Hammermeister v. Ludeman

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota March 25, 2019

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

RANDY EARL HAMMERMEISTER , Civil No. 16-2592 (JRT/LIB)

Plaintiff,
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
v. RECOMMENDATION
CAL LUDEMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Randy Earl Hammermeister, 1111 Highway 73, Moose Lake, MN 55767,
pro se plaintiff.

Brandon L. Boese, OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA ATTORNEY
GENERAL, 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100, St. Paul, MN 55101, for
defendants.

On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff Randy Hammermeister filed this action against
various individuals, collectively referred to as “Defendants,” alleging that the conditions
of his civil commitment violated his constitutional rights. Defendants subsequently filed
two Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiff has objected to Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois’s
Order and Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), which recommended that the Court
grant Defendants’ Motions. Because the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that
Plaintiff is precluded from raising the issues underlying Counts 1 and 2, and correctly
determined that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to
Count 3, the Court will adopt the R&R in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (“MSOP”).

(Mot. for Leave, Proposed Am. Compl. (“PAC”) ¶ 1, Jan. 27, 2017, Docket No. 44-1.)
He is currently housed at MSOP’s Moose Lake Complex 1 facility. (Id. ¶ 9.) The Moose
Lake Complex 1 facility, and the conditions of confinement there, have been the subject
of litigation for several years. In 2011, individuals civilly committed at Moose Lake filed
a

28 U.S.C. § 1983

 class action complaint against Minnesota state officials, alleging that 
the policies, procedures, and conditions of their confinement amounted to a violation of 

their  constitutional  rights.    See  generally  Karsjens  v.  Jesson,  Civ.  No.  11-3659 
(DWF/JJK),

2015 WL 420013

 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2015).  The Karsjens class brought 
thirteen separate claims, but pertinent to this case are counts I, II, V, and VII.  Count I 
challenged the MSOP as facially unconstitutional and count II alleged that the MSOP 
was unconstitutional as applied.

Id. at *4

.  In count V, the Karsjens class alleged that the 

defendants had “denied Plaintiffs the right to be free from punishment in violation of the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  United  States  Constitution  and  the  Minnesota 
Constitution.”

Id.

  Similarly, count VII alleged that the defendants had “denied Plaintiffs 
the right to be free from inhumane treatment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution.”

Id.

      

On June 17, 2015, after a six-week bench trial, the District Court held that the 
MSOP was facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied, and therefore found 
for the class plaintiffs on counts I and II.  See generally Karsjens v. Jesson,

109 F. Supp. 3d 1139

  (D.  Minn.  2015).    The  Court  declined  to  address  the  remaining  counts—
including counts V and VII—at that time, because the remedy fashioned for counts I and 
II would address the issues raised in those counts.

Id. at 1173

.         

The Karsjens defendants appealed the Court’s rulings.  On January 3, 2017, the 
Eighth  Circuit Court  of  Appeals  reversed  the  District  Court  on  counts  I  and  II  and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.  Karsjens v. Piper,

845 F.3d 394

 (8th Cir. 
2017).  The Eighth Circuit first held that the MSOP is facially constitutional because it is 
rationally related to Minnesota’s legitimate interest to protect its citizens.

Id. at 410

.  The 
court then held that the Karsjens class had failed to show that the conditions of their 

confinement rose to a level that shocks the conscience, and that they therefore failed to 
show that the MSOP was unconstitutional as applied.

Id.

 at 410–11.       
On remand, the Karsjens defendants moved for summary judgment on the claims 
that had not been explicitly addressed by the Eighth Circuit.  The District Court granted 
that motion, stating that “in light of the Eighth Circuit's decision, the Court finds that 

Defendants are not liable.”  Karsjens v. Piper,

336 F. Supp. 3d 974, 987

 (D. Minn. 2018).  
Specifically with regard to counts V and VII, the Court held that “the Eighth Circuit's 
holdings and reasoning preclude finding a substantive due process violation under Counts 
V and VII.”

Id. at 986

.                                                  
On June 22, 2016, before the Eighth Circuit issued its decision on the Karsjens 

appeal, and therefore before the District Court dismissed the remainder of the Karsjens 
claims, Plaintiff filed this case.  Plaintiff claims that the physical conditions and the 
policies  of  confinement  within  the  Complex  1  facility  result  in  the  violation  of  his 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from punishment (Count I) and be free from 
inhumane treatment (Count II); and deny him equal protection of the law (Count III).  
(PAC ¶¶ 180-208.)                                                         

Defendants, both before and after the Eighth Circuit’s decision, filed Motions to 
Dismiss the Complaint.  (1st Mot. to Dismiss, Nov. 1, 2016, Docket No. 11; 2nd Mot. to 
Dismiss, Mar. 6, 2017, Docket No. 55.)   Pertinent here, Defendants argued that the 
Karsjens litigation and the ensuing decisions by the District Court and the Eighth Circuit 
preclude Plaintiff from bringing Counts 1 and 2, and that Plaintiff has failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted as to Count 3.  The Magistrate Judge took 

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss under consideration.  On January 4, 2019, the Magistrate 
Judge wrote an Order and R&R recommending that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims 
and denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his Complaint.  (R. & R. at 23, Jan. 4, 2019, 
Docket No. 79.)  Plaintiff now objects to the R&R.  (Obj., Jan. 22, 2019, Docket No. 80.)                        

                      DISCUSSION                                     

I.   STANDARDS OF REVIEW                                                  
A.   Objections to the Report and Recommendation                     

Upon the filing of a report and recommendation by a Magistrate Judge, “a party 
may  serve  and  file  specific  written  objections  to  the  proposed  findings  and 
recommendations.”    Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  72(b)(2);  accord  D.  Minn.  LR  72.2(b)(1).  
Dispositive orders which have been properly objected to are subject to de novo review.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); accord D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(3).  Thus, the Court will consider 
the dispositive portions of the R&R to which Plaintiff has objected de novo. 

B.   Motion to Dismiss                                               
Reviewing  a  complaint  under  a  Rule  12(b)(6)  motion  to  dismiss,  the  Court 
considers all facts alleged in the complaint as true and construes the pleadings in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party.  See, e.g., Turner v. Holbrook,

278 F.3d 754

, 
757 (8th Cir. 2002).  To survive a motion to dismiss, however, a complaint must provide 
more than “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 
of action.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555

 (2007)).  That is, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must 

include  “sufficient  factual  matter,  accepted  as  true,  to  state  a  claim  to  relief  that  is 
plausible  on  its  face.”

Id.

    (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    “Though  pro  se 
complaints are to be construed liberally, they still must allege sufficient facts to support 
the  claims  advanced.”    Stone  v.  Harry,

364 F.3d 912, 914

  (8th  Cir.  2004)  (citation 
omitted).                                                                 

Additionally, because the Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend 
his complaint on futility  grounds, the Court will treat Plaintiff’s Proposed  Amended 
Complaint (“PAC”) as the operative complaint when considering Defendants’ Motions to 
Dismiss.  The Court will therefore consider the Motions to Dismiss assuming the factual 
allegations within the PAC are true and will afford Plaintiff all reasonable inferences 
from those allegations.  Butler v. Bank of Am., N.A.,

690 F.3d 959, 961

 (8th Cir. 2012). 
II.  DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS                                        

A.   Counts 1 and 2                                                  

Defendants move to dismiss Counts 1 and 2, arguing that Plaintiff is barred by the 
doctrine of issue preclusion.  Defendants argue that these claims present the same issues 
as counts V and VII brought by the Karsjens class, and that, because the issues were 
decided in Karsjens, Plaintiff is precluded from asserting them here.     
The Court applies federal common law to determine the preclusive effect of a 

judgment in a case based on federal question jurisdiction.  See Taylor v. Sturgell,

553 U.S. 880, 891

  (2008).    “The  preclusive  effect  of  a  judgment  is  defined  by  claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as ‘res judicata.’”

Id. at 892

.  “‘Issue preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing relitigation of 
a matter that has been litigated and decided.’”  Sandy Lake Band of Miss. Chippewa v. 

United States,

714 F.3d 1098, 1102

 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Migra v. Warren City Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ.,

465 U.S. 75

, 77 n.1 (1984)).  Issue preclusion bars parties from 
relitigating only those issues “that were actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of 
a prior judgment,” Jefferson Smurfit Corp. v. United States,

439 F.3d 448, 451

 (8th Cir. 
2006).                                                                    

Issue preclusion applies to bar relitigation of an issue when:       

  (1) the party sought to be precluded in the second suit [was] a party, 
  or in privity with a party, to the original lawsuit; (2) the issue sought 
  to be precluded [is the] same as the issue involved in the prior action; 
  (3) the issue sought to be precluded [was] actually litigated in the 
  prior action; (4) the issue sought to be precluded [was]determined by 
  a valid and final judgment; and (5) the determination in the prior 
  action [was] essential to the prior judgment.                      

Ginters v. Frazier,

614 F.3d 822, 826

 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Robinette v. Jones,

476 F.3d 585, 589

  (8th  Cir.  2007)).    Analyzing  these  five  factors,  the  Magistrate  Judge 
concluded that Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint are subject to issue preclusion 
because the issues they present were decided by either the Eighth Circuit’s Karsjens 
decision or the District Court’s decision on remand.                      
Plaintiff has two specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s preclusion analysis.  

First, he contends generally that “[t]his case has many more and different defendants sued 
in  both  an  official  capacity  and  in  their  individual  capacity”  whereas  the  Karsjens 
defendants were only sued in their official capacity.  (Obj. at 9.)  However, the identity of 
the defendants in the Karsjens case is irrelevant to the Court’s issue preclusion analysis, 
because the doctrine of issue preclusion only considers whether the “party sought to be 

precluded” was a party to the original lawsuit.  Ginters,

614 F.3d at 826

.  Plaintiff does 
not assert, nor could he, that he was not a party to the Karsjens class lawsuit.                 
Second, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the issues in 
this case are the same as some of the issues decided in the Karsjens litigation.  He states 
that the “Karsjens case proclaimed that Minnesota statutes violated due process” whereas 

“[t]his  case  proclaims  the  defendants  have  violated  existing  and  lawful  Minnesota 
Statutes, which results in violations of due process.”  (Obj. at 9–10.)        
It  is  true  that  count  I  in  the  Karsjens  case  alleged  that  the  MSOP  is 
unconstitutional on its face.  However, as stated above, the remaining twelve claims in 

the Karsjens case all alleged that the MSOP program, as administered, violated the class 
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in some manner.  In particular, count V alleged that the 
state defendants had  violated the class plaintiffs’ due process rights to be free from 
punishment, and count VII alleged that the state defendants had denied the class plaintiffs 
right to be free from inhumane treatment.  See Karsjens,

336 F. Supp. 3d at 978

. Here,
Count 1 alleges that the Complex 1 facility violates Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment

right to be free from punishment and Count 2 alleges that the Complex 1 facility and the
policies put in place by Defendants violate Plaintiff’s right to be free from inhumane
treatment. The claims are identical in name.
Importantly, not only are those claims identical in name, but the facts Plaintiff
uses to support his claims here are the same facts used by the class plaintiffs in Karsjens.

The Karsjens plaintiffs argued that the construction of and the policies in place at Moose
Lake amounted to a punitive situation. The same is true here. In fact, as the Magistrate
Judge noted, the final Karsjens complaint “contains and alleges each of the facility
construction problems with which Plaintiff, in the present case, also here takes issue.”
(R. & R. at 15.) Despite Plaintiff’s attempts to recast his due process allegations in the

present case, the underlying issue in counts V and VII of the Karsjens complaint and the
underlying issue in Counts 1 and 2 here are the same.1 Both the Eighth Circuit and the

1 Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish this case from the Karsjens case by alleging
wrongdoing regarding the Defendants’ receipt of administrative variances to build
District Court fully considered the conditions of confinement at Moose Lake, the
construction of Moose Lake, and the policies in place at Moose Lake, and ruled that they
do not amount to a due process violation. Clearly, this issue has been decided.2

Because Plaintiff does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning on the other
four preclusion factors, the Court will adopt the R&R and hold that Counts 1 and 2 of
Plaintiff’s Complaint are barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion, and will grant
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss those counts.

B. Count 3
Count 3 alleges that Plaintiff’s confinement violates his Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection because he is treated differently than other civilly committed

patients. As the Magistrate Judge summarized, Plaintiff claims that he is unlawfully
treated differently than: (1) other civilly committed persons in Minnesota who are
committed to facilities other than the Moose Lake Complex 1 facility; (2) other persons
civilly committed in other states; and (3) other civilly committed persons who are also
committed to the Complex 1 facility. (R. & R. at 18.)

Complex 1 is equally unavailing. The Karsjens class also alleged that the state
defendants had obtained administrative variances and used that fact in their argument that
constitutional violations had taken place. (See Civ. No. 11-3659, Third Am. Compl. ¶
147, Oct. 28, 2014, Docket No. 635.) Thus, the Karsjens litigation embraced this fact.
2 Plaintiff makes the argument that the Court, by lifting the stay it put in place pending
the outcome of the Karsjens remand, “agrees [that] Plaintiff’s issues were not
adjudicated” in that case. (Reply at 2, Feb. 11, 2019, Docket No. 93.) However, it is
precisely because this case is so closely related to the Karsjens case that the Court first
entered the order to stay.
The Magistrate Judge considered each of the three arguments raised by Plaintiff,
but concluded that Plaintiff failed to state an equal protection claim. As to the first and

second classes, the Magistrate Judge stated that “[c]ourts in this District, and across the
country, have regularly held that persons civilly committed at one facility are not
similarly situated to individuals who are civilly committed at other facilities.” (Id. at 19.)
Thus, Plaintiff could not sustain an equal protection claim because he could not, as a
matter of law, show that he is similarly situated to individuals civilly committed at
facilities other than Complex 1. As to the third class, the Magistrate Judge concluded

that Plaintiff failed to state a claim because he “failed to plead any factual assertions
demonstrating how persons civilly committed within the MSOP Moose Lake Complex 1
facility are being treated differently.” (Id. at 20.)
Plaintiff objects only to the conclusion that he is not similarly situated to other
civilly committed individuals in Minnesota at facilities other than Complex 1. He instead

asserts that he is similarly situated, and cites Minn. Stat. § 253B.185, subdivision 1 to
argue that “he is to be treated identically with other civil committees under Minnesota
jurisdiction.” (Obj. at 11.) Plaintiff seems to be referencing language stating that
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, the provisions of this chapter pertaining to
persons who are mentally ill and dangerous to the public apply with like force and effect

to persons who are alleged or found to be sexually dangerous persons.” Plaintiff argues
that this language indicates that sexually dangerous committees are to be treated
identically as other committees, and that he is therefore similarly situated to other
committees across Minnesota.
The statute Plaintiff is referencing, § 253B.185, subdivision 1, was repealed and
recodified in 2013. Prior to 2013, the procedures pertaining to both sexually dangerous

civil committees and mentally ill and dangerous civil committees were found in chapter
253B. Accordingly, chapter 253B was generically labeled the “Minnesota Commitment
and Treatment Act,” and §§ 253B.01–253B.17 outlined procedures governing aspects of
the civil commitment process for both types of committees.
However, while true that both types of committees were subject to some identical
procedures, it is not true that sexually dangerous civil committees were treated identically

as other civil committees. In fact, the pre-2013 version of chapter 253B went on to
provide additional procedures which applied to mentally ill and dangerous committees or
sexually dangerous committees, but not both. For example, § 253B.18 and the
procedures contained therein applied only to individuals who were mentally ill and
dangerous, and § 253B.185 and its procedures applied only to individuals who were

sexually dangerous. Thus, when § 253B.185 subdivision 1(a) stated that “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this section, the provisions of this chapter pertaining to persons
who are mentally ill and dangerous to the public apply with like force and effect to
persons who are alleged or found to be sexually dangerous persons,” it was not an
indication that all civil committees in Minnesota were treated equally, but simply an

acknowledgement that many of the procedures of the Minnesota Commitment and
Treatment Act applied to both classes of committees.
That the Minnesota legislature views the two classes of committees differently is
further evidenced by its 2013 decision to separate entirely the procedures for the
respective classes. That year, the legislature created a new chapter, 253D, which applies
only to sexually dangerous persons. This new chapter essentially took the older version

of § 253B.185, added to it, and clarified its provisions. Consequently, because the
procedures for the civil commitment of mentally ill and dangerous individuals and
sexually dangerous persons are housed in completely different chapters, the language that
Plaintiff relies on was repealed.
Absent some explicit indication that the Minnesota legislature considers sexually
dangerous committees to be similarly situated to other committees, and seeks to treat

them identically, the Court sees no reason to reconsider the cases cited by the Magistrate
Judge which hold that persons civilly committed at one facility are not similarly situated
to persons committed at other facilities. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation that Plaintiff has failed to state an equal protection claim
because he cannot, as a matter of law, show that he is similarly situated to other

committees in Minnesota.3
III. MOTION TO AMEND

“The standard of review applicable to an appeal of a Magistrate Judge’s order on
nondispositive pretrial matters is extremely deferential.” Skukh v. Seagate Tech., LLC,

3 In Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ response to his objection he argues that he is
similarly situated to other Moose Lake committees who are not housed at Complex 1.
(Reply at 3–4.) Although he did not specifically raise this argument as an objection, the
Court nevertheless finds it meritless. As stated, courts have consistently held that civil
committees at one facility are not similarly situated to committees at other facilities. See
Vasquez v. Frank,

2005 WL 2740894

 at *12 (W.D. Wis., Oct. 21, 2005) (prisoner Equal 
Protection claim failed because “inmates at other institutions and in other units are not 
similarly situated to petitioner.”) (emphasis added) (vacated on other grounds).

295 F.R.D. 228, 235

  (D.  Minn. 2013).   Reversal  is only  appropriate  if  the  order  is 
“clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”

28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(a); D. Minn. LR 72.2(a)(3).  For an order to be clearly erroneous, the district court 
must be “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  
Lisdahl v. Mayo Found.,

633 F.3d 712, 717

 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer City,

470 U.S. 564, 573

 (1985)).                                 
Whether  to  grant  a  motion  to  amend  is  a  matter  squarely  within  the  Court’s 
discretion.   While a motion to amend should typically be granted freely  to promote 

justice, Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, of Poplar Bluff,

167 F.3d 402, 409

 (8th Cir. 1999), 
there are situations in which a motion is properly denied.  Where, like here, a plaintiff has 
submitted  the  proposed  amended  complaint,  a  court  may deny the  motion  based  on 
futility.  Denying based on futility is proper where the “court has reached the legal 
conclusion that the amended complaint could not withstand a motion to dismiss.”  Munro 

v. Lucy Activewear, Inc.,

899 F.3d 585, 589

 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cornelia I. Crowell 
GST Tr. v. Possis Med., Inc.,

519 F.3d 778, 782

(8th Cir. 2008).
The Magistrate Judge in this case denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend on futility
grounds. The Court considered Plaintiff’s PAC in its review of the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation and found that, even taking the facts from the PAC as true, Plaintiff

could not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the Magistrate Judge appropriately denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS OBJECTIONS
Plaintiff makes several additional, non-specific objections to the Magistrate

Judge’s R&R. First, he argues that the Magistrate Judge improperly recommended
dismissal of a plausible complaint. (Obj. at 2–5.) However, whether the complaint itself
contains factual allegations sufficient to support Plaintiff’s claims is irrelevant in this
case, because the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of this case purely on legal
grounds. No amount of factual allegations made by Plaintiff would overcome the fact
that the issues he is asserting were already decided by the District Court and the Eighth

Circuit. Similarly, Plaintiff cannot overcome the fact that he is not similarly situated to
other civil committees not residing in Complex 1. Thus, this objection is meritless.
Next, Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge did not liberally construe his
Complaint, as he should have done given Plaintiff’s pro se status. (Obj. at 2.) Once
again, the factual grounds of his Complaint, and therefore how the Magistrate Judge

construed them, are irrelevant given the Complaint’s legal failings. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the Magistrate Judge did liberally construe the complaint, as the Magistrate
Judge noted the correct standard of review regarding pro se litigants in his R&R. (R. &
R. at 10.) Accordingly, the Court finds this objection meritless.

CONCLUSION
The ultimate issue with Plaintiff’s Complaint in this case is not its factual
legitimacy. The Complaint’s allegations are serious, and as evidenced by Judge Frank’s

ruling following a six-week bench trial, the conditions and policies of confinement at the
Moose Lake facility are constitutionally questionable. Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit
considered these conditions and policies, and held that they do not violate any civilly

committed individual’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff cannot escape this fact. Because
the issues he asserts in this case have been decided before, and because he cannot show
that he is similarly situated to other civilly committed individuals outside of the Complex
1 facility, the Court must grant Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that:                                                      
1.   The Magistrate Judge’s Order and Report and Recommendation [Docket 

No. 79] is ADOPTED.                                                       
2.   Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [Docket Nos. 11 and 55] are GRANTED.  
Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.                        
3.   Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint [Docket No. 
44] is DENIED.                                                            

LET JUDGEMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                

DATED:  March 25, 2019               _____s/John R. Tunheim_____          
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.              JOHN R. TUNHEIM                   
                                      Chief Judge                    
                                 United States District Court