This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                         Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                               STATE OF MINNESOTA
                               IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                     A23-0351

                                   State of Minnesota,
                                      Respondent,

                                            vs.

                                 Chad William Buckley,
                                      Appellant.

                                   Filed April 8, 2024
                                        Affirmed
                                    Connolly, Judge

                              Dakota County District Court
                              File No. 19HA-CR-20-3065

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Heather Pipenhagen, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Joseph McInnis, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

       Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and

Bratvold, Judge.

                           NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

CONNOLLY , Judge

       Appellant challenges his conviction of possession of a firearm by a person

previously convicted of a crime of violence, arguing that the evidence seized pursuant to a
search warrant must be suppressed because the warrant application did not establish

probable cause. We affirm.

                                         FACTS

       On December 14, 2020, a Dakota county law enforcement officer applied for a

search warrant for a residence located in Eureka Township, Dakota County. In the warrant

application, the officer stated that, on December 11, 2020, the Dakota County sheriff’s

department received notice that the district court had issued an order for protection (OFP)

alleging that appellant Chad William Buckley posed an “immediate danger of domestic

abuse” to the protected party, appellant’s stepmother, S.B.

       Appellant and S.B. lived in the upper and lower portions of S.B.’s residence,

respectively. In the OFP petition, S.B. described a text-message video she received from

appellant that showed a shotgun lying on appellant’s bed. S.B. showed the video to the

officer who stated in the warrant application that he “viewed the video and confirmed that

the video showed a shotgun lying on [appellant’s] bed.” S.B. reported that on December

9, 2020, she heard appellant “shooting a gun from the upstairs deck towards the road.” She

also reported that appellant had sent her several text messages, stating, “[Y]ou looking to

see me dead,” “I don’t want to hurt anyone else but [was] not [] left much of a choice,” and

“I’m not going anywhere in handcuffs that’s a PROMISE AND now there’s a big problem.

I’m ready to leave this miserable world.”

       When deputies spoke with S.B., she confirmed the information in the OFP petition.

She also reported that appellant struggled with anxiety, depression, post-traumatic-stress

disorder (PTSD), suicidal thoughts, and had recently become “more manic.” S.B. warned


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officers that executing a search warrant of appellant’s home would upset appellant and may

prompt him to bring a gun to the door. S.B. also informed deputies that a neighbor, who

lived behind appellant’s residence, told her that on December 8, 2020, he heard appellant

shooting a firearm out of the back of the Eureka Township residence. On December 12,

2020, the officer spoke with S.B.’s neighbor. The neighbor confirmed that the information

he told S.B. was true. The neighbor also recalled that two weeks earlier, he heard five

gunshots coming from appellant’s residence.

       The officer noted in the warrant application that appellant had been convicted in

2004 of felony theft involving a firearm—constituting a crime of violence. 

, subd. 5 (2020). As a result, appellant is prohibited from possessing a firearm.

See 

, subd. 1a (2020).        Based on this information, the officer

requested authorization to search appellant’s residence for firearms, ammunition, and other

firearm-related items, to show that appellant is an ineligible person in possession of a

firearm. The officer also requested permission to search mobile devices capable of having

sent the text-message video. The district court issued a warrant for the search of appellant’s

residence the same day.

       Officers executed the search warrant, recovering a 12-gauge shotgun from

appellant’s bedroom. Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with possession

of a firearm after being convicted of a crime of violence. See 

,

subd. 1b(a) (2020). Appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search

for lack of probable cause. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the

warrant affidavit established probable cause based on the following information:


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              (1) [Appellant] was ineligible to own or possess a firearm due
              to prior convictions; (2) [Appellant] sent a video of a firearm
              on his bed; and (3) Two separate witnesses, S.B. and the
              neighbor, confirmed that they heard gunshots coming from
              [appellant’s] [r]esidence days leading up to the execution of
              the search warrant.

       After a stipulated evidence trial, appellant was found guilty as charged. The district

court sentenced appellant to 60 months in prison and stayed the execution of that sentence

for five years.

       This appeal follows.

                                        DECISION

       Warrants may be issued only upon a finding of probable cause. U.S. Const. amend.

IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. When determining whether probable cause exists, issuing

courts must “make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of

knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates,

 (1983). A fair probability requires “a direct connection, or nexus,

between the alleged crime and the particular place to be searched.” State v. Souto, 578

N.W2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998). When assessing whether such a nexus exists, we consider

“the type of crime involved, the nature of the items sought, the extent of an opportunity for

concealment, and reasonable assumptions about where a suspect would likely keep that

evidence.” State v. Ruoho, 

 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn.

Nov. 16, 2004). On appeal, we review only whether “the issuing judge had a substantial



                                             4
basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” State v. Zanter, 

(Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted).

       The issuing court here had a substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair

probability that a firearm would be found at appellant’s residence. The search warrant

affidavit contained statements from S.B., appellant’s stepmother, who also lived at the

Eureka Township residence. S.B. stated that five days before the warrant was signed she

heard appellant “shooting a gun from the upstairs deck towards the road.” S.B. showed

law enforcement a video that appellant sent to S.B. showing a shotgun in his bedroom.

And appellant sent text messages to S.B. stating that he “[did not] want to hurt anyone else

but [he was] not [] left much of a choice,” and that he was “ready to leave this miserable

world.” The text messages concerned S.B. because of appellant’s threats to commit suicide

and erratic behavior, including “cutting power to the house, disconnecting S.B.’s TV

antennas, and throwing things around the house.” Appellant’s neighbor also reported

hearing gunshots from appellant’s residence six days before the warrant was signed as well

as two weeks prior.

       Moreover, a defendant’s past crimes may be considered as part of the totality of the

circumstances for determining probable cause exists. State v. Hochstein, 

 (Minn. App. 2001).       Deputies discovered that appellant had several felony

convictions, including possession of a firearm while ineligible, fleeing peace officers in a

motor vehicle, and theft of a firearm—providing the basis that appellant is permanently

disqualified from owning a firearm. See 

, subd. 1b(a) (“Any person

who has been convicted of a crime of violence, as defined in section 624.712, subdivision


                                             5
5,” and possesses a firearm, commits a felony); 

, subd. 5

(enumerating “theft of a firearm” as a “crime of violence”). These facts established a

substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed to search appellant’s residence

for evidence that appellant possessed a firearm. See State v. Yarbrough, 

 (Minn. 2014) (explaining that “it is reasonable to infer that [gun] evidence would be

kept at a defendant’s residence”).

       Appellant insists that the search warrant was invalid because (1) the officer’s

statement that S.B.’s video showed a shotgun and the witnesses’ statements that they heard

gunshots were conclusory, (2) information in the search warrant was stale, and (3) the

neighbor was an unreliable confidential informant.        We address each of appellant’s

arguments in turn.1

       1.     Conclusory statements

       A probable cause determination cannot rest on conclusory statements. Gates, 

. Instead, a warrant affidavit must identify the source of information relied on,

allowing the issuing judge “to independently evaluate” the information in the warrant

affidavit. Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 749.



1
  The state argues that appellant failed to preserve on appeal his arguments related to the
witnesses’ statements, staleness, and the confidential informant. This court generally will
not review issues raised for the first time on appeal. Roby v. State, 

(Minn. 1996). But this court may address the issues when the facts are undisputed and the
issues are briefed by both parties. McKenzie v. State, 

 (Minn. 2015)
(explaining that appellate courts may review “previously unaddressed issue[s]” when they
“involve[] a legal question and the parties had an opportunity to brief the question”).
Because the record contains the facts necessary to address appellant’s arguments and the
parties briefed the same, we address each of appellant’s arguments.

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       Appellant relies primarily on Souto to assert that because the officer merely

“confirmed” that there was a shotgun in the text-message video, his statement was vague

and conclusory, making it improper for the district court to consider when determining that

probable cause existed. In Souto, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that “the officer’s

statement that ‘he [knew]’ that Souto was involved in the possession and/or distribution of

drugs on a wide scale was too vague and conclusory” to support a determination that Souto

was a drug dealer. 

 The court reasoned that because the officer’s assertions were

supported only by evidence of phone calls between Souto’s residence and the residence of

another suspected drug dealer—without information about the content of the phone calls—

the officer’s conclusion that Souto was part of the other suspect’s “drug ring” “lack[ed]

value.” 

       Here, unlike in Souto, the officer concluded that appellant had a shotgun in his home

after reviewing the video that S.B. received from appellant, which S.B. also determined

showed a shotgun in appellant’s room. The officer noted S.B.’s statement that appellant

owned both a cell phone and tablet, giving him the capability to send the text-message

video. The officer’s conclusion was also based on witness statements that appellant had

been heard shooting a firearm from his residence. Based on this information, the issuing

judge could make an independent determination that there was probable cause to believe

appellant had a gun in his home.

       Second, appellant asserts that statements made by S.B. and appellant’s neighbor—

that they heard appellant firing a gun—are conclusory. He argues that the witnesses had

no “basis of knowledge that would allow them to distinguish a gunshot from” any other


                                             7
noise. He suggests that the officer should have inquired into the witnesses’ experience

with firearms or asked them to offer details about the “muzzle flash,” “gun smoke,”

“discarded shells,” or “[the witnesses’] efforts to make a contemporaneous report of the

‘gunshots’ to the police.”

       The statements made by S.B. and the neighbor, like the officer’s statement, are

readily distinguishable from those in Souto. Both witnesses described hearing gunshots

fired from appellant’s residence, corroborating each other’s statements. See Hochstein,

 (explaining informants may corroborate other informants). Appellant

points to no authority requiring a witness have extensive experience with guns before

reporting the sound of gunshots.

       In sum, the affidavit provided the issuing judge with sufficient information to rely

on statements made by the officer and the witnesses, as their statements were not

conclusory. See Gates, 

 (explaining “wholly conclusory statement[s]” do

not provide a substantial basis for establishing probable cause).

       2.     Stale information

       A search warrant must not be based on stale information. State v. Jannetta, 

 (Minn. App. 1984), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 14, 1985). Instead, a valid

search warrant must rely on “facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant

as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time.” Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 750. When

assessing whether information is stale, this court considers whether (1) there is ongoing

criminal activity, (2) the items to be seized are “innocuous or incriminating,” (3) the items

are “easily disposable or transferable,” and (4) the items “are of enduring utility.” Id.


                                             8
Appellate courts will not “set arbitrary time limits in obtaining a warrant.” Jannetta, 

.     Instead, courts must review the totality of the circumstances with

“flexibility and common sense.” 

       Appellant asserts that the information in the search warrant was stale because there

was a seven to 21-day gap between when the witnesses reported hearing gunshots coming

from appellant’s residence and the execution of the search warrant. He also notes that

gunshots were not reported the week before the execution of the search warrant. This

argument is unpersuasive.

       In Souto, the court held that information in the search warrant was stale because

over six months had passed since the report of defendant’s purchase of less than an ounce

of methamphetamine. 578 N.W.2d at 748. And approximately 10 months had passed since

a package containing a controlled substance was attempted to be delivered to the residence

where defendant had not lived for seven months. Id. In contrast, the search warrant here

stated that S.B. and the neighbor heard gunshots coming from appellant’s residence as

recently as six days before the search warrant was executed. This is a substantially shorter

timeframe than that examined in Souto. Id. Further, appellant was still living at the

residence when the warrant was signed and executed.

       Moreover, the reports of gunshots allegedly occurred over a two-week period,

indicative of an ongoing crime. See id. at 750 (“When an activity is of an ongoing,

protracted nature, the passage of time is less significant.”). And according to S.B.,

appellant’s vehicle was inoperable and he was “unlikely to leave the residence,” creating a

reasonable inference that appellant remained at his residence with a gun.


                                             9
       Finally, appellant’s gun was likely of enduring utility. According to S.B., appellant

struggled with anxiety, depression, PTSD, manic behavior, and a history of threatening

suicide. Appellant sent text messages to S.B. that he (1) did not “want to hurt anyone else

but [was] not [] left much of a choice,” (2) would not be “going anywhere in handcuffs,”

and (3) was “ready to leave this miserable world.” And S.B. warned deputies that if they

executed a search warrant, appellant would likely be upset and may bring a gun to the door.

Because appellant was allegedly threatened by others and suicidal, it is reasonable to

conclude that appellant’s gun was of enduring utility to him. See Gerdes v. State, 

 (Minn. 1982) (reasoning traffic-control devices are acquired for

personal use and not likely to be disposed of quickly); see also Jannetta, 

 (determining that the observation of photographs depicting child pornography and the

execution of a warrant two-years later did not render the information stale because “[t]he

photographs would likely have enduring utility to the perpetrator for his own sexual

gratification”).

       In sum, the information in the search warrant was not stale.

       3.      Confidential informant

       When a probable cause determination is based on hearsay statements, the issuing

court must consider the informant’s reliability, including their “veracity” and “basis of

knowledge.” Gates, 

. But this is “not a rigid two-pronged test,” as “a

deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip,

by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.” State v. Mosley,

, 890 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). “[W]hen an informant gives


                                              10
police information based on the informant’s personal knowledge, police do not need to

corroborate significant details in the tip for the tip to be sufficient to support probable

cause.” Mosley, 994 N.W.2d at 892. Even minor details like a defendant’s name and

address can enhance an informant’s reliability. State v. Wiley, 

 (Minn.

1985).

         The neighbor, deemed a confidential informant in the affidavit, lived directly behind

appellant and was familiar with appellant and S.B. The neighbor gave deputies a first-hand

account of the gunshots he heard on December 8, 2020, coming from appellant’s home.

He stated that the shots he heard were in such close proximity to his home that they startled

him. And he specifically recalled hearing the gunshots at 5:15 p.m. The neighbor’s ability

to recall specific first-hand details about what he heard supports his reliability.

         Appellant argues that “[t]he neighbor’s statements are not reliable because they are

uncorroborated claims of a confidential informant.” Appellant argues that because (1) the

neighbor did not provide predictive information, (2) the neighbor did not voluntarily

approach the police, (3) the neighbor did not make an incriminating statement, (4) the

officer only spoke with the neighbor over the phone, and (5) the officer did not label the

neighbor as a “first-time citizen informant,” the neighbor is unreliable. These arguments

are not persuasive.2


2
  Appellant argues that the district court erroneously “assumed the reliability of the
neighbor’s statements without” analyzing the factors in State v. Ross, 

(Minn. App. 2004). However, we are not convinced that it was required to do so. See State
v. Hinton, No. A22-1772, 

, *5 (Minn. App. Nov. 13, 2023) (rejecting a
strict application of the Ross factors—which have not been adopted by the Minnesota
Supreme Court—to assess the reliability of a confidential informant in favor of a totality-

                                              11
       Appellant is correct that the affidavit does not indicate whether the neighbor

provided predictive information, initiated police contact, or made any incriminating

statements. But we are not convinced that this made the informant unreliable. See Mosley,

994 N.W.2d at 889 (stating, courts must review an informant’s reliability based on the

“totality-of-the-circumstances”) (quotation omitted). First, nothing in the affidavit states

that the conversation between the neighbor and the officer occurred over the phone and

“[o]ur inquiry is limited to the information presented in the affidavit.” State v. Holland,

 (Minn. 2015). Second, as argued by respondent, the neighbor’s

statements were partially corroborated by S.B.’s statements; both witnesses heard gunshots

coming from appellant’s residence on December 8 and 9, 2020, respectively.              See

Hochstein, 

 (concluding an informant was reliable in part because the

informant’s statements were corroborated by the statements of another informant). And

the neighbor’s statements were corroborated by appellant’s own text-message video

showing a shotgun in appellant’s bedroom.

       Appellant relies on State v. Gabbert, 

 (Minn. App. 1987), for

the proposition that because the neighbor was not labeled as “a first-time-citizen

informant” he is less credible. But Gabbert is distinguishable. In that case, this court

affirmed the district court’s determination that no probable cause existed because the

affidavit was based largely on an anonymous caller’s tip, the affidavit did not substantiate

the informant’s credibility, and the informant’s tip was proved incorrect. 

. In


of-the-circumstances assessment); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c)
(nonprecedential opinions are persuasive authority).

                                            12
contrast here, the neighbor’s identity was known to law enforcement, the neighbor’s

statements were corroborated by other information in the affidavit, the neighbor was

familiar with appellant, and the neighbor’s information was based on first-hand

knowledge—which was never proven to be incorrect. Under the deferential standard

afforded to issuing courts, we are convinced that the issuing judge here made a common-

sense decision when relying on the neighbor’s statements. See Zanter, 

.

       In sum, the information in the affidavit supports a finding of probable cause and

none of appellant’s arguments to the contrary are persuasive. Thus, the district court did

not err by denying appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized under the search

warrant and appellant is not entitled to a new trial.

       Affirmed.




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