non-secured” facilities and an EJJ placement in a secured facility

would better ensure public safety. The record shows that G.M.D. previously has been

placed in a secured facility. Also, G.M.D.’s new offense occurred while on probation, not

in a correctional facility.

       Even if we assume error on factors 5 and 6, we cannot grant relief unless G.M.D.

also shows prejudice. See In re Welfare of S.J.T., 

 (Minn. App. 2007)

(requiring juvenile appellant to show that district court’s error prejudiced its certification

decision), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2007). We conclude he cannot. G.M.D. argues that

“the district court’s certification decision may have been different had it correctly assessed”

factor 5. G.M.D.’s argument is not persuasive given that he accepts the district court’s

findings on the other four factors favoring certification. The district court found that five

of six factors weighed in favor of adult certification. And it found the two factors that must

be given greater weight under Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 18.06,

subdivision 3—“the seriousness of the alleged offense” and “the child’s prior record of

delinquency”—weighed in favor of adult certification. Thus, even if we were to conclude

that the district court erred in its analysis of factors 5 and 6, this would not lead us to

conclude that the district court abused its discretion in ordering adult certification.

       Because the record supports the district court’s findings on and analysis of factors

5 and 6, and because factors 1, 2, 3, and 4 also favor adult certification and are not

challenged on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in


                                              13
certifying G.M.D. for prosecution as an adult because retaining the proceedings under

juvenile jurisdiction would not serve public safety.

       Affirmed.




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