Central Specialties, Inc. v. Large

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota November 7, 2018

Trial Court Opinion

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                
Central Specialties, Inc.,                                                
    Plaintiff,                                                           
v.                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION                
                                            AND ORDER                    
                                       Case No. 17-cv-5276 (MJD/LIB)     
Jonathan Large and Mahnomen County,                                       
    Defendants.                                                          

    Kyle E. Hart and Jeffrey A. Wieland, Fabyanske, Westra, Hart & Thomson, 
P.A., Counsel for Plaintiff.                                              
    Michael T. Rengel, Pemberton, Sorlie, Rufer & Kershner, PLLP, Counsel for 
Defendants.                                                               
    This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim, qualified immunity and/or lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.                                                             

I.   Allegations in Amended Complaint                                     

    Plaintiff Central Specialties, Inc. (“CSI”) is a Minnesota corporation doing 
business as a general contracting construction company.  (Amended Complaint ¶ 
6.)  In July 2017, CSI had a contract with the Minnesota Department of    

Transportation (“MnDOT”) for road work on State Highway 59 in Mahnomen    
County.  (Id. ¶ 9.)  The contract required CSI to use its trucks to haul construction 

material, and that Mahnomen County Highways 10, 6 and 5 were the routes CSI 
used to perform its contract.  (Id.)                                      

    CSI contacted Defendant Jonathan Large, the Highway Engineer for     
Mahnomen County, to express the company’s interest in utilizing a recently 

reconstructed portion of Highway 10, south of Highway 5, as a route for CSI 
trucks.  (Id. ¶ 10.)  Throughout the spring and early summer of 2017, that portion 
of Highway 10 was posted as open to trucks up to 5-ton per axle weight.  (Id. ¶ 

11.)  Although the road was open to the public, CSI contacted Large to avoid any 
potential conflict their usage may have with ongoing construction work.  (Id. ¶ 

12.)                                                                      
    Large informed CSI it was his preference that CSI not use that portion of 

Highway 10 during times at which the Knife River Corporation was actively 
performing construction work on the road.  (Id. ¶ 13.)  CSI responded on Friday, 

July 14, 2017, indicating it would begin sending its trucks on the route the 
following Monday.  (Id. ¶ 14.)  In response, Large told CSI it should not use 
Highway 10 that Monday because Knife River would be performing shoulder   

work that day.  (Id. ¶ 15.)                                               
    On Monday afternoon, July 17, 2017, after discovering that no construction 

was actively being performed and being assured by Knife River that no further 
construction was planned until Friday, CSI started routing its empty trucks along 
that portion of Highway 10.  (Id. ¶ 16.)  The road was open to the public and CSI 

met the posted weight restriction.  (Id. ¶ 17.)                           

    On Tuesday, July 18, 2017, CSI again used Highway 10 for its empty   
trucks.  (Id. ¶ 19.)  That same day, after learning that CSI was using Highway 10, 
Large and/or Mahnomen County employees under his direction, began changing 

signs on that road which posted a new and lower weight restriction – from 5-ton 
per axle to 5-ton total weight.  (Id. ¶ 21.)  When CSI continued to use Highway 10 

after the new weight restriction was posted, Large created a roadblock on 
northbound Highway 10, south of Highway 5 using a Mahnomen County         
vehicle.  (Id. ¶ 22.)  Large stopped two CSI trucks and refused to remove his 

roadblock until Minnesota State Troopers arrived on the scene.  (Id. ¶ 23.)  The 
CSI trucks were detained by Large for over three hours.  (Id. ¶ 25.)  While CSI 

trucks were detained, other large trucks passed by without being stopped.  (Id. ¶ 
28.)                                                                      
    CSI believed it had little choice but to submit to Large’s traffic stop because 

of the road block and because of Large’s supervisory and policy-making    
authority with respect to much of the construction work in Mahnomen County.  
(Id. ¶ 29.)  The CSI trucks were released after the State Patrol determined that the 

trucks had been stopped illegally.  (Id. ¶ 30.)  CSI alleges the unconstitutional 
seizure of the CSI trucks caused harm to CSI by delaying its work.  (Id. ¶ 31.) 

    CSI alleges that Defendants deprived it of its rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments (Count I – Violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1983

).  CSI further 

alleges that by blocking the road and preventing its trucks from leaving, Large 
deprived CSI of the use of its trucks.  As Large’s employer, the County is liable 

for the damages resulting in Large’s actions.  (Count II – Trespass to Chattels).  
Finally, CSI alleges that Large’s actions caused CSI’s performance under its 
contract with MnDOT to be more expensive and burdensome, causing CSI to   

incur damages in the form of project delays and related costs, additional fuel and 
employee salary costs (Count III – Tortious Interference with Contract).  

    CSI alleges that Large is not entitled to qualified immunity because his 
authority as the County Highway Engineer does not include the power or    

discretion to conduct traffic stops.  (Id. ¶ 32.)  Large knew or should have known 
that because he was not a law enforcement officer, it was unlawful to conduct a 

traffic stop.  (Id.)  Further, CSI alleges that Large is not entitled to qualified 
immunity because his actions were intentional and malicious.  (Id. ¶ 33.)  
Because of Large’s actions, CSI was forced to reroute its trucks for the duration of 

their ongoing construction project, causing project delays and additional costs.  
(Id. ¶ 34.)                                                               

II.  Standard of Review                                                   
    Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may 

move the Court to dismiss a claim if, on the pleadings, a party has failed to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted.  In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the 

Court takes all facts alleged in the complaint to be true.  Zutz v. Nelson,

601 F.3d 842, 848

 (8th Cir. 2010).                                                 

    To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
    matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
    face.  Thus, although a complaint need not include detailed factual  
    allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his  
    entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 
    formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.

Id.

 (citations omitted).                                                 
    In support of their motion, Defendants have submitted two affidavits from 
Defendant Large, one of which has as an exhibit a copy of an email chain.  
Because the motion before it is one under Rule 12(b)(6), the Large affidavits and 

the exhibit will not be considered as they are outside of the pleadings.  
III.  Count I – Section 1983                                              

    “The essential elements of a 1983 claim are (1) that the defendant(s) acted 

under color of state law, and (2) that the alleged wrongful conduct deprived the 
plaintiff of a constitutionally protected federal right.”  Schmidt v. City of Bella 
Villa,

557 F.3d 564, 571

 (8th Cir. 2009).                                 

    A.   Fourth Amendment Violation                                      

    CSI claims that Defendants seized its trucks in violation its Fourth 
Amendment rights when Large, acting under color of law, created a roadblock 

on Highway 10 with his County vehicle and causing two CSI trucks to pull off 
the road and be detained for more than three hours.                       

    A seizure occurs, “when there is some meaningful interference with an 
individual’s possessory interests in that property.”  United States v. Jacobsen,

466 U.S. 109, 113

 (1984).  To be lawful, the seizure must be reasonable; that is based 
on “individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”  City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,

531 U.S. 32, 37

 (2000).   Further, an unreasonable seizure occurs “only when the 
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way 

restrained the liberty of a citizen.”  Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1

, 19 n. 16 (1968); see 
also California v. Hodari D.,

499 U.S. 621, 627

 (1991) (finding that an arrest 
requires either a show of force or submission to the assertion of authority); 

United States v. Mendenhall,

446 U.S. 544, 554

 (1980) (“As long as the person to 
whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, 

there has been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would under 
the Constitution require some particularized an objective justification.”).   

    CSI asserts the three-hour detention was a meaningful interference with its 
right to use its trucks, and that such seizure was not reasonable because it is not 

clear that holding the trucks for over three hours was necessary for road safety or 
that Large had the authority to do so.  CSI further alleges that Large acted 
maliciously, because only CSI trucks were detained on the day in question while 

other similar trucks were allowed to use Highway 10.                      

    Defendants argue that assuming Large made a showing of force or      
authority such that it rose to the level of placing a restraint on the liberty of CSI 
trucks, such seizure was reasonable under the circumstances.  They argue that 

Minnesota law authorizes a momentary re-direction or cessation of traffic flow 
when safety concerns call for such action.  See

Minn. Stat. § 169.06

, subdiv. 4a 

(authorizing flaggers, or other traffic control mechanisms to command     
automobiles to stop until it is deemed safe to proceed).  Such action – even if it 
constitutes a seizure - is reasonable under the circumstances.  This is true in this 

case, where the plaintiff is a corporation and is not necessarily entitled to operate 
on any road it chooses.  See, e.g.,

Minn. Stat. § 161.25

 (authorizing the state 

commissioner to designate a haul road or temporary highway while roadwork 
continues);

Minn. Stat. § 160.08

, subdiv. 3 (authorizing road authorities to design 
a controlled -access highway to regulate, restrict or prohibit access to the same).  

    Defendants further argue it was contemplated by legislatures across the 

country that roadway safety and maintenance require small sacrifices to   
individual liberty.  Large had a duty to maintain the roads under his jurisdiction 
and to ensure that traffic operating on them may do so safely and without undue 

damage to the roads themselves.  Large subjectively and reasonably believed CSI 
was operating on Highway 10 wrongfully and unlawfully and asked through   

hand gestures to stop the trucks, and the drivers complied.  Thus, as a matter of 
law, the brief seizure of the CSI trucks was reasonable.                  
    The Court finds that CSI has pleaded sufficient facts which plausibly state 

a claim of unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  CSI has 
alleged that Large targeted the CSI trucks, forced them to pull over by show of 
authority, and thereafter detained the CSI trucks for over three hours without the 

legal authority to do so.  Accepting these facts as true, CSI has not described a 
traffic flagging operation that involved the momentary redirection or cessation of 

traffic.  Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss CSI’s claim under 
the Fourth Amendment.                                                     

    B.   Fourteenth Amendment Violation                                  

    CSI alleges that Defendants violated its rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment by 1) depriving it of its liberty and property by detaining two of its 
trucks for over three hours; 2) depriving it of equal protection of the laws by 

selectively changing its road weight limits to damage CSI and then selectively 
enforcing those weight limits only against CSI; and 3) failing to give appropriate 

notice of the change in the road weight restrictions, and then depriving it of its 
liberty and property by detaining its trucks for over three hours.        
         1.   Substantive Due Process Violation                          

    The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that the government shall not    
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV § 1.  “’The touchstone of due process is protection of the 

individual against arbitrary action of government’ whether the fault lies in a 
denial of fundamental procedural fairness or in the exercise of power without 
any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate government objective.”  

County of Sacramento v. Lewis,

523 U.S. 833, 845

 (1998) (internal citations 
omitted).  Cases dealing with abusive executive action require a showing of the 

most egregious official conduct; conduct that can be “characterized as arbitrary 
or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.”

Id. at 847

.          

    Defendants argue it is unclear whether CSI is asserting a substantive due 
process claim.  If so, CSI has failed to allege that Large engaged in conduct that 

shocks the conscience.  The Court agrees.                                 
    Thus, to the extent CSI asserts its substantive due process rights were 

violated when its trucks were detained for three hours, such claim must be 
dismissed as it does not describe conduct that shocks the conscience.     
         2.  Procedural Due Process                                      

    “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions 
which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning 

of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”  Mathews v. 
Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 332

 (1976).  These types of claims are examined under a 

two-part test: “whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been 
interfered with by the government”; and “whether the procedures attendant 
upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.”  Kentucky Dept. of 

Corrections v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 460

 (1989).  “An essential principle of due 
process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice 

and opportunity or hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”  Cleveland Bd. 
of Educ. v. Loudermill,

470 U.S. 532, 542

 (1985).                         

    CSI claims that it had no notice that the weight restrictions had been 
changed on Highway 10 before being deprived of its rights to use its trucks for 

allegedly violating the new weight restrictions.  While Defendants claim that 
there was no deprivation of rights in this case, or that CSI cannot establish that a 
hearing or other type of process was due prior to the deprivation, the Court finds 
that based solely on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, CSI has    

sufficiently stated a claim of violation of procedural due process.       
         3.  Equal Protection Violation                                  

    The Equal Protection Clause requires that the government treat all   
    similarly situated people alike. The Supreme Court recognizes an equal 
    protection claim for discrimination against a class of one.  The purpose of a 
    class-of-one claim is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction 
    against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by 
    express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly 
    constituted agents. It is recognized law that a class-of-one claimant may 
    prevail by showing she has been intentionally treated differently from 
    others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the 
    difference in treatment.                                             
Barstad v. Murray County,

420 F.3d 880, 884

 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

    CSI alleges it was deprived of equal protection of the laws when     
Defendants selectively changed the road weight limits to damage CSI and then 
selectively enforced those weight limit changes only against CSI.         
    Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because the weight 
restrictions on the road applied to all travelers equally, and that to the extent 
other trucks were allowed to pass, Defendants note that Large was the only one 
at the road and was unable to stop other vehicles.                        
    For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court finds 

CSI has sufficiently pleaded a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.   
    C.   Qualified Immunity                                              

    A government official that is sued under Section 1983 in his individual 

capacity may raise the defense of qualified immunity.   Sisney v. Reisch,

674 F.3d 839, 844

 (8th Cir. 2012).  “Qualified immunity protects government officials from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”

Id.

 (citations omitted).                                     

    To determine whether Large is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court 
must conduct the following inquiry: “(1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has 
alleged ... make out a violation of a constitutional right and (2) whether the 

constitutional right violated was clearly established at the time of defendant's 
alleged misconduct.”

Id.

                                                 

    Dismissal based on qualified immunity “will be upheld on a 12(b)(6)  
motion only when the immunity is established on the face of the complaint.”  
Hafley v. Lohman,

90 F.3d 264

, 266 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Weaver v. Clark,

45 F.3d 1253

, 1255 (8th Cir. 1995)).  “Dismissal is inappropriate ‘unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 

which would entitled him to relief.’”  Id. (internal citation omitted).   
    At this time, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to demonstrate 

beyond doubt that CSI can prove no set of facts in support of its claims under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.  This issue is best addressed at summary 

judgment in this case.                                                    
    D.   Remand State Law Claims                                         

    Because the Court will not dismiss the § 1983 claims at this time, the Court 

will continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law 
claims.                                                                   

    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No.    
37] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:  to the extent Plaintiff 

asserts a substantive due process claim, such claim is dismissed; the motion is 
denied as to all remaining claims.                                        

Date:    November 7, 2018          s/ Michael J. Davis                               
                                  Michael J. Davis                       
                                  United States District Court