State of Minnesota v. Lamechtric Irving Beasley

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-1657 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Lamechtric Irving Beasley, Appellant.

Filed December 22, 2025 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded Bond, Judge

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-23-24299 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION BOND, Judge In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, appellant argues he is entitled to a new trial because the district court abused its discretion in admitting relationship evidence and because the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. Alternatively, appellant argues that the warrant of commitment incorrectly lists convictions for both counts. Appellant raises additional issues in a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm appellant’s conviction, but we reverse and remand to the district court to correct the warrant of commitment.

FACTS In 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Lamechtric Irving Beasley with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), (g) (2014). The charges arose from allegations that Beasley sexually abused his girlfriend’s minor daughter in 2015. The case proceeded to a jury trial, at which the district court received the following evidence.

The victim in this case, S.J., was born in 2006. In 2012, S.J.’s mother began dating Beasley. Beasley moved into S.J.’s family home in 2013. S.J. testified that in 2015, when she was eight years old, Beasley began touching her breasts and bottom while they were watching television in the living room. After about a month, the sexual abuse escalated to vaginal and oral penetration, which S.J. testified happened on a nearly daily basis. Beasley would tell S.J. “your [m]om said this was okay” and “this is love.” The abuse stopped abruptly around October 2015, after S.J. turned nine years old.

Over Beasley’s objection, S.J. testified that Beasley was physically and verbally abusive to her, her mother, and her grandmother. Beasley slapped S.J. and dragged her up the stairs by her arm and punched her mother and grandmother. Beasley also threatened to kill S.J. and her family if she told anyone about the sexual abuse. S.J. did not immediately report the abuse because, based on Beasley’s threats and his physical abuse toward her and her family, she was afraid of him.

When S.J. was 16 years old, she disclosed the abuse to her boyfriend, sister, and mother. S.J.’s subsequent statements to the police and to a CornerHouse forensic interviewer were admitted at trial. In addition to S.J.’s testimony, the jury heard testimony from S.J.’s mother, sister, police officers, a child-protection investigator, the Cornerhouse interviewer, and the doctor who performed S.J.’s sexual-assault examination.

Beasley waived his right to testify. The jury found Beasley guilty on both counts.

The district court convicted Beasley of count one, first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), and sentenced him to 168 months in prison.

Beasley appeals.

DECISION I.

The district court acted within its discretion in admitting relationship evidence.

Beasley argues that the district court committed reversible error in admitting relationship evidence. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Loving, 775 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Minn. 2009). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017).

Generally, evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is inadmissible. See Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Minn. 1965). But there is an exception for what is “commonly referred to as relationship evidence.” State v. Matthews, N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010). Relationship evidence is “[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or household members.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2024). “Domestic conduct” includes “domestic abuse,” as defined in the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 (2024). Id. Relevant here, the Domestic Abuse Act defines “domestic abuse” as “physical harm, bodily injury, or assault.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(1). A “family or household member” includes “persons who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past.” Id., subd. 2(b)(4).

Relationship evidence is admissible “unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20; see State v. Andersen, N.W.2d 438, 442 (Minn. App. 2017). “[T]he rationale for admitting relationship evidence under section 634.20 is to illuminate the relationship between the defendant and the alleged victim and to put the alleged crime in the context of that relationship.” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010).

Relationship evidence may also help the jury assess witness credibility. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d at 549; see also State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting relationship “evidence that, if believed by the jury, could have assisted the jury by providing a context with which it could better judge the credibility of the principals in the relationship”).

Before trial, Beasley filed a motion in limine to exclude prior bad-acts evidence.

The state moved to admit evidence of Beasley’s physical abuse toward S.J. and her family as relationship evidence pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20, arguing that the evidence was relevant to put the charged conduct in context and to help explain that S.J. did not immediately report the sexual abuse because she was afraid that Beasley would harm her or her family. The district court allowed the state to introduce evidence that Beasley was physically violent toward S.J., her mother, and her grandmother, agreeing with the state that it would contextualize S.J.’s decision to delay reporting the abuse. The district court limited the relationship evidence to acts of physical violence that S.J. “witnessed and knows about,” and cautioned the state that the relationship evidence should “not [be] in great detail,” because what was relevant for the jury was to “understand what may have motivated [S.J.]” not to immediately report the abuse. Additionally, the district court excluded any evidence of Beasley’s convictions or conduct that occurred after the sexual abuse stopped and it granted Beasley’s request to redact S.J.’s CornerHouse statement to remove references to domestic violence that went beyond the court’s relationship-evidence ruling. Finally, the district court provided a cautionary instruction to the jury before the relationship evidence was admitted during S.J.’s testimony, and again before her mother’s testimony.

On appeal, Beasley asserts that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that Beasley was physically abusive to S.J. and her family. Beasley argues both that the relationship evidence lacked probative value and that any probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Probative Value Evidence has probative value “when it, in some degree, advances the inquiry.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2005); see also Minn. R. Evid. 401 (defining “[r]elevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”). As the district court found, evidence of Beasley’s threats to harm S.J. or her family if she told anyone of the abuse, coupled with S.J.’s belief that Beasley was capable of inflicting such harm because she had seen him hurt people she loved in the past, had substantial probative value because it helped the jury understand why S.J. delayed disclosing the abuse. See State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. App. 2008) (“Evidence that helps to establish the relationship between the victim and the defendant or which places the event in context bolsters its probative value.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008). The relationship evidence was also relevant to the jury’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, in particular S.J. and her mother.

See McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161 (affirming the admission of relationship evidence that helped provide context with which the jury could better judge the parties’ credibility); see also Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 757 (concluding that the relationship evidence in that case “had significant probative value in assisting the jury to judge witness credibility”).

Additionally, evidence of Beasley’s physical and verbal abuse of S.J.’s mother and grandmother is probative of how Beasley may have interacted with S.J. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 637 (holding that evidence showing “how a defendant treats his family or household members” is relevant because it “sheds light on how the defendant interacts with those close to him, which in turn suggests how the defendant may interact with the victim”).

Beasley maintains that the relationship evidence was only minimally probative because the state did not “need” the relationship evidence to make its case because the jury had “ample evidence” from which to assess S.J.’s credibility, including S.J.’s own testimony as to why she delayed reporting the abuse. This argument is not persuasive. A defendant’s “challenge to the admissibility of the section 634.20 evidence on the ground that it was not needed to strengthen the state’s case fails” because “the need for section 634.20 evidence is naturally considered as part of the assessment of the probative value versus prejudicial effect of the evidence.” State v. Meyer, 749 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn. 2006) (stating that “a separate analysis of need” is not required to admit evidence under section 634.20). The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the relationship evidence had probative value.

Risk of Unfair Prejudice Beasley contends that, even if the evidence was probative, the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value. “All evidence offered against defendants in criminal trials is prejudicial to some extent.” State v. Spaeth, 552 N.W.2d 187, 195 (Minn. 1996). In the context of relationship evidence, “[w]hen balancing the probative value against the potential prejudice, unfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641 (quotation omitted).

Here, the district court reduced the risk of unfair prejudice by excluding some of the relationship evidence the state sought to introduce. Further, a cautionary instruction can reduce “the probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence.” State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted); see also Andersen, 900 N.W.2d at 441 (“[T]he district court’s cautionary instructions lessened any probability that the jury would rely improperly on relationship evidence.”). Before S.J. testified about Beasley’s physical violence, the district court instructed the jury that the relationship evidence did not “prove domestic violence.” Further, the district court instructed the jury that the relationship evidence was being offered to help you understand sort of the relationship and the dynamics within the household, as well as what [S.J.], you know, may have observed and believed as a result of it. . . .

There’s only a special, limited purpose for you to hear this. I want to make sure you keep your perception of that within that narrow purpose.

The district court gave similar instructions before S.J.’s mother testified.1 “We presume that jurors follow a judge’s instructions.” State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 675 (Minn. 1998). While the relationship evidence undoubtedly was prejudicial, Beasley does not show that the risk of the evidence persuading by illegitimate or unfair means outweighed its probative value. Thus, the district court acted within its discretion by admitting relationship evidence at Beasley’s trial.

II.

Beasley is not entitled to a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct.

Beasley argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. The right to due process includes the right to a fair trial. State v. Duol, 25 N.W.3d 135, 141 (Minn. 2025). “Prosecutors have an affirmative obligation to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial.” State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, As Beasley notes, the district court did not provide a relationship-evidence instruction during final jury instructions. Beasley does not raise this as an issue on appeal. Therefore, we do not address this point.

686 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “A prosecutor engages in prosecutorial misconduct when [they] violate[] clear or established standards of conduct, e.g., rules, laws, orders by a district court, or clear commands in this state’s case law.” State v. McCray, 753 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

Beasley identifies three instances of alleged misconduct by the prosecutor during closing argument: (1) telling the jury that S.J. could not have made up the sensory details in her testimony, (2) describing proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a standard that is not so high, and (3) urging the jury to put themselves in S.J.’s shoes.

The parties agree that Beasley objected to the first two instances of alleged misconduct. “For objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, we have utilized a harmless error test, the application of which varies based on the severity of the misconduct.” State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 389 (Minn. 2007). For cases involving “serious prosecutorial misconduct,” we will reverse unless the misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning that “the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to the error.” State v. Hunt, N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2000). But “[f]or less serious misconduct, the test is whether the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” Id. Beasley contends that the alleged misconduct was serious, and thus we should apply the more stringent harmless-error test. The state does not appear to take a clear position on which harmless-error standard applies to the prosecutor’s arguments about S.J.’s sensory details and the burden of proof.

As to the third alleged form of misconduct, the parties dispute whether Beasley objected to the prosecutor’s argument asking the jury to put themselves in S.J.’s shoes and which standard of review guides our analysis. Beasley argues that we should apply the standard of review for objected-to serious prosecutor misconduct. The state contends that, because the district court sua sponte raised a concern about the prosecutor’s argument and Beasley did not object, the modified plain-error standard of review is appropriate. See State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006) (outlining the modified plain-error test that applies to unobjected-to trial errors).

We need not resolve the parties’ disagreements about the proper standard of review because we conclude that Beasley cannot establish that he is entitled to relief under the more demanding test that applies to objected-to and unusually serious misconduct.

S.J.’s Description of Sensory Details Beasley argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing that the sensory details S.J. disclosed “are details that no person can make up unless they have experienced it.” During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that “[t]hose details [S.J.] provided to you are details no person can make up unless they have experienced it.

No one makes up a salty sperm taste.” The district court overruled Beasley’s objection to these statements, determining that it would leave it to the “judgment of the jury [to determine] what happened to [S.J.].” Later, discussing the details of the abuse S.J. provided during the CornerHouse interview, the prosecutor said “[n]obody makes up that kind of taste because that is a sensory detail.” Beasley once again objected on the ground that the prosecutor was sharing his “personal opinion” that “nobody would make up” such sensory details. While the record does not reflect whether the district court granted Beasley’s second objection, the court cautioned the jury: I think I understand what the objection is. I think the jury understands as well. It’s not what [the prosecutor] is telling you you need to believe. It’s what you believe based on your common sense and the judgment that’s there. So, to the extent [the prosecutor is] saying, this is what I believe based on the evidence—that’s not relevant. Is that clear to everyone? Okay.

Beasley contends the prosecutor’s statements that S.J. could not have made up the sensory details in her testimony were serious misconduct because the prosecutor was “essentially vouching for S.J.’s credibility.” The state maintains that the prosecutor’s remarks, while “not ideal,” were not misconduct.

While “[a] prosecutor may not personally endorse the credibility of witnesses,” they can “argue that particular witnesses were or were not credible.” State v. Fields, 730 N.W.2d 777, 785 (Minn. 2007). “In closing arguments, counsel has the right to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.” State v. Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584, (Minn. 1996); see also State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Minn. 1995) (“While the state’s argument need not be colorless, it must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.” (quotation omitted)). When analyzing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, we consider the argument “as a whole,” not “selected phrases and remarks.” State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 310, 335 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

We conclude that the prosecutor’s argument was a permissible reference to inferences that could be drawn from the evidence presented at trial. Smith, 541 N.W.2d at 589. The CornerHouse interviewer provided expert testimony about the concept of “sensory details,” explaining that a victim’s description of sensory details is a specific part of the disclosure process. The interviewer testified that, during the CornerHouse interview, S.J. disclosed sensory details such as the salty taste of sperm in her mouth.

Further, the closing argument as a whole reflects that the prosecutor tied S.J.’s recollection of sensory details to the credibility factor addressing a witness’s ability to remember events, telling the jury, “I am asking you find—you believe her, find her credible, because she lived it. She experienced it. And she talked about it with you. She went through those details. She went through those sensory details with you.” Thus, the prosecutor’s statements properly discuss “the credibility of witnesses in the context of the evidence before the court and the conclusions that can be drawn from that evidence.”

Fields, 730 N.W.2d at 786; see also State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 106-07 (Minn. 2009) (“We conclude that although the first statement was vulgar, none of these statements constituted vouching for the witness’s credibility. Instead, the statements were inartful attempts to argue that witnesses were credible.”). We note as well that the district court instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s personal opinions and base its credibility determinations on its “common sense and . . . judgment.” See State v. Whitson, 876 N.W.2d 297, 304 (Minn. 2016) (stating “the prejudicial effect of misconduct can be cured by proper instructions to the jury”).

Accordingly, the prosecutor’s statements about the sensory details of S.J.’s testimony do not constitute misconduct.

Describing Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Beasley alleges that the prosecutor committed serious misconduct by misstating and “attempting to reduce” the state’s burden of proof. “A prosecutor’s misstatement of the burden of proof is ‘highly improper’ and constitutes misconduct.” Martin, 773 N.W.2d at (quoting Hunt, 615 N.W.2d at 302).

During closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jury beyond a reasonable doubt is not this standard that is so high.

It is the same exact standard used in any criminal case. It’s the exact same standard you use in speeding tickets, parking violations, all the way up to, even, last week, when our former president was on trial. That is the exact same standard that every case has to be proven by.

Beasley did not contemporaneously object, but, before beginning the defense closing, requested a curative instruction on the ground that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not the standard for parking tickets. After the district court expressed uncertainty on that point, the prosecutor explained that proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies to parking-ticket disputes. Consequently, the district court denied Beasley’s request for a curative instruction, concluding that no “correction” was required.

“The highest requirement of proof is in criminal cases where the guilt of the defendant must be established ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Carpenter v. Nelson, 101 N.W.2d 918, 921 n.3 (Minn. 1960). We thus agree that the prosecutor’s description of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as “not so high” was potentially misleading. Further, analogizing the burden of proof in a first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct case to the standard required in parking- or speeding-tickets cases may be confusing because, as was the case with the district court here, jurors might not know the burden of proof in a parking- ticket dispute.

Assuming without deciding that the prosecutor’s description of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was misconduct, we conclude that Beasley is not entitled to a new trial because any misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Any confusion caused by the prosecutor’s description of the standard of proof was mitigated by the district court’s instructions accurately defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt and instructing the jury to disregard statements of law that differed from those given by the district court. Whitson, N.W.2d at 304; see also State v. Atkins, 543 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. 1996) (concluding prosecutor’s misstatement of the law during closing argument was harmless in part because the district court properly instructed the jury on the law). And the prosecutor referred to the jury instructions in his closing, noting that the jury “ha[d] the definitions” of beyond a reasonable doubt which it could reference. See State v. Tate, 682 N.W.2d 169, 178-79 (Minn. App. 2004) (concluding prosecuting attorney’s misstatement of the burden of proof was error, but was harmless because “taken as a whole, [the statements] do not indicate that the burden of proof was shifted”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

29, 2004). Finally, defense counsel countered the prosecutor’s argument in his closing argument, describing proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a “heavy burden” explaining that “[t]he fact that it’s used for every criminal charge does not lessen the weight of that burden on the [s]tate.”

Accordingly, even if the prosecutor’s description of the burden of proof constituted misconduct, the district court’s accurate instructions and the closing arguments of the parties as a whole demonstrate that the verdict was surely unattributable to the prosecutor’s statement and any misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.2 Asking the Jury to Put Itself in S.J.’s Shoes Finally, Beasley asserts that the prosecutor committed serious misconduct by urging the jury to put themselves in S.J.’s shoes. The prosecutor told the jury to “[p]ut yourself in [S.J.’s] shoes. Imagine what [S.J.] was going through when she went to a doctor who specializes in child abuse pediatrics. . . . Imagine that kind of invasion into your body— how that’s going to make you feel.” When the prosecutor began to describe the sexual- assault examination in graphic terms, the district court interjected and told counsel to approach. After a bench conference, the district court instructed the jury: [Y]ou’re not to imagine what it was like to be [S.J.] or anyone.

You are not to put yourself in their shoes and look at the evidence that way. You can use common sense, certainly, but . . . you can’t see this case through the eyes of a witness . . . .

So disregard any argument that has suggested that you put yourselves in [S.J.’s] shoes.

“Generally, arguments that invite the jurors to put themselves in the shoes of the victim are considered improper.” State v. Johnson, 324 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1982).

In every case, a prosecutor “must refrain from making statements that will inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury.” State v. Duncan, 608 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000). And, in sexual-abuse cases in particular, we Beasley argues that the prosecutor’s argument impermissibly refers to punishment, which the jury is not allowed to consider. See State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 474 (Minn. 1999) (stating that “sentencing is not a proper consideration for the jury”). We disagree because, while the prosecutor’s argument discusses the burden of proof, it did not refer to punishment. hold prosecutors to the highest ethical standards. See State v. Jahnke, 353 N.W.2d 606, (Minn. App. 1984). Sexual-abuse cases “inescapably evoke an emotional reaction, and any emotive appeal to jurors is likely to be highly prejudicial.” Id. We are troubled by the prosecutor’s argument urging the jury to put themselves in S.J.’s shoes as she was undergoing a child sexual-assault examination and agree that, in making that argument, the prosecutor committed misconduct. But we conclude that Beasley is not entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor’s statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We reach this conclusion for three reasons.

First, by stopping the prosecutor’s argument and instructing the jury to disregard any suggestion that it put itself in S.J.’s shoes, the district court mitigated any prejudicial effect of the misconduct. Whitson, 876 N.W.2d at 304. “Courts presume that juries follow the instructions they are given.” State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 1998).

Second, because of the district court’s prompt intervention, the prosecutor’s improper comments were not repeated or pervasive. And third, the state’s evidence against Beasley was strong. S.J. provided detailed testimony about the sexual abuse that was largely consistent with her prior statements to the police and the CornerHouse interviewer.

Therefore, the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury verdict was “surely unattributable to the error.” Hunt, 615 N.W.2d at 302.

III.

The district court erred by listing convictions for both counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct on the warrant of commitment.

Beasley argues, alternatively, that the warrant of commitment incorrectly lists convictions for both counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The state agrees that we should reverse and remand to correct the warrant of commitment. We also agree.

Minnesota law provides that, “[u]pon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2024). Minnesota courts have interpreted Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1, to mean that “a defendant may not be convicted of two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.” State v. Folley, 438 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Minn. 1989). Courts may correct clerical errors in the warrant of commitment at any time. Minn. R. Crim.

P. 27.03, subd. 10.

The jury found Beasley guilty of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.

Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), (g). At sentencing, the district court adjudicated Beasley guilty on count one and sentenced him to an executed sentence of 168 months in prison.

Consistent with the law, the district court did not enter a conviction on count two. Contrary to the court’s oral pronouncement, however, the warrant of commitment lists convictions for both counts one and two. Generally, appellate courts “look to the official judgment of conviction in the district court file as conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated.” Spann v. State, 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). But when a district court’s orally pronounced sentence differs from the warrant of commitment, the oral pronouncement controls. State v. Statloch, 643 N.W.2d 329, 331 (Minn. App. 2002). Because the warrant of commitment erroneously states that Beasley was convicted of count two, we reverse and remand to the district court to correct the warrant of commitment so it reflects a conviction on count one only.

IV.

Beasley is not entitled to relief on the arguments raised in his pro se brief.

In a pro se supplemental brief, Beasley asserts various challenges to the testimony of S.J., the CornerHouse interviewer, and other witnesses. On appeal, we defer to the jury’s credibility determinations and do not reweigh the evidence. State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 72-73 (Minn. 2009). And while “some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). “Claims in a pro se supplemental brief that are unsupported by either arguments or citation to legal authority are forfeited.” State v. Montano, 956 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “Such arguments will not [be] considered unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Id. at 650-51.

Beasley’s claims of error are forfeited because they are unsupported by either legal arguments or citation to legal authority and because prejudicial error is not obvious on mere inspection. See id. We therefore do not address them.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.