Lopez v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, LLC

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota June 12, 2018

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Anastacio Lemus Lopez, Civ. No. 17-1179 (PAM/TNL)

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Minnesota Vikings Football Stadium, LLC,
Monterrey Security Consultants, Inc.,
Minnesota Sports Facilities Authority, SMG,
Janee Harteau, Andrew Hodynsky, Russell
Cragin, Anthony Rodin, Michael Grahn,
Stephen McCarty, Gerald Moore, Michael
Fossum, Richard W. Stanek, David J. Hough,
Michael O. Freeman, being sued in their
individual and official capacities, Minnesota
Vikings Football, LLC, Hennepin County, and
City of Minneapolis,

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Hennepin County’s1 Motion to
Dismiss. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
During a Minnesota Vikings game at the U.S. Bank Stadium, Defendant
Minneapolis police officers and an employee of Defendant Monterrey Security
Consultants, Inc., were escorting Plaintiff Anastacio Lemus Lopez to a security
processing center before ejecting him from the venue. (Am. Compl. (Docket No. 93)

1 The Amended Complaint names Defendant Hennepin County, as well as Defendants
County Administrator David J. Hough, Sheriff Richard W. Stanek, and County Attorney
Michael O. Freeman (“the individual County Defendants”). The Court will reference all
County Defendants as “the County” and the individual County Defendants as applicable.
¶¶ 30-38.) On the way, they allegedly “attacked [Lopez] while [he] was in custody, due
to his color and ethnicity.” (Id. ¶ 1.) One Defendant police officer discharged his Taser

on Lopez twice. (Id. ¶¶ 60-64.) The officers also allegedly hit and punched Lopez while
he was pinned down on the floor. (Id. ¶¶ 51-52.)
Paramedics on scene removed the Taser probes and treated Lopez for injuries to
his right eye. (Id. ¶ 71.) The officers ultimately transported Lopez to the Hennepin
County jail, where he was booked for attempting to disarm a police officer. (Id. ¶ 73.)
The next day, a state court judge found sufficient probable cause to order Lopez’s

continued detention. (Martenson Decl. (Docket No. 148) Ex. 1.) A jury ultimately found
Lopez not guilty. (Am. Compl. ¶ 79.) Lopez alleges that the County “falsely arrested,
incarcerated, maliciously prosecuted, and failed to provide adequate medical attention.”
(Id. ¶ 78.)
The 14-Count Amended Complaint contains nine Counts against the County,

including excessive use of force (Count I); a Monell violation (Count II); a § 1985
violation for conspiring to deprive Lopez of his civil rights (Count III); negligent failure
to provide adequate medical care (Count VI); negligent training, hiring, retention, and
supervision (Count VII); false imprisonment (Count XI); malicious prosecution (Count
XII); and respondeat superior claims for intentional and negligent misconduct (Counts

XIII and XIV). The County moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
DISCUSSION
When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumes the
allegations in the Amended Complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences
from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Morton v. Becker,

793 F.2d 185, 187

  (8th  Cir.  1986).    But  the  Court  need  not  accept  as  true  wholly 

conclusory allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens,

183 F.3d 799

, 805 
(8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions that the plaintiff draws from the facts pled.  Westcott 
v. City of Omaha,

901 F.2d 1486, 1488

 (8th Cir. 1990).                    
A complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face” to survive a motion to dismiss.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570

 (2007).  Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must 

contain facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level.”

Id. at 555

.  “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 
mere conclusory statements,” will not pass muster under Twombly.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009) (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555

).  This standard “calls for 
enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 

[the claim].”  Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556

.                                  
A.   § 1983 Individual-Capacity Claims                                    
Count I is a claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

, alleging that the individual County 
Defendants violated Lopez’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.  (Am. 
Compl. ¶¶ 80-81.)  “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a 

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own 
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”  Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 676

. 
Here, the Amended Complaint fails to allege a discrete act by any of the individual 
County Defendants.  Cf. Ellis v. Norris,

179 F.3d 1078, 1079

 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming 
dismissal of a § 1983 complaint for “fail[ure] to allege facts supporting any individual 
defendant’s personal involvement” in the alleged violation of plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights).  Thus, Count I is dismissed against the individual County Defendants. 
B.   Municipal Liability                                                  
Lopez claims that the County is liable under § 1983 for inadequately training its 
employees to provide medical assistance to inmates in jail.  See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs.,

436 U.S. 658

 (1978).  As relevant here, “liability for a constitutional violation 
may attach to a municipality if the violation resulted from . . . a deliberately indifferent 

failure to train or supervise.”  Corwin v. City of Independence,

829 F.3d 695, 699

 (8th 
Cir. 2016); accord City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 389

 (1989).  A claim for 
inadequate training exists if (1) the county’s “training practices [were] inadequate”; (2) 
the “failure to train reflects a deliberate or conscious choice” by the county; and (3) the 
“alleged deficiency in the . . . training procedures actually caused the plaintiff’s injury.”  

Parrish v. Ball,

594 F.3d 993, 997

 (8th Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quotations 
omitted).    Establishing  deliberate  indifference  on  a  failure-to-train  claim  generally 
requires  “[a]  pattern  of  similar  constitutional  violations  by  untrained  employees.”  
Connick v. Thompson,

563 U.S. 51, 62

 (2011).                              
Lopez argues that “Hennepin County Jail’s policies/lack of policies were violated 

during his stay in their custody as he was not given any  medical treatment, despite 
countless requests and his obvious physical appearance.”  (Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. (Docket 
No. 150) at 4.)  But he acknowledges that the Amended Complaint fails to reference any 
specific  jail  policy  or  pattern  of  constitutional  violations.2    The  allegations  in  the 
Amended Complaint are thus insufficient to support a Monell claim.        

Lopez also contends that he need not allege a pattern of similar constitutional 
violations because the unconstitutional consequence of the County’s failure to train is 
“patently obvious.”  Connick,

563 U.S. at 64

; Canton,

489 U.S. at 390

 n.10 (creating 
single-incident liability for Monell claims).  But the County’s alleged failure to train is 
simply not patently obvious.  And even if it was, Lopez also failed to allege deliberate 
indifference—that “it was so predictable that failing to train [the County’s employees] 

amounted to conscious disregard” for Lopez’s constitutional rights.  Connick,

563 U.S. at 71

 (emphasis omitted).  Count II is dismissed against the County.         
C.   § 1985 Conspiracy Claim                                              
Section 1985(3) provides for a cause of action to recover damages against two or 
more persons who conspire “for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of 

persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under 
the laws.”  To state a claim under § 1985(3), Lopez “must allege (1) a conspiracy, (2) for 
the purpose of depriving another of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges 
and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an 
injury to a person or property, or the deprivation of a legal right.”  Federer v. Gephardt,

363 F.3d 754, 757-58

 (8th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).  Lopez must also “allege with 
particularity and specifically demonstrate with material facts that the defendants reached 

2  Lopez submitted a newspaper article with his opposition memorandum in an attempt to 
demonstrate a pattern of the County’s constitutional violations.  (See Docket No. 151.)  
But this article may not be considered on a motion to dismiss.            
an agreement.”  Johnson v. Perdue,

862 F.3d 712, 717-18

 (8th Cir. 2017) (quotation 
omitted).                                                                 

Here, Lopez alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive him of “equal protection 
of the laws,” in part, because of his race.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 87.)  The County’s alleged 
role in the conspiracy was “using unreasonable and excessive force against Plaintiff while 
he was in custody including depriving him of adequate medical assistance.”  (Id. ¶ 88.)  
However, similar to Johnson, the Amended Complaint fails to allege with specificity that 
Defendants “reached an understanding to violate [Lopez’s] rights.”

862 F.3d at 718

 

(quotation omitted).                                                      
Lopez argues that the County “worked together through prosecution and continued 
detention  to  further  the  interests  of  all  parties,  specifically  Minneapolis  Police 
Department and the City of Minneapolis.”  (Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. at 5-6.)  This allegation is 
not in the Amended Complaint.  And regardless, the allegation still fails to “demonstrate 

with material facts that the defendants reached an agreement.”  Johnson,

862 F.3d at 717

-
18.  This claim is dismissed against the County.                          
D.   Negligent Failure to Provide Medical Care                            
Lopez claims that the County was negligent in failing to provide him with proper 
medical care.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 98-100.)  A negligence claim requires “(1) the existence 

of a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) an injury, and (4) the breach of the duty 
being the proximate cause of the injury.”  Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp.,

632 N.W.2d 666, 672

 (Minn. 2001).  The County has “a general duty to provide medical treatment to 
jail inmates.”  Thomsen v. Ross,

368 F. Supp. 2d 961, 978

 (D. Minn. 2005) (Rosenbaum, 
J.) (citing

Minn. Stat. § 641.15

). The County argues that Lopez failed to allege that it
breached that duty and that any such breach did not cause Lopez further injury.

The Amended Complaint alleges that the individual County Defendants
failed to provide adequate medical attention and assistance
and denied Plaintiff access to treatment appropriate to his
condition. Plaintiff was suffering from lacerations,
contusions, and fractured ribs, yet he was not taken to a
hospital or examined by a physician despite Plaintiff’s
repeated requests. The need for medical examination was
obvious given the preceding events and Plaintiff’s visible
injuries. Plaintiff could reasonably have been suffering a
concussion and/or internal hemorrhage that would have
resulted in serious injury or death without medical attention.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 74.) But this allegation is conclusory; the Amended Complaint does not
state any facts related to when or how Lopez requested—or the individual County
Defendants actually denied—medical assistance.
With respect to injury, the Amended Complaint simply claims that the County’s
negligence “contributed to [Lopez’s] physical and emotional harm and placed him in
danger of severe complications.” (Id. ¶ 99.) This allegation demonstrates only that the
County’s alleged failure to provide treatment could have caused him further injury, not
that Lopez actually realized any specific harm as a result of the County’s alleged conduct.
See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Arneson,

322 N.W.2d 604, 607

 (Minn. 1982) (“[T]he threat of 
future harm, not yet realized, will not satisfy the damage requirement.”). 
At the hearing on the County’s Motion to Dismiss, Lopez stated that the severity 
of his injuries worsened due to the lack of medical care he received while in custody, but 
this allegation is not in the Amended Complaint, and is in any event conclusory.  Lopez 
has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish breach or causation, and his negligence 
claim against the County is dismissed.                                    

E.   Negligent Training, Hiring, Retention, and Supervision               
Lopez claims that the County’s “fail[ure] to exercise the appropriate supervision, 
control,  authority,  training  and/or  discipline”  caused  his  injuries.    (Am.  Compl.      
¶¶ 101-03.)  But “Minnesota law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent 
training.”  Johnson v. Peterson,

734 N.W.2d 275, 277

 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).  And 
hiring,  retention,  and  supervision  decisions  are  discretionary  acts  that  entitle  a 

municipality to statutory immunity.  Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit Operations,

563 N.W.2d 309, 320

 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds,

582 N.W.2d 216

 (Minn. 1998).  The County is a municipality, see

Minn. Stat. § 466.01

, subd. 
1, and thus entitled to statutory immunity on these claims.               
Even  if  statutory  immunity  does  not  apply,  the  Amended  Complaint  contains 

insufficient  factual  allegations  to  establish  a  negligent  hiring  claim.    Such  a  claim 
requires an allegation that the employer hired a person even though the employer “knew 
or should have known” that a person’s incompetence would cause foreseeable harm.  
Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs.,

331 N.W.2d 907, 912

 (Minn. 1983).  Negligent retention and 
supervision  claims  require  an  allegation  that  an  employer  failed  to  take  remedial 

measures  against  its  employee,  or  failed  to  exercise  reasonable  care  to  supervise  its 
employee,  after  the  employer  became  aware  or  should  have  become  aware  that  the 
employee’s incompetence could foreseeably cause harm.  Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.,

561 N.W.2d 530, 540

 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (negligent retention); Oslin v. State,

543 N.W.2d 408, 415

  (Minn.  Ct.  App.  1996)  (negligent  supervision).    The  Amended 
Complaint fails to allege anything about what the County knew or should have known 

with respect to its employees.                                            
The claims for negligent training, hiring, retention, and supervision against the 
County are dismissed.                                                     
F.   False Imprisonment                                                   
Lopez  claims  that  the  County  falsely  imprisoned  him,  arguing  that  it  lacked 
probable cause to detain him at the Hennepin County Jail.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 113-15.)  But 

a  defense  to  a  false  imprisonment  claim  exists  if  a  jailer  acts  “in  reliance  upon  a 
commitment fair and valid on its face and issued by a court.”  Peterson v. Lutz,

3 N.W.2d 489, 489

 (Minn. 1942) (citing Weigel v. Brown,

194 F. 652, 655

 (8th Cir. 1912)). 
Here, the County detained Lopez pursuant to an order and probable-cause finding 
issued by a state-court judge.  Although he believes that law enforcement lacked probable 

cause to arrest and detain him, Lopez does not dispute that this order was valid on its 
face.  The County detained Lopez pursuant to that state-court order.  Thus, this claim is 
dismissed against the County.                                             
G.   Malicious Prosecution                                                
In  Count  XII,  the  Amended  Complaint  claims  that  the  County  maliciously 

prosecuted Lopez.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 116-18.)  However, “public prosecutors, when acting 
within the scope of their duties by filing and maintaining criminal charges, are absolutely 
immune from civil liability.”  Brown v. Dayton Hudson Corp.,

314 N.W.2d 210, 214

(Minn. 1981). Lopez did not address this claim in his opposition brief, apparently
conceding that absolute immunity apples. This claim is therefore dismissed against the
County.

H. Respondeat Superior Claims
Lopez claims that the County is vicariously liable for intentional and negligent
misconduct related to his claims for malicious prosecution, negligence, and false
imprisonment. “For respondeat superior [liability] to lie, there must be, first, an actor
personally liable for the tort, and, second, the actor must be within the scope of the
employment by the employer.” Leaon v. Washington Cty., 397 N.W2d 867, 874 (Minn.

1986). Here, the Amended Complaint identifies only the individual County Defendants
as actors. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 120, 124.) But it does not state what they did or did not do.
Lopez asserts that an assistant County attorney acted negligently by charging him,
despite a clear lack of probable cause. This allegation is not in the Amended Complaint,
and regardless, this claim is meritless because Lopez does not dispute that the charging

attorney is entitled to absolute immunity.
Regarding his negligence claim, Lopez contends that the individual actors who
allegedly failed to provide him adequate medical care must have been County employees,
such as sheriff’s deputies or jail staff. But the Amended Complaint alleges only that the
individual County Defendants failed to provide adequate medical attention and does not

mention any other County employee. (Id. ¶ 74.) In any event, Lopez’s negligence claim
fails because the Amended Complaint contains no allegations related to the County’s
alleged denial of medical care and fails to identify any injury the County caused. The
respondeat superior claims against the County are dismissed.
I. Leave to Amend Complaint
Lopez may only amend his pleadings with the Court’s leave. Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2). Lopez asks for permission to amend his Amended Complaint in the alternative
to dismissal, but throughout his opposition memorandum, he repeatedly asserts that he
has pleaded sufficient allegations and that the discovery process will uncover additional
facts to support his claims. Lopez has failed to identify sufficient facts “to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal” the desired evidence. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556

.    Further  amendments  with  respect  to  the  County  would  be  futile,  and 

Lopez’s request to amend the Amended Complaint is denied.                 
CONCLUSION                                                                
The Amended Complaint fails to state any claim against the County on which 
relief can be granted, and the Court does not grant Lopez leave to amend his Amended 
Complaint.  Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:                       

1.   The County’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 140) is GRANTED; and 
2.   The Amended Complaint (Docket No. 93) is DISMISSED with prejudice 
     against  Defendants  Hennepin  County,  David  J.  Hough,  Michael  O. 
     Freeman, and Richard W. Stanek.                                 

Dated: June 12, 2018          s/ Paul A. Magnuson                         
                         Paul A. Magnuson                            
                         United States District Court Judge

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Anastacio Lemus Lopez, Civ. No. 17-1179 (PAM/TNL)

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Defendants.

793 F.2d 185, 187

  (8th  Cir.  1986).    But  the  Court  need  not  accept  as  true  wholly 

conclusory allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens,

183 F.3d 799

, 805 
(8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions that the plaintiff draws from the facts pled.  Westcott 
v. City of Omaha,

901 F.2d 1486, 1488

 (8th Cir. 1990).                    
A complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face” to survive a motion to dismiss.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570

 (2007).  Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must 

contain facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level.”

Id. at 555

.  “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 
mere conclusory statements,” will not pass muster under Twombly.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009) (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555

).  This standard “calls for 
enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 

[the claim].”  Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556

.                                  
A.   § 1983 Individual-Capacity Claims                                    
Count I is a claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

, alleging that the individual County 
Defendants violated Lopez’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.  (Am. 
Compl. ¶¶ 80-81.)  “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a 

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own 
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”  Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 676

. 
Here, the Amended Complaint fails to allege a discrete act by any of the individual 
County Defendants.  Cf. Ellis v. Norris,

179 F.3d 1078, 1079

 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming 
dismissal of a § 1983 complaint for “fail[ure] to allege facts supporting any individual 
defendant’s personal involvement” in the alleged violation of plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights).  Thus, Count I is dismissed against the individual County Defendants. 
B.   Municipal Liability                                                  
Lopez claims that the County is liable under § 1983 for inadequately training its 
employees to provide medical assistance to inmates in jail.  See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs.,

436 U.S. 658

 (1978).  As relevant here, “liability for a constitutional violation 
may attach to a municipality if the violation resulted from . . . a deliberately indifferent 

failure to train or supervise.”  Corwin v. City of Independence,

829 F.3d 695, 699

 (8th 
Cir. 2016); accord City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 389

 (1989).  A claim for 
inadequate training exists if (1) the county’s “training practices [were] inadequate”; (2) 
the “failure to train reflects a deliberate or conscious choice” by the county; and (3) the 
“alleged deficiency in the . . . training procedures actually caused the plaintiff’s injury.”  

Parrish v. Ball,

594 F.3d 993, 997

 (8th Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quotations 
omitted).    Establishing  deliberate  indifference  on  a  failure-to-train  claim  generally 
requires  “[a]  pattern  of  similar  constitutional  violations  by  untrained  employees.”  
Connick v. Thompson,

563 U.S. 51, 62

 (2011).                              
Lopez argues that “Hennepin County Jail’s policies/lack of policies were violated 

during his stay in their custody as he was not given any  medical treatment, despite 
countless requests and his obvious physical appearance.”  (Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. (Docket 
No. 150) at 4.)  But he acknowledges that the Amended Complaint fails to reference any 
specific  jail  policy  or  pattern  of  constitutional  violations.2    The  allegations  in  the 
Amended Complaint are thus insufficient to support a Monell claim.        

Lopez also contends that he need not allege a pattern of similar constitutional 
violations because the unconstitutional consequence of the County’s failure to train is 
“patently obvious.”  Connick,

563 U.S. at 64

; Canton,

489 U.S. at 390

 n.10 (creating 
single-incident liability for Monell claims).  But the County’s alleged failure to train is 
simply not patently obvious.  And even if it was, Lopez also failed to allege deliberate 
indifference—that “it was so predictable that failing to train [the County’s employees] 

amounted to conscious disregard” for Lopez’s constitutional rights.  Connick,

563 U.S. at 71

 (emphasis omitted).  Count II is dismissed against the County.         
C.   § 1985 Conspiracy Claim                                              
Section 1985(3) provides for a cause of action to recover damages against two or 
more persons who conspire “for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of 

persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under 
the laws.”  To state a claim under § 1985(3), Lopez “must allege (1) a conspiracy, (2) for 
the purpose of depriving another of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges 
and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an 
injury to a person or property, or the deprivation of a legal right.”  Federer v. Gephardt,

363 F.3d 754, 757-58

 (8th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).  Lopez must also “allege with 
particularity and specifically demonstrate with material facts that the defendants reached 

2  Lopez submitted a newspaper article with his opposition memorandum in an attempt to 
demonstrate a pattern of the County’s constitutional violations.  (See Docket No. 151.)  
But this article may not be considered on a motion to dismiss.            
an agreement.”  Johnson v. Perdue,

862 F.3d 712, 717-18

 (8th Cir. 2017) (quotation 
omitted).                                                                 

Here, Lopez alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive him of “equal protection 
of the laws,” in part, because of his race.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 87.)  The County’s alleged 
role in the conspiracy was “using unreasonable and excessive force against Plaintiff while 
he was in custody including depriving him of adequate medical assistance.”  (Id. ¶ 88.)  
However, similar to Johnson, the Amended Complaint fails to allege with specificity that 
Defendants “reached an understanding to violate [Lopez’s] rights.”

862 F.3d at 718

 

(quotation omitted).                                                      
Lopez argues that the County “worked together through prosecution and continued 
detention  to  further  the  interests  of  all  parties,  specifically  Minneapolis  Police 
Department and the City of Minneapolis.”  (Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. at 5-6.)  This allegation is 
not in the Amended Complaint.  And regardless, the allegation still fails to “demonstrate 

with material facts that the defendants reached an agreement.”  Johnson,

862 F.3d at 717

-
18.  This claim is dismissed against the County.                          
D.   Negligent Failure to Provide Medical Care                            
Lopez claims that the County was negligent in failing to provide him with proper 
medical care.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 98-100.)  A negligence claim requires “(1) the existence 

of a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) an injury, and (4) the breach of the duty 
being the proximate cause of the injury.”  Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp.,

632 N.W.2d 666, 672

 (Minn. 2001).  The County has “a general duty to provide medical treatment to 
jail inmates.”  Thomsen v. Ross,

368 F. Supp. 2d 961, 978

 (D. Minn. 2005) (Rosenbaum, 
J.) (citing

Minn. Stat. § 641.15

). The County argues that Lopez failed to allege that it
breached that duty and that any such breach did not cause Lopez further injury.

322 N.W.2d 604, 607

 (Minn. 1982) (“[T]he threat of 
future harm, not yet realized, will not satisfy the damage requirement.”). 
At the hearing on the County’s Motion to Dismiss, Lopez stated that the severity 
of his injuries worsened due to the lack of medical care he received while in custody, but 
this allegation is not in the Amended Complaint, and is in any event conclusory.  Lopez 
has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish breach or causation, and his negligence 
claim against the County is dismissed.                                    

E.   Negligent Training, Hiring, Retention, and Supervision               
Lopez claims that the County’s “fail[ure] to exercise the appropriate supervision, 
control,  authority,  training  and/or  discipline”  caused  his  injuries.    (Am.  Compl.      
¶¶ 101-03.)  But “Minnesota law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent 
training.”  Johnson v. Peterson,

734 N.W.2d 275, 277

 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).  And 
hiring,  retention,  and  supervision  decisions  are  discretionary  acts  that  entitle  a 

municipality to statutory immunity.  Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit Operations,

563 N.W.2d 309, 320

 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds,

582 N.W.2d 216

 (Minn. 1998).  The County is a municipality, see

Minn. Stat. § 466.01

, subd. 
1, and thus entitled to statutory immunity on these claims.               
Even  if  statutory  immunity  does  not  apply,  the  Amended  Complaint  contains 

insufficient  factual  allegations  to  establish  a  negligent  hiring  claim.    Such  a  claim 
requires an allegation that the employer hired a person even though the employer “knew 
or should have known” that a person’s incompetence would cause foreseeable harm.  
Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs.,

331 N.W.2d 907, 912

 (Minn. 1983).  Negligent retention and 
supervision  claims  require  an  allegation  that  an  employer  failed  to  take  remedial 

measures  against  its  employee,  or  failed  to  exercise  reasonable  care  to  supervise  its 
employee,  after  the  employer  became  aware  or  should  have  become  aware  that  the 
employee’s incompetence could foreseeably cause harm.  Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.,

561 N.W.2d 530, 540

 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (negligent retention); Oslin v. State,

543 N.W.2d 408, 415

  (Minn.  Ct.  App.  1996)  (negligent  supervision).    The  Amended 
Complaint fails to allege anything about what the County knew or should have known 

with respect to its employees.                                            
The claims for negligent training, hiring, retention, and supervision against the 
County are dismissed.                                                     
F.   False Imprisonment                                                   
Lopez  claims  that  the  County  falsely  imprisoned  him,  arguing  that  it  lacked 
probable cause to detain him at the Hennepin County Jail.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 113-15.)  But 

a  defense  to  a  false  imprisonment  claim  exists  if  a  jailer  acts  “in  reliance  upon  a 
commitment fair and valid on its face and issued by a court.”  Peterson v. Lutz,

3 N.W.2d 489, 489

 (Minn. 1942) (citing Weigel v. Brown,

194 F. 652, 655

 (8th Cir. 1912)). 
Here, the County detained Lopez pursuant to an order and probable-cause finding 
issued by a state-court judge.  Although he believes that law enforcement lacked probable 

cause to arrest and detain him, Lopez does not dispute that this order was valid on its 
face.  The County detained Lopez pursuant to that state-court order.  Thus, this claim is 
dismissed against the County.                                             
G.   Malicious Prosecution                                                
In  Count  XII,  the  Amended  Complaint  claims  that  the  County  maliciously 

prosecuted Lopez.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 116-18.)  However, “public prosecutors, when acting 
within the scope of their duties by filing and maintaining criminal charges, are absolutely 
immune from civil liability.”  Brown v. Dayton Hudson Corp.,

314 N.W.2d 210, 214

(Minn. 1981). Lopez did not address this claim in his opposition brief, apparently
conceding that absolute immunity apples. This claim is therefore dismissed against the
County.

550 U.S. at 556

.    Further  amendments  with  respect  to  the  County  would  be  futile,  and 

Lopez’s request to amend the Amended Complaint is denied.                 
CONCLUSION                                                                
The Amended Complaint fails to state any claim against the County on which 
relief can be granted, and the Court does not grant Lopez leave to amend his Amended 
Complaint.  Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:                       

1.   The County’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 140) is GRANTED; and 
2.   The Amended Complaint (Docket No. 93) is DISMISSED with prejudice 
     against  Defendants  Hennepin  County,  David  J.  Hough,  Michael  O. 
     Freeman, and Richard W. Stanek.                                 

Dated: June 12, 2018          s/ Paul A. Magnuson                         
                         Paul A. Magnuson                            
                         United States District Court Judge

Reference

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