Kapacs v. State of Minnesota

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota November 20, 2017

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Margots Kapacs, Case No. 17-cv-3615 (WMW/HB)

Plaintiff,
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
v. RECOMMENDATION

State of Minnesota and Minnesota Board
on Judicial Standards,

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the August 22, 2017 Report and
Recommendation (R&R) of United States Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer. (Dkt. 18.)
The Court granted Plaintiff Margots Kapacs’s request for an extension of time to object
to the R&R, and Kapacs thereafter filed timely objections.
On October 3, 2017, approximately three weeks after filing his objections to the
R&R, Kapacs filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint. Because Kapacs has not
yet served his original complaint on Defendants, he is permitted to amend his complaint
as a matter of course and need not first obtain the Court’s leave. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(1). Thus, the Court construes Kapacs’s amended complaint as the operative
complaint. In his amended complaint, Kapacs does not add or remove defendants or
legal claims or otherwise alter the nature of the relief he seeks. Rather, the amended
complaint includes approximately six additional paragraphs in which Kapacs provides
additional details in support of his claims. These additional details involve allegations
that the Minnesota state court judge who presided over Kapacs’s marriage dissolution
proceedings treated him unfairly during the course of those proceedings and altered court
records, and that Kapacs’s complaints to Defendant Minnesota Board on Judicial
Standards (Board) have been ignored. In light of the limited nature of the differences

between Kapacs’s original complaint and his amended complaint, the R&R’s analysis
and recommendations with respect to the original complaint also are largely applicable to
the amended complaint. As such, the Court will construe the R&R as applying to the
amended complaint.
The R&R observes that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state-court decisions. See D.C. Court of
Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462, 482

 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413, 416

(1923). Thus, to the extent that Kapacs challenges the decisions of the Minnesota
state courts in his marriage-dissolution proceedings, the R&R recommends dismissal for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As to Kapacs’s claim that the Board has acted

unlawfully in rejecting his claims of judicial misconduct, the R&R concludes that (1) this
Court must abstain from intervening in ongoing administrative state proceedings
involving alleged judicial misconduct and (2) Kapacs’s claim against the Board is both
factually and legally frivolous because Kapacs has not alleged any judicial impropriety or
misapplication of relevant law or that he has any legal entitlement to federal redress from

the Board’s decisions.
In his objections, Kapacs first asserts that the R&R omits or misstates certain facts
underlying his lawsuit. Kapacs does not, however, identify any alleged omissions or
misstatements that would materially affect the R&R’s analysis or legal conclusions.
Moreover, several of Kapacs’s objections misconstrue the R&R. For example, Kapacs
incorrectly asserts that the R&R concludes “that the Minnesota Board on Judicial
Standards . . . is above the law.” The R&R reaches no such conclusion. Kapacs also

incorrectly suggests that the R&R includes factual findings and legal conclusions as to
the merits of Kapacs’s claims. To the contrary, the R&R recommends declining to reach
the substantive merits of Kapacs’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Significantly, Kapacs fails to acknowledge or remedy the jurisdictional
deficiencies identified in the R&R. Thus, the Court overrules Kapacs’s objections arising

from his claims challenging the decisions of the Minnesota state courts and adopts the
R&R’s recommendation that these claims be dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Although Kapacs challenges the R&R’s conclusion that his claims against the
Board must be dismissed, he does not challenge the R&R’s conclusion that this Court

must abstain from intervening in ongoing state administrative proceedings involving
alleged judicial misconduct. When there is an ongoing state proceeding that both
implicates important state interests and provides an adequate opportunity to raise any
relevant federal questions, a federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction.
Plouffe v. Ligon,

606 F.3d 890, 892

 (8th Cir. 2010).  Kapacs’s representations to this 

Court regarding the complaint he filed with the Board in July 2017 indicates that there is 
an ongoing state proceeding.  There “is a strong state interest in attorney disciplinary 
proceedings.”

Id. at 893

.  And Kapacs has not demonstrated that the state administrative 
proceedings will not afford him an adequate opportunity to raise any relevant federal 
issues.    See

id.

  (recognizing  that  plaintiff  bears  burden  to  show  that  state  attorney 
discipline  proceedings  will  not  afford  plaintiff  opportunity  to  raise  federal  issues, 
including constitutional claims).  Nor has Kapacs shown bad faith, harassment or other 

extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.  See

id. at 892-93

.  
Thus, Kapacs’s objections do not establish that abstention is unwarranted here.  See

id. at 893-94

 (affirming dismissal of complaint against director of state professional conduct 
office on abstention grounds).                                            
Even  if  abstention  were  not  warranted  here,  the  Eleventh  Amendment  to  the 

United States Constitution bars a plaintiff from suing a state or its agencies in federal 
court absent consent or congressional abrogation of immunity.  Monroe v. Ark. State 
Univ.,

495 F.3d 591, 594

 (8th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Nebraska,

345 F.3d 593, 597

 (8th Cir. 
2003).  The Board is an agency of the State of Minnesota.  See Minn. Stat. § 490A.01 
(establishing Board); Snyder v. Kurvers,

767 F.2d 489, 490

 (8th Cir. 1985) (describing 

origins of Board).  As a state agency, the Board is immune from being sued in federal 
court unless the state has consented to the lawsuit or Congress has abrogated the Board’s 
immunity.    See  Ashby  v.  Minn.  Bd.  on  Judicial  Standards,  No.  08-4691,

2008 WL 5236023

,  at  *3  (D.  Minn.  Dec.  15,  2008)  (concluding  that  complaint  against 
Minnesota  Board  on  Judicial  Standards  must  be  dismissed  on  immunity  grounds).  

Kapacs has not alleged that either circumstance exists here.  For these reasons, the Court 
overrules Kapacs’s objections with respect to his claims against the Board. 
This Court reviews those portions of the R&R to which no objections have been 
made for clear error.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) 1983 advisory committee note; Grinder v. 
Gammon,

73 F.3d 793, 795

 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).  Having reviewed those portions 
of the R&R, the Court concludes that the R&R is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary 
to  law.    Moreover,  the  additional  information  that  Kapacs  supplies  in  his  amended 

complaint does not remedy the deficiencies identified in the R&R or otherwise entitle 
Kapacs to the relief he seeks.1                                           
Based  on  the  foregoing  analysis,  the  R&R  and  all  the  files,  records  and 
proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:                                 
1.   Plaintiff’s objections, (Dkt. 24), are OVERRULED;               

2.   The August 22, 2017 R&R, (Dkt. 18), is ADOPTED;                 
3.   Plaintiff’s  amended  complaint,  (Dkt.  26),  is  DISMISSED  WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE;                                                                
4.   Plaintiff’s application to proceed in district court without prepaying fees or 
costs, (Dkt. 2), is DENIED;                                               

5.   Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, (Dkt. 4), is DENIED;  
6.   Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, (Dkt. 12), is DENIED; and 
7.   Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel, (Dkt. 25), is DENIED.    
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                 


Dated:  November 20, 2017               s/Wilhelmina M. Wright            
                                   Wilhelmina M. Wright              
                                   United States District Judge      

1    After filing his objections to the R&R, Kapacs filed a motion to appoint counsel.  
In light of the Court’s rulings, Kapacs’s motion to appoint counsel is denied as moot.